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ABSTRACT 
Although double entry bookkeeping forms the basis of one of the oldest 
and most powerful knowledge systems used within organizations, 
accounting procedures and the information produced by accountants have 
increasingly come under attack. 
Despite some very different criticisms, it is argued in this thesis 
that the source of the problems is a common one. The hypothesis of 
this thesis is that the present need to articulate financial statements 
is largely psychological, arising from misconceptions about the systems 
nature of double entry, and diverts attention from the proliferation of 
ad hoc rules with which accounting information is manipulated. 
Introduction of a more formal systems approach not only offers a more 
rigorous basis for accounting systems, but sets aside these 
misconceptions and the psychological grip of 'automatic' articulation. 
However, the notion of 'system' is not clear. Systems theory, despite 
a vogue in nearly every discipline, is in poor array. In particular, 
it has been criticised for its 'boundary' problem, a lack of 
definition~ and its 'reification', its remove from the individual 
actor, leading to a consequent puzzle in how systems adapt. A partial 
solution to the first problem is offered through developing a systems 
logic to handle systems 'arrangements' and exemplify closure. A 
solution to the second problem is achieved through integrating the 
theory of signs with the notion of closure and subsequently developing 
a formal basis for a knowledge system to be applied in Part II. The 
role of knowledge systems in the context of organizations is then 
discussed. 
In Part II, a fundamental analysis of money indicates that three types 
of money signs are required to capture the full information set in 
money signs and suggests the development of three systems models, using 
the formal basis for knowledge systems developed earlier. A comparison 
of the controls in the systems models with the 'information control' 
school is then given, followed by an historical analysis of double 
entry. The latter is felt to be particularly required in this area, 
given both the long history of the use of double entry and the 
intricacy of the argument that the system leads to an 'artificial' 
articulation of reports. The theme of articulation is then developed 
further and it is also demonstrated how the systems models, despite 
different valuation bases, can be said to articulate or 'reconcile', 
thereby forming an integrated system. 
The results from Part II are not only suggestive of the robustness of 
the formal basis for knowledge systems, but indicate possibilities for 
wide application elsewhere. Within the thesis, the centre to the 
crisis in accounting has been identified, not as anomalies arising from 
the use of historic cost (although these certainly exist), but from an 
artificial and logically unnecessary closure being imposed on the 
reporting system whose source is to be found in the balancing 
phenomena. However, while the earlier discussion on the organizational 
context for knowledge systems suggests that the further articulation of 
management accounting with other reports is still problematic, the 
systems model offers a solution to the articulation problem in external 
financial reporting. 
Nan-in, a Japanese master during the Meiji era 
(1868-1912), received a university professor who 
came to inquire about Zen. 
Nan-in served tea. He poured his visitor's cup 
full, and then kept on pouring. 
The professor watched the overflow until he no 
longer could restrain himself. 'It is overfull. 
No more will go in.' 
'Like this cup,' Nan-in said, 'you are full of 
your own opinions and speculations. How can I show 
you Zen unless you first empty your cup?' 
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In writing this thesis I have entered a number of different 
disciplines. Some deliberately, some only in the accident of being 
there. The difficulties of inter-disciplinary research are many and, 
in some respects, the ideas which follow arise out of reflections on 
those difficulties. In particular, questions of the peculiarity of 
terms to a discipline - its 'technical' meaning - interested me. How 
could a term be imported from one discipline to another? 
Following Bertrand Russell's advice, I have collected a number of 
oddities to tease myself with which relate to this problem of how terms 
might articulate with each other. But none have teased me more, nor 
are as satisfactory, as a passage from Borges quoting a 'certain 
Chinese encyclopedia' in which it is written that 'animals are divided 
into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) 
sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in 
the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn 
with a very fine camelhair brush, (1) et cetera, (m) having just broken 
the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies'. 
What sort of joke is this? What meaning is there here that races 
through the dulled habits of a lifetime of other people's lists and 
shatters the comfortable geography of thought? What is it about this 
taxonomy which announces its impossibility; that gives voice to what it 
is not? As Foucault points out, there are no monsters in Borges's 
ennumeration. It is the list alone which is monstrous. 
Foucault recalls he laughed for a long time after reading this 
list, but not without a certain uneasiness. My own unease took a 
sharper form when I took the liberty of substituting, as accountants 
have become accustomed to substitute, in to the above list some well 
used and currently recommended accounting terms. Given a little 
licence an 'Accounting encyclopedia' might contain the following items: 
(a) value to the owner, (b) valued at historic cost, (c) fixed assets, 
(d) research and development, 
assets, (h) current assets, 
(e) reserves, 
(i) valued 
(f) goodwill, (g) total 
by the directors, (j) 
allocations and adjustments, (k) other, (1) waste and shrinkage, (m) 
excluded by materiality. Except there is no laughter. This is a list 
in which habit has dulled our wits. 
For helping raise the jokes to the surface, this thesis owes its 
thanks to the collective wits of Art Thomas who challenged the fantasy 
brush strokes of allocations, Ray Chambers who has done more than 
anyone to disembalm financial reports of historic cost, Tom Lee who 
questioned the fable of goodwill, Bob Sterling who warned about sirens 
such as reserves drawing firms from their steady course onto the rocks 
and Ricco Mattestch who recognized the ritual in it all but kept faith 
that there was a system. 
It has been a privilege to meet, discuss and argue with these 
thinkers who have changed the terrain of accounting. But if the 
foregoing have thought the unthinkable, a special thanks goes to 
Caroline Hall who, in reading the unreadable, gave essential help. 
Special thanks also go to Fenton Robb and Murray Wells for listening 
and giving encouragement when it was most needed, and especially to Tom 
Lee for his patience and advice and for being willing to supervise the 
unsupervisable - although whether he feels that refers to the 
interdisciplinary content of the thesis or to the undisciplined nature 
of the doctoral student is one referent best left ambiguous. 
INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 a rationale for the thesis 
Any business engages in exchanges with other businesses to its mutual 
advantage, such as the purchase of goods or the sale of goods. Such 
exchanges external to the business are known as 'transactions'. Double 
entry in accounting refers to the process of making entries in 
bookkeeping by (1) representing any such transaction by its money sign, 
the amount paid rather than any physical quantities involved, a 
monetary convention, (2) entering this sign twice into a set of 
classified accounts with each account having a debit and a credit side, 
once as a debit and once as a credit, these being equivalent to 
attaching positive or negative values to the signs, and ( 3 ) 
periodically calculating for each account the net 'balance', the 
difference between the sum of debits and the sum of credits, an 
aggregation convention. 
Two matters need to be attended to immediately. First it should be 
clear from this brief definition that double entry is no mere name for 
a particular type of entry, but that the above description provides the 
basic elements for a whole system of keeping records. Secondly, as a 
term it represents a process of record-keeping which is intricate and 
highly elaborated in practice. Whether or not the age of double entry 
impresses, being at least five hundred years old, the fact that the 
bookkeeping processes of the multifarious forms of business around the 
world reduce to these three common rules seems a marvel sufficient to 
excite praise. And perhaps it was just such an impression of uniformity 
in the past which permitted Goethe, through one of his characters 
Werner, to see it as one of the finest inventions of the human spirit. 
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But is the common following of a few rules worthy of excitement 
what about all the rules which are ~ followed uniformly in attempts 
to calculate profit? And is 'double' entry important - suppose 'single' 
entries were used, would there be any difference? And is double entry a 
system - in what sense does a few rules constitute a system? These are 
important and possibly urgent questions and an attempt to provide some 
answers forms a rationale to this thesis. In an age where the 
environment of 'market information' has been swallowed nearly whole by 
the development of huge corporations, any benefits from an instrument 
based on recording external transactions might look slight, especially 
given the comparative advantages of any system designed to take 
advantage of the computer's increasing flexibility and storage ability 
with search speed alongside enormous computing power. 
This thesis locates in the use of double entry both the 
difficulties businesses find in changing accounting practice and the 
frustration some accounting academics feel with the 'myth' and 'ritual' 
of accounting. However, rather than simply supporting pleas for the 
abandonment of double entry, an attempt is made to excavate the 
benefits of double entry, identify what is important about 'systems' 
and suggest a provisional basis for developing accounting as a formal 
knowledge system which retains the benefits of double entry within the 
framework of a unified but more flexible system. 
1.2 the importance of articulation 
For many accountants, the question of the use of double entry may be 
considered hardly to arise at all. It is in use and, as such, simply is 
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not 'on offer' as a point of discussion. Certainly, Edey [1980] in 
discussing the 'logic' of financial accounting has few doubts as to the 
major role in accounting of the double entry system. Edey interprets 
the Cohen Report in 1945 as making a decision to abandon the suggestion 
of a link between 'historic cost' (the recording of price data from the 
historical transactions) and 'going-concern values' (the measurement of 
prices prior to current transactions), rather than abandon historic 
cost altogether. Edey recognises that this decision on Company Law 
Amendment necessarily had implications for profit reporting: 
As the profit and loss account and the balance sheet were, 
and are, articulated by the double-entry system, and this 
articulation is maintained in the financial accounts, the 
decision to adhere to the historical cost basis in the 
balance sheet necessarily had implications for profit 
reporting. 
[Edey, 1980, p.3] 
Edey's concern is to establish a firm relation between the use of 
historic cost and any consequent effects on the profit reporting. 
What is of interest for this thesis, however, is less Edey's 
conclusion, and rather more the grounds of his argument. In particular, 
there are two crucial steps in the above argument. First, there is an 
'articulation' of the two main financial reports by the double entry 
system. Secondly, this articulation is carried through to ensure an 
'articulation is maintained in the financial accounts'. Strictly, the 
first step conflates two matters, the existence of an articulation in 
financial reports with the relation of the two types of articulation. 
In asserting that it is the fincial reports which are articulated £y 
the double entry system, attention is focussed on the dependence of the 
former on the double entry system. However, it might also be thought 
that 'maintained' in the second step suggests a primacy for the 
reporting articulation. Nevertheless, while the direction to any causal 
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relation here may be in doubt, Edey's belief in relation itself is 
clear. 
1.3 the logic of accounting 
The use of 'necessarily' by Edey in the above quote is also suggestive, 
together with the appearance of 'logic' in the title of his paper, that 
these are logical steps. But clearly these are not logical steps in 
respect of traditional logic. It is not at all evident 
articulation, either in the double entry system or at the reporting 
level, forces consequences Qn the reporting of profit from the use of 
historic cost. Nor, indeed, is it clear why the choice which faced the 
Cohen Report arose at all. These matters may be intuitive to 
accountants or accounting academics, but to 'see' the links in Edey's 
argument appears to involve some special 'accounting logic'. 
It is the intention in this thesis exactly to raise to the surface 
what these accounting intuitions or 'logic' are. While much of the 
debate in fincial reporting has taken the articulation relations, the 
'logic', for granted and pursued a similar path to Edey in 
investigating the relation of the selection of a particular valuation 
base and its reporting implications (see section 4.1 below), it is 
exactly the articulation process which is at the centre of the 
investigation in this thesis. 
Whereas much of the debate may be characterized as having adopted 
a virtual 'black box' approach to the processing of information (see 
below and Chapter 5) and has been concerned principally with the 
relative advantages of one type of 'input' of data over others in 
respect of the 'output' of reports for users, it is the processing 
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which is examined in the following chapters. A focus for this 
examination is the constraints which this processing entails and, in 
particular, the constraint of selection of a single valuation rule, a 
restriction which underpins the choice for the Cohen report referred to 
above and is at the heart of some of the valuation schools discussed 
below. 
The argument of this thesis is that the source of this constraint 
lies in some misunderstandings about the nature and purpose of 
articulation. That this matter of articulation presenting particular 
types of contraints is a key issue is also suggested by the information 
economists school (section 5.3 below), who have unsuccessfully long 
argued for many valuation bases being reported. 
2.1 changing attitudes to double entry 
Part of the rationale for this doctoral study was occasioned by a 
remark by Mattesich on the general awareness of the nature of the 
double entry system or, as he terms it, the 'double-classification 
model' (see also Chapter 6): 
The neglect which this model has suffered in the hands of the 
younger generation of academic accountants may be explained 
by two factors. The first is a natural reaction to what they 
regard as a symbol of the past, representing mere description 
without any analytical challenge. The second, not unrelated 
to the first, lies in a misunderstanding of the nature of the 
double-classification model. They regard it as an 
occasionally convenient but purely coincidental 
classification device, thereby overlooking the empirical and 
general "physical" foundation underlying this conception. 
[Mattesach, 1980, p.233] 
In particular Mattesich has in mind the attitudes of the information 
economics accountants who he feels: 
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, 
seem to distrust the double-classification input-output model 
and aim less towards fundamental improvement of the 
traditional deterministic accounting measures than towards 
establishing new concepts requiring many stochasic measures. 
[Matte~ich, 1980, p.220] 
However, frustration with the confines of the double-classification 
system extends also to a growing critical analysis as to what might be 
discardable in double-entry by those in the field of data base 
management. McCarthy, for example, discusses the impact 
computerization as a transition period: 
an opportune time to rethink some of the basic constructs of 
traditional double-entry bookkeeping. 
[McCarthy, 1982, p.554] 
of 
This mood, although not entirely new, reflects an attitude which 
is, in MatteS:i.ch's view, a potentially "revolutionary scientific" 
activity in the Kuhnian sense, see below, [Mattesich, 1980, p.220]. As 
such, it makes a striking comparison to the conclusion of early writers 
on bookkeeping as reported by Yamey: 
Indeed the commentaries surveyed here generally seem to treat 
the introduction of duality as the last significant 
historical event •••• there could be no improvement on that 
system, and that any changes in book-keeping practice were no 
more than minor modifications made within its structure. 
[Yamey, 1980, p.91] 
2.2 a revolution in accounting? 
For the early writers, the foundations of the 'science' were seen as 
incapable of improvement. While such a view has long ceased to be 
tenable, a central puzzle remains round exactly what aspects of double 
entry ~ capable of improvement? 
It might be safely said that few academics doubt the need for some 
change in accounting. While critics continue to grow in the management 
accounting area [for example, Kaplan, 1984], criticism has been 
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sustained particularily in the area of financial reporting. For 
example, the AAA Committee on Concepts and Standards for External 
Financial Reports claimed an apparant consensus that the "matching and 
attaching" approach to theory formation was 'disintegrating' and that, 
further, issues irrelevant or unresolvable to that approach continue to 
be recycled together with an ever expanded array of alternatives. The 
Committee interpreted the existence of these factors as suggestive that 
the process of theorizing in accounting may be more 'revolutionary' 
than evolutionary [AAA, 1977, p.41]. 
However, there is little consensus about the direction of that 
change. The AAA committee mentioned above reported that there currently 
existed 'an abundance of theories of external reporting' and, of these, 
no 'single universally accepted basic accounting theory' could be 
determined [AAA, 1977, p.1]. Nor could such a theory be anticipated, 
since 'all theory approaches are flawed when viewed from the 
perspective of some alternative approach' and 'this problem cannot be 
avoided' [AAA, 1977, p.S1]. 
In view of all the ferment and furrore which has surrounded the 
possible abandonment of the matching and attaching basis to historic 
cost, it is somewhat odd, considering the basic nature of double entry 
to existing accounting p~actice, to find an absence of any sustained 
critique on the double entry system within this debate, except for 
those concerned to defend or develop the traditional model [Ijiri, 
1975, Littleton, 1966]. 
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2.3 double entry as a central problem 
This suggests that either the acceptance of the double entry system is 
so deep rooted for many accounting academics to consider it as a 
possible candidate for change, or perceived as so -irrelevant by the 
information economists encountered by Mattesach that it is not seen as 
worthy of more than a passing dismissal. On either surmise, there is 
evidence here that the double entry system may in some deep way be 
involved in the demarcation of ground which gives rise to the type of 
'paradigm' disputes which preoccupied the aforementioned AAA committee. 
In this case, a close analytical survey in respect of the role of 
double entry in the income debate may prove more fruitful than might 
have been anticipated from its relative absence from the more recent 
literature. 
It will be suggested that insufficient attention has been paid by 
accounting researchers to the 'system' aspects of double entry and it 
will be argued that a major factor in the historical success of double 
entry was its contribution to organizing the bookkeeping. This thesis 
attempts to explicate in what ways double entry as a system has 
accomodated change, even during the period mentioned by Yamey above. 
Further, it attempts to explain in what ways it has ;esisted change and 
also attempts to explicate in what ways developments could be made to 
financial reporting without neglecting the utility of double entry. 
It is possible, for example, that many accountants have 
unconsciously perceived suggested changes as threatening the integral 
nature of double entry as a bookkeeping system. In this respect, 
removal of such doubt or demonstration of the ability to switch to a 
preferred system (that is, one with a greater scope than double entry, 
see below) without loss of the important factors which surround double 
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entry, would perhaps satisfy a call from the aforementioned AAA 
committee 'for a better understanding of the reasons' why previous 
attempts at theory building and conceptual modeling 'seem to have 
persuaded only a small proportion of the intended audience' (AAA, 1977, 
p.1]. 
3.1 scientific revolutions 
Some of the hidden complexities in attempting to change the maps or, 
more usually, theories, of a discipline have been most powerfully 
recognised in recent years by Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (1970]. Kuhn's thesis is that scientific progress proceeds 
finally, not through accumulation of knowledge, but through a series of 
revolutions whereby a 'time-honoured scientific theory' is rejected in 
favour of another incompatible with it (Kuhn, 1970, p.6]. Typically 
the new theory accomplishes not only new solutions, but retains, in 
some way, solutions to older problems. It should be clear from this 
last comment that 'revolution' here does not imply the destruction or 
complete replacement of all that has gone before. Kuhn's relativism, 
if that is what it is, has deep conservative leanings [Barnes, 1982] 
and these include a proviso for a succesful bid by an alternative 
theory to incorporate the benefits of the old theory, a matter 
discussed further below. 
Kuhn predicates his argument on the existence of some type of 
community (the problems in identifying a community are discussed in 
section 3.2 below). Certain steps by the community are identifiable in 
the process of change. Simplifying somewhat, the steps are: 
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1. Recognition of anomalies; leading to a period of insecurity; 
2. Generation of alternatives; identifying different schools of thought; 
3. Selection of ascendent theory; dominating new practices and ideas. 
Step 1, the recognition of anomalies, gives rise to the feeling in 
the community of crisis and is critical to the whole process. The 
processual nature here needs to be stressed; it is the period of 
insecurity, for example, which encourages alternatives to emerge. It 
should also be emphasised that it is in the nature of these anomalies 
not to be solvable within the theory as it stands; the insecurity does 
not arise simply out of observational or logical errors, rather the 
anomalies are signs of the inadequacy of the central theory. Initially 
the response by the community to an anomaly will be that of ad hoc 
modifications to the theory. 
However, some particular problem may prove intractable (and 
generic) to many of the apparent anomalies. It is these recalcitrant 
problems which may present a focus for a change in the problem-solving 
activity away from the 'residual' problems (perceived from the vantage 
of acceptance of the challenged theory) and towards attempts to solve 
the apparent anomalies. However, such attempts appear largely ad hoc 
or self-defeating until a paradi~ shift is experienced. Steps 1-3 do 
not involve a smooth process (accumulation of knowledge) but require 
for the individual a complete and usually sudden switch in positions, 
or paradigms, similar to that reported by the Gestalt psychologists 
(see Chapter 4). 
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3.2 the crisis in accounting 
The case for viewing accounting as undergoing a Kuhnian revolution has 
been most carefully suggested by Wells [1976]. Strictly it is members 
of the accounting community who experience the crisis, undergo the 
feelings of insecurity and tend towards adoption of particular schools 
of thought. A community is identifiable through the general set of 
ideas to which members of the community subscribe. This general set of 
ideas acts as a discipline over the members and gives a unifying order 
to the various elements; Kuhn refers to it as a disciplinary matrix 
[Kuhn, 1970, p.182]. 
The various elements in the disciplinary matrix can further be 
identified as: 
(1) symbolic generalizations - the representations are 
undisputed and understood by the community; 
(2) shared commitments - there are common beliefs about what 
is acceptable as solutions; 
(3) values - these relate to the standards of work expected 
of each other; 
(4) exemplars - the concrete problems through which students 
learn procedures. 
[Kuhn, 1970, pp. 182-187] 
Briefly, Wells interprets the above terms into the disciplinary matrix 
of accountants, as it stood in the 1940s, in the following way: 
(1) symbolic generalizations included the double entry 
equation and representations of income, together with 
the current/fixed classification of assets and various 
ratio formulations; 
(2) shared commitments included the principles of 
realization and matching, the cost basis of asset 
valuation and the notion of a going concern; 
(3) values included conservatism, consistency and 
materiality; 
(4) exemplars were contained in textbooks which were almost 
univocal in their contents. 
[Wells, 1976, pp.473-474] 
Wells notes the similarity of (1)-(3) to Gilman's use of 
conventions, doctrines and standards [Wells, 1970, p.474n]. However, 
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it is in explicating the role of (4), exemplars, in which Kuhn makes a 
particular contribution. Exemplars are the stock examples through 
which the disciplinary matrix is acquired. That is, the student learns 
to work with the symbolics and acquires the commitments and values 
through 'doing'. In recognising the existence of paradigms, therefore, 
Kuhn emphasises that the rules do not have to be explicit. The 
disciplinary matrix is not necessarily inviolate or rigid. 
In this respect, it is the exemplars and the disciplinary matrix 
which work together and reinforce each other. Seeing through the stock 
examples gives to the accountant his 'outlook', but it is this outlook, 
or disciplinary matrix, which helps the examples to be seen and gives 
the world its 'look', exemplars. 
As Wells interprets the matter, 'the shift in the view which 
theorists have of the world' is 'fundamental' if a new disciplinary 
matrix is adopted. For example: the view of the monetary unit as 
stable changes to a recognition of its variability; the recognition of 
gains as limited to those realized widens to include other criteria; 
and the identity of transactions data as objective data is broken 
[Wells, 1976, p.479]. 
The 'world-view' of the accountant is acquired in a circular and 
mutually reinforcing manner which may occasion particular types of 
perceptual blindness and mislead the holder of the world-view as to the 
coherence of the dogma because he or she is simply unable to perceive 
the inconsistencies. As mentioned above the disciplinary matrix can be 
flexible but, during the period of insecurity, the rules will tend to 
become more explicit and rigidify. It is difficult to avoid seeing 
here the development of official pronouncements on accounting 
standards. However, as Kuhn points out, this very attempt to explicate 
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assumptions (even the non-existent ones) can weaken the grip of 
tradition on the mind and suggest the basis for a new one [Kuhn, 1970, 
p.11]. 
3.3 disagreement between paradigms 
This inward lock between the exemplars and the disciplinary matrix is 
at the head of Kuhn's notion of a paradigm. Unfortunately, in the 
process of alternatives being generated, there is the tendency for 
these alternatives also to evolve themselves in the form of paradigms. 
The result is 'paradigm debates' where each group 'uses its own 
paradigm to argue in that paradigm's defense' [Kuhn, 1970, p.110]. An 
example of such a paradigm debate arose in the Robert M. Trueblood 
Memorial Conference, held in Chicago, 1974. Gonedes and Dopuch [1974] 
in a long review article argued against the 'a priori' work of Chambers 
[1966] and Edwards and Bell [1961]. Sterling and Harrison [1974] took 
exception to this criticism. Since Gonedes and Dopuch failed to point 
out any logical deficiencies in either Chambers or Edwards and Bell, 
the basis of their criticism seemed to rest with the exemplars of their 
own disciplinary matrix, capital market efficiency, beginning with Ball 
and Brown [1968] and including their own articles (nine of Gonedes' own 
references are cited). 
In fact, Sterling and Harrison produced a long list of further 
criticisms, the detail of which is not relevant here, but which were 
clearly also intended as logical arguments. What is important to note 
is that Gonedes and Dopuch rejected all the criticisms and did so, 
typically, on supposed logical grounds. Gonedes and Dopuch also return 
to an earlier paper by Sterling [1970] to further their argument. They 
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quote an explicit analogy by Sterling and translate the substance of 
that analogy as 'inconsistent' with capital market efficiency (their 
own position) through an article by Gonedes. They then simply assert 
that in comparison to Sterling theirs is a 'theoretical result', 
precisely the claim Sterling and Harrison have disputed. 
continue: 
These fundamental differences between Sterling's mode of 
reasoning and ours are so great that a comparison of his 
conclusions with ours hardly seems worthwhile. 
[Gonedes & Dopuch, 1974, p.163] 
They 
Perhaps not for Gonedes and Dopuch. However, the Gonedes and 
Dopuch articles and the Sterling 1970 article, to which they refer, 
were placed virtually equal in responses by Ph.D. students to a 
'significant accounting articles' survey [Heck & Huang, 1985]. In 
fact, the articles were also perceived important enough to draw second 
and third places respectively. Whatever the weaknesses of this 
particular survey, these placings are suggestive of Kuhn's discussion 
on the co-existence of different schools of thought and, further, 
illustrative of the powerfulness of the paradigm, giving to members 
their outlook, through the disciplinary matrix. What also needs to be 
remembered is that both Gonedes with Dopuch and Sterling with Harrison 
agree on the problems associated with the prior theory of historic 
cost, although further differences exist between Sterling or Chambers 
and the position of Edwards and Bell, schools which are perceived by 
Gonedes and Dopuch as belonging to the same 'measurement' paradigm. 
4.1 anomalies and accounting answers 
Wells points out there is one class of anomaly which has proved to be 
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intractable; that is, the historic-cost based system fails to take 
account of either changes in asset prices or in changes in the 
purchasing power of the monetary unit. The anomaly arises because 
despite financial statements having 'going concern' values, 'those 
statements no longer represent the state of affairs of the corporation' 
[Wells, 1976, p.476]. 
This anomaly Wells considers, therefore, as central to the current 
crisis in financial reporting. As such it presents a focal point for 
research during the crisis and is only with danger ignored. However, 
the existence of several recognizable schools of thought for dealing 
with the anomaly is widely recognized. Wells, for example, lists four 
schools: 
1. Price-Level Adjusted Accounting (Current Purchasing 
Power) 
2. Replacement Cost Accounting (Entry Prices) 
3. Deprival Value Accounting 
4. Continuously Contemporary Accounting (Exit Prices or Net 
Realizable Value) 
[Wells, 1976, p.478] 
In recognizing the existence of the anomaly as central to current 
research, it is possible simply to adopt one or other of the 
perspectives of foregoing schools. However, each school has several 
disadvantages, or criticisms, which have been well rehearsed [for 
example, AAA, 1977; Lee, 1985] and new defences of historic cost have 
also been given [Ijiri, 1975] which add to Littleton's earlier work 
[Littleton, 1966]. Further, from the information evaluation 
perspective, choice among these measurement schools has been held not 
to be a substantive matter [Beaver & Demski, 1979]. 
The list also excludes more radical proposals such as Cash Flow 
Accounting [Lee, 1984], which challenge the income model on other 
grounds, such as allocation, and includes, only as a footnote, Present 
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Value Accounting as a possible ideal against which the alternatives 
might be evaluated [Wells, 1976, p.478n]. 
4.2 retention of the existing system 
What is essentially common to all four schools listed by Wells is the 
retention of the accounting system. The time-honoured framework of 
double entry, with its articulating income and capital statements, is 
retained and it is largely the selection of monetary values which is 
criticised. Essentially, this amounts to much of the procedures for 
income determination being preserved and, in the place of historic cost 
values, different monetary values are simply substituted. Any 
rewriting takes place less at the expense of the accounting framework 
and more at the less essential aspect of operational standards. 
Each of the alternative schools, in challenging the prevailing 
paradigm, is also held in its sway. Keeping to Wells' analysis, almost 
all of the symbolic generalizations are kept; the double entry 
equation, the current/fixed asset classifications, the ratios are all 
preserved and even the representations of income look familiar. 
Secondly, the values of conservatism, consistency and materialism are 
not fundamentally challenged, although their exact role may need 
reinterpretation to allow particular monetary values to be used. 
Even the shared commitments may survive in some form. For 
example, Lee [1985] demonstrates how the commitment of 'matching' may 
be retained in all four schools for income determination. It is only 
Net Realizable Value which seriously challenges the 'realization' 
commitment. Only minor changes are needed with Current Purchasing 
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Power and, in Replacement Cost Accounting, realizable gains are 
carefully separated from realized gains [Edwards & Bell, 1961]. Again, 
of the four schools considered by Wells, it is only the Net Realizable 
Value school which breaks with the 'going concern principle (although 
Cash Flow Accounting also would break with the going concern 
presumption). 
These reservations about Net Realizable Value mark it out as 
potentially revolutionary. Another sign might also be the relative 
lack of favour shown in its adoption into various professional 
standards. Its lack of appeal here to practitioners is in marked 
contrast to its intuitive appeal to non-practitioners [Tweedie, 1977; 
Lee, 1984]. Net Realizable Value apart, while different values may 
enter in place of historic cost, the model is largely that of the 
system previously known as historic cost. The changes here amount to 
less than a revolution and are reminiscent more of the French adage 
(the French being accustomed to revolutions): the more it changes, the 
more it remains the same. 
4.3 asymmetries in the alternatives 
Kuhn points to any fundamental shift in theory being a decision that 
can 'only be made on faith' [Kuhn, 1970, p.158]. Faith, however, does 
not simply amount to an equation of new solutions plus old solutions. 
This latter procedure is essentially ad hoc and it is likely that new 
inconsistencies occur in the process which counter any relative gains. 
The critical point for the new paradigm is that its adoption is 
expected to sweep away anomalies, not increase some for the price of 
dissolving others. Wide adoption of a new paradigm only comes if the 
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new solutions are wider in scope1 they solve the old puzzles and solve 
some new. 
The relative support, as adducible from their inclusion or partial 
inclusion in various standards, for the first three schools, Current 
Purchasing Power, Replacement Cost and Deprival Value may be traceable 
to their being, in their present form, largely extensions of the 
~xisting system. In particular, it might be supposed in line with the 
hypothesis, suggested in section 2.3 above, that these offer less of a 
challenge to continued use of the double entry system. That is,' their 
substitution for historic costs occurs more naturally or with less 
repercussions for the system as a whole. 
Of the four schools, only Net Realizable Value lays claim to being 
essentially a different system, in the sense that it is wealth 
measurement driven, not income driven. Certainly, Sterling [1970] 
gives a wealth emphasis and Friedman [1978] has argued the 
unsatisfactory nature of the income figures for NRV. In constrast, 
while a wealth approach could be true for Replacement Cost, it is not 
principally how its advocates present it1 nor would its meaning as a 
wealth measure be entirely clear. 
4.4 the possibility of several systems 
An essential division is being suggested here. The first three 
schools, and of course Historic Cost, are all essentially income 
approaches from which balances are left as residuals. Net Realizable 
Value presents itself initially as a wealth measure, from which an 
income figure can be adduced. This suggests some reclassification of 
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these approaches is possible: 
Income schools Wealth schools 
1. Current Purchasing Power 4. Net Realizable Value 
2. Replacement Cost 
3. Oeprival Value 
Figure 1 
In addition, the income schools are often seen as surrogates for 
ideal income, or Economic Income (EV), although this supposition has 
had recent challengers [Bromwich, 1977; Peasnell, 1977]. Further, 
lying outside either income or wealth measurement is the measurement of 
strict cash flows, with no allocations whatsoever (these form a pivotal 
base to the development of a system of Cash Flow Accounting [Lee, 
1984]), although possible modifications to allow credit transactions to 
be reported might be added. These inclusions considerably affect 
Figure 1 to suggest the following: 
income calculations 
Surrogates for Economic Income 
(HC, CPP, RC, Oeprival Value) 
'flow' transactions 'stock' measurement 
Strict Cash Flows Net Realizable Values 
(+ credit modifications?) 
Figure 2 
Since historic cost is included in Figure 2 as a 'value' and not 
as a 'system', the diagram is suggestive of the nature of a potential 
'gestalt switch' as required by Kuhn. That is, there are potentially 
three separable systems, which rise in place of the previous one 
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(historical) system, and require explication as systems. There is also 
the further, and important, question of relations between these 
systems. Are, for example, the flow transactions and stock measurement 
systems supportive of any income calculation system and in what way? 
5.1 the articulation problem 
Even accepting the possible separability of the individual systems as 
presented, the question of their arrangement is a vital one. This 
.question of arrangement is generally referred to as articulation. The 
matter of articulation is not something which is usually on offer for 
discussion in accounting. It is simply expected. Any income statement 
must automatically articulate with the balance sheet and this 
expectation is usually given prominence in the so-called balance sheet 
equation, or double entry equation (listed first by Wells among the 
symbolic generalizations above). 
However, Wells does not suggest anywhere in his discussion that it 
is the double entry equation which has played any role in the criticism 
surrounding the crisis in accounting and, although there have been 
passing critics as mentioned in the opening section of this 
Introduction, generally these have been regarded as the result of 
inexperience or allegiance to other disciplines [Mattesich, 1980, p.220 
and p.233]. No sustained critique on a possible role in the income 
debate of this automatic articulation arising out of the use of double 
entry has been offered, although Ijiri [1975] has sought to use double 
entry as a justification for the use of historic cost (this is explored 
in Chapter 5) and Littleton, in developing the matching attaching 
20 
paradigm as a theory, drew on his earlier analysis of double entry 
[Littleton, 1966]. 
Difficulties in introducing different value systems into the area 
of financial reporting, as shown in Figure 2, arise from a possible 
break with the articulation implicit in the traditional model. That 
is, the suggested arrangement, or virtually any other change to the 
arrangement, is inhibited by the presupposition that the various 
reports need to articulate. While the problem has been recognised, 
only MacDonald [1974], although by way of an aside, has seriously 
suggested the abandoning of articulation in favour of greater 
disclosure. 
In the area of management accounting, different values are also 
needed and used. To the extent these are stored and applied in any 
systematic way, the co-ordination between the management accounting and 
the financial accounting systems seems also threatened. The 
expectation, however, is that these should be 'tied in' [Brown, 1966, 
p.58]. Nevertheless, difficulties appear in attempting this due to the 
prior expectation of the articulation in the financial reports. 
In this way, lying behind the criticisms discussed by Wells on 
'values' in financial reporting and the criticisms discussed by 
Mattesich against the double classification model in management 
accounting, can be seen a common concern regarding the utility of the 
existing articulation of reports. 
5.2 The illusion of articulation 
The problem posed by Figure 2 is essentially one of the articulation of 
potentially different systems. While Sterling has strongly argued the 
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case for phenomena articulating [Sterling, 1979], it needs to be 
stressed that any articulation built into the balance sheet equation is 
of a very different kind to either of these positions. Within the 
existing historic cost system, the articulation which results is 
entirely artificial: the balance sheet items are simply residuals of 
costs not yet allocated to the income statements of any period. 
Such an automatic articulation can be held to be entirely 
illusory. Only if independent measurements are taken can there be a 
proper check on the articulation of actual phenomena and this is an 
essential argument of Sterling [1979]. And only if the information 
arose from different measurement systems might there be a problem in 
articulating the figures. The illusion of articulation which appears 
from calculations within the single system of historic cost is simply 
axiomatic from the structure of the system. 
It is the balancing inherent in the double entry system which 
gives rise to the artificial or automatic articulation of the income 
statement with the balance sheet. The paradigmatic hold of this may be 
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Essentially the disciplinary matrix holds if certain prices are 
substituted in place of historic cost prices, although certain ad hoc 
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adjustments to values, such as conservatism, may be necessary. This is 





































In these terms, therefore, it can be surmised that a 'revolution' 
in accounting appears precluded unless either the double entry system 
(in its present form) is abandoned, or the pretence of articulation is 
given up. Either of these will allow a Kuhnian 'gestalt switch' (such 
as illustrated in Figure 2) to take place. However, before a new 
paradigm can be taken on requires, not only an explication of the scope 
of the new system, but also a careful analysis of the old system. What 
has to be clearly identified are not only the possible solutions from 
adoption of the new methods, but also the success of the past. In 
particular, the question can be phrased as: what precisely is given up 
by the abandonment of either (1) articulation, or (2) the double entry 
system? 
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6.1 classification and possibility 
Some of the difficulty in breaking with the double classification 
system may be illustrated with reference to Foucault's comments on the 
passage in Borges quoted in the Preface to this thesis. The great 
force of the passage arrives when the stark impossibilit~ of the 
classification dawns on the reader. No one could ever think that 
[Foucault, 1970, p.xv]. 
Foucault asks 'what kind of impossibility are we faced with 
here?'; what is it which is impossible to think? [Foucault, 1970, 
p.xv] • Each of the categories could be made precise or given 
demonstrable content - the 'encyclopedia' makes careful distinctions 
between the animals of fantasy, for example (e) sirens and (f) 
fabulous, and then of reality, for example (g) stray dogs and (h) those 
having just broken the water pitcher. No particular gross beings or 
beasts are described; the categories are cool, distanced. What breaks 
some hidden taboo is simply the very nature of the classification: 
'What transgresses the boundaries of all imagination, of all 
possible thought, is simply that alphabetical series (a, b, 
c, d) which links each of those categories to all the 
others. ' 
[Foucault, 1970, p.xvi] 
It is the common ground, or 'site' in which such things could meet 
which is destroyed. Each category might have utility or 'propinquity' 
alone, but there is no seeing any meeting ground on which such 
utilities could coexist. Although language has the power to spread 
them before us, it can only do so in an 'unthinkable space' [Foucault, 
1970, p.xvii]. 
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6.2 system and order 
Foucault goes on to argue that a 'system of elements' is indispensible for 
the establishment of even the simplest form of order: 
Order is, at one and the same time, that which is given in 
things as their inner law, the inner network that determines 
the way they confront one another, and also that which has no 
existence except in the grid created by a glance, an 
examination, a language. 
[Foucault, 1970, p.xx] 
This is the power of the double entry system; its power comes as 
much from what it excludes as what it includes. The entities which 
appear on its 'operating table' are monetary; physical units do not 
directly enter the system. Traditionally, only historic prices (costs 
and revenues) enter the system. Other possible prices can only be 
entered in their place. That is, other price data are substituted for 
the existing values; they do not have their own place in the system, or 
in Foucault's terms they do not have a site. They are modifications 
which' require the support of a separate system in accounting, that of 
perpetual inventory records in physical terms. Other price data cannot 
be transferred in directly to the double entry, but can only enter 
through the identification of physical entities with the conseguent 
problem of price attachment (this difficulty is at the heart of the 
last in first out, LIFO, and first in first out, FIFO, debate). 
Some agreement can be made here with Wells [1976] that the 'focus' 
of the anomaly in the present crisis is the problem of the historic-
cost based system dealing with changes in asset prices and changes in 
the purchasing power of the monetary unit. However, the indications 
here are that there may be something intrinsic to the double entry 
system which makes the importation of current price data intractable 
(this possibility is examined in detail in Chapter 7). 
A more precise statement of the anomaly may be derived from 
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adapting Thomas's concern about the arbitrarl nature of allocations 
[Thomas, 1969]. If the entry to the double entry system is bound 
primarily with transactions, then a 'permission' rule exists for the 
making of any entry: for every entrl, there must be a corresponding 
transaction (see Chapter 7). Adjustments or allocations among periods 
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of any type break this rule and require new rules for their 
justification, such as the 'going concern' commitment. 
However, while any particular allocation is then given 
justification, there is nothing to justify the rule being invoked to 
permit such allocations. Each rule looks as good as each other and 
choice among them appears ad hoc [Thomas, 1969]. And it is this lack of 
any ultimate basis in which to compare possible additional permission 
rules (additional to the transaction basis of double entry) that is at 
the basis of the anomalies in the current crisis. And while so-called 
adjustments or allocations would not be designated as such under, say, 
'events' accounting [Sorter, 1969], it is then no longer clear what 
slstem would be required to 'recognise' events. A permission rule over 
transactions contains clear and distinct phenomena as referents. What 
classification system would bring order to the immense problems in 
recognizing and classifying 'events'? 
6.3 the information evaluation approach 
A possible answer to the question of system for an events approach lies 
in the work of information economists mentioned in section 2.2 and in 
developments involving agency theory. The importance of the analysis 
of information economists has been to widen the notion of costs and 
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values embedded in the historic cost model to include, not only 
'market' cost and values, but also the cost of the information process 
itself including gathering, communicating and processing. Importantly, 
costs and values are the result of actions and preferences [Demski & 
Feltham, 1976]. Agency theory attempts to import motivational 
behaviour into the theory of the firm and focuses on the control and 
information relations between principal and agent; thus shares in any 
money surpluses depend ultimately not only on actual performance but, 
due to the costs of monitoring the agent, also on the particular 
information available to either the principal or the agent [Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976]. 
While both developments widen the basic accounting concepts in 
appreciable ways (information costs are clearly as important as market 
costs and knowledge also seems an important factor in distributions), 
it should be given emphasis that these are essentially attacks on the 
anomalies arising in the micro-economics paradigm. But, as solutions, 
they are also predicated upon the assumptions inherent in that 
pa~adigm. It is the assumption of certainty in the micro-economics 
paradigm which gives rise to the problems of recognition of other costs 
(absence of 'prices') and the imperfectly distributed knowledge between 
principals and agents. While uncertainty is introduced into the 
frameworks, it is of a limited type and Debreu [1959], an economist 
widely drawn on by information economists, makes the inadequate nature 
of the uncertainty which he considers clear in his introduction. 
Economics cannot jump over its own shadow and those importing economic 
analysis into accounting areas cannot progress beyond the problems 
economics faces in dealing with its own anomalies. 
Mattesich stresses the considerable enthusiasm for these theories, 
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but notes that it is 'of eq~al likelihood' that these 
sophisticated analyses have long since passed their 
increasingly 
point of 
diminishing return [Matte~ich, 1980, p.229). The problem facing these 
theorists is that, instead of being able to introduce coherent 
modifications to their models, they have to introduce ad hoc 
simplifications in order to ground their models [Matte~ch, 1980, 
p.223). These simplifications (introducing linear for non-linear cost 
functions and neglecting risk attitudes) appear to have a very 
different status to the substitutions of current prices for historic 
prices in the double entry system. As a type of substitutions they 
appear to be of an entirely different order and it is difficult to see 
any 'site' on which categories, which divide up prices between a) 
historic costs and b) replacement costs or c) sale prices, could meet 
categories involving a) cost functions, b) distribution functions and 
c) risk attitudes. 
6.4 identifying the source of success 
This question of 'site' is critical. Since it is the double entry 
system which is in use, the onus is on those wishing to import theories 
from other paradigms to demonstrate the common ground. Further, until 
some questions over the utility of the double entry system are answered 
it is unlikely that accountants will change or abandon double entry. 
That is, no revolution can proceed in Kuhnian terms until there is a 
recognised potential to surpass the scope of the previous success. 
The new paradigm must carry with it the power of the old. 
Essentially this is a problem-solving task. Fixed behaviour can be 
expected to remain fixed until the source of the satisfaction is teased 
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away from the context in which the satisfaction was gained. The object 
of the success, in this case the double entry system, tends to 'occupy' 
the success and gives rise to what Marx termed 'fetishism'. 
In reference to meta-models such as agency theory, the 'major' 
problem and unsolved issue as Mattesich sees it, is of matching 
analytically a given information purpose to its proper system structure 
[Mattesich, 1980, p.224]. The practical problem, as stated above, is 
that of capturing the essence of the double entry system within a 
broader framework. Both the earlier discussion and Matte~ich present 
the focus as essentially a systems issue. Unfortunately the 'proper 
system structure' may not be exactly how Matte~ich perceives the 
systems nature of the double entry model. 
7.1 the accounting system as an input-output model 
Mattesich sees the double classification model as crucial to the 
accounting paradigm. In discussing three conditions which seem to him 
necessary for a general theory of management accounting, he includes a 
general awareness of the double classification principle and this is in 
line with the Kuhnian requirement for acceptance of a new theory. 
However, discussing the 'object area' as comprising of relatively well-
defined objectives - such as efficiency control - under a given set of 
goals and environmental constraints, he ties the duality principle to 
an input-output approach: 
All the objectives pivot on the input-output relations of the 
entity to be managed; and it is for this reason that the 
double classification model forms the core of these basically 
atomistic object models. 
[Matte~ich, 1980, p.230] 
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Mattesich argues that a general concern with control systems or 
information systems lies outside accounting proper and sees the 'young 
Turks' as in part confused and attempting to substitute meta-models for 
object models. 
Apart from any confusion here and any 'natural reaction to the 
symbols of the past', Mattesich disputes that double classification is 
a mere convenience of classification. Such a view, he claims, misses 
the empirical and general 'physical' foundation: 
The double classification principle has its ultimate 
(though not its historical justification) in the law 





[Mattesich, 1980, p.233] 
This bold statement purports to carry some startling insight and 
also appears to represent an unargued shift from his earlier 
preoccupation with the second law of thermodynamics [Matte~ich, 1978], 
following on from the arguments of Georgescu-Roegen [1971] on the role 
of entropy in economics. However, if the claim over 'conservation' is 
to carry weight, it must amount to more than simply 'total output 
equals total input'. Indeed if it is not to face the charge of simply 
preferring a different meta-theory to be swapped into the object area, 
on Mattesach's own arguments, the principle of conservation has to be 
established as important within the accounting 'object area', not as a 
possible importation from outside. The issue of conservation is 
returned to in Chapter 5. 
7.2 the nature of systems 
Mattesdch's grasp of the nature of the double entry system as 
essentially an input-output model may be substantially correct, but 
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there is a danger in predicating any argument here with the idea that 
all systems are perspicuous through the input-output model. Yet this 
is exactly what Mattesach does in his wider analysis of systems 
[Mattesich, 1978, p.275] and in also setting out of the first 
conditions for a general theory in management accounting: 
one that provides the basic assumptions and theorems of the 
input-output model characteristic for all accounting systems. 
[Mattesich, 1980, p.232, first emphasis added] 
But just as systems theory has been criticised as too concerned 
with natural systems (see Chapters 1 & 2), equally not all systems may 
be formed on the input-output model. Indeed, if, as seems possible, 
double entry might stand as a historical prototype for input-output 
models, a predicate of this nature can only inhibit any proper 
discussion of evolution of an accounting system. As discussed earlier, 
much of the debate in financial reporting may be characterized as 
reliant exactly on the appropriateness of an application of the input-
output model in discussing the satisfaction of user needs through 
selection of a single valuation base. It needs also to be said that a 
close reading of Mattesich's (1978] detailed study of systems 
approaches reveals a much richer view of systems approaches, especially 
in his consideration of Herbert Simon's attempt to study 'programs' 
which veers more to a 'white box' analysis. 
In any case, systems theory is also in bad array at the moment. 
Apart from challenges about its overconcern with natural systems, and 
the critical question over a system's boundary, many other criticisms 
have been brought against it. For example, Silverman has pressed the 
'efficiency' orientation of systems theory, which perhaps could be 
avoided or restated in a shift from a focus on natural systems, but the 
'reification' charge is harder to answer [Silverman, 1970]. How do 
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actors and systems interact without some problem equivalent to the 
mind-body dispute among philosophers occurring? 
At the root of the reification problem may be the 'unification of 
science' tendency of early systems theorists. Certainly, Matte~ch 
makes it his second condition for a general theory that it leads to a 
more unified system of management accounting [Mattesach, 1980, p.232]. 
Again, however, unification cannot be predicated. The problem for a 
general theory is how to allow for behavioural or other aspects without 
complete fragmentation. Further to questions about unification or the 
status of input-output models for information systems, the wholesale 
inclusion by Bertalanffy of cybernetics· and information theory in his 
General System Theory developments could be challenged (see Chapter 2). 
What makes these particularly systems approaches? 
7.3 the problem of the epistemic shift 
In considering positions from which to view the problem of the 
accounting system, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
virtually every discipline, from which a meta-theory could be drawn 
(economics, psychology, sociology, biology, physics and so on), is 
experiencing either a paradigm shift or is wrapped in paradigm 
conflicts. A possible reason for this extraordinary state of affairs 
might be that 'science' (in its widest sense) is not just experiencing 
a series of revolutions surrounding theories, but the very sense of 
order through which theories themselves can be understood is in the 
throes of some epistemic shift as discussed by Foucault. 
For example, Foucault discusses the shift at the end of the 
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sixteenth century from similitude (the emphasis on the Same) towards 
the cause and effect emphasis which became the very basis of any claim 
to knowledge [Foucault, 1970, p.17 and p.162]. It appears that this 
cause and effect emphasis, together with the reductionism inherent in 
it, is being questioned, but that, as yet, no firm 'episteme' has taken 
its place. 
7.4 the direction of the thesis 
In these circumstances, despite the weaknesses of the systems approach, 
there seems some relative advantage in not adopting the perspective of 
a 'better' worked-out discipline and, instead, attempting to rework the 
systems concepts to meet some of the challenges. Such a reworking needs 
to be attempted before attempting to investigate and develop the double 
entry system and the particular problem of articulation embedded in the 
system. Critical issues to be faced in the systems area would be 
identifying more closely what constitutes a system in order to lessen 
the hold of the 'organismic' analogy, and examining the problem of 
perceiving information in systems terms and, with this, recognition 
that systems perception involves information. Such an integration 
might also go some way to introducing explanations of how actors and 
systems can interact with each other. 
The thesis therefore begins with the difficult task of attempting 
to reconstruct systems theory in the light of criticisms which it has 
attracted (on the grounds that the criticisms may act as signs of a 
'new' episteme). This occupies the first part of the thesis. The 
second part of the thesis is concerned with an application of the 
systems material developed from Part I into the area of financial 
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reporting. 
The task of a full-blown reworking of systems theory was seen as 
too large for a single thesis, instead the information systems section 
is the most fully developed and links with environment questions 
(scarcity) and individual actors (motivation) are simply projected 
without any full discussion. In this case, developing fully a theory 
of accounting becomes prohibited because of the absence of the 
foregoing extensions. However, to the extent that existing problems or 
anomalies in the financial reporting system have unnecessarily 
constrained developments in accounting generally and in management 
accounting in particular, it is to be hoped that a reworked financial 
reporting system is a first step in one aspect of developing the 
management area. 
The thesis, in these respects, might be thought largely to have a 
technical focus (although the technical nature is wider perhaps than 
envisaged by Burrell & Morgan [1979] who favour an approach more linked 
to ethnomethodology). It is also largely a thesis of explication, 
rather than an exercise in argumentation or justification. In that it 
is the systems area which is worked out first, without drawing on 
accounting for its justification, the application to accounting may be 
considered to serve as an empirical test for the system theory 
partially developed in Part I. Such a test is perhaps very different 
from what is ordinarily meant by an empirical test but, even if it can 
be understood only as an~logy, in showing how the theory can be used 
1 t lk b t th th . ;t meets the So What? normative y to a a ou 0 er eor~es • 
criticism of positivists against the descriptive homologies of General 
System Theory (see Chapter 1). In so doing an accounting system is 
presented which is in turn workable and can stand the test of practice 
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(see Chapters 6 & 8). 
8.1 outline of thesis 
In terms of Mattesich's conditions for a general theory of 
[Matte9ich, 1980, pp.232-233], the following are 
considerations in the thesis: 
accounting 
the main 
(1) To consider the general nature of systems (Chapters 1 & 2) and, in 
particular, the nature of information systems and evolve from this 
a formal basis for a knowledge system (Chapters 3 & 4). 
(2) To identify a particular domain in the area of information systems 
which may properly be perceived as accounting systems and develop 
the application of the formal basis for knowledge systems within 
this (Chapter 5 & 6). 
(3) To explicate the possible use and retention of double entry in 
accounting and, in particular, to examine the role and possible 





The Development of Systems Approaches 
1.1 introduction 
Systems theory has enjoyed some vogue in most subjects in science, and 
especially in the social sciences. While the extent of any specific 
vogue, or the dates for any specific entry into and exit from a 
particular discipline, in many cases might be difficult to determine 
(indeed the actual entry in some cases might appear in retrospect as 
sometimes quite insubstantial or periodic), the general heyday of 
systems theory appears to be the sixties when interdisciplinary 
questions were approached with a renewed vigour. Here systems theory 
appeared as a major, but by no means the sole, contender for providing 
a 'site' [Foucault, 1970, see also Preface and Introduction], a common 
ground in which discussions could be organized among participants of 
different disciplines. 
Some considerable attention in this opening chapter on systems 
will therefore be given, not only to the roots of systems theory 
(biology, psychology) and to current developments (the problem-solving 
emphasis), but also to some issues or criticisms raised about systems 
theory which seemed particularily pertinent in the sixties, 
particularily on whether the purpose of systems theory was to aid the 
'unity' of science or whether the nature of the site which systems 
theory provides is a 'language' or a 'logic'. 
A further complexity arises, perhaps not surprisingly in something 
which has enjoyed general, if occasional, vogue. This is that concepts 
of systems vary. For some systrns theory is linked with holism, the 
study of wholes, and is therefore antithetical to analysis; for others 
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the key concept is that of the 'black box' or input-output analysis; 
others still see the area as virtually a branch of mathematics; and a 
further and important subject is information and communication links or 
cybernetics. Systems theory also appears to host biological analogies 
alongside mechanical analogies, apply to the largest of social 
organizations and still apply to individuals from the cellular to the 
mental levels, and permit information concerns to coexist with energy 
matters. The semantics of systems theory seems either not fixed, and 
dangerously indiscriminate, 
applied. 
or poorly understood and improperly 
The intention in this chapter is to introduce, explicate and 
contrast two major systems approaches which have been developed this 
century. Ludwig von Bertalanffy's development of General System Theory 
from his early pioneering work in biology is contrasted with the 
practice orientation of Systems Research. As an extension of this 
research tradition, Peter Checkland's more recent problem-solving 
systems methodology is then examined. Following this discussion, an 
enquiry into the fundamental nature of systems thinking forms the basis 
of Chapter 2. 
The results of this latter enquiry will then be consolidated in 
Chapter 3 in terms of distinguishing information systems from knowledge 
systems and, in Chapter 4, the knowledge systems framework to be 
applied in Part II will be considered in an organizational context. 
Some possible answers to some of the criticisms with which systems 
approaches have been faced in this context will be framed. However, 
since the important development for Part II is restricted in this 
thesis to the results of the earlier chapters, Chapter 4 is suggestive 
only. The key Chapters in Part I are Chapter 2, in the discussion on 
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'closure', and Chapter 3, where the transporting and interpreting of 
'signs' is examined. 
1.2 ubiquity of 'system' 
Even disregarding any occasional vogue of systems theory, the term 
'system', derived from the Greek sustema, is a term much in use within 
a number of academic disciplines, without explicit definition of the 
term. The discipline itself is sometimes referred to as a system and 
sometimes it is the objects of study which are described as systems. 
The ideas of particular thinkers are also described as philosphical 
systems. Equally gravitational or planetary systems are found in nature 
and biological systems in living or organic matter. And between the 
natural and conceptual systems lie the economic, social, political and 
business systems; hybrid systems made more complex by the increasing 
development of artificial systems, mechanical and electrical, which are 
changing not only the fabric of the natural world but also influence 
the way in which the world is perceived. 
The ubiquity of 'system' contains both a promise and pitfalls. The 
promise is that system is an entity which is common to all or most 
disciplines and it is the exploration of this promise which forms a 
major concern of this chapter. For example, Bertalanffy, the founder of 
General System Theory, sees in 'system' an opportunity for the 'unity 
of science' [Bertalanffy, 1971, p.37]. In contrast, Checkland, who has 
developed his Soft Methodology, sees in 'systems' a subject which can 
'talk about the other subjects' [Checkland, 1981, p.S]. The pitfalls 
are in the possibility that the entities under discussion here are so 
diverse and subject to such fundamentally different properties that 
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only conceptual confusion and muddled argument will result from 
inattention to these fundamental differences. For example, it cannot be 
simply presumed that a social system is of the same ilk as a machine 
control system. 
It might seem that clear and explicit definitions within the 
individual disciplines would protect against such conceptual monism and 
restrict the use of some of the more hazy analogies between, for 
example, a biological system and a societal system. Nevertheless 
particular disciplines are marked more by the absence of any definition 
of system. While it is not clear that such definitions would progress 
beyond the doubtful circularity of, say, an economic system is that 
which is studied in economics, it might be assumed in these cases that 
it is convenient for such disciplines to rely on general undefined 
terms and not to bound or restrict the entity under discussion, actual 
discussion of the entity being restricted by the application of the 
analytical or methodological tools permitted in the discipline. 
1.3 definition of system 
Where terms are used without clear technical definition, one recourse, 
exceptionally, is an index of cornmon use. However, nor is the common 
use of the term without vagueness and circularity. For example, the 
Concise Oxford English Dictionary (sixth edition) gives three brief 
definitions of system: 
1. complex whole - the role of 'complex' suggests a difficulty since 
it is not immediately clear why simple systems could not exist and, 
while 'whole' looks helpful, the definition of whole is 'complete 
system', 
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2. set of connected things or parts - the term 'set' is not the same 
as that of 'system' and it is precisely the type of connection 
which makes these of a different order1 
3. organized body of material or immaterial things 'organized' 
appears helpful but the definition of organization refers to 
'system' and 'whole'. 
Circularity is a matter to which definitions often give rise and, 
in addition to drawing attention to the mere verbal expression of 
definition, Wittgenstein [1958] has held instead that the test of 
understanding lies in a concept's use, because a person could describe 
some qualities of an apple but point to an orange. Such a test appears 
adequate for a number of classes of objects, where there is something 
specific to gesture towards, but difficulties arise with terms like 
system, where the term is ubiquitous in use and when the 'system' under 
discussion lies, not in objects themselves, but in their relations. 
Disagreement might arise as to whether something constituted a system 
or not1 to which authority could reference be made? 
Where disagreement arises in terms, one tactic is merely to assert 
what the term is. Choice of terms appears arbitrary but, if ambiguity 
is avoided, at least the term may be seen to be used consistently. For 
example, one 'systems team' for the Open University adopted the 
following features: 
1. It is an assembly of parts or components connected 
together in an organized way. 
2. The parts are affected by being in the system and are 
changed if they leave it. 
3. Our assembly of parts does something. 
[Naughton & Peters, 1976, p.7] 
While such a definition has the merit of setting up a series of 
tests, the tests appear not only arbitrary but also ambiguous. What is 
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the status of something which, say, meets criteria 1 and 2, but fails 
3? What do the critical terms 'doing', 'affected', and 'changed' mean? 
Until these terms are clarified the tests are non-operational. But 
what criteria can be introduced to reduce ambiguity, and assist 
operationality, which will not further increase the arbitrary nature of 
the definition? 
1.4 categories of systems 
Since it is the very nature of systems which is being held in doubt, it 
is not possible to define the term here. Nevertheless, some indication 
of possible meanings is desirable. First the range of the term seems 
very wide: possible ontologies are real or natural systems and 
conceptual systems [Bertalanffy, 1971, pp.xix-xx). However, natural 
systems in turn might be divided between ostensive systems, which can 
be readily pointed to (such as a dog, a tree or a man) and abstract 
systems, which require indirect gestures through language or theories 
(grammer, gravitation). And, since conceptual systems seem to include 
languages and logic, the ontology at once collapses. Indeed, even 
pointing presupposes a shared system for communicating understanding 
and the 'seeing' of a dog implies a perceptual, and with this 
conceptual, system. However, when pressed, even ostention collapses, 
what does it mean to see a system (dog-system?) instead of a dog? 
Gilbert Ryle gives the example of a university. After showing 
someone round various buildings and introducing the person to some 
staff and students, he feels he would be puzzled if that person still 
insisted on seeing the university. Since universities cannot be seen, 
Ryle concludes that a category mistake has been made [Ryle, 1963, 
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pp.17-18]. Yes, but not a confusion of the order of mixing up say 
carrots with cabbage, or even vegetables with fruit, but more analogous 
to expecting fruit to be the cabbage, a confusion between a generic 
term with one of its objects [Fine, 1983]. 
The actual confusion in Ryle's example arises over someone 
expecting to see something of the university which cannot be seen, to 
see 'team spirit' as a physical manifestation on the cricket field 
separate from the players themselves. Perhaps the confusion might be 
better stated as someone confusing a system with its parts, better, 
that is, if such a distinction led to more than mere circular 
insistence that a system was simply a 'whole' which was more than its 
parts. This latter move not only relegates aspects like team spirit to 
being residuals, but faces a further difficulty where neither the 
'whole' nor the 'residual' can be pointed to. 
These examples illustate the difficulty of definition of systems. 
However, these difficulties may themselves be suggestive. Systems seem 
to be among those things which it is difficult to see, they cannot be 
pointed to, and they also seem to resist some traditional categories. 
If this is so, a begining might be made if systems are taken to be that 
which does the pointing, that which makes the categories. The 
possibility of systems as 'that which points out the categories' does 
offer an explanation of the impossibility of the 'Chinese 
Encyclopedia', the impossibility of Borges's list (see Preface) arises 
through the conflation of categories derived from different systems. 
Tentatively, therefore, a system is that which orders its parts. 
However, such a position on the nature of systems immediately raises 
difficulties of ontology, where or in what do systems then exist? What 
are these things which can be seen only through their categories? 
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1.5 Process and Thing views of the world 
Taking systems as that which does the ordering, as how the categories 
or parts come into being, contrasts with the definition of the Open 
University given earlier which centres round the parts. Clearly 
different uses of system may be at, work here; it is not immediately 
obvious that the one definition, with the emphasis on 'things', should 
be preferred or rejected in favour of the other definition with its 
emphasis on process or 'ordering'. 
Waddington, in discussing the Thing view of the world and the 
Process view, has little hesitation in rejecting the Thing view 
[Waddington, 1977, pp.18-24]. However, rejection of 'things' as such 
seems to amount to rejection of the facility of 'perception' in favour 
of the 'conception' of process, rejection of 'looking' in favour of 
'interpreting'. 
However, since 'looking', the seeing of things as things, 
entitation as Gerard [1964] terms it, is the window onto the world, 
Waddington cannot mean rejecting perceptual input. Instead, it is a 
ready-made 'interpreting' or prior ordering of perceptual things, 
entities, into ever larger 'things' through thingness, which he 
rejects. It is the projection of the way things appear on to the 
understanding of how they are organized which he rejects, it is the 
projection of the 'what' on to the 'how' which gives rise to the thing 
view. In brief, there is a hint here of the difference between the set 
theoretic approach using classes, which can then belong as members to 
other classes, and the systems approach in which ordering by classes 
becomes simply one system of ordering. 
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1.6 purposes of definitions 
A question arises, however, as to whether any definition of 'system' is 
required at all? Popper has criticised attempts towards definition as 
'essentialism', rooted in the view that some properties of a thing are 
essential. Instead, Popper has claimed that some of the success of 
science arises through not deciding such issues beforehand and instead 
relying on symbols, which he takes to be 'nominalism' [Popper, 1966, 
pp.13-141. In line with this, Emery, in the introduction to an 
influential set of readings in systems thinking, has noted the tendency 
of pioneers in the area to 'work out their intuitions in their own 
language' and expressed his concern that some might attempt a premature 
'conceptual framework' [Emery, 1969, p.12]. 
In contrast Ackoff, who has claimed that 'system' has become a 
key concept in scientific research, claims that some conceptual 
framework is necessary and has provided a 'system of system concepts' 
[Ackoff, 1971]. However, no attempt is made by Ackoff to clarify what 
makes a 'system' out of the list which he presents of definitions 
corresponding to types of system, nor is any basis to his synthesis 
made explicit. This lack of application of systems ideas to the 
development of a framework is surprising and disappointing. Some 
account of the process by which the concepts appear as categories might 
have been expected. Since this would involve perhaps using systems to 
talk about systems - the property of reflexiveness - this suggests that 
this property may well be an important aspect in any coherent systems 
approach. 
In addition to the property of reflexiveness and the possibility 
that many purposes might be involved in the idea of systems, there is 
also the difficulty of site, where systems can be thought to have a 
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place. It is clear no single definition will accomodate these diverse 
and far-reaching aspects. The purpose of the rest of this chapter, 
therefore, is to elucidate from the literature something of the nature 
and use of the term system and discuss reasons for some of the muddle 
and confusion which surrounds systems approaches. 
In particular, Bertalanffy's attempt at a General System Theory is 
considered and then the more diffuse area of 'systems research' is 
examined with special attention to the 'soft' problem-solving 
methodology of Checkland. In the light of problems highlighted in these 
approaches, consideration is given in the next chapter to ways in which 
possible restrictions upon systems terms can be imposed without loss of 
the flexibility which is a hallmark of the approach. In passing, it 
should be mentioned that Matteeach has raised a question over 
Bertalanffy's status as the 'father' of systems theory pointing to the 
earlier writings of the Russian A.A. Bogdanov [Mattesich, 1978, pp.283-
284] • However, the concern in this chapter is on the development of 
systems theory and Bertalanffy had more recognised influence during the 
period under· discussion. 
2.1 reductionism and mechanism 
Some of the explanation for the lack of definition of system in 
particular disciplines lies in a particular attitude to the nature of 
systems. Aligned with the Thing view of the world, some, particularily 
physicists and chemists, take a position that there are no such 
entities as systems. Resting their case on ostention, the pointing to 
things, they refuse to recognise entities which cannot be pointed to. 
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Francis Crick, for example, takes the strong position that there is 
nothing beyond the properties being measured [Crick, 1966]. This is a 
denial of the existence of systems and the growth of the systems 
movement can be traced, as will be discussed below, in large measure as 
a reaction to such a 'reductionist' position. 
While the roots of the modern systems movement are traced by 
Bertalanffy to developments, discussed below, in the 1920s to 1940s, 
its early heritage lies in the philosophies of the Greeks, their 
emphasis on (w)holism taking its extreme form in the monism (the 
doctrine that everything belongs to the One) of Parmenides and Zeno. 
Plato's Republic may also be regarded as an early example of systems 
design round the ideal of justice and the principle of division of 
labour. Aristotle, whose philosophical edifice was to last nearly two 
thousand years into the late medieval period, is credited with the 
maxim that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. 
After Aristotle, however, the importance of teleology 
(purposefulness) became inextricably tied to the notion of a supreme 
being. It has been customary to assume that the grand systems developed 
by the philosophers in the mould of Aristotle before the Renaissance 
were particularly sterile, and anti-scientific, concerned as they were 
with a teleological doctrines of 'final cause', although the physicist 
de Broglie claims that Duhem has challenged this position in a 
stringent historical analysis, and shown how there were gradual and 
important contributions to the development of scientific thinking 
[Duhem, 1962, p.vii]. In any case, the fruits of the early 
'reductionist' experiments isolating the 'efficient' cause (the push 
and pull of the mechanical universe) by Galileo, among others, were so 
rich as to turn the feeling against metaphysical speculation and 
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against other types of causes and all notions of 'purpose' were 
discredited as tied together with the doctrine of final cause. 
Reductionism developed further as an epistemological position with 
Descartes, who adopted as his second rule to the 'proper conduct of 
one's reason' the decomposition principle of breaking up the problem 
into separate parts. While Cqeckland [1981] has identified this as a 
clear shift from pure holism, it alone is not sufficient to capture the 
position of science which, after Newton, became more and more 
associated with mechanism. Mechanism, partially an extension of the 
analogy of the workings of the clock to nature, relied on investigating 
the purely 'efficient causes' to effect its push pull universe. It is 
the combination of breaking the problem into parts and the eschewing of 
any notion of purpose that more fully captures the 'scientific' 
episteme which denied there could be anything more than the 
measurements themselves. 
Newton was a scathing critic of those who thought there was 
something at work behind his laws of gravitation such as a force of 
attraction. This force of attraction allowed a view (still held by 
some) that bodies could influence each other at a distance (and not by 
impact). Newton rejected all this with 'hypotheses non fingo': 
gravitation could mean nothing more than the observed phenomena and no 
explanation should be offered. To the Master of his College, Bentley, 
who incautiously had referred to the force of gravitation, Newton 
wrote: 
That'gravitation should be innate, inherent and essential to 
matter, so that one body may act upon another at a distance 
through a vacuum ••• is to me so great an absurdity that I 
believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent 
faculty for thinking can ever fall into it. 
[Urmson, 1982, p.4] 
This reluctance to countenance any concept which did not firmly 'cash 
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out' in term of the obs~ations (measurements) which could be made was 
the basic position against which the systems movement, and more 
generally the social sciences, were to emerge. 
2.2 the development of G.S.T. 
While Checkland [1981] has surveyed the particular effect of the rise 
of science and the reductionist position on systems thinking, 
Bertalanffy has identified early contributers to the resurgence of 
holistic notions. In particular, he has identified gestalt (holistic) 
thinking in Koehler's work in physics, Lotka's statistical work on 
biology, Cannon's work on homeostasis and the work of the Gestalt 
theorists in psychology [Bertalanffy, 1971]. However, in this period of 
the 1920s and 1930s the epistemological concerns of researchers had 
narrowed reductionism further under the development and spread of 
logical positivism, which denied any meaning to non-verifiable 
statements, and it is not until the 1950s and 1960s, by which time 
positivists had retreated to the more neutral ground [Bertalanffy, 
1962], before the systems movement developed and when, initially, it 
appears to have attracted some researchers and spread quite widely 
among disciplines both in the sciences and the social sciences. 
For Bertalanffy [1971, 1962] a crucial debate arose in biology in 
the mechanism-vitalism controversy. Mechanism avoided issues of any 
organization in the make up of an organism and 'vitalists' attributed 
regulation after disturbance to 'hobgoblin' soul-like factors. 
Bertalanffy contributed to this debate by holding the 'organismic' 
viewpoint which advocated the importance of organization as a factor 
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fundamental to biology. Crucial to the development of his thesis was 
his distinction between 'open' and 'closed' systems, together with the 
purposive concept of 'equifinality' (equal final state) detached from 
the hobgoblin embrace of vitalism. 
The nature and importance of the open and closed distinction and 
its relation to equifinality and other concepts which Bertalanffy holds 
to be 'systems' concepts will be explored in the next chapter. 
Bertalanffy moved on from considering organization in the particular 
context of biology to develop his work as having potential application 
to other subjects. Attracted by the potential generality of the term 
system, the ·promise alluded to earlier from the term being common to 
many disciplines, Bertalanffy developed his General System Theory: 
It appeared, however, I could not stop on the way once taken 
and so I was led to a still futher generalization which I 
called "General System Theory". 
[Bertalanffy, 1962, p.31] 
3.1 the goal of G.S.T. 
Underpinning this conception of a General System Theory (hereafter 
referred to as G.S.T.) is the bold assumption that the entities under 
discussion as systems within any particular discipline have elements in 
common across those disciplines. The stated goal of G.S.T. is the 
'unity' of science [Bertalanffy, 1971, p.37] and the notion of system 
is the instrument of unitY7 that is, systems theory provides a common 
base or reference for all the other disciplines. This assumption must 
be borne in mind when evaluating the claims of Bertalanffy for the 
development of G.S.T. 
The list of contributors to the systems area is now enormous and 
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not limited to any particular field and, although it would be hard to 
find an area in which systems theory has not been applied or, 
alternatively, a discipline from which ideas about systems have not 
been generated, it is not necessarily the case that this work extends a 
general system theory, as Bertalanffy [1971, 1962] in a wide and 
undiscriminating trawl claims. It is a necessary, although not 
sufficient, condition of setting any general hypothesis about systems 
that they hold some systems properties in common and it may be the case 
that the systems aspects of the entities which Bertalanffy is 
including, when closely scrutinized, turn out to be of an essentially 
different nature from discipline to discipline. 
Although Bertalanffy sees all this work on systems as entirely in 
line with the stated goal of his General System Theory (G.S.T.), the 
'integration in the various sciences, natural and social' [Bertalanffy, 
1971, p.37], it is difficult to see the actual advances in the 
individual disciplines having an explicit bearing on G.S.T. The 
examples which Bertalanffy quotes seem to indicate a different episteme 
from simple-minded mechanism through attention to inter-action effects 
and explicit recognition of goals but, as is discussed later with 
systems engineering and information theory, formal concern for system 
properties, as discussed in Chapter 3, is often absent. 
However, there has been some explicit work on G.S.T. itself and, 
while the connections of the mathematical work of Mesarovic [1964] in 
axiomatizing formal properties in terms of set theory is tenuous, as 
Bertalanffy remarks, to actual systems problems [Bertalanffy, 1971, 
p.19], Boulding from economics, for example, produced a notable 
contribution in developing a well-accepted hierarchy of systems 
[Boulding, 1956] and Jordan [1968] has also produced a dimension-based 
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taxonomy of ,systems. 
3.2 the method of G.S.T. 
A principle tool for this integration of science is seen by Bertalanffy 
to be isomorphism (same shape); fundamental processes or structures 
which are observed in particular disciplines may turn out to be 
represented in similar models or be 'captured' by a common device. This 
'empirico-intuitive' method of G.S.T. employed by Bertalanffy relys on 
these similarities or isomorphisms being noticed. Recognising the lack 
,of 'mathematical elegance and deductive strength' in his method, 
Bertalanffy offers the defence that his orginal list of systems 
concepts drawn from biology, not G.S.T., has remained intact. The list: 
appears to be remarkably complete ••• no principles of 
similar significance were added. 
[Bertalanffy, 1971, pp.101-102] 
While there is some strength in this assertion, it may also be taken as 
a sign of the weakness of the theory. The lack of any 'new' concepts 
may either simply mark the esoteric nature of the concepts, since any 
rationale by which the~ may be added to outside the framework of a 
particular discipline is missing, or indicate their 'completeness'. 
However, since the goal of the unity of science seems as far off as 
ever, new concepts or radical development of the existing would seem 
desirable and it would seem, therefore, that it is the lack of explicit 
rationale that lies at the failure to generate new concepts. 
A further caveat on the inclusion of much work under the systems 
rubric is that some of this work has been subject to the criticism of 
mere extension of analogy [for example, Buck, 1956]1 previous 
mechanical analogies are replaced by the 'organismic' perspective. The 
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status of analogy is in any case a difficult matter since it might be 
argued that there is little else, that even to 'see' the rule of modens 
ponens requires some use of analogy. However, there is a clear 
difference between the use of analogy for the suggestion of ideas and 
its use for justification of those ideas as beliefs. Replying to 
attacks on the arbitrariness involved in the perception of analogies, 
Bertalanffy is careful to distinguish his ground as 'homologies', or 
formal specifications, which he sees as very different from the popular 
and loose use of analogy. 












encapsulate some type of general applicability, of a similar order as 
he claims to Newton's laws of motion. However, contrary to a 
justificatory role being carried here similar to that of Newton's laws, 
this invites a 'so what?' argument: what can be learnt from the 
'coincidence' of two systems having similarites? Bertalanffy's answer 
to this is to suggest that common structure may arise from more than 
co-incidence. However, although Newton's laws are generalized through 
mathematics, they apply, to the extent they apply at all, to a specific 
system and it is this which gives them content. Mere mathematical form 
itself is contentless and substantive statements cannot be drawn from 
them alone. 
A confusion here in Bertalnffy as to what mathematics does or may 
do continues. A main attraction for Bertalanffy in mathematics is that 
he is 'aiming for exact theory' [Bertalanffy, 1971, p.37]. He wishes 
not only for general applicability, but also for some concomitant 
precision and is particularily interested in homologies for their 
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possibly wide application, but expects them to be specified in 
mathematical terms, prehaps as a defence against the otherwise apparant 
lack of rigour in his method. However, while mathematical models may be 
applied widely, operation research has been frustrated by the crude 
simplifications which often need to be introduced to apply the model 
[Matte$ich, 1980]. Validity of models often needs to be sacrified, but 
the linear equation still looks 'exact' even if nonlinear models were 
required. 
There would also seem to be a particular danger in generalizing 
from mathematical models since the only generality may lie in the 
fashion or convenience of a particular mathematics. It is this danger 
which lies at the heart of the 'so what?' argument put foward by, among 
others, Buck [1956]. Bertalanffy quotes the Russian authors Lektorsky 
and Sadovsky as holding that his approach has a definite methodological 
function in avoiding duplication of effort in various disciplines by a 
single formal apparatus [Bertalanffy, 1962, p.39]. Such an answer might 
do little to allay any fears that G.S.T. is a move towards a pseudo-
science (see below) since the difficulty is the hoary problem of 
whether the theory should be imposed or whether the observations should 
dictate the theory. The difficulty for G.S.T. is that it appears to 
offer a permission for theory to be imposed - a possibility singularily 
unattractive to positivists like Buck. This is now discussed. 
3.3 The problem of demarcation and G.S.T. 
This difficulty is so central to the nature of G.S.T. that some further 
comment is necessary_ First, it must be said that one value of 
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mathematics in a science is to permit conclusions to be deduced from 
the general axioms of the theorY1 specific predictions that can be 
tested by observation. This use of mathematics forms, it can be argued, 
an important background assumption in Popper's attempted 'demarcation' 
between science and pseudo science. Popper's emphasis is that science 
will rely on falsification of theories through observations [Popper, 
1963]. However, the effectiveness of this principle arises only if the 
predictions about proposed observations can be formally deduced from 
the theorY1 otherwise there is no logical entailment for the rejection 
of the theory from a negative result. Hence the preference for theory 
to be in a mathematical form since this aids deduction. 
Popper suggested his demarcation principle in part as a solution 
to the hoary problem mentioned above, the problem of induction, whether 
facts should precede theory or theory precede facts. Popper is 
indicating that the direction of fact to theory is a red herring. As 
long as the theory is subject to observation, theories need only be 
internally consistent (consistency is vital to ensure that contrary 
predictions do not result - in which case the falsification programme 
fails). But this is exactly one point on which G.S.T. falls down, since 
any system level theories (homologies) drawn from the extant empirical. 
theories in disciplines will not be open to observation 1 only the 
theories within the respective disciplines are open to observation and 
falsification. It follows therefore that while it may be desirable to 
have a collection or data bank of possible isomorphisms or homologies 
derived from theories, this collection cannot itself attain the status 
of a testable theory. 
It is also not clear that the further requirement for a theory to 
have internal consistency would be desirable for a data bank of 
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isomophisms as different isomorphisms can be expected to apply in 
different circumstances. Since a clear role for the use of mathematics 
is the internal consistency to a theory which is ensured, the great 
emphasis on mathematics in much of the direct work on G.S.T. [van 
Gigch, 1978; Klir, 1969; Mesarovic, 1964] may be more of a hindrance 
than a help. It must be further added that much of science which lends 
itself to mathematical formulas is, primarily, reductionist in approach 
and opposed to the 'holistic' nature of systems. For example, Newton's 
laws are essentially reductionist and ignore the order and organization 
of material things aspects essential to the holistic view. If these 
views hold, the explicit concern for wholes (the holism) of General 
System Theory seems inconsistent with the use of mathematics. 
3.4 false assumptions and problems in G.S.T. 
Ackoff has also pointed out that G.S.T. fails on the same grounds as 
that of its forerunner in the attempt to unify science, logical 
positivism. According to Ackoff the logical positivists failed to 
understand that simplicity is not to be found at the beginning of an 
enquiry, but only (if at all) at the end: 
Hence, the logical positivists found themselves in the 
position of attempting to unify science out of the pieces 
into which it had been disassembled. 
[Ackoff, 1964, p.53] 
Since Bertalanffy accepted the structure of disciplinary sciences and 
looked for structural isomorphisms within these, Bertalanffy assumed 
implicitly that the structure of Nature is isomorphic with the 





further from the truth. Nature 




presents to us are not divisible into disciplinary 
We impose scientific disciplines on nature; it 
impose them on us. 
classes. 
does not 
[Ackoff, 1964, p.54] 
In this context it is helpful to remember the initial problem for 
Bertalanffy arose in the specific discipline of biology in the form of 
the mechanist-vitalist debate. The problem appeared to be one of 
reductionism in biology. However, it can be argued that the problem was 
not so much reductionism (the method of analysis is after all a 
brilliant invention) as its extension into a general approach for the 
unity of science with the implicit assumption that physics was the most 
reductionist discipline and that (therefore) all other disciplines 
needed (to be scientific) to reduce their concepts to those of physics. 
There is little doubt that this emphasis on the primacy of 
physics, and the need for all sciences to use physics as the referent 
language level, was a prevailing view at the time and certainly this 
was how Bertalanffy interpreted the position: 
Up to recent times the field of science as a nonmothetic 
endeavor, i.e. trying to establish an explanatory and 
predictive system of laws, was practically identical with 
theoretical physics. 
[Bertalanffy, 1962,p.30] 
The problem for biology was not to move from the use of 
reductionism to a holist (non-reductionist) approach but to free itself 
of the fetters of a discipline which had no place for entities such as 
organism. That is, biology benefitted from being rid of the implicit 
attempt to achieve a unity of science through the deification of 
physics and it does not follow that it would benefit from embracing a 
different attempt to integrate science. 
Indeed, while biology no doubt keeps a watch on physics over its 
shoulder, its development has proceded from taking the very opposite 
direction to the unity of science and concentrating on its own 
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entities. And if nature is not inter-disciplinary, then considerable 
advantage may be gained by pursuing entities specific to the 
discipline. It must be said, therefore, that the goal of the unity of 
science looks to be misconceived and incoherent. 
It is also the case that the problem of knowledge is deepened by -
separate development of the disciplines and, since nature is presumed 
not to be disciplinary, the interstices between the disciplines open up 
as yawning chasms. While 'hybrid' disciplines do develop to investigate 
these gaps, they themselves may develop their own entities for 
investigation. What appears then to be the problem is one of how to 
draw together results and findings from different disciplines. And 
again, if nature is not disciplinary, the need to do this will be great 
and some remarks of Boulding are returned to later. Unification is only 
one, and possibly trivial in its substantive potential, solution to the 
problem of integrating different forms of information. 
However, from the earlier discussion what cannot be presumed, as 
Bertalanffy presumed in setting the direction of G.S.T. towards 
mathematics, is that 'mathematics' can be relied upon to provide a 
general understanding. It is not the case that mathematics is the 
coherent body of knowledge which it is often mistakenly taken to be. 
Certainly much of mathematics is abstract but in its application it can 
be highly specific to the functions being investigated. In summary of 
the foregoing discussion, therefore, it must be said that both in its 
goal of the unity of science and its reliance on mathematics, G.S.T. 
seems ill-founded in its present state. 
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4.1 the beneficial influence of G.S.T. 
The possibility of incoherence in G.S.T. in its 'utopian' project for 
the unity of science, together with its suspect methodology of 
observing homologies, does not entail views that the whole exercise has 
proved abortive. Bertalanffy's particular contribution is his calling 
attention to the dynamic equilibrium properties of open systems 
[Rapoport, 1964, p.1?1] and this receives further attention in Chapter 
2. In addition, despite the use of suspect analogies, G.S.T. provided a 
banner under which inter-disciplinary work on systems could explore the 
interstices, work which was only loosely connected, if connected at 
all, to the aims of G.S.T., G.S.T. provided an umbrella, an 'excuse' or 
permission, under which research methods or alternatives to 
reductionism could germinate and it is this type of research which is 
the focus of the next few sections. 
G.S.T. also provided a useful forum, in both symposiums and 
publications such as the General Systems Yearbook, for questions to be 
posed and for issues to be discussed. At the Second Systems Symposium, 
for example, Hrones pressed one of the complicating problems to be the 
difficulty on which the discussion in this chapter opened, the problem 
of definition or meaning: 
the lack of understanding of the meaning of the term 
"system", as we use it 
[Hrones, 1964, p.ix] 
However, despite this, there was 'general agreement that the most 
crucial problems our society faces involve large and complex systems' 
[Hrones, 1964, p. ix] • The notion of complexity receives particular 
attention below, but it might be said that the use of 'large' is 
revealing about much of attitudes to systems research in the Sixties 
when there was a fascination, as Hrones mentions, with the 
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possibilities of enormous entities such as the predicted Great Lakes 
megalopolis. While such talk may not be entirely utopian, it is not the 
case that complexity is best perceived either in very large systems or 
even, at the present state of knowledge, that such huge systems can be 
designed instead of 'just growing'. 
Hrones makes a further remark that many of the problems are so 
complex that 'large computing machines have to be used' [Hrones, 1964, 
p.x]. However, the use of computers has significantly developed so that 
the additional problem, the need to understand the complex computer 
systems themselves has also arisen. While complexity can be manifest 
within a domain or dimension, it does not exist solely in a dimension 
but exists across dimensions to the extent that the problem entity is 
not restricted within one dimension (consider here also Ackoff's claim 
about nature not being disciplinary). Complexity is not unidimensional 
and there is a need to restate Hrones's problem in system terms to 
reveal the additional complexity introduced by the systems approach. 
The problem is of understanding a human (system) using computer systems 
to understand system entities in a possibly systems organized 
environment. This particular problem is considered in Chapters 3 and 4. 
4.2 different approaches to systems 
Mesarovic in his preface to the Second Systems Symposium categorises 
four groups in their approaches to systems research: 
(1) those who attempted to define a system by adopting a 
definite stand 
(2) those who were against formalizing G.S.T. since this 
would make it more or less specific 
(3) those who considered systems theory as a viewpoint taken 
when approaching a given (practical) problem 
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(4) those who considered a broad-enough collection of 
powerful methods for synthesis of systems to constitute 
a sufficient theory 
[Mesarovic, 1964, p.xiv-xv] 
The first group essentially clusters round those who simply assert 
what a system is and G.S.T. exemplifies a particular case of this 
derived from the application of a special, and somewhat dubious, 
methodology. Group 2 might contain those who recognise some of the 
problems arising in the discussion in this chapter, but who are 
unwilling to abandon the idea of a theory in the systems approach and 
might therefore prefer the theory to remain more as 'background' 
assumptions. The last two groups, however, indicate a different, more 
pragamtic, perspective. Rapoport, for example, has criticised any 
distinction between 'concrete "real-life" problems and abstract 
problems of conceptualization'. He holds the distinction is about 
whether the investigator has a problem at all: 
What makes the formalistically oriented systematizer sterile 
is that he really has no problem at all. He already has the 
answers, and his "activity" amounts to little more than 
boring with his "answers" people who are involved with real, 
painful problems. 
[Rapoport, 1964, p.172] 
This lack of a problem is a succinct statement of the potential 
futility of G.S.T. as discussed above. The unity of science was, to 
anticipate a distinction of some importance to Checkland's work 
examined below, an 'issue', not an 'active problem' (Checkland 
separates problems which are 'issue-based' from those which are 
'primary task'), although undoubtedly the issue masked important 
problems. The existence of a problem, whether concrete, real-life, or 
abstract and conceptual, is the bedrock of the systems approach and has 
become the central entity in two strands of methodologies developed 
round the principal figures of Ackoff or Churchman [1971] and, to be 
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examined in some detail below, Checkland (1981]. 
4.3 systems and problem-solving 
While it is clear from the foregoing remarks of Hrones, Messarovic and 
Rapoport that the entity of 'problem' and the notion of 'system' were 
never far apart, both Checkland and Churchman began explicitly tying 
together problem-solving with the systems approach: Churchman in his 
discussion of 'inquiring systems' [1971], an approach developed by 
Mitroff and Mason (see Chapter 4); and Checkland through a programme of 
'action research' at Lancaster University. Checkland now perceives his 
approach, with important qualifications discussed below, to be an 
operational version of Churchman's [Checkland, 1981, p.261] but he has 
considerably extended and developed the relationship of the systems 
approach with problem-solving, with his most important single 
contribution being the development of his 'soft' systems-based 
methodolgy for 'real-world problem-solving' [Checkland, 1981; 1972]. 
While Waddington traces the problem base in systems approaches 
(Mesarovic's group 3 above) to the early work in operations research 
developed during World War II (Waddington, 1977], it is generally 
acknowledged that operations research quickly lost its systems 
'flavour' in favour of the application of sophisticated mathematical 
techniques and Checkland takes as more important 'systems engineering' 
- he quotes Sargent as arguing that this arose partly out of the 
cybernetic and control engineers' desire to generalise engineering from 
their perspective (Checkland, 1981, p.139] - and 'systems analysis'; a 
movement particularily associated with the RAND group and arising out 
of developments in first defence from the legacy of operations research 
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and then, crucial to its popularity, the space race in the U.S. 
Checkland points to the text by Hall [1962] as a classic in systems 
engineering and exemplifying Hall's experience with telephone systems 
for Bell Laboratories (where Shannon produced his work on information 
theory). In contrast, Checkland sees the thinking of the RAND group, 
Hitch [1955], Jordan [1960], Quade [1963] as diverse and somewhat 
obscure but their outline methodology is very definite and clear 
[Checkland, 1981, p.134]. 
5.1 hard and soft systems 
However, Checkland argues that these latter two approaches, which may 
be conceived of as belonging to Group 4, were much more concerned with 
a systematic approach rather than systems as such. This is an important 
and substantial claim, whose deliniation will partly occupy the rest of 
Part 1 of this thesis. Both systems analysis and systems engineering 
were essentially concerned with applications of methods and, while the 
methods themselves could be rigorous, any application could be of an ad 
hoc nature, since there were no internal rules for their application. 
Neither group's approach constituted a 'system' and, instead, a 
decided view (ad hoc) on how to limit or constrain the problem was 
taken in order to adopt a fixed, sequential, set of steps (method) 
towards a solution. 
In Rapoport's terms above, there was a concern with (pre-
conceived) 'answers' rather than the 'real, painful problems', a 
concern with the application of highly developed, ready-made techniques 
(often referred to as 'solutions looking for problems', rather than 
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problem-solving. In systems engineering this was achieved through the 
elaboration of definite procedural rules to a problem which was 
circumscribed by identification of the 'gap' between an existing and a 
desired system. In systems analysis the key requirement before 
application of the set methodology was an explicit and fixed objective 
or goal for the analysis [Checkland, 1981, pp.128-141]. 
Checkland identifies these 'systematic' approaches as limited to 
hard problems, and not at all useful to soft problems which require a 
more • systemic' view. This crucial distinction between hard and soft 
problems (its relation to Bertalanffy's open and closed distinction is 
examined in the next chapter) has a precursor in Simon's [1960] 
programmed (well-structured) and non-programmed (ill-structured) 
distinction while soft has a transatlantic cousin in Ackoff's 'messy' 
problems 7 Ackoff describes a mess as a 'system of problems' [Ackoff, 
1974, p.4]. These relations are examined in Chapter 4. 
Both the hard approaches and the soft view are seen as responses 
to the keynote of complexity and are taken as attempts to deal with the 
complexity 'which defeats the reductionism of the scientific method' 
[Checkland, 1981, p.245]. However, the distinction appears to arise 
around a difference in the type, or attitudes to the type, of 
complexity within the problem structure. Checkland does not dispute the 
usefulness of hard systems approaches but sees them as limited to 
particular aspects of problems readily available to solution. He is 
particularily concerned to avoid the 'answers' syndrome pointed to by 
Rapoport above - the 'solutions looking for problems'. 
While the hard/soft distinction is itself vague, the difference 
might be succinctly interpreted as arising where the perception of 
problem structure is in doubt. Hard systems approaches reflect a 
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'decision model' orientation rather than a 'problem-solving' 
perspective and it is exactly over this possibility that part of the 
'active' nature of the problem lies in the perception of problem 
structure which earmarks Checkland's need for a soft methodology to 
allow changes in the problem structure to be made. 
5.2 the purpose of a soft methodologx 
Checkland's methodology is fundamentally concerned with the possibility 
of poorly stated or mistaken objectives in problem-solving (clear 
objectives being the province of systems analysis) or loosely and 
wrongly circumscribed problem spaces (difficulties in problem 
recognition and definition) which could give rise to difficulties which 
essentially concern the 'structure' of the problem. In this sense, 
therefore, Checkland has characterised his approach, with relations to 
Churchman [1971], Emery and Trist [1960] and Vickers [1970], as having 
a core concern with 'learning' (the essence of the problem-solving 
perspective) as distinct from 'optimizing' (the orientation of decision 
models) [Checkland, 1981, p.258]. Of crucial importance to optimizing 
approaches is the stability of the 'ends-means' relationship (systems 
analysis beginning with the 'ends' route through well-defined goals and 
systems engineering concentrating on readily available 'means' or 
stable perceptions of 'how'). 
Checkland's discussion of the ends-means analysis infers a basic 
reluctance to assume any stability in this relationship since the 
perceptions of this relationship, in 'soft' problems, can be expected 
to change and may alter dramatically. While a possible definition of a 
'hard' problem is where the essential entity can be captured within the 
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realm of one dimension, Checkland's approach revolves round recognising 
the inter-relations among entities; for example, a system may be 
conceived as 'serving' another in which case the system served must 
also be included in the problem space. In this context, the application 
of systems engineering principles or method to social problems, 
invariably multi-dimensional, has been particularily attacked [Hoos, 
1972]. 
It is because of this lack of stability of means-ends 
relationships and the need to move across dimensions to consider 
different types of inter-relations that the methodology, is largely 
built round the pre-conceptualization (problem definition) stage of 
problem-solving, principally deriving 'root definitions' (discussed 
below), and also, crucially since it must be expected that these root 
definitions can be improved through the learning process inherent in 
problem-solving, the iterative comparison of 'conceptual models', 
derived from the root definition(s), with the 'rich picture' describing 
existing structures across a wide range of dimensions. 
5.3 outline of Checkland's methodology 
The soft systems methodology is itself 'soft'. Checkland has argued 
that no-one can claim definitively to have applied it or deny that it 
works; it can neither be held to have been applied successfully, nor 
can it be said that it has failed. Checkland is careful to stress that 
it is not a theory (compare the earlier discussion on G.S.T.) and as a 
methodology is not open to refutation [Checkland, 1972, p.76]. It is 
also complex and multi-layered in its elaboration, and, unlike systems 
analysis, need not be carried out sequentially. 
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Basically, see Figure 1, it is made up of seven stages: from (1) 
the problem entity, (2) the problem is expressed in a 'rich picture' 
and then (3) the root definition is formulated. From the root 
definition (4) a conceptual model is made. These four stages can be 
compared with the single 'identify problem' stage of systems analysis. 
After this (5) a comparison is made of stages four and two from which 
(6) feasible or desirable changes may be selected and finally (7) 
action for improvement taken. Stages five, six and seven may be 
usefully compared to the generate alternatives, evaluation and 
implementation stages of systems analysis out of which Checkland's 
methodology grew. It is in stages one to four in which the methodology 
is most different and, in stages three and four where it is most 
distinctive. 
In distinct contrast to the vagueness of the 'systems' aspect to 
systems analysis, where there appeared to be a confusing identity 
between the problem identity and the notion of system - leading systems 
analysts not only to a dangerously incoherent 'total systems' approach 
but to seek to engineer or design, with disappointing and potentially 
disastrous results, ever larger systems [Hoos, 1972] - Checkland has 
separated the entity under investigation, the problem, from discussion, 
or, he phrases it 'talk about' the problem; it is this latter stage 
which he perceives to be amenable to systems thinking; the discussion, 
talk about, systems is kept distinct from the entity which gives rise 
to perceptions about problems. A further difference is the involvement 
-
of the researcher who is taken to be an actor rather than an observer; 
the action research focuses on change and there is an inter-action 
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5.4 roots of the methodology 
A difficulty of the G.S.T. approach was its apparent excessive concern 
with wholes, a problem further discussed in Cbapter 2. Checkland's 
split between the real world entity, that from which the problems are 
arising, and the abstraction of system, the problems which are in the 
actor's view, as observer, provides a quite different and potentially 
much more flexible approach. The phenomenological implications of this 
approach, which stresses the inability to have knowledge directly about 
the world, have been identified by Checkland, who particularily 
identifies Husserl [Checkland, 1981, pp.273-277]. 
Although there is no place here for such a discussion, in passing 
it might be said that Husserl's phemonenology is essentially a priori, 
leading to idealism [Sprigge, 1984, pl16-117]. However, others, 
particularily Heidegger, in his deepening of perceptions of the nature 
of ontology, through his explication of 'being-in-the-world' 
[Heidegger, 1973], together with Schutz's 'interpretative' perspective 
of existential phenomenology [Schutz, 1970], have enriched 
phenomenology and given an empirical or interpretive base to it. 
These therefore seem potentially more fruiful referents for 
further investigation than Husserl's abstract axiomatization. However, 
from his teacher Brentano, Husserl crucially introduced the concept of 
'intentionality' [Husserl, 1960]; that is, all our mental activity is 
about something. It is in this context that a link can be established 
between phenomenology, having intentions about things (more 
specifically acts), and the importance of the tie between systems 
thinking and problem-solving. And it is this which gives Checkland his 
warrant for emphasising the mental level of systems being 'talk about' 
other subjects. 
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5.5 the methodology as a systems approach 
Checkland's deliberate restricting of systems thinking to the evolving 
of the root definition and the construction of the conceptual model 
marks a considerable advance on the generalized and potentially 
bankrupt systems claims of the hard methodologies. Nonetheless, and 
despite the potentially fruitful links to phenomenology, it is still 
not apparant what the systems thinking is. Checkland makes much of the 
four crucial systems terms, 'emergent properties', 'hierarchy', 
'control' and 'communication' [Checkland, 1981, pp.74-92] but the 
actual application of these terms, surprisingly, is nowhere evident in 
the methodology. While a root definition might be seen as an emergent 
property and the drawing up of a conceptual model evidences hierarchy 
indirectly through the notion of a sub-system, this lack of 
reflexivness is disappointing and out of character with Checkland's 
otherwise instructive and interesting considerations. 
The point being made here is not that systems terms are absent 
from Checkland's discussion of his methodology. Indeed, his analysis is 
very rich in terms of inter-connectedness, purpose and boundary. Rather 
it is that the principles on which these terms apply are not disclosed 
and, further, that the nature of systems thinking itself is not 
disclosed except negatively as an alternative to reductionism. 
Checkland himself quotes Jones as raising this point: 'General theory 
is nowhere in evidence' [Checkland, 1981, p.24S) and, further, that the 
methodology is 'an ad hoc theory'. Considering the action base to the 
research, this absence is not perhaps surprising and, as was mentioned 
by Emery earlier, researchers are possibly reluctant to fix their 
conceptual framework. However, Checkland has incorporated a logical 
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analysis by Smyth and himself to check the 'well-formed' nature of a 
root definition [Smyth & Checkland, 1976] but this is more a question 
of internal validity; no overall systems rationale is clear. 
5.6 relations to G.S.T. 
There is an implication, although he is critical of G.S.T., that 
Checkland sees Bertalanffy's work as having the place of a referent 
level; that is developments or suggestions at the problem solving end 
may be checked against G.S.T. Any connection between them, however, is 
very vague and loose and Checkland himself has developed more the links 
of his methodology with sociological perspectives than he has attempted 
to derive an epistemological framework [Checkland, 1984, 1981]. 
Further, where Bertalanffy makes mathematics central to G.S.T., 
Checkland eschews it altogether. It is also the case that explicit use 
of Bertalanffy's key concepts of open and closed, equifinality and 
differentiation are missing from discussion of the methodology; and yet 
all of these, as is further discussed in Chapter 2, seem implied by the 
discussion as the methodology is infused by an appreciation of these 
concepts. 
In making fully distinct Bertalanffy's approach, it is helpful to 
keep "G.S.T.'s 'basic science' orientation separate from the 'action 
research' programmes of Checkland and others [Kindler and Kiss, 1984]. 
While the purpose of the soft methodology is effectively to bring 
foward the beneficial experience of the past through a flexible 
procedural structure, to guide the problem solver rather than leave the 
choice of heuristics to be completely open or ad hoc, the gap between 
it and the level of Bertalanffy's discussion is too wide to see any 
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'fruitful connections. There is the temptation to see a G.S.T. approach 
as on a 'higher' level, but it would be perhaps more correct to see 
Bertalanffy as standing or working 'backwards' from system approaches 
to his general theory and Checkland as using systems ideas to help work 
(foward) on problems. 
This idea of working foward (an emphasis on a close focus on the 
problem using a specific'methodology) hints at an operational concern 
to the soft methodology and Checkland has allowed Naughton's criticism 
that there is more than a 'whiff of functionalism' about the 
methodology [Checkland, 1981, p.252]. Nor is Checkland's approach 
without its use of reductionist, or at least analytical, techniques~ 
especially stages 2 and 5 are reliant upon these. Until the nature of 
systems thinking is clarified the heavy reliance of systems on being 
grouped together as 'anti-reductionist' looks suspect and lacks 
security. 
6.1 diversity of approaches 
The work carried out under the systems banner is exceedingly diverse. 
Despite frequent references by some authors to the 'systems movement', 
among other terms, it is not at all the case that the actual research 
is as unified or characterised by similar procedures as the label might 
imply. What connection is there between, say, the research pioneered 
by Emery and Trist at the Tavistock Institute and Hitch and Quade at 
RAND? Or between Churchman's inquiring systems and Ackoff's 'complex 
planning'? Or between Boulding's classification of system levels and 
Mesarovic's mathematical schemas? While Checkland has attempted to 
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unravel his own position and compare his approach to others [Checkland, 
1981, pp.254-264], attempts to forge connections among the many strands 
of the systems literature quickly raises differences of the order 
discussed above. 
In this chapter two central strands of thought have been traced: 
those interested in the issue of a 'theory of theories' (G.S.T.), where 
the concentration tends to be on wholes which are assumed to be 
purposeful as part of that whole (this is further discussed in Chapter 
2); and those faced with 'active' problems (see section 4.2 above) and 
where the stress was on the purposive, or 'telenomic', nature which was 
brought to the problem entity through an inquiry. Some of those 
interested in the theory level have developed much of their work in the 
abstract with no explicit problem in view. Much of the work on active 
problems has simply concentrated on finding solutions peculiar to the 
problem in hand; it is difficult to recover the nature of the solution 
in terms external to the problem even when, in the case of systems 
analysis, an external framework has been applied. 
This seems to set up a dichotomy between the entity of a knowledge 
system (the theory level) and the entity of an 'active' problem (the 
observation level). Expressed in these terms, the project of 
unification of science through systems theory would require the 
development of G.S.T. as a knowledge system and the disciplines to act 
as 'active' problem entities. However, at present G.S.T. amounts to 
little more than a loose collection of homologies with no claim to 
being a system and whose only rigor derives fundamentally from 
applications of mathematics (which might be better placed to press its 
unifying claims). It is also not clear in what way a discipline could 
be regarded as problem entities, since either problems occur within the 
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discipline (and require the 'system' or view of the discipline) or they 
occur outside the disciplines. 
While Checkland and other systems researchers have identified a 
group of problem entities which lie outside the framework of the 
traditional disciplines, the lack of specification at the theory level 
makes it not yet clear as to what extent there may be simply a new 
discipline appearing round the discovery of a method for handling a 
particular type of problem entity. And, indeed, since problems need to 
be perceived, some observation method, formal or informal, is required 
for formulation of the problem as an entity. If this, the observation 
methodes), is to be called the systems level, then a difficulty arises 
as to the demarcation of traditional problem entities, perspicuous to 
the well-recognised disciplines, and those problem entities which are 
not amenable to reductionist analysis in the normal way unless these 
are termed 'systems' problems. 
Although Checkland has identified the problem entity level with 
'real world systems', there is little doubt that he also wishes to 
regard his methodology in systems terms, as is evidenced by his 
emphasis that systems thinking is to help talk about other subjects 
(see section 5.3). The problem here will be fully discussed in the 
next two chapters but, for the moment, it should be said that the 
perceived problem may arise in the artificiality of the distinction set 
out above and that some reflexiveness, systems appearing at both 
levels, is to be expected. Before considering this issue, however, it 
will aid exposition if the problem entities which are recalcitrant in a 
discipline are termed anomalies, in line with Kuhn's discussion [Kuhn, 
1970] and distinguished from those problem entities which appear in the 
structure of an organization as dysfunctional and which Checkland has 
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termed active problems. 
6.2 reflexiveness between levels 
Boulding argued against the development of G.S.T. as a general theory 
of 'practically everything', holding that generality is paid for by 
sacrificing content. Instead, a level should be found between the 
meaningless particular and the contentless generality: 
the specific that has no meaning and the general that has no 
content 
[Boulding, 1956, p.197] 
While Boulding's remark has a certain force, the discussion in the 
previous section suggests that the key to the issue lies more in 
identifing the inter-relations of the particular to the general, than 
steering between two lines which are never in any case hard and fast. 
What is of interest is the reflection of the general in the perceptions 
about the particular and the way in which the general is reflexive to 
the particular. 
For example, a particular difficulty of systems analysis is that 
the framework is so general that there is no proper connection to the 
specific problem and, therefore, there is no possiblity of 
reflexiveness between the experience of the problem and the structure 
of the framework. The danger is that a pre-supposed sequence sails 
above the actual problem level; in certain cases a hard methodology 
simply 'passes the problems by'. In this context, Checkland's approach 
is of particular interest since there is an attempt to make the 
methodology reflexive to the action research. The methodology is 
evolved from the work and part of the purpose of the work is to study 
the usefulness of the methodology. Here it must be noted that the 
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'softness' of the methodology is crucial to the success of such a 
project. Equally, as Checkland has emphasised, this softness makes the 
methodology not open to a Popperian falsification. These considerations 
raise the question of the status of Checkland's methodology: is it a 
general approach or is it particular? 
Typically, a methodology might be considered as a set of 
procedural rules, bound by theory, and concerned with capturing 
specific types of observations. Checkland would see this as too 
particular and draws a distinction between 'substantive' theories and 
'methodological' theories. The value of the latter is that they draw 
the problems (entities) into the discipline [Checkland, 1981, p.7]. 
Once 'inside' the discipline, these entities might be regarded (since 
Kuhn regards sciences as constituted around methods more than theories) 
as the 'exemplars' around which the discipline's paradigm is 
constituted [Kuhn, 1970]. However, since Checkland considers 'systems' 
as a 'meta-discipline' [Checkland, 1981, p.7, his italics], it is not 
at all clear, remembering earlier difficulties with G.S.T., that the 
problem entities with which Checkland deals could form 'exemplars' at 
the level of a 'meta-theory'. 
Indeed, Checkland's distinction is perhaps more useful to clarify 
'anomalies', which are recalcitrant to approved methods, and paradoxes 
which are logical difficulties for the accepted theory. Contrary to 
Checkland's methodology simply 'bringing in' problem entities into the 
discipline, a major force of the soft methodology of Checkland is that, 
using iterative loops, some reflection of the 'active' problem as it is 
captured in the concrete level of the 'rich picture' also appears in 
the abstract level of the 'conceptualization' of the model. This 
reflexivity then allows the use of iterative loops. 
75 
6.3 systems as a language 
Boulding takes his 'systems' level to fulfil the tasks of G.S.T.7 
identify similar theoretical constructs in different disciplines and 
indicate areas for potential development in empirical knowledge. But he 
also is arguing for this level as a language for inter-disciplinary 
communication. The advantage of systems as a language, rather than a 
theory, is that it avoids the potential paradox in the 'holism' of 
systems· 'reducing' (reifying?) all the disciplines to 'systems'. This 
emphasis on language is also echoed in Checkland who sees systems as a 
way of 'talking about' other subjects: 
What distinguishes systems is that it is a subject which can 
talk about the other subjects. 
[Checkland, 1981, p.S] 
While the foregoing discussion should have made clear the 
limitation of Checkland's methodology as it presently stands (it is not 
a general mode for discussion of other subjects, but a mode for 
investigation of particular problems), it is also suggestive of the 
need to examine systems, not as a theory (or theory of theories) but as 
a language or level of discourse. 
What might distinguish systems, systems thinking, from a natural 
language, such as English, or an artificial language, such as PASCAL or 
PROLOG? Mesarovic has indicated one property of disciplinary knowledge 
is abstraction: 
Knowledge in any particular discipline is embodied in a 
theory which as such is an abstract construct. 
[Mesarovic, 1964, p.xiii] 
Bearing in mind the possible use for inter-disciplinary 
discussion, a systems language would appear not only to be abstract, 
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have the ability to stand as 'arbitrary objects' (apply to anyone of a 
range of particulars), but also use and organize abstract notions, such 
as 'generic terms' (the ability to handle or use arbitrary objects). 
This might appear to take it away from a natural language which, while 
containing concepts, is directed towards natural phenomena or 'objects' 
(Things). Equally, however, the lessons of. action research point to the 
need to direct attention to 'active' problem entities and that,· 
further, the complexity of these entities makes them partially 
accessible only through the use of natural language. 
A major property of systems as a language would also be its 
attention to reflexiveness. A tendency towards circularity in natural 
language definition, which arises when basic terms are being considered 
has already been pointed to in the discussion on system definition. 
Difficulties also exist in logical languages and are illustrated by the 
large number of paradoxes [Quine, 1966], such as the Russell paradox 
of the 'class of all classes'. Frequently calls for 'meta theory' can 
be heard to solve problems of arbitrariness in definitions or ad hoc 
solutions on the theory level; little is said usually on how the 
metatheory itself will escape arbitrariness. If systems thinking is to 
operate on the metatheory level as well as the theory or object level, 
reflexiveness will prove a key characterisitic. 
6.4 a systems logic 
Hrones, like Boulding, does not see the point of G.S.T. to be the 
'interrelation of all things' but, in contrast, sees systems more as an 
extension of logic: 
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we can acheive a framework of logic which will enable us to 
design an predict systems of far greater complexity than 
those that can be dealt with today 
[Hrones, 1964, p.x] 
Again this appears to push the systems language in the artificial 
direction. However, most artifical languages are logic-based and it 
would be redundant simply to duplicate the logic task. In any case, a 
number of systems thinkers including Checkland take the stand that 
systems as such is a mode different from logic. In particular, Angyal 
[1941] has argued forcibly for the development of a 'systems logic' to 
replace the reliance on traditional 'two-variable' relational logic 
which he shows to be intrinsically reductionist in character. 
In Angyal's analysis, fully developed in Chapter 2, traditional 
logic is shown to be one form of logic fulfilling particular tasks. In 
particular, most formal logics may be considered as 'truth-preserving', 
their function is not directed at truth itself, but validity [Flew, 
1975]. A set of strict limitations within any logic is placed upon 
types of relations in order to ensure validity, or internal 
consistency. While the fundamental rule of self-contradiction cannot be 
absent from systems thinking as a logic, it cannot be bound to 
traditional validity rules since much of the interest is also with 
external relations. While science is also concerned with external 
relations, those sciences to which reductionism is central procede by 
isolating one variable or part of a system from the rest and examining 
causality. The systems approach is intent instead on the behaviour of 
the system as a system. It is also purposive in its inquiry, whereas 
reductionism eschews purpose altogether. 
In terms of the theory of signs (see Chapter 3), a distinct 
difference between natural language and artificial languages is the 
latter'S propensity to be largely syntactical in structure (concern 
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with internal relations) with a virtual indifference to semantic 
content except for the limitations embedded with the highly specific 
pragmatics (purpose) implicit in the choice of syntactic structure. 
Natural language, although semantics directed, retains a flexibility in 
terms of pragmatics. The abstract level of systems discussed above 
leads it towards being syntactic in emphasis rather than semantic, but 
the problem-solving emphasis pushes the language to be more concerned 
with meaning and semantics. However, since purpose is also open for 
investigation, not only can a systems language not afford to 
attempt to be either be purely syntactical like most formal logics, nor 
solely semantic in base, but it further has to pay attention to 
pragmatics. 
Since all three aspects of signs appear to be needed, pragmatics, 
syntactics and semantics, in the development of a systems language, its 
clear relation is to natural language. However, it can be considered 
that natural language is too permissive. The concern against systems 
being a vehicle for anything and everything has already been expressed 
by Boulding. Crucial to the development of systems is to find a means 
of restricting the use of terms but, crucially, without the rigidity of 
fixed syntactical rules. This would satisfy the 'logic' requirement. 
Additionally, the requirements of 'abstraction' and 'reflexiveness' 
need to be added. This challenge is now considered in Chapter 2. 
7.1 summary of discussion 
Systems thinking has been portrayed, in part, as a reaction to 
reductionism and mechanism. In particular the notion of a whole or 
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'system' counterpoints the reductionist tendency to break the whole 
(problem) into parts and the notion of 'purpose' reintroduces 
purposive, or telenomic, aspects into the problem space where before 
mechanism considered only functional or 'efficient' causes. 
Two main strands of approaches to systems revolve round these 
fundamental concepts. In reaction to the autocratic unity imposed by 
physics on science through the extreme reductionist position of logical 
positivism, General System Theory with its emphasis on wholes arose as 
a counter-bid to achieve unity. However, in so doing it was caught in 
the same doubtful assumption of the possibility of unity. This gives 
rise to an apparent paradox in the reduction of disciplines into the 
holism of systems. Popper's demarcation problem was also used in the 
discussion to question the desirability of an axiomatized general 
theory which, using Bertalanffy's 'empirico-intuitive' method, is not 
open to observation and falsification. The reliance on mathematics of 
G.S.T. was further held open to question, both in the suspect 
identification of homologies and in the 'tenuous' relation of 
axiomatizing to actual systems problems. In being stranded on the 
dubious issue of the unity of science, focusing on the vague notion of 
wholes and being caught up in the 'ceremonial' use of mathematics, 
G.S.T. as it presently stands looks ill-conceived and ill-founded. 
In reaction to the limits of the mechanist fixity of function, 
purposive approaches developed under the collective title of systems 
research. While systems engineering and systems analysis in different 
ways paid attention to goals, there were certain limitations in their 
reliance on means-ends analysis. Checkland has identified these as 
'hard' systems approaches and introduced his own 'soft' methodology for 
dealing with multi-dimensional complexity and loose or unstable 
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relations between means and ends. In .particular, out of his action 
research programme, Checkland appears to have drawn the need to 
restrict the application of 'system' by separating the abstract systems 
level of thinking, evolving root definitions and conceptual models, 
from the investigation level of the real-world entity. Despite this, an 
overall rationale in systems terms is lacking and although Checkland 
offers some helpful attempts at mapping possible connections to G.S.T. 
the links are tenuous and, from the foregoing discussion, need 
rethinking if they are to be worth saving. 
This distinction between the focus on wholes by G.S.T. and the 
focus on purpose by systems researchers is a reflection of the 
involvement of biologists in the former where, for many of the entities 
being considered, purpose was part of the whole, the 'organic' entity 
was purposeful. For the systems researchers, especially in the field of 
management of resources or information, the 'conceptual' entity 
required the imposition or recognition of what was purposive, goals, 
objectives, ends or aims. Where those concerned with the more 
abstractive (that is, abstracting from real problems) systems thinking 
in management have entered the more general realms of systems thinking, 
for example Boulding and Jordan, they have discussed the project of 
G.S.T. more in terms of a 'language' or a 'logic' which needs to be 
evolved. Checkland's own line of reasoning follows this although he has 
not developed the theme. 
7.2 conclusions 
An important conclusion of the discussion on a goal for systems theory 
in the unity of science was that too great an emphasis on wholes looked 
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unhelpful. Instead the holistic emphasis needs to be split between the 
real-world entity, the problem which lies out there, and the 
abstraction of system, the problem which is in the actor's view. The 
phenomenological implications of this positiop have been explored by 
Checkland and the implicit position is that of being unable to know the 
world (in any certain way) direct. Reality can never be known, only 
'touched', hence the importance of language in describing such 
'touches'. However, what is also needed is a language or logic level in 
which the semantic content or psychological 'set' surrounding each 
touch can be abstracted from to allow conceptual shifts in perception 
without giving rise to a 'Chinese Encyclopedia' effect. A 'site' is 
needed which permits perspectives to be 'exchanged' for another view in 
an organized way. 
In view of this potential need to exchange semantic content, such 
a language cannot be a meta-language in the usual sense of an 
artificial language evolved from a restricted syntax such as the 
adoption of a strict law of non-contradiction, since such languages are 
necessarily semantic indifferent. However, some restriction on the 
introduction and use of terms seems important in view of some of the 
vagueness, circularity and weak analogising which surrounds much so-
called systems work. Other important properties of such a language or 
systems logic would seem to" be reflexiveness, not only in the need to 
switch perceptual views on the problem entity to evolve a systems 
abstraction, but also it would seem desirable for the language to be 
self-reflexive. That is, the language should not only assist the 
discourse or talk about systems, but should apply recursively to itself 
(this property was absent in Ackoff's conceptual framework). 
The fundamental terms of systems thinking revolve not around 
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wholes direct but the application of 'system' and 'purpose' to problem 
entities. While some developments are evident in the methodology of 
systems approaches, the actual systems application remains highly 
intuitive. While for the moment they are only suggestive as to the 
critical differences between systematic and systems approaches, the 
main properties of systems thinking would appear to be abstraction, 
restrictions on the introduction and use of terms and, importantly to 
investigate the system-purpose relationship, reflexiveness between 
abstract or conceptual models and the problem entity. Such properties 
suggest the possible development of a systems language or logic and 




A Systems Logic 
1.1 introduction 
In Chapter 1 the development of systems thinking was traced as a 
reaction in part to the positions of reductionism and mechanism and, 
further, the idea of unity of science through General System Theory was 
examined before discussion of the more diverse field of systems 
research. The particular contribution of Checkland's soft methodology 
was examined as an attempt to explicitly tie together the purposive 
nature of systems enquiry to problems. 
However, the idea of a unity of science was held to be incoherent 
and G.S.T. was also shown to be vulnerable to criticisms about its 
validity, either in its undiscriminating importation of systems 
'results', with potentially self-contradictory consequences, or in the 
absence of any external verification tests arising from it being closed 
to falsification. In these circumstances, the suggestions of others 
interested in the potential for a systems language (where substantive 
claims on truth open to tests might enter) or systems logic (where 
controls on internal validity might be introduced) were put foward as 
potentially more fruitful for investigation than the direction for 
General System Theory proposed by Bertalanffy. The intention in this 
chapter is to explore this potential for a systems language or logic 
and make suggestions towards developing such a language or logic. 
The central question is what might such a language or logic look 
like? Further, what are the elements in either languages or logics 
which either seem desirable or are essential? For example, at the root 
of logics are restriction rules which add to the central notion of 
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avoiding self-contradiction and ensure 'validity' of internal 
operations on terms or variables. At the centre of technical languages 
(or conceptual frameworks) are some core concepts which purport to 
carry some vital insights or 'truth' of the external world and, in so 
doing, introduce the possibility of tests. All other concepts are then 
used in reference to these core concepts. 
Much of the discussion in this chapter in concerned to outline how 
it is possible for a systems language or logic to capture something of 
both these aspects, without the consequent difficulty of importing with 
these the fixed perspective of a specific discipline. Particular 
distinctions will be drawn between restriction requirements over 
arrangements as compared to relations, in respect of logic, and between 
core concepts and the Wittgensteinian notion of end terms in respect of 
languages. 
However, in order to consider some candidates for core concepts 
already extant in the systems literature, first the special or key 
terms proposed by Bertalanffy from his work in biology are discussed 
and various questions are raised. Then, after a fundamental basis to 
the systems approach has been d~veloped, these concepts are returned 
to, together with the terms which Checkland holds as important, and it 
is argued that, while some of the difficulties have been resolved, the 
particular end terms drawn from systems thinking are insufficient to 
operate with alone and further terms and criteria are needed. 
1.2 wholes and holism 
The key concept that arose from the discontent Bertalanffy and others 
experienced with reductionism and mechanism was the notion of 
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'wholeness' or 'wholes'. Recognizing that the concern of biologists 
lay, not simply with the properties of the parts alone, but with the 
organization of the parts, biologists began to recognise into analysis 
a new entity, that of the organized whole. Recognition of the entity of 
wholes permitted the study of the behaviour of wholes - as distinct 
from the study of the properties of the parts. 
Hidden here is a central dispute revolving round prediction. For 
the reductionist, the behaviour of any whole (were such a thing 
admitted) must be predictable from the properties of the parts; 
otherwise it is assumed that there can be no secure foundation for 
discussion of the behaviour and it can only be seen as metaphysical 
speculation. In contrast, the holist takes the whole as a recognizable 
entity having behaviour which is measurable. Some holists not only hold 
that the knowledge of the properties of the parts is too incomplete at 
present to afford prediction of holistic behaviour [for example, Nagel, 
1974], but also take the strong position that the reductionist approach 
is necessarily incomplete. An argument here by Angyal [1941] is 
returned to later in this chapter when the idea of a logic which deals 
specifically with the genus of wholes is considered. 
It may be noted here that an intermediate position is someone who 
holds that any discussion of parts can only fully be entered into 
through reference of the parts to the whole. Those who hold this 
position are also often referred to as 'holists' (and sometimes also 
'organists', if they also adopt the organismic analogy) and to the 
extent that they believe 'wholes' exist, they appear to share the 
holist position above, with the same difficulties to be discussed 
below. To the extent they merely see the whole as a referential 
construct, their position appears to be near the systems thinker, whose 
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approach this thesis is attempting to illuminate. 
1.3 the boundary problem 
A difficulty with the notion of a whole is precisely the recognition of 
that whole. The danger is of any recognition of a whole being 
convenient but arbitrary; if the recognition could be mistaken, or 
altered in some way, equally what is recognised or interpreted as 
behaviour may alter. Measurements alone are not secure enough a base to 
-build a science. While examples illustrating particular problems here 
will be returned to later, a difficulty fundamental to the holistic 
position may be noted: since it is a frequent claim of holists that 
'everything is hinged to everything else', it is difficult to see how 
recognition of any whole can be other than arbitrary. In passing it 
should be added here that while some 'hinges' seem less important than 
others, introduction of 'values' to hinges brings in the difficulty of 
perspectives; that is, it may only seem less arbitrary from one point 
of view while from another point of view the 'values' may be reversed. 
This problem of the recognition of the whole, discriminating the 
hinges, is known as the boundary probl~m and, as discussed below and as 
shown in Part II through the example of accounting, this is perhaps the 
most critical problem for the holistic approach, since it is not simply 
a question of delineating a boundary, where the boundary is, but also a 
matter of understanding the nature of the boundary; what sort of hinge 
is it? Critically, what does a boundary do? 
The problem of arbitrariness is not, however, unique to holism and 
some have returned the charge at reductionist science. Bradley, for 
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example, denies the reality of all re~ations since, for him, only the 
wrapped-up whole of the universe, the 'absolute', can be real 
[Bradley, 1897]. However, the claim of reductionism is that they have 
identified through measurements important relations, the importance of 
the relations arising out of their regularity or constancy. 
Reductionists, therefore, do not feel the need to claim their relations 
escape reduction and, by concentrating on properties of things, 
identify aspects of measurement which are stable and (relatively) 
unchanging. 
The difficulty of arbitrariness is critical to the holist's 
approach because the measurements concerned will be about behaviour, 
either a change takes place in the whole itself, or the behaviour of 
the whole affects or changes something else. A behavioural approach 
loses the justification of repetition or repeatability when doubt over 
an entity is expressed since it is concerned less with the unchanging 
properties of things (the whiteness of chalk) and more with transient 
stages of growth in an organism or an organization, and the changes 
which manifest within the organism as part of that growth, or with the 
changes that take place outside the whole as effects of the changes 
within. 
1.4 open and closed systems 
The principle area of interest for biology lay not, Bertalanffy 
perceived, with relatively unchanging physical objects, but with wholes 
organized for growth. To distinguish between these two types, he 
proposed a distinction between open and closed systems [Bertalanffy, 
1971, p.38-40]. Bertalanffy claimed that physics had dealt with closed 
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systems only and, indeed, thermodynamics explicitly made clear that its 
entropy laws held solely to closed systems. Since Bertalanffy was 
concerned with growth, that is with entities for which the second law 
of thermodynamics (entropy, or disorder, increases) did not appear to 
hold, the concept of 'open' systems was a natural reaction to an 
emphasis on 'closed' systems. 
While the concept of open systems was not precisely defined, a key 
emphasis which arose from the introduction of the concept was a focus 
on the exchange relations, the inter-relations of the 'system' with its 
'environment', required for the purpose of understanding growth, or the 
counter-action of decay. 
In this way Bertalanffy critically extended the previous work of 
Cannon on homeostasis, since this was fundamentally directed to the 
maintenance of internal relations. Here Bertalanffy also extended the 
rather static and introverted conception of homeostasis into 
eguifinality, which allowed different organisms to achieve the same 
final state from different initial positions, through differences in 
exchanges [Bertalanffy, 1962, p.36-37]. (In passing, the fruitfulness 
of Bertalanffy's work when addressing the problem of growth may be 
contrasted with the difficulties of his later ideas concerning the 
issue of a unity of science). 
1.5 system boundary 
For the purpose of identification of changes taking place within or 
outside a whole, some boundary to it must, implicitly or explicitly, be 
recognized. It becomes crucial, in order to formally identify the 
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boundary, to specify the exchange relations between the system and the 
environment and it is these which form the system boundary. From this, 
it can be seen that the selection of the systems boundary emerges from 
a consideration of system, purpose and environment. In terms of 
Checkland's analysis, this 'systems' thinking is an abstraction of the 
'entity' level and it is the abstraction which is potentially arbitrary 
in respect of the 'actuality' of the entity. It is from this abstract 
combination of system, purpose and environment that the potential to 
escape the charge of arbitrariness appears and this is returned to 
below. 
For the type of wholes which biology principally regarded as 
organisms, the distinction between the entity level (the whole itself) 
and the abstract level of systems thinking becomes blurred. Animals, 
for example, have a clearly discernible separateness from their 
surrounds. This 'natural' boundary appears to help justify application 
of the concept of a systems boundary but, in so doing, it encourages 
transfer of the concept of system boundary to the existential whole 
without examination of purpose and further encourages a tendency to 
identify any whole as having one single system boundary. 
While this move is convenient, in certain circumstances, it has 
the disadvantage of losing the essence of the systems approach which is 
purposive 1 that is the system relates to the purpose. With 'natural' 
wholes, purpose is left aside or is subscribed within the whole as 
'purposeful', 'self-purposive' or self-constructing. Typically, for 
these 'natural' wholes this purposfulness is left vague or given a 
potentially spurious teleological specificity in being designated as 
'survival'. The developments discussed in Chapter 1 reveal the slow 
'weaning' of systems thinking from the 'natural' systems or 
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'organismic' perspective. At the centre of difficulties of the 
organismic analogy is precisely this switch from 'purposeful' wholes to 
'purposive' entities whose recognition depends on the purposes 
introduced by the nature of the enquiry. 
Reliance on the open-closed distinction in terms of entities also 
becomes incohate. No known entity is completely closed, with the 
possible, but unknowable, exception of the universe. And, while 
Bertalanffy defines closed as 'no material enters or leaves' 
[Bertalanffy, 1962, p.23], this is inadequate since, not only is the 
level of material transfer not defined (consider the sand eroding from 
a block of sandstone - is this not leaving the 'system'?), but this 
would define an entity as closed which was open to energy and 
information importation. Equally, although apparantly not usually 
considered, there is no such entity which is completely open. All 
entities must be closed to some types of material transfer and closed 
to some types of information or energy importation. One example with no 
restrictions whatsoever on importation will serve to refute this claim. 
Considered at the level of wholes, therefore, the distinction 
between open and closed, becomes fuzzy, relying on an entity being 
relatively more open or relatively closed. While there is little 
dispute over the convenience of distinguishing between open and closed 
systems, a major test of a systems language would be to clarify the 
basis of this distinction. 
It also might be expected that a systems language could say 
something about equifinality, since it is unclear whether final states 
can ever be 'equal'; an organism that is open to exchange will be 
changed by that exchange, but not necessarily towards some 
predetermined end state. The possibility of some adaptation, in 
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consequence to exchange, needs to be allowed for. My returning to a 
university instead of joining a merchant bank changes my goal-
directedness as well as my intial or intermediate state; the self that 
is arising out of the university experience is not comparable to the 
one that might have emerged from merchant banking, since it cannot be 
presumed that my desires remain unchanged. 
2.1 consistency and completeness 
A possible heuristic in developing a systems language is that of a 
conceptual framework, as Ackoff [1971] attempted (see Chapter 1). The 
objective of this is to aim for a type of completeness and identify 
all the important concepts used by systems thinkers and construct some 
framework round the terms which are used to refer to these concepts. 
The difficulty of inclusion of all the systems concepts is not 
immediately apparent and arises from consistency (see also below) also 
being a requirement of a framework. That is, the inclusion of concepts 
should not result in self-contradiction. 
This type of completeness should be compared to a more strict 
definition of completeness in which all true statements (observables) 
are predictive from a theory. In the present context, completeness is 
to be understood (with some possible circularity here) as the concepts, 
which are derviable from some core concepts, cover all the required 
concepts. 
However, in the foregoing discussion, the basic position has been 
that certain important terms to systems thinking, particularily the 
open and closed distinction, need clarification. They cannot 
themselves, at least as Bertalanffy left the position, be treated as 
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fundamental building blocks for a systems language. This is suggestive 
that other terms which are considered crucial to systems thinking, for 
example Checkland's emphasis on 'emergence', 'hierarchy', 
'communication' and 'control' should also be treated with care (they 
are considered in more detail towards the end of this chapter and in 
Chapter 3). 
2.2 logical consistency 
An alternative heuristic to the aim of completeness in developing a 
conceptual framework is logical consistency. Rather than rely on self-
contradiction being discovered post hoc, the aim here is ensure an 
internal coherence in a prior way through using only transformation 
rules which are valid. Where there is doubt to the meaning of terms 
this heuristic is attractive. 
Fundamentally the concern is to retrict inclusion to that which is 
demonstrable and this was the method followed by Descartes, after 
employment of his reductionist rule. Whereas the latter rule was 
concerned to break the problems into separate parts, demonstration 
consists of building up from the parts towards the complex, restricting 
what is accepted as demonstration solely to the use of chains of 
reasoning modelled on Euclid. Two difficulties arise, however, with 
this axiomatic method. First, a fixed point or the knowledge of 
something indubitable is required1 secondly, what is taken as 
demonstrable is limited to a particular form of consistency. 
In the case of systems thinking it is not clear how either of 
these apply. Since systems thinking is abstract, no fixed point offers 
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itself (give me a fixed point, said Archimedes, and I will move the 
world)J in contrast 'system' seems ultra-flexible. Nor is there a ready 
equivalent to Descartes's cogito. And, perhaps even more fundamentally, 
what might amount to a method of demonstration in systems thinking is 
open to dispute. The role of logic in this area has been argued to be 
inappropriate and some proposals for a systems logic capable of dealing 
with the genus of wholes has been proposed. These arguements and 
proposals are now considered. 
2.3 a systems logic 
The question of a systems logic for the genus of wholes has been given 
particular attention by Angyal [1941] but remains relatively 
undeveloped. Angyal argues against reliance on traditional logic which 
he identifies as: a concern with relations which are reducible to two 
part relationsJ the reduction to aspects or properties (or immanent 
attributes) of objects from which the relationships are formedJ the 
absence of consideration of the dimensional domain in which the 
relations belongJ and an emphasis on direct relations. 
In constrast Angyal holds that systems is the abstract 
consideration of 'arrangements' (not two-part relations), is concerned 
with 'positional' arrangements (not relations of properties). Further, 
this consideration of positional arrangement requires explicit 
attention to a 'dimensional domain' which participates in the 
consideration of arrangement (not something which serves as a mere 
disjunction for the relations) and, finally, the attention to 
positional arrangement or connexity stretches beyond contiguity and may 
require reference to the 'whole' - the positional arrangement on the 
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dimensional domain (and is not concerned with direct relations only) 
[Angyal, 1941, pp.18-25]. 
Angyal's reference to 'wholes' here is unfortunate, bearing in 
mind the previous discussion, since it might appear that Angyal was 
referring to an existential, whereas his context for discussion of 
systems is that of 'abstract' conceptualization: 
The term 'system' is used here to denote a holistic system. 
Further, in using this term we abstract constituents 
('elements') and refer only to the organization of the whole. 
[Angyal, 1941, p.20] 
Angyal's discussion maps perfectly with Checkland's emphasis on 
the systems level conceptualization being an abstraction of perceptions 
at the entity level. Angyal's discussion is of 'arrangements', giving 
emphasis to positional aspects, at the systems level, while 
'relations', it is suggested here, may be usefully taken to represent 
connections perceived at the entity level, particularily the functional 
relations of cause and effect. In this way, systems thinking is taken 
to be complementary, and not mutually exclusive, to the use of 
traditional, or more modern, logics which may be better suited to 
examining functionality. 
In brief, using somewhat metaphorical terms, systems logic can be 
understood as a logic of 'perspective' (discussion on arrangements is 
at the level of purpose~, while traditional logic is a logic of 
'function' (discussion of relations is at the level of syntax). The 
logic of perspective is understood by stepping back to consider 
arrangements or 'structure', the logic of function is entered by 
stepping foward and examining relations or two part connections. 
It may be added here that there now exist a wide variety of 
alternative logics to the traditional Aristotelian system. Haack 
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(1978] provides a very readable survey review of these and Matte~ch 
[1978] considers multi-valued logic and modal logics. However, while 
these innovations are important in developing the two-valued 
Aristotelian roots of logic, Angyal's logic appears radically different 
in its attempt to capture positional arrangements or extend the 
'dimensions' of logic. For these reasons, the various strands of 
developments in logic are not discussed further, although it is 
possible that at some point some fruitful integration of a multi-valued 
logic with a logic of arrangement may be given. At the moment, 
however, Angyal's contributions and extensions from the bivalence 
principle should not be confused. 
2.4 requirements of a systems language 
From the discussion in Chapter 1, the requirements for a systems 
language centred around its ability to aid discourse about entities, 
with a particular emphasis on the problem-solving aspect of systems 
thinking. Systems thinking is the abstract conceptualization of 
arrangements reflecting perceptions of relations at the entity level. 
The particular requirements noted in Chapter 1 were: 
(1) the potential to exchange semantic content 
(2) a restriction on the introduction of terms 
(3) the property of self-reflexiveness. 
Some of the requirements for a systems language may seem at odds 
with possible approaches to derive a language. While the heuristic of 
'completeness', attempting to integrate all systems terms, has been 
rejected, it was also evident that the heuristic of 'consistency' could 
not take the form of axiomatic reasoning. And, although Angyal's 
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exposition of systems suggests that positional arrangement should 
replace the method of traditional logic for demonstration in systems 
thinking, it is not clear how this will work. Can any arrangement be 
considered? This appears unduly permissive, are there no restrictions 
on the type of positional representation allowed? This would seem to 
contradict the need to restrict choice of terms. Further, there was the 
difficulty also of finding an equivalent of a fixed or indubitable 
axiom: instead, 'system' appears to apply to anything and everything. 
This, as discussed later, directly affects semantic content. 
The important issues to be settled are: how the systems language 
can be positional but incorporate restrictions ( this identifies 
'arrangements' with requirement (2) above), how it can have semantic 
content but be applied, if not to 'everything', at least in a general 
way (identifying 'relations' with requirement (1», and, additionally, 
how it could incorporate self-reflexiveness 





'arrangements' and 'relations')? Once these difficulties have been 
settled, the test of the language is in its application. How well it 
applies to a specific system, the accounting system, is considered in 
Part II. In the meantime, the ability to explain some otherwise vague 
systems terms such as 'emergence' or 'open' and 'closed' can be 
regarded as an important test and this is examined later in this 
chapter. 
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3.1 the need for end terms 
A particular difficulty in the use of language in any particular 
discourse is the importation of terms. The difficulty lies in the 
meaning, or semantic content, of a term. If the denotations of a term, 
objects to which the terms refer, are tightly specified, then this is 
sufficicent for logical rules to be applied to ensure that semantic 
entailment will map with logical entailment. However, if the precise 
dimensions of a term are vague or if the object to which the term 
refers is ambiguous, then an argument in which the term is used is 
potentially flawed. Given the difficulties in practice in setting 
precise dimensions or unambiguously specifying objects, the 
requirements of logic set formidable if not impossible standards for 
all but the most tightly constrained context. 
However, if precise meanings, definitions, of all terms could be 
. drawn from reference to other terms, whose meanings are known, no 
importation is required and the impractical validity checks through 
logic become unnecessary. In contrast to the use of external reference, 
the extension perspective of the logician, this move is towards 
internal reference, or intension (not intention). Rather than 
definition by ostension, the pointing outwards, it is a 'pointing 
inwards'; the justification for the concept's use being provided by its 
relation to a previously accepted concept. 
Such a move critically shifts the focus for justification from the 
term itself to the nature of its relation to the accepted concepts, to 
be discussed below, and is implicit in the frequent plea which can be 
heard for a 'conceptual framework' and pertains to a possible need for 
a set of 'terminal concepts' or end terms, terms subject to shared 
agreement and about which there can be no dispute. 
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Essentially, the perceived requirement here is for a core of 
accepted or undisputed concepts to which others may be referred either 
in a case of disagreement or where there is a need for clarification. 
Acceptance of a concept either comes through experiments, the 
application of methods, held to be particularily fruitful and known as 
'exemplars' or, instead, through the development of a theory. Strictly, 
the justification for the latter arrives through the use of logic1 a 
requirement for the acceptability of the theory is that it is logically 
consistent and, to ensure this internalization of logical checks on 
relations between core concepts and defined terms, usually any theory 
will be specified in a mathematical form. 
'Technical' languages appear to evolve in this way for the 
measurement sciences and Kuhn's discussion of the existence of 
'paradigms' in science [Kuhn, 1970] is suggestive of language entities 
which approximate this behaviour, analogously to the 'organized wholes' 
in biology. However, discussion of paradigms needs to be conducted with 
carel for example, the issue whether it is core concepts (theories) or 
key experiments (exemplars) which arbitrate disagreements over 
dimensions or denotations is itself open to dispute and, as well as 
being very much an issue in current debates in the Philosophy of 
Science [for example, Hacking, 1981], goes back through Kant's 
attempted resolution of the problem [Kant, 1929], to Descartes and 
Bacon and to the early Greeks. 
Nevertheless, within anyone discipline it can be expected that 
the core concepts are fundamental, even if temporarily, to that 
discipline 1 that the core concepts fully capture some rich insight 
particular to that discipline. In constrast, if systems thinking is 
inter-disciplinary, the quite different property of neutrality might be 
99 
proposed for the introduction to it of end terms. Such a proposal 
partly arises because of the variety of technical languages which have 
evolved and the need, if possible, to find a language which mediates 
among these. Checkland sees his choice of key terms as 'neutral ideas' 
[Checkland, 1981, p.250]. As such they may be thought to avoid the 
difficulty of imposition of core concepts from a preferred and partial 
viewpoint. 
3.2 the role of neutrality 
At first it might be thought that adoption of neutrality might 
contravene the particular requirement for a systems language, the 
potential to exchange semantic content - (1) above. If terms have 
semantic content, it is not clear how any concept can be 'neutral'. How 
can anything to which meaning attaches be regarded as neutral? It is 
in his discussion of 'paradigms' that Thomas Kuhn extended discussion 
of some of these philosophical difficulties into the area of science 
[Kuhn, 1970]. 
Recognising that it is the theory which appears to constrain the 
recognition of the facts, Kuhn's emphasis on a 'paradigm' is suggestive 
of the difficulties which theory intrudes into problem perception. 
Foucault has taken these matters further in the concept of a 
'discourse' in which he is suggesting that the perception is organized 
[Foucault, 1970]. These difficulties in what loosely is termed 
'perspective' might usefully be seen as analogous to that of pre-
selection or bias in what those psychologists particularily involved 
with problem-solving have termed the 'viewing set' [see, for example, 
Newell et al, 1958]. 
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As has been discussed at length above, much of the early 
discussion on systems, for example, arose in biology in an effort to 
displace physics as the sole contender for a unifying language of 
science (see Chapter 1). In consequence, the 'exemplars' of natural 
systems or organisms held considerable sway over researchers who have 
been slow to be weaned off such 'organismic' analogies. Indeed, a 
number of writers still follow Miller's depiction of social 
organizations as 'living systems' [Miller, 1978] as an attempt to 
counter mechanistic thinking in discussion of systems. Importation of 
'core concepts' from other disciplines not only leaves the approach 
open to the charge discussed in Chapter 1 of reliance on analogy, but 
also limits the applications of the approach by making any neutrality 
in the terms suspect. 
3.3 the meaning of neutrality 
In what sense can a term be neutral? An idea of Popper's can be 
adapted here. Popper holds that the information (semantic) content of 
theory comes from what is excluded by a theory or hypothesis; that is, 
the content comes from what is ruled out by what the theory entails, 
not what appears to be included or covered by the theory [Popper, 
1963]. The powerfulness of this position is not immediately apparent 
since it might be supposed that the relation was monotonic, the more 
ruled out, the greater the theory. This alone would soon reduce to 
absurdity. 
What makes Popper's idea viable is that some substantive content 
is carried in scientific theories and, this, together with the law of 
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non-contradiction, ensures that self-contradictions will arise from 
what appears to be ruled out and what appears included in a poor 
theory. 
the information content of a theory is the set of-statements 
which are incompatible with the theory 
[Popper, 1976, p.26, emphasis original] 
Popper's position is certainly radically different from the 
position which admires the all-embracing ambit of very general 
theories; these he would see as vacuous. Where a theory fails to rule 
out any eventuality, or any cause whatsoever, it can have no meaning. A 
theory of the type 'anything might happen' or 'God did it' has no 
information content because it could be applied to each and any event; 
it is unable to distinguish among events, they are all part of a 
sameness - from which claims to knowledge appear mystical rather than 
epistemological. 
Just so. By using the inverse of Popper's dictate and by making 
the concept of system potentially applicable to anything and 
everything, the concept becomes so general that it does attain an 
equivalent of a desired neutrality. Nothing is ruled out from possibly 
being considered as system. No prior logical or sematic rules debar 
something from being perceived as a system. The criticism of this 
(logical) emptiness of 'system' as a core concept which worried 
Bertalanffy is the strength of the concept as an end term. 'System' as 
a term may be applied to anything and everything. 
What is being discussed here is not a system, but the concept of 
'system' itself. The discussion, for the moment, is being directed 
away not only from the level of 'objects', discussion on systems which 
pertains to entities (particular organizations) or 'wholes' (the actual 
living organisms like animal) and the further use of 'system' as a 
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'generic' term to handle any particular predicates or properties of 
systems, towards that which organizes or arranges generic terms before 
they carry specific concepts or apply to specific entities. 
However, the application of the term system even as an end term 
cannot be without some consequences if it is to have some meaning or 
utility. This type of meaning enters end terms, not through ostension 
to specific objects (referents) but through their arrangement. This 
arrangement of end terms is facilitated through the introduction of a 
systems (or positional) restriction requirement, which will be 
discussed following the explication of the remaining end terms. 
3.4 the end terms 
Once the broad neutrality of the term system, as a term, is understood, 
it follows that content, information content, can only be given to the 
term system by an election of content through a particular application 
of the term system. And application of the term requires a purpose for 
the application to be held in view. What may be considered to be 
included in any particular system is governed,. therefore, by the 
particular purpose held in view. Since purpose again may apply to 
anything or everything, it, equally, must be considered as an end term. 
Here purpose as an end term must be kept strictly distinct from any 
particular purpose which any particular system (again, 'system' in this 
case no longer operates as an end term) may have or be attributed as 
having. 
Finally, since the law of non-contradiction must be observed, some 
term is needed for what is excluded from any applications of the term 
system. What is ~ system is termed environment. Again an end term, 
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it becomes operational only when a particular system is held in view. 
Technically, what is excluded from the system for any particular 
purpose is environment. It follows, however, that parts of the 
'environment' may, for other 'purposes', be regarded as 'system'. And, 
within the systems perspective, it also follows logically that the 
environment can only be represented or given shape as systems, since it 
stands defined in this negative role. 
Viewed in this way, the key terms, 'system', 'purpose' and 
'environment', which were suggested from the earlier discussion, 
concord with the discussion here on choice of end terms. The question 
arises as to whether this constitutes a sufficient choice. Need any 
other terms be considered? Here the question hangs around the 
restriction requirement, requirement (2) above, to be adopted. Since 
end terms are involved, it may be taken that the restriction should be 
as tight as possible, as few terms as may be required should be 
enclosed and, equally, remembering self-reflexiveness, requirement (3), 
the restriction requirement, the closure, should be a systems closure. 
4.1 positional arrangement and closure 
The tightest restriction arises if the three terms discussed, system, 
environment and purpose, alone can give rise to a type of closure. If 
these are end terms, no definition of the end terms is possible. In 
line with the inverse of Popper's dictum, all extensional relations are 
ruled out for any end term, there is no information content in an end 
term. However, this does not require that there is no meaning to the 
end terms, since 'meaning' of a type arises out of the inten~ionality 
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or arrangements in the end terms themselves. The crucial aspect here is 
that the terms system, purpose and environment are end terms which 
stand as distinct categories. The three end terms form a closed system 
and this may be given representation in the form of a triangle, 
indicating the way in which a positional arrangement as required by 
Angyal may give rise to closure. The end terms for any systems 
discourse, illustrating this closure and showing the discourse, talk 
of terms, bound by the system of end terms, may be summarized as 





At this fundamental level, no proper explanation of the use of 
this triangular form can be given other than its convenience as a 
device to represent the restriction requirement, in line with 
requirement (2) above. Nevertheless, it is not intended to be· 
metaphorical in its use, except in the loose sense that it suggests in 
its positional arrangement the horizons of any particular perspective. 
However, the intention is exactly to bring the limits or horizons of a 
particular perspective in view in order that these may be explicitly 
and formally considered. 
Although other devices may be possible (but see Chapter 3 for an 
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interpretation of the triad) the triangular shape stands to represent 
the phenomenon of closure in systems. Rather it is more suggestive of 
the set of all possible arrangements. In this strictest of all forms it 
does, however, in its emphasis on restriction, run in accord with the 
underlying rule in Occam's razor, not to multiply factors without 
necessity. The tightest and most stable entity may be also taken as 
being representable in the triangular form [Waddington, 1977, pp.169-
171]. Nor is the use of triads, and the emphasis on distinctions, in 
the attempt to make explicit personal constructs through the formation 
of Kelly 'grids' without interesti this is touched upon in Chapter 4 
although any clear mapping here is fraught with difficulty. What needs 
to be made clear is that the representation, triangular or otherwise, 
is a dimensional domain in which arrangements may be operated on to 
represent relations at the entity level. 
4.2 the end terms considered as system 
While Figure 1 is illustrative only, it is drawn in a form to indicate 
that the end terms operate with interdependence. System, purpose and 
environment are no mere set of end terms, loosely drawn together. They 
are definitively, through the closure which they evince, the end terms 
and they provide the dimensional domain from which 'arrangements' (the 
systems level examination) may be given infinite expansion through the 
importation of 'relations' (the entity level of perception or 
observation). System and environment may be operated on as a 
distinction, with purpose (in the hands of an observer) as the operator 
of that distinction. The selection of a particular purpose operates to 
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discriminate a particular system from its particular environment and it 
is at this level that any discussion of arrangements may be expanded to 
include relations embedded in entities, subject to the difficulties 
discussed below. 
The terms are also recursive in that they not only 'participate' 
(see Angyal above) in the conceptualization of a 'system' in which any 
particular discourse (a discourse relates to a set of terms in which 
the 'talk' is operating) is bound, but they also operate' self-
reflexively as a system of end terms for the purpose of being end 
terms. In this latter case, all other terms constitute the environment 
of terms which, for any particular purpose, may be drawn upon to gain 
derived terms. 
However, two difficulties present themselves. The first is that 
the severe closure obtained would appear to prohibit any discourse 
outside the end terms. The second is that, since 'purpose' is observer-
dependent, it might appear not to meet a strict criterion of an end 
term. It is, nevertheless, within the apparent difficulties and 
contradiction here that the potential for the end terms lies. The end 
terms must constitute a closed system, otherwise coherence (internal 
consistency) will be lacking. This is discussed below. Equally, the 
terms must be open to observer dependence or they cannot act as 
operators in the hands of observers. Unless they are open to observer 
interpretation, 'completeness', entry into the set of all entity 
relations, is unobtainable. This matter is exemplified and given 
particular attention later in this chapter. 
As a system of end terms, the strict criterion of observer 
independence is met since purpose is not in the hands of an observer: 
all the terms do is stand in an arrangement with each other, they have 
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no extensional content outside this arrangement. It is only when the 
observer wishes to construct a specific 'system' to talk about a 
particular entity that a specific, observer-dependent, purpose will be 
brought to bear. However, in this context it is crucial to understand 
that it is not the system of end terms which are applied to the 
specific purpose, but the specific purposes which may be brought to the 
system of end terms. These remarks need considerable elaboration and 
the operationality of the system is returned to below. In the meantime, 
since objectivity (independence from observer) properly lies in the 
application of the rules which affect closure, 
'consistency' is now considered. 
4.3 a'systems consistency criterion 
this aspect of 
As a system of end terms, they introduce their own logic of system. 
That systems logic operates in a different way to conventional logics 
was discussed above, with particular reference to Angyal who criticised 
conventional logics as being concerned with relationships of the 'two 
variable, linear form'. While the basis of formal logics is the law 
of non-contradiction, nothing can both be something and not that 
something, -(A & -A), other rules may be added; traditionally these 
were the law of identity, A = A, and the law of the excluded middle, 
A v -A. It is particularily with the bivalence of this last rule that 
systems logic dispenses in introducing spacial arrangements. 
While, strictly, the logic of systems is positional (traditional 
logic is seen sometimes as 'existential', things are either 'true' or 
'false'), a consistency criterion equivalent for systems may be stated 
formally as: no thing can be both system and environment for any 
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particular purpose. That is, if something is elected (i.e. for a 
particular purpose) as part of a particular system, then not that 
something can be considered as belonging to the consequent environment. 
This follows from the contra-position of the end terms since 
environment stands, in respect of purpose, as not system. 
Further, this consistency criterion for systems, additional to the 
fundamental law of non-contradiction is not, therefore, required as an 
additional and exogenous rule, but falls out, emerges from the system 
of end terms. Also, since the system of end terms is recursive in 
form, that is it can be used self-referentially, no logical paradox of 
the type 'the class of all classes' is involved. Nor are there the 
usual difficulties of the dubiety of axioms associated with metatheory, 
because transfer from one level of discussion of the next is guided by 
explicit consideration of purpose, not some concept of final truth. 
Since purpose, in its introduction of perspective, appears here as the 
key operator in the potential to exchange perspectives through changing 
purposes, substantial discussion of this is reserved for the next 
sections. 
4.4 closure and consistency 
As a system of end terms, it appears to upset some previous notions and 
in particular some omissions might seem surprising. No mention is 
made, for example, of 'information' or 'energy'. The completeness of 
the system might be thought, therefore, to be in question. However, 
since it is simply a matter of definition that what is not system is 
environment, the system of end terms is necessarily complete, although 
109 
such completeness is trivial, when the system of end terms is 
considered as a system gua system, all other terms are excluded and, 
hence, stand as an environment to the system. The completeness is no 
longer trivial when, in consideration of any particular system for a 
particular purpose, and when 'system' pertains to an 'entity', the term 
system is no longer operated on as an end term, since it will, no 
longer, be semantically empty. 
However, it is not clear how purpose may be operated on. The end 
terms are enclosed in themselves. As a system of end terms they exhibit 
closure. And any entity is also, as Kant [1929] remarked, a 'thing in 
itself', it is unknowable in itself. This might be pictured as follows 




Consideration of particular purposes is needed to open up the 
system of end terms. However, specific purpose can only be introduced 
by giving up the locked in, enclosed, general purpose of considering 
end terms. General purpose is exchanged for specific purpose. This 
allows the focus of 'system' to alter and, with this, what is 
designated by environment. However, it also appears that the 
consistency criterion also must be 'exchanged', since the closure of 
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the end terms must be given up. This can be shown as follows: 
purpose 
Figure 3 
The difficulty which arises here is that in opening up the end 
terms, no restriction on terms now seems available, the previous 
restriction requirement (the triangulation of the terms) is lost. The 
purpose of the end terms partly appears to fail since new restrictive 
rules appear needed and any introduction of those rules would appear 
arbitrary. For example, to jump ahead of the discussion, for the system 
to obtain content, information content, some specific purpose must be 
in the observer's view and some method used which applies a restrictive 
rule to ensure consistency. Any move towards completeness, or 
substantive content, is made at the cost of introducing restrictive 
rules which impose a more narrow form of closure. Note, in passing, 
that 'true' completeness, full descriptions of all information content 
for anyone set of restriction rules, may be regarded as impossible, 
since any information content is gained through exchange only and this 
will entail also switching restriction requirements. 
At the level of thinking about the system of end terms, the 
consistency criterion is the closure of system through that general and 
inward looking purpose. However, for investigation of substantive 
matters, such as ostensive description of phenomenal reality, or for 
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convenience of exposition, additional consistency criteria may be 
introduced. To the extent that this is so, completeness may no longer 
be maintained. The notion of completeness may be related to 
consistency like that of reality to a mirror. The perspicacity of the 
mirror is limited to the visual plane and the angle of the mirror, its 
veracity is further restricted by the material or type of glass. The 
world for the Lady of Shalott can never be complete and, for the 
moment, it seems that systems theory fails in offering much aid here. 
5.1 systems relations 
Attention to 'wholes', often taken as the rationale of systems 
approaches, while it has some intuitive appeal also does tend to appear 
fatuous, as it not only suggests a disdain of analysis and therefore 
comes up against the difficulties of how to proceed, but also meets the 
difficulty of nothing (except possibly the universe) being 'whole' 
within itself. 
approaches. 
Clearly, rather more must be involved in systems 
It is being suggested in this thesis that the purpose of discourse 
about systems (the arrangement level) is to discuss entities (the level 
of relations between things) in the perspective of their organization, 
not simply to discuss things (or wholes) themselves. Perceptions or 
'object-languages' already exist and are extended by the host of 
technical languages 1 what is needed is a language which permits 
discussion on possible arrangements that extend beyond the two-part 
relations encapsulated in causal discussion of the reductive mode, A 
then B. The holistic air to systems comes not simply from a concern to 
avoid reduction but, instead, is indicative of a desire to investigate 
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possible arrangements at the systems level in order to handle or 
reconstitute sets of relations measurable at the entity level. 
From the end terms system and environment, two possible sets of 
entity relations may be considered. The set of relations which are 
internal to any entity which the system reconstructs and represents 
through some positional arrangement. And relations which are internal-
external to the entity under view. Relations completely external to an 
entity can only come under view when the environment (or parts of it) 








needs to be 
depicted as 
systems 
In expressing the 'stubborn' persistence of the 'one dominant 
theme' of boundary definition or closure as the main problematic issue 
in systems approaches, it has been suggested by O'Arcy & Jayaratna that 
what takes place is an artificial closure drawn from the observer's 
perceptions of what is relevant [O'Arcy & Jayaratna, 1985, p.8S]. The 
schema in Figure 4 shows the clear dangers of arbitrary inclusion of 
relations under system instead of environment and vice versa. However, 
Figure 4 is also revealing in suggesting that, strictly, exchange 
relations (the main focus of arbitrary inclusions) are subsumed under 
purpose, where under the systems perspective, these need to be regarded 
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in systems terms. In fact, the analysis goes further. If at the systems 
level the positional arrangements are depicted, then at the exchange 
level any internal-external and external-internal relations can be 
considered. 
Specific entity relations, which the positional arrangements at 
the systems level attempt to describe, become clear only as purpose is 
made more specific. Closure at the systems level (abstraction) marks a 
notional grasp of an entity's boundary (the concrete level) when it is 
a particular entity, such as a business organization, which is under 
consideration. The pressing danger, or arbitrariness, of 'artificial 
closure' arises when these different levels, the schematic (systems) 
and the measurement (entity) levels are conflated. Much of the utility 
is Checkland's methodology can be presumed to come from the keeping the 
abstraction or 'conceptual' level of an organization sharply and 
systematically separate from the perceptions or observations at the 
'real world systems' level. It is only with such careful 'bookkeeping' 
that a need to acheive a better 'fit' can be felt and the use of 
iterative loops introduced. 
As an end term 'purpose' necessarily, remains open. It has no 
content. It is only when an observer wishes to give 'system' content 
that purpose becomes operative: the observer selects the system 
content in the perspective of his purpose. His purpose may be to 
describe an artificial system or a natural system; as an end term 
system is open to both. However, to describe a particular system, it 
becomes necessary to close up such openness - description of specific 
arrangements rules out other types of systems. The attempt to open up a 
discussion through providing a specific purpose, is termed a heuristic. 
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5.2 the direction of systems thinking 
As can be seen from the above, there exists in systems approaches a 
tendency towards conflating the systems level with the entity level 
(and many occasions on which it may simply be convenient to do this). A 
danger for this discussion of a systems language is that it tends to 
suggest that a language can be evolved towards the entity level. One 
expectation from the end terms might have been that all other terms 
could be directly derived from the end terms. Such a project would be 
hopelessly utopian and the closure and trivial completeness of the 
system of end terms rules against this. Language is, fundamentally, 
instrumental in its use, it arises out of purposes and its use is about 
something. Until some specific purpose is introduced, it is not about 
anything. 
The direction for systems thinking is not, therefore, necessarily 
towards problems. It is rather that problems, and problems at the 
entity level, are brought to systems thinking. The difficulties which 
arise in the use of reductionist techniques to gain knowledge arise 
with the insularity of that knowledge, the refusal to see beyond the 
measurements and an inability to question the use of the technique. 
Since the shift in the episteme in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, mentioned in the Introduction, knowledge has become 
essentially functionalist. Thinking in systems terms serves to clarify 
the heuristic nature of any technique and link the introversion of the 
purpose of applying a technique with the extroversion of why it was 
needed in the first place. 
In the terms that have been used, the set of possible techniques 
or methods which have been invented constitute the set of heuristics. 
At this general level of discussion, there is no limitation on the 
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number of heuristics for possible application of the end term system1 
it may be applied to either natural, artificial, abstract, or imaginary 
systems. It is convenient, in lieu of the attention given to them, to 
discuss applications in living systems before returning to abstraction. 
First purpose must be closed up to make specific the purpose in which 
the living system is to be viewed. 
example of a heuristic. 
Energy transfer provides a rich 
5.3 the perspective of energy transfer 
In considering any entity from the perspective of energy transfer, 
interest is in the energy exchange between the entity and its 
environment, the 'internal-external' and 'external-internal' relations 
deduced earlier. Von Bertalanffy's notions of openness and closure in 
terms of living systems can now be stripped of the muddle which 
attaches to these as descriptive categories of wholes. Viewed as 
systems, all entities exhibit closure and retain, in however limited a 
form, openness - this follows from the absence of any completely closed 
or completely open system. These terms describe system arrangements 
(not wholes viewed as objects) and the two terms represent a dual 
aspect of form. For form, there must be closure. However, that form 
itself leaves the system open in some other respect. Closure and 
openness are intimately, and inseparably, related to each other. 
Consider the importation of energy. The organism is organized in 
a special way which leaves it open to energy transfer. It is open to 
the type of energy transfer it needs, only through the closure that 
results from the organization. The closure of the organization, the 
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structure of the 'internal' arrangements, needs, however, to be 
discriminated from the closure within the workings of any particular 
function which composes the 'internal-external' relation and it is 
within these functions that there is the openness to allow exchange 
through external-internal relations. The interchange of energy is 
entirely dependent on the machinery of the open-closed relationship as 
to what type or level of energy is 'selected' and imported. It follows 
that the design of the structure of the function is itself crucial to 
matters of efficiency or effectiveness in energy importation. 
The exchanges of energy which are possible are made more complex 
by the consideration of the what is usually termed 'organization', the 
arrangements internal to the system. Such positional arrangements 
usually are introduced in terms of the structure of 'parts' [Feibleman 
& Friend, 1945]. Again, as with wholes, there is a problem here in 
treating these matters on a reductionist view of objects. Such a 
convenience can be highly misleading and tends towards notions of 
perceived pattern(s) of parts having some corresponding ontology. 
Strictly, in systems terms, each 'part' may for some purposes be viewed 
as a system in its own right, termed a sub-system, with the former 
system now being considered as within the environment of the new system 
under view. Equally each part, considered as a system, may be 
considered as having a structure of parts, or arrangements of further 
sub-systems. 
In this way, analysis is made possible without recourse to 
reductionism. Purposeful enquiry can be made at different levels of 
systems thinking. Note, however, that in order to proceed to the lower 
level of analysis (to the investigation of cells, instead of organisms) 
it is necessary to close up, temporarily, the analysis at the higher 
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level. Investigation of the energy interchange within a subsystem (the 
internal-external • closure' and the external-internal 'openness') is 
made within the context of the energy interchange of the system with 
its environment through the organization of system arrangements which 
joins up these sub-systems; but how this organization may be described 
is, necessarily, heuristic. For example, an overall structure to the 
functions within the organism might be discerned and reduced to some 
pattern. This does not entail an existence level, at least within the 
viewing purpose of energy exchange, to the structure; rather it is a 
heuristic, a convenient way of closing up at the arrangements level the 
systems representation of sets of relations with which the entity is 
'organised' in order to consider the functional level in detail. 
To move the analysis to a higher level (to switch from cellular 
action and reaction to the organism) it is necessary to 'open up' the 
analysis. Such opening up may be conducted through the use of the 
above mentioned heuristic, capturing the structure or arrangement of 
the complexity of the relations internal to the entity by some 
representation, perhaps graphical. In other words, to open up the 
analysis, it is necessary to switch from the purpose of viewing energy 
exchange within a particular function to a purpose of viewing the 
system schematically; that is, considering the system in some abstract 
view. This view is necessarily heuristic, since justification to the 
representation, the arrangements level has to be made" to a dimensional 
domain to reveal spatial or other criteria. 
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5.4 the set of heuristics in systems 
The move to examine exchange in terms of energy appears to entail a 
move from the abstraction of systems to the concrete level. However, 
in terms of systems, discussion remains abstract and the move to such a 
level of discussion is heuristic. Discussion of energy exchange seems 
concrete, because a close correspondence between the level of discourse 
and actuality is assumed through the introduction of the language of 
physics. The language of science has the 'aura of a convincing power 
and certainty' [Kindler and Kiss, 1984, p.11] which in physics is 
identified with a fundamental level of events. 
The set of all possible moves to open up the closed system of end 
terms constitutes the set of heuristics; the moves which can be made 
for purposeful activity, but which do not of themselves lead to any 
certain result. Note, however, that although the heuristic of using 
energy exchange opened up the end terms, it also, since energy was 
taken to be a term linking in the system of the language of physics, 
closed up the discussion. The closure enabled discussion of energy 
exchange to be conducted at a functional level, where, had it been 
required, mathematical expressions could have been employed. 
From the emphasis in the systems literature on information theory 
and cybernetics [Robb, 1984; Bertalanffy, 1971; Mesarovic, 1964], it 
might be expected that another powerful heuristic to open up the end 
terms is that of information exchange. A similar analysis to that 
employed over energy exchange looks to be invited. However, the 
foregoing analysis suggested that openness and closure are integral in 
a way that seems to challenge the usual presentation of these ideas. As 
discussed below, information theory is concerned, through the concept 
of a channel, with a completely closed system, except for noise, while 
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the ideas of cyberneticians such as Ashby [1956], also discussed below, 
picture machines as closed systems open to input1 the ambiguities over 
closure here need to be resolved. 
6.1 the information perspective 
Rather as the systems thinking of biologists has focussed on organisms, 
resulting in a preconception of 'wholes' as either open or closed 
systems, cybernetics has been preoccupied with 'machines' and taken 
them to be closed systems requiring input [Ashby, 1958]. More 
particularly, the cybernetic model is of a system 'open to information 
but closed to entropy transfer' [Bertalanffy, 1962, p.34]. What is not 
clear is how this arises. How could information be imported without the 
use of energy? Even to catch the light waves on the rain outside the 
window requires some work to be done by the eye and brain. And in using 
energy how can entropy transfer be avoided? 
The difficulty here suggests that there may be something 
fundamentally problematic in the concept of information. It is 
certainly not to be defined by recourse to the hazy, and perhaps 
potentially misleading, concept of information simply being defined as 
the opposite of entropy or 'negative entropy' ('negentropy'), a term 
invoked widely by systems theorists including Bertalanffy. Since 
entropy itself has been related by Boltzman to 'missing 
information' [Shannon & Weaver, 1949, p.3], the term negative entropy 
entails the negation of an absence and appears, therefore, meaningless. 
The concept of information is considered fully in Chapter 3. For the 
moment, however, some of the problems can be avoided through 
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recognizing that a machine is a functional design which permits an 
openness to energy exchange to receive a 'signal', at the consequence 
of the closure through the design itself. 
In a machine the readiness to accept a signal has to be in-built 
to the machine before any receipt of signals (and monitoring of such 
signals) can begin. Such a readiness will also shut out other types of 
signal, or, indeed, the signal itself unless it has been properly 
articulated. This suggests that a signal may only be received if proper 
preparation has been made, beforehand, to receive that signal. This 
analysis might constitute one way of regarding the concept of a machine 
being closed but open to input and be analogous to the concept of an 
entity being 'organizationally closed' [Maturana & Varela, 1972]. 
This problem is not met directly within information theory. The 
weakness of Shannon's theory is that it is closed round the problem of 
transmission of information in a special way. It deals with the 
problems of,a 'channel' only, the 'transmission level' as distinct and 
separable from the • semantic' and 'effectiveness' levels [Shannon & 
Weaver, 1949, p.4]. Shannon envisages a decoder which is a perfect 
replica of the encoder - no signals ('messages') are received by the 
decoder outside its bounds since, if they were, they could not enter 
the encoder in the first place. Effectively this closes up the analysis 
from examination of information in any usual sense and restricts the 
analysis to a type of transportation problem in a way that makes the 
transformation of signals analytically trivial, were it not for the 
practical inconvenience of telephone wires or other transportion 
channel being open to 'noise'. This topic is given fuller discussion in 
Chapter 3. 
From these remarks, it can be argued that the fundamental problem 
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of the cybernetician is one of design. Two broad directions seem 
possible1 building machines with great specificity which will accept 
only certain types of signals (e.g. early warning devices for ballistic 
missiles which are closed to moonbeams [Hoos, 1972) or building 
machines with great generality in their acceptance (open to noises), 
but capable of imposing highly complex decoding patterns to separate 
out types of signals. A simulation of human thinking would further 
require, presumably, abilities to put together again, in some useful 
way, the types of signals. The central difficulty in the design is 
getting round the problem of the design being closed to information 
signals which can warn the system itself of its need to change. Since 
the 'entry' of the information into a 'channel' is dependent on the 
expectation of that information in order that the appropriate channel 
may be set up, it is difficult to see how any wholly 'new' or 
unexpected information could enter. This question of preparedness is 
closely connected to the 'recognition' problem, or response readiness 
discussed in connection with information systems in Chapter 3. 
6.2 systems approaches and perspective 
These discussions on energy exchange and information exchange have not 
been particularly satisfactory from an analytical point of view. To the 
extent that the discussion here has not proceeded directly from the 
earlier discussion on end terms, this is suggestive that the end terms, 
as proposed, are unsatisfactory as they presently stand and, 
additionally, that there has been too great an insistence here on an 
analytical viewpoint. While systems thinking is an intrinsically 
abstract approach, to be useful it needs to be applied to practical 
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problems. Such application introduces a perspective (naturalistic, 
mechanistic and so on), but given the wide claims of systems theorists 
discussed in Chapter 1, it seems systems thinking itself should not be 
tied to any perspective. 
However, as the discussion above suggests, systems thinking does 
have a general exchange perspective. The systems approach allows shifts 
(always heuristic) to be made between an abstract level of discussion, 
which might attempt to capture 'complexity' through positional 
arrangement, and the functional level where a particular task, such as 
energy or information exchange, takes place. In this way the systems 
approach allows discussion about (systems) arrangements among sub-
systems to be opened up, through closure of the functional level1 and 
discussion of structure in the sub-system to be entered into through 
closure of discussion of arrangements at the systems level. 
It may now be suggested that there is a connection between the 
crucial systems and environment distinction and energy exchange. 
Consideration of 'material' changes between a system and its 
environment maps the energy exchanges. What is needed also is a 
fundamental distinction which can map the information exchanges. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, in the information dimension this is the level 
of 'signs' (this corresponds to 'material' at the energy level) with 
perhaps perception (looking) and phenomena (interpreting) being the 
crucial distinction which needs to be added to the end terms to make 
them operable in some rigorous way_ This would be to incorporate the 
'observer' of the measurement dimension, previously discussed, as an 
actor in the communication dimension. Full discussion of this important 
topic is reserved for Chapter 3. 
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6.3 Checkland's methodology and key terms 
Checkland's methodology can now be described as a systems approach 
which, through careful separation of the abstraction level from the 
perceptual entities, enables a researcher to switch between the 
construction of a systems level and an entity level investigation, 
through procedural switches of opening up the problem and effecting 
closure. In particular, the opening of the problem is achieved through 
'acceptance' of perceived patterns or structures with which the 
organization is composed. This is the stage of drawing up a 'rich 
picture' - the rationale here is to include a number of specifications 
without being caught within any function. An attempt is made then to 
capture the 'systems' essence in this rich picture by a 'root' 
definition. This seeks to avoid functional fixation by straddling 
across functions contained in the specifications and by encapsulating 
purpose through a 'transformation process' [Checkland, 1981, pp.224-
227]. 
Given the problem of which systems arrangements to select, the 
'root definition' is a method of closing up, in order that possible 
solutions can be derived in the form of a conceptualization of systems 
which may be effective to fulfil the 'root definition'. Comparison is 
effected by comparing the conceptualization to the rich picture and, 
with parsimony, suggestions of change are made. Iterative loops are 
required to go through the analysis again, to take advantage of 
researcher's grasp of the problem having been changed by the dynamics 
of analysis. 
Checkland also proposed four fundamental systems concepts: 
emergent properties, hierarchy, communication and control. While these 
appear to reflect some fundamental systems appraisal by Checkland, 
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rather than being drawn directly from his methodology, they may be 
considered instructive if set against the 'end terms'. When the end 
terms were regarded as a system gua system, there was an 'arrangement'. 
Such an arrangement corresponds closely to Checkland's use of 
hierarchy, particularily in that the arrangement of the end terms is 
directed by purpose (shown as the apex). The structure of the 
arrangement was also revealed and may be taken as an emergent property. 
However, since discussion here is at the systems level, not the entity 
level, it may be preferable to mark structure as an emergent 
characteristic of characterizing arrangements and retain 'properties' 
to describe the output of two-part relations, e.g. whiteness. 
Given the acknowledged contribution [Bertalanffy, 1971] by some of 
the early Gestalt psychologists to the development of systems theory, 
it is a little surprising that Checkland makes no explicit attempt to 
relate his problem-solving emphasis to some of the crucial problem-
solving experiments where different types of 'closure' were identified 
[for example, Duncker, 1945; Maier, 1931]. However, it may be that 
Checkland wished to avoid the psychological interpretations of closure. 
Certainly, in this chapter closure has been given a logical 
interpretation and, since Husserl attacked 'psychologism' in 1900 
[Husserl, 1964, p.x], this has been a preferred level of explanation. 
Comment on the remaining two terms, communication and control, 
seems problematic. The discussion on information exchange revealed the 
need to use energy to transmit signals through channels. However, 
signals can often appear to be passed without a channel but, since 
light or sound waves are used this is an illusion. It does seem that 
information and energy are related in an intergral fashion. However, 
the existence of 'materials' as such and 'signs', still to be 
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discussed, also suggests the usefulness of distinguishing these in some 
way which does not sever them completely and this is attempted in 
Chapter 3. What is meant by communication and control may also become 
more clear, together with some other key system terms such as 
'adaptation' and 'maintenance'. 
6.4 conclusions 
It has been proposed that none of the principal approaches to systems 
are satisfactory in themselves. Instead, the fundamental terms of 
system, purpose and environment have been considered as satisfying the 
requirements of a system of end terms. Such a system is closed in 
itself and is entirely abstract and devoid of content. As such it 
represents the bounds on discourse, but is suggestive in the use of a 
restriction requirement for the form of a systems logic to be derived 
from it. Difficulties arise, however, when the system of end terms is 
opened up, since, to allow the entry of other terms, the terms enter in 
a manner unrestricted by the systems logic. While the system of end 
terms displays parsimony to an extreme degree, in opening up the 
system, any restriction on number of terms introduced looks to need 
other, and arbitrary, rules. 
Two heuristic (observer-dependent) moves of opening up the system 
of end terms were illustrated in discussing 'energy' and 'information' 
exchange as examples of perspectives which embed purpose. The terms 
openness and closure were further elucidated by this discussion, but 
the operations involved were not fully described by the end terms and 
require further comment and discussion. This is explored in the next 
126 
chapter. 
In summary, a system of end terms has been proposed, capable of 
infinite (if arbitrary) expansion, through the heuristics of openness 
and closure. The system has been investigated in reflexion to system 
approaches, but not in respect of its use in individual disciplines. 
The test of its use will arise in these disciplines, particularly in 
respect of the ever-present problem of retroduction in terms, and 
offers the possibility of a partial escape from the closed system 
charge of Kuhn for technical, or scientific discourse. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Th~~~~lopm~~t_of a Formal-B~~is_f~~ 
K~~ledg~Sy~t~ 
C~T~ 3 
The Development of a Formal Basis for a Knowledge System 
1.1 introduction 
The discussion in Chapter 2 appeared to reach an impasse. On the one 
hand, in terms of a perceived need for a systems logic (to restrict the 
'importation' of terms), a system of end terms was derived which 
exhibited a potentially useful and non-arbitrary set of restrictions on 
arrangement. Such a restriction on arrangements was termed closure. On 
the other hand, in view of a perceived need for a systems language (to 
facilitate an 'exchange' of terms between disciplines), the use of the 
core concepts from the systems approach of 'system', 'environment' and 
'purpose' as end terms threatened too tight a closure on the end terms 
for them to have any application. Any substantive discussion might be 
gained only by the loss of a strict and clear sense of closure and the 
introduction of ad hoc or arbitrary restriction rules in order to open 
up the terms to use. 
However, the exhibition of closure was an emergent characteristic 
in that it arose out of the inter-dependence of the end terms. This is 
what marks out the system as a 'system' and distinguishes it from being 
an arbitrary set of 'relations'. This suggests that the restriction 
requirement need not be given up if a different set of end terms could 
be proposed. Further, since 'system' is defined by a set of end terms, 
there is something inappropriate in considering it as an end term. The 
possibility of abandoning system as an end term is perhaps made more 
clear by the energy level discussion in Chapter 2 where the wholes or 
parts were termed entities, leaving the term system more free to 
indicate discussion of more abstract matters, especially 'arrangement'. 
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This more abstract level consists either in the handling of 
information, information systems, or the interpreting of information, 
knowledge systems. Fundamentally, it is concerned with signs, the 
representing of phenomena or the perception of things. Any talk about 
things (Checkland's systems level) necessarily imposes on these signs 
an arrangement. And to make explicit such arrangements requires 
discussion of a system of signs. It would therefore suit the purposes 
of this discussion if the system of end terms could be reconstituted by 
reference to a theory of signs. 
While there are many such theories, a number of these suffer from 
the difficulty (from the point of view of them acting as end terms) of 
signs having fixed referents. In contrast, one of the most potent of 
theories, initially worked out by Peirce and developed by Eco [1976, 
1985], also has the advantage of allowing signs to be 'nomadic', a 
quality essential for purposes of being able to exchange terms. 
While the need to have 'referents' for signs is fundamental when 
extensional meaning is required, the position that each sign should 
have its own and unique reference is both undesirable and impossible, 
except within restricted circumstances. This is demonstrated using 
'information theory'. The roots of this position on fixed references 
are then discussed through Foucault's excavation of the classical 
episteme, before introducing Eco's more fluid and systemic perspective 
on signs and explicating from this a system of signs. Finally, from 
the core of the 'system of signs', a formal basis for 'knowledge 
systems' is derived. 
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1.2 measurement, information handling and interpretation 
In particular, a theory of signs must be able to handle both the need 
to organize the perceptual aspects of signs, measurement (see also 
section 1.3), and the need to design their array in order to 
communicate information about perceptions or intentions. Peirce's 
theory has appeared in the management literature to facilitate a 
discussion on measurement [Mason & Swanson, 1979] and in the accounting 
literature to unify a discussion on communication [Chambers, 1964] and 
it is exactly the ability of this theory to bridge the phenomenal world 
of measurement with the abstract world of design and communication that 
is the appeal of this theory for the present purposes. The focus of the 
theory will be on the exchange of terms from the one world into the 
other. 
However, before proceeding to a discussion on signs, sections 4.1-
5.5, a further distinction within the term 'communication' is 
important. It is helpful to distinguish between information handling, 
the passing on of signs through space and time, and interpreting, the 
construction of meaning from those signs. The failure to distinguish 
properly between these aspects has led to much confusion in discussion 
on communication and on the topic of meaning. To avoid this confusion, 
a full discussion on Shannon's 'information theory' is given, not only 
in view of its importance in the systems literature, but also because 
it is, in its attempt to avoid the question of meaning altogether, 
suggestive of the areas in which a discussion of 'meaning' may not be 
helpful and therefore indicative of where the focus of any discussion 
on meaning must finally lie. 
Unfortunately, due to the technical complexity of the theory and 
the way in which the theory was initially presented, this is an 
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extensive discursion. Nevertheless, in explicating the central and 
dualistic role of substitution of signs in measurement and 
communication, the discussion is of value to set out the importance of 
translation or the use of synonomy (equivalence) in the context of 
coding and decoding in information systems, as against the 
transformation (inference) of series of signs, based on moving from one 
code into another [Manning, 1986] for knowledge work. 
1.3 information in science 
Information before this century appears to have played very little role 
in the physical sciences. As an entity, it lay outside the push-pull 
of the natural world; measurements were taken, but these played no part 
other than to help the observer in making predictions. 
However, suppositions about the role of information have radically 
changed this century. Observation can no longer be taken as separate 
from, or devoid of, interpreting [Kuhn, 1970]. While the question of 
dates here is undecidable, Weaver pinpointed a key date in 1884 when 
Boltzman observed in some work on statistical physics that entropy is 
related to 'missing information' inasmuch as it is related to the 
number of alternatives which remain possible to a physical system after 
all the macroscopically observable information concerning it has been 
recorded [Shannon & Weaver, 1949, p.3]. 
In consequence, 'information' no longer stood outside the physical 
world as a mere synonym to observational data. Information, it 
appears, also needed to be observed. A potential paradox in this 
statement might be resolved here through anticipating the later 
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distinction of equivalence and'inference1 that is, no observation 
stands as a mere 'equivalence', it is also partially an 'inference'. 
'Interpreting' is embedded in 'looking'. 
Nevertheless, while notions of 'structure', 'paradigm' [Kuhn, 
1970], 'system' [Putnam, 1974] have become increasingly dominant in the 
. 
philosophy of science to describe the inferential arrangements, the 
'interpreting', embedded within the organizational process in 
observation, the 'looking', the concept of organization (no doubt due 
to the sway of reductionism) has been recalcitrant to physics. Any 
role played by information has tended to be subsumed under an observed 
absence of order known as entropy. However, recent work by the Nobel 
prizewinners Prigogine [1980] in physics and Eigen [1975] in chemistry 
have greatly extended the use of concepts of organization within 
experiments across science from its introduction in biology discussed 
earlier in Chapter 1. 
2.1 information theory 
Interest in information as an independent subject for research took a 
dramatic leap in 1948 with the publication of works by Wiener on 
cybernetics and Shannon on communications theory. Published 
independently, they fused a connection between ideas of communication 
and those of control1 Wiener examined the need for communication in 
control through feedback loops [Wiener, 1948], and Shannon discussed 
the control aspects of communication [Shannon & Weaver, 1949]. The 
crucial role played by information in each, analogous to the focus on 
energy in physics, gave rise to the term 'information theory'. 
For Shannon, the fundamental problem of communication lay in the 
132 
reproduction at one point, either exactly or approximately, of a 
message selected at another point [Shannon & Weaver, 1949, p.31]. The 
problem which Shannon was investigating may be regarded as a transport 
problem. This transport perspective of Shannon's needs to be kept 
firmly in mind in evaluating the theory. Meaning was given no part in 
the theory [Shannon & Weaver, 1949, p.31] and, because of this, a 
separate consideration of meaning is required after a full discussion 
of information theory. 
Whatever is transported (in considering primarily 
telecommunications, Shannon and Weaver use the more specific term 
'transmitted') is taken to be information. However, since meaning was 
absent from any discussion in the theory, whatever was being 
transported might have been better termed messages. The use of the term 
'information' has caused constant confusion and, in consequence, much 
of what the theory appears to say looks counter-intuitive. In 
contrast, the ability for a carrier of a message to have no 
understanding of the content of a message meets with ordinary 
experience and examples of the homing pigeon or the urchins used by 
Sherlock Holmes spring readily to mind. 
As a result of the previous confusion, however, there was 
considerable disappointment with Shannon's theory after its initial 
promise and, in more recent years, the theory may have suffered some 
neglect although it is still used in the area of semiotics [Eco, 1976] 
and, with somewhat different purposes in mind, Dretske [1981] has made 
it once again important in the area of cognitive science. It is 
examined in this thesis as a preamble to the more important discussion 
on a theory of signs, in part to introduce some important aspects to 
that theory and in part to examine the claims of Bertalanffy, mentioned 
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in Chapter 1, that information theory in some way has been part of the 
systems movement. 
2.2 three levels of information 
Weaver in an introduction to the work of Shannon emphasized the 
transport or transmission focus of the theory by identifying three 




How accurately can the symbols of communication be 
transmitted? (The technical problem.) 
How precisely do the transmitted symbols convey 
the desired meaning? (The semantic problem.) 
How effectively does the received meaning affect 
conduct in the desired way? (The effectiveness 
problem.) 
[Shannon & Weaver, 1949, p.4] 
Weaver sees these three problems in series and, strictly, information 
theory is concerned solely with the technical problem of transmission, 
level A. Given this, together with a ready acknowledgement of the 
importance of the semantic and effectiveness levels, there is a danger 
that a theory at the technical level could be dismissed as 'relatively 
superficial'. Against this, Weaver was concerned to stress that, 
although the technical level could be separated, it has applications 
for the other levels: 
Part of the significance of the new theory comes from the 
fact that levels Band C, above, can make use only of those 
signal accuracies which turn out to be possible when analyzed 
at Level A. Thus any limitations discovered in the theory at 
Level A necessarily apply to levels Band C. 
[Shannon & Weaver, 1949, p.G] 
However, Weaver claims that, as it turns out, the analysis at level A 
discloses that this level overlaps the other levels more than could 
naively be suspected. For example, any errors in level A will be passed 
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into the other levels. The substantial claim for Weaver was that the 
theory of level A is, to a significant degree, also a theory of levels 
Band C [Shannon & Weaver, 1949, p.6]. 
There is a certain asymmetry in the claim here. While level A is 
seen crucially to affect levels Band C, apparantly in the 
identification of the technical problem, difficulties at levels Band C 
do not affect A. That is, there is an implied assumption that the 
semantic and effectiveness problems do not affect accuracy 
transmission in any fundamental way. Since Weaver saw 
of 
the 
effectiveness problems level as closely integrated with the semantic 
level, it is not at all clear if separation of the technical level is 
possible and, if it is, how this is achieved. This question is 
explored below (sections 2.3 - 3.7) and, in so doing, the set of 
special conditions under which the theory operates are made explicit 
and the consequences for the theory are considered once these special 
conditions are removed. 
2.3 choice and message selection 
Instead of meaning, the significant aspect of the theory was taken to 
be that an actual message was one 'selected from a set of possible 
messages'. The system needs to be designed to operate for each 
possible selection and is not simply the one chosen, the latter would 
be unknown - otherwise no message need be sent. However, a key feature 
of the design would be efficiency and, in particular, Shannon was 
concerned with the savings possible in transmission due to the 
'statistical structure' of the original message and due to the nature 
of the final destination of the information [Shannon & Weaver, 1949, 
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, p. 31] • The structure of the system envisualized by Shannon [Shannon & 
Weaver, 1949, p.34] was as follows: 
information 
source transmitter 






While Shannon described his system in terms of three main categories, 
discrete, continuous and mixed, the following explication of 
information theory will use examples of discrete signals only. 
Once the source of the desired message has been fixed (information 
source), the message is changed into the signal by the transmitter. 
The change from message to signal may be described as an encoding 
process. Signals are transmitted through a channel to the receiver. 
The receiver changes the signal back to a message through a decoding 
process. The message is then simply 'handed on' to the destination. 
Nothing is said directly about either the process of fixing the message 
source or the handing on, other than there had to be the possibility of 
more than one message which could have been selected or handed on. The 
actual source or destination, in effect the choosing of this meaning 
instead of that, is left outside the system. 
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2.4 channel and capacity 
Crucially, therefore, the system is somewhat more restricted than 
Shannon depicted. The centrepiece of the system is the channel 
(electric current on a wire or sound in fluid or light waves in space) 
across which signals will be transmitted. At either end of the channel 




encoder 1~ ______ S~i~g~n~a~l~s~ ____ ~:..._d_e_c_o_d_e_r~ ____ __ 
. message 
reconstituted 
For the moment, this depiction ignores noise. 
Figure 2 
The capacity for any channel is a function of time. While certain 
physical statements could be made about limits say to a piece of copper 
wire of a certain thickness under a certain temperature, the concern 
for Shannon was to step aside from these to ascertain an information 
measure. The key to such a measure lies in the coding process. It 
depends on how tightly bound any coding system could be. 
Essentially information is a measure of freedom of choice [Shannon 
& Weaver, p.9]. If there are only two possible measures, then choice 
of one message over the other involves one unit of information. This 
is in part an arbitrary definition. However, intuitively this can be 
seen to be so, since only one signal need be sent to elicit choice 
provided the messages have been appropriately coded beforehand. For 
example, 'yes' can give the verbal signal for a whole army to attack. 
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A single pulse down an electric wire (in the absence of noise) could 
achieve the same result. Channel capacity and coding arrangements, 
therefore, are highly interdependent. 
2.5 coding 
As the range of possible messages expands, then so the range of signals 
to be sent extends. However, since only sufficient signals need to be 
sent to effect selection of the message (that is, the set of whole 
messages need not be sent), the range of possible messages can expand 
exponentially to the range of signals. This is usually expressed in 
reverse: that the unit of information is the natural logarithm of the 
number of messages. This fits well with the adoption of the binary 
code. Thus an eight bit code (beginning with 00000000 and ending with 
11111111) provides two hundred and fifty six combinations. 
It is important to note here that there must be sufficient variety 
in a code to handle the number of all possible messages to provide the 
necessary differentiating detail to distinguish the unique properties 
of an item. The need for this, usually known as the Law of Requisite 
Variety [Ashby, 1956] will be demonstrated later (sections 3.6 - 3.7). 
However, to the extent that expectations vary about the 
possibility of each particular message being sent, that is the 
probability of each message varies, the average number of bits of code 
involved in any set of signals can be reduced (and efficient use of the 
channel enhanced) through carful design of the coding system. For 
example, if in a range of messages - Yes, Maybe, Maybe Not, No - the 
probability of No might be 1/2 (or .5) and Yes only 1/8. Thus No could 
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be coded as '0', using 1 bit, and Yes as 'Ill', using three bits: 
0 1 
I 
No (1/2) 0 1 
0 I 
Maybe Not (1/4) 0 1 
10 I I 




To arrange a coding for all possible messages, treating each possible 
message in its entirety, is soon cumbersome and finally impossible 
except in very tightly constrained circumstances. Fortunately messages 
have a structure. For example, written verbal messages in English use 
the alphabet. Messages are pre-coded. All that is then required is 
for the message to be translated from one code into another (it will be 
explained later why it is proper to use the term 'translation' here in 
preference to 'transformation'). Again efficiencies are possible here 
since the average probability of the use of anyone letter may be 
calculated from 'normal' speech and Shannon has demonstrated the 
properties of speech to be statistically well behaved. An equal 
probability coding uses between four and five bits (binary digits) per 
letter. However, by paying attention to the frequencies of use the 
average number of bits being sent can be considerably reduced. Thus 
the letter E, which has a relatively high frequency (.12) in passages 
of English, could be given a signal using fewer bits than, say, the 
letter W (.02). Shannon calls this first order approximation to 
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English. 
However, the potential gains for efficiency are somewhat larger 
than this. The structure of English is not only affected by relative 
frequency of occurrence of any letter, the probability of certain 
sequences of letters is also important. For example, the possibility 
of two 'E's occurring together is much higher than two 'W's and so the 
expectation of 'W', with the knowledge of the prior 'W', drops far 
below the .02 probability mentioned above. There are also preferred 
groups like 'TH' and 'ED'. Taking account of the lack of independence 
of letters in English words gives the possibility of further savings 
remembering that all that needs to be transmitted, given a decoder 
with the same expectations as the coder, is that which helps selection 
of messages (in this case letters or rather combinations of letters). 
The recognition of combinations of letters Shannon calls second-order 
approximation; this is usually limited to combinations of two or three 
since very quickly the combinations outrun the possible gains. For 
example, while there are 17,576 possible ways to arrange 26 letters 
into groups of three, but nearly half-a-million combinations occur from 
four letter groups. 
At this point, therefore, Shannon jumps from sequence of letters 
to word approximation. Here words are seen as having relative 
frequencies (in 'normal' English) and if these are seen as unit 
messages, the number of bits used could be dropped. 
transition probability could also be calculated. 
Finally word 
That is, the 
likelihood of some words following 'the' is greater than others. While 
Shannon does not discuss explicit applications of grammatical or 
syntactic structures, these are also possible. However, any further 
steps, three word combinations or a move into the even higher gear of 
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probabilities of whole sentences, bring the process towards the upper 
limit of knowledge of any message beforehand; in which case no message 
need be sent. 
3.1 concepts of information 
Although the foregoing discussion was in terms of the alphabetic code, 
it should be clear that this was for explication only. The principles 
of the theory are general and will hold for any coding system with a 
constant structure. Central to the analysis is the way in which the 
signal acts to precipitate in the decoder (receiver) a selection of one 
message from a set of messages. That is, it appears that what needs to 
be sent is not the message, but simply a set of signals to the decoder 
which assists in the selection process. The utility of this central 
principle is in determining (within any particular circumstances) the 
relative advantages of using a more tightly bound coding system as 
against expanding channel capacity. 
Within Shannon's communication system, therefore, it appeared 
that, instead of having to send whole messages, only some uncertainty 
reducing signals needed to be sent. This fact has been widely 
interpreted. One view taken was that this defined information as that 
which was 'new'. The information content of any particular message was 
restricted to that which was not already known or decidable. A similar 
view if somewhat more strict in interpretation adopted by, among 
others, Herbert Simon [1957b] was that information could be defined as 
that which reduced uncertainty. The information content of any 
particular message was restricted to that which reduced doubt or 
uncertainty in the receiver. 
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A difficulty of the 'new' view is the openness of interpretation 
of the term 'new'. It is difficult to see how a message which was 
entirely novel could be transmitted effectively since the set of state 
expectations in the decoder would, by definition of the meaning of 
novel, exclude the possibility of choice of the message. However, 
particular combinations of entities present no difficulty. Thus, 
provided the decoder has an entity 'Jane' in the set of persons known 
to it and the phenomenon of making babies, the mere fact of Jane having 
a baby can be easily transmitted. Expressed in these terms, it can be 
appreciated why the 'uncertainty reduction' interpretation is preferred 
to the 'new' interpretation. The possibility of Jane having a baby was 
already programmed in the decoder. All that needed to be confirmed was 
the fact of it. 
Confirmation of the type just discussed is the removal of doubt. 
However, the great number of messages which are transferred in 
organizations (business or otherwise) have little to do with 
uncertainty reduction in the strict sense discussed above. Rather the 
contrary, much of the content of the messages appears already known or 
facilitates the making of links across message sets, 'organizing' 
information in a way that is outside the sequential sending of signals 
(see sections 3.4 - 3.7 below). Application of the strict measure 
would leave" most messages as having direct zero information content. 
Unless these messages be dismissed as simply nonsense, the question 
arises as to whether these messages have any other role. 
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3.2 levels of information 
Taking the Shannon arrangements as an analog, it can be said that a 
message may only be transmitted if there is a response readiness (set 
of expected messages) in the receiver. The message has to be codable 
in terms that the receiver (the decoder) can decode. Strictly any 
message not already extant at the decoder end may not be transmitted. 
With an alphabetic coder this amounts to saying that a message '*' 
could not be sent since the message has not been anticipated and no 
code exists for its transmission. 
A second level of information must be concerned therefore with the 
coder/decoder level, the response readiness. In practice this 'response 
readiness', the set of possible messages in the decoder, is not fixed. 
Uncertainty attaches not only to which particular message may be 
elicited (the Shannon problem) but also to the general set of messages, 
the readiness from which the response is stimulated. In terms of the 
analog, if 'Z' is never elicited, this could be dropped from the 
decoder. If '*' is required, then '*' must be added to the code. The 
message 'a', although already contained in the alphabetic decoder, not 
only elicits through its coded signal 'a', but confirms the utility of 
keeping 'a' in the set of possible messages. 
There are two aspects here, therefore. Apart from any transmission 
function, messages are needed not only to maintain the response 
readiness in the face of uncertainty of 'structures', but also there is 
the need to change response readinesses; that is the structure of codes 
needs to be capable of adaption. Messages need to be sent, for 
example, to instruct the decoder to add '*' to its list of possible 
messages. To communicate this message through an alphabetic code would 
need both the long message 'Construct five sets of lines all arriving 
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at a central point. The dimensions of these lines are to be ••• ' and, 
further, the decoder would have to have a graphic construction facility 
superimposed upon the primary code level and there would also need to 
be a signal that this was a second order message, an adaption message 
and not a message simply to be passed on. 
3.3 errors in the system 
The only concern for errors in Shannon's work arises out of the 
intrusion of 'noise', signals entering the channel from other than the 
information source. Such signals are perceived as random and are 
eliminated through a degree of redundancy in the set of signals and the 
use of feedback loops. Errors in input of source may be handled in a 
similar way. For example, in a message set of any four digits, a 
mistake could be made on one of the digits. By extending the set to 
five digits a parity check may be introduced which can ~equire the 
message to be sent again. 
However, uncertainty may also in practice surround the structure 
of the code. If 'a' in the encoder is '010' and in the decoder '100' 
then the transmission will be in error. Thus, confirmation of 'a' may 
be just as important as a signal eliciting the response 'a'. Any checks 
on this are either carried out outside the system, or require the use 
of the second order checking device such as the graphical construction 
facility (the use of which may require some primitive recognition 
device for checks on itself). 
However, a particular difficulty in practice over signals is 
whether 'errors' are appearing because of the difficulties of 
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maintaining, closure or whether the signals should be interpreted as 
indicating that some adaptation of the closure structure is required 
(an extension of the code or even the use of a different code). This 
problem is fundamental to any design of 'feedback loops' but is not 
further discussed here. 
3.4 values and measures 
I~ is clear that the foregoing interpretations of information as 
'uncertainty reducing' present difficult ground. What has to be most 
guarded against is the naive identification of the value of information 
with one particular measure of information. Some of these difficulties 
can be quickly seen if any particular message 'Caesar has crossed the 
Rubicon' is considered. Now for a number of people this particular 
message has no information value because they already knew the fact. 
For some who knew of both Caesar and the Rubicon and understood the 
activity of crossing, the message has information value (for others, of 
course, the Rubicon as a river, or even Caesar, may simply be unknown). 
The problem here, and it is an important one, is that value is 
receiver specific. Shannon's measure is simply the measure of the 
difficulty in sending it but, also importantly, even this measure is 
only obtainable as a measure because the measure is within a special 
system. Given the decoder is simply a perfect inverse of the coder, to 
be discussed further below, 
specific. 
Shannon's measure is also receiver 
The value of any message is not so bound. Clearly to those in 
Rome at the time of Julius Caesar the message of the crossing had 
greater impact than to people today. Regardless of whether some had 
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expected it and others had not, it is what the crossing implied that 
mattered 7 it was an event which they could perceive could change their 
lives and the ways in which it could lie outside the message itself. 
Again, Mary's husband can gain the news from the same signal about Jane 
as Jane's husband, but the upshot for Jane's husband is much greater 
[Sterling, 1970, pp.46-47]. It is clear that what a sign such as a 
crossing or a birth implies, what these stand for, requires a separate 
and full discussion. However, before beginning this task some 
conclusions regarding Shannon's theory need to be more fully drawn out. 
3.5 types of measures 
These considerations suggest that several measures for information may 
exist, depending on the level of communications. The measure proposed 
by Shannon is at the level of transmission where the structure of the 
encoder (sender) and decoder (receiver) are perfect inverse mappings of 
each other. This is equivalent to assumptions that there is a full set 
of expectations in the decoder (the set of all possible messages) and, 
further, that the encoder can precisely anticipate this set of 
expectations 7 that is, there is certainty within the system. 
Note here that uncertainty can exist outside the system in that 
the source of the message is unknown7 what is certain inside the system 
are the translations to be carried out to turn the message into signals 
and also the translations on the signals which will recast them in the 
form of the message. This type of certainty is highly restrictive and 
can only exist (or be approximate) in man made systems such as 
computers. Outside such areas, moving codes always reflects possible 
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changes in meaning, because possible uncertainties in equivalences 
require inferences to be made. In these cases, it is strictly more 
correct to talk of transformation, [Manning, 1986J rather than 
'translation' and this matter is returned to below to distinguish 
'knowledge systems' from information systems. 
In respect of completeness, it also needs to be stressed that the 
completeness of any channel (the ability to handle all possible 
messages) is defined within the scope of a particular code. No single 
channel can possibly transmit all messages. For example, if the 
message is one of apology, then some persons would expect this to be 
given orally (hence the telephone might serve); for others it would 
demand a letter; others still might require expression of contriteness 
(here videos might serve); someone closer might prefer a hug. The form 
of completeness is simply that any message acceptable for translation 
by the encoder is automatically capable of being decoded. 
3.6 translation and substitution 
Some of the matters here may perhaps be elaborated through some 
examples in the context of substitution. Of interest to logicians 
considering the rules of substitution is the over-riding concern for 
truth preservation. That is, if a substitution of a term into a true 
sentence (proposition) leaves the new sentence to be false, then the 
substitution is debarred. For example: 
Margaret Thatcher is a woman 
becomes, when Margaret Thatcher = Prime Minister. 
The Prime Minister is a woman 
- (1) 
- (2) 
with the usual, understood, locutions of space and time, i.e. in 
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Britain and now. 
Compare, however: 
The evening star is in the south 
becomes, when the evening star = morning star 
The morning star is in the south 
- (3) 
- (4) 
Substitution of the different names for Venus turns a true statement 
into a false one. 
Or, 9 is necessarily greater than 7 
becomes when the number of planets = 9 
The number of planets is necessarily greater than 7 
- (5) 
- (6) 
Again turning a true statement into a false one [Quine, 1980, p.143]. 
These, among many other examples which could be given, demonstrate 
the care which is needed in translations to avoid transformations of 
messages and this is discussed further later. For the moment what 
needs to be seen is that within the type of system envisualized by 
Shannon, problems of translation have absolutely no transformation 
effect whatsoever. The reason for this is that any substitution which 
is carried out is subject to a retranslation process, the substitutions 
cancel each other out leaving the effect as nil. That is, if the 
encoder transforms (3) to (4), the decoder will transform (4) 
using 'morning star' = 'evening star' 
into The evening star is in the south - (5) 
Despite (4), (5) is an exact replica of the message in (3). 
3.7 substitution and reguisite variety 
However, as was mentioned above, there has to be sufficient variety in 
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the code to distinguish each possible message. Retranslation alone is 
not enough. This is how a Humpty Dumpty system might fail to get 
message (1) above across: 
using 'Margaret Thatcher' = 'glory', 'is' = 'glory', 'a woman' = 'glory' 
Glory glory glory - (6) 
That is, letting 'glory' stand for anything and everything produces a 
series of signals where, despite the eqivalences being constant in the 
code, the lack of sufficient distinguishing detail entails that the 
decoder needs an ability to make guesses to decode (6) and might give: 
Is Margaret Thatcher a woman - (7) 
or Is Margaret Thatcher Margaret Thatcher - (8) 
and so on, with the original message being only one of a possible set 
of messages. The signals have failed to elicit the intended message and 
it is mere chance whether the original message will be selected (unless 
the guessing of the decoder is in some way ordered in respect to the 
message sequence indicating the existence of a higher grade code 
somewhere off-stage). 
For pure translation, therefore, three conditions are needed. 
Unless the decoder carries precisely the same code as the encoder, 
unless there is exactly the requisite variety in the signalling code to 
match the variety of say phonemes in the prior (message level) code (a 
one to one translation) and unless the prior code is sufficiently 
accurately understood to design the signalling code, a transformation 
process occurs and this will result in some message loss, distortion or 
inferencing in moving from one code to another. 
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3.8 Shannon's theory as a system 
The foregoing suggests that in addition to the recognition that any 
discussion at the level of meaning is excluded from 'information 
theory', the communication system examined by Shannon would be also be 
aided by distinguishing the message level from the signalling level. 
Recognizing that interpretative acts (see the following section) might 
take place between sources and senders or receivers and destinations, 
still leaves an important area for signals in say computers, where 
feedback loops can be designed and the restrictions mentioned in 3.7 
above controlled. From this discussion, it can be suggested that 
Figure 1 earlier is better encapsualted as follows: 
source sender receiver destination 
channel 
Figure 4 
This schematic representation emphasizes (1) the closed loop nature of 
the communication channel, shown below the dotted line, (2) the 
potential physical separation of senders and receivers, (3) that the 
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'message' level is disjoint (above dotted line) from the 'signal' level 
(below dotted line). 
Contrary to Weaver's postulate that errors in transmission affect 
all other levels, it rather appears that, given the closed loop of the 
theoretical discussion (and in practice the extraordinary efficiency) 
at the transmission level, these errors can almost be ignored at the 
semantic and effectiveness levels. While any errors could affect an 
interpretation, due to their ability to be controlled, they may be 
considered as additional, and perhaps not significant, to the 
fundamental problems of different intentions, different syntactical 
structures and different referents or meanings attaching to signs. It 
is these problems which are now considered in a discussion about signs. 
4.1 substitution, coding and representing 
At the centre of the use of information is the act of substitution. 
This act is so general, so much part of every act that it is at first 
difficult to comprehend its generality and, because of this generality, 
difficult then to see it as other than trivial. More usually, 
substitution is designated by the term representing, or in terms of 
communication systems 'coding' as has been discussed. 
The intention in this part of the thesis is to cover generally 
what is denoted by 'representing', but to extend this by drawing 
attention to the underlying rules which support any representation and, 
in particular, to draw attention to the limits or constraints on 
representing by giving emphasis to that aspect of representing which is 
better caught by the term substitution. 
Primarily, representing is a substitution which not only offers 
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the opportunity to make 'references', having something stand for 
(denote) or be 'equivalent' to something else, but further permits the 
facility of making further substitutions, or 'exchanging' signs. The 
latter type of substitution is a question of understanding under what 
circumstances a substitution may be made. This formally introduces the 
actor into the discussion, since Strawson [1950] has pointed out that 
it is not 'expressions' which do the 'mentioning or referring', it is 
something that someone uses an expression to do. 
While Strawson was particularly concerned to challenge Russell's 
[1905] use of 'denoting', an extreme reliance on equivalence, his 
remarks are particularily pertinent to the facility which signs give 
rise to in permitting substitutions across codes through 
'interpreting', the use of inference. Specifically, it is this facility 
which is taken to be primary and the concern in the next sections is 
with exchanging signs and the question of the 'meaning' of signs is not 
approached directly [see also Kuhn, 1963, p.188]. 
In the previous sections, the examination of information theory 
revealed some criteria to consider 'translation' problems in the use 
of equivalence in formal codes. Now a more general investigation of the 
role of inference in 'transformation', moving information from one code 
to another, is attempted. 
4.2 substitution and signs 
Substitution is fundamental to the act. This happens in two ways. 
First, there is the aspect of intentionality in any act. The actor 
seeks to effect a change in the order of physical relations, 
substituting one object in place of another; here the general intention 
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might be for work to be performed. Or with a gesture, verbal or 
physical, the actor seeks to change the attention of another actor, to 
substitute one object of attention for another. The picture here is 
made slightly more complex by a recognition that actors not only have 
to direct their own attention to objects, but they wish to affect the 
intentionality of other actors. However, the mode of affecting the 
intentions of others is through attention directing. 
But it is not always possible to effect the work in a way which 
was intended. This is often put down to 'being in the wrong place at 
the wrong time'. However, this says little of why expectations have 
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been unfulfilled. Crudely, it might be said in reply to a question like 
this that 'the signs misled'. Doing work then is a matter of having the 
right signs in the right place at the right time. In a similar way it 
is not always possible to affect the attention of others and the same 
adage should hold (although it is tempting to substitute 'the right 
face at the right time') but the idea of 'place' here needs to be 
understood as a spacial metaphor; crucially it is the order of signs 
which can affect attention, which both affects and reveals aspects of 
relevance. 
But this is also one reason why signs can 'mislead'; more 
correctly, therefore, the adage needs to be stated as a matter of 
having the right system of signs in the right place at the right time 
(contrast having the right signs in the right system at the right time 
in worlds giving antecedent knowledge). It is in this respect that 
'substitution' takes on its importance. Simply needing the right sign 
and so on is a plea for perfect knowledge. Ordering the signs is a 
crucial step out of such expectations, it is making do with the signs 
which are already known and is itself a sign of man taking charge of 
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knowledge, as discussed in section 4.3 below, rather than leaving 
knowledge 'in the world'. And it is this link between system and signs 
which both makes substitution possible (the admission of lack of 
perfect knowledge) and also restricts or constrains, because of the 
closure inherent any system of signs, the utility of substitutions (the 
claims to knowledge). 
4.3 knowledge as organized signs 
Signs then are organized. But the order lies not simply in a 'real' 
structure to the world, the organization of signs arises partly from 
the knowledge systems through which the world is seen. These knowledge 
systems are neither a priori nor purely empirical; they are 
experiential in combining say a frame of 'constancy' with the results 
from applying that frame. Constancy is not itself in the world although 
the 'events' perceived through the application of this 'heuristic' may 
be said to be. 
However, the question of knowledge systems, and what they are, may 
be said to belong to the episteme currently being experienced. They do 
not seem to have been an issue before the rise of science in the 
seventeenth century and, even after that, the growth of knowledge as a 
system seems blurred by the dominance of the heuristic of 'constancy' 
and the generality of the use of this heuristic giving an impression of 
the unity of science in its method, however diverse its field. 
Knowledge grew increasingly more functional without particular 
recognition being given to the role played by such heuristics as 
constancy in organizing it from within. 
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Before attempting to explicate the notion of knowledge systems or 
their potential role, it may be helpful to develop further the nature 
of the episteme through contrasting the shift in earlier epistemes from 
the work of Foucault [1970]. In brief this marks a shift from a 
presumption that names accompany things in the world to the Classical 
attempt to allocate names to types of events perceived through the 
knowledge frame of unquestioned recognition rules, particularly 
constancy or regularity. 
4.4 the Classical episteme 
In attempting to explicate the importance and virtual invisibility of 
an episteme, Foucault pays particular attention to the shift in the 
episteme, which occurred after the Renaissance and gave way to the 
Classical age, by contrasting the earlier kinship of knowledge with 
divinatio (the language which God had distributed across the earth and 
which simply waited to be discovered) to that of a perceived importance 
of signs being within knowledge; it is from 'within knowledge itself 
that the sign is to perform its signifying function' [Foucault, 1970, 
p.59]. 
From the advent of the classical age, there can no longer be an 
unknown sign or 'mute mark' because 'men are in possession of all the 
possible signs' and because no sign can exist until there is a known 
'possibility of substitution' between two known elements: 
The sign does not wait in silence for the coming of a man 
capable of recognizing it: it can be constituted only by an 
act of knowing. 
[Foucault, 1970, p.59] 
For Foucault the 'simultaneously endless and closed, full 
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and 
tautological world of resemblance' is now split down the middle. On the 
one side are the tools of analysis, 'the marks of identity and 
difference, keys for a taxonomy', and on the other side the 'raw 
material for divisions and distributions' [Foucault, 1970, p.58]. 
On the one hand, the general thegns,- divisions, and 
classifications, on the other, the problem of immediate 
resemblances, of the spontaneous movement of the imagination, 
of nature's repetitions. 
[Foucault, 1970, p.58] 
What was altered in the Classical age and perhaps 'up to our own day' 
was the 'entire organization of signs', 'the conditions under which 
they exercise their strange function' [Foucault, 1970, p.58]. The 
'table' on which Hume's two-pronged fork could operate was now set. 
Drawing on the ideas of the grammarians of the time as expressed 
in the Logique de Port-Royal, Foucault identifies three variables: 
1) the degree of certainty of the relation: signs are so 
constant as to impart a sureness of accuracy (breath 
denotes life) or simply probable (cloud denotes rain) 
2) the type of relation: a sign belongs to the whole which 
it denotes (a regular pulse is part of the health which 
it denotes) or it is separate (figures of the old 
Testament are distant signs of the Incarnation and 
Redemption) 
3) the origin of the relation: a sign is either natural (a 
reflection in a mirror denotes that which it reflects) or 
conventional (a word may signify an idea to a given group 
of men) 
[Foucault, 1970, p.58] 
Resemblance, the idea of language as the mirror of the world, has been 
abandoned even with natural signs. A cry of fear is a spontaneous sign 
of fear, but is not analogous to the fear. 
The fundamental element of the Classical episteme for Foucault is 
not the success of failure of mechanism, nor the right or impossibility 
of mathematicizing nature (compare the arguments of Bertalanffy in 
Chapter 1), but the supposition that 'it is always possible to reduce 
problems of measurement to problems of order'. It is the understood 
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'ordered succesion of things' which is at the heart of the Classical 
episteme and in this sense analysis was quick to aquire the value of a 
'universal method'. Howev~r, the forms of knowledge which entered 
through the episteme (general grammar, natural history, analysis of 
wealth), although dependent upon analysis in general, made use not of 
an algebraic method but the system of signs [Foucault, 1970, p.57] 
4.5 the need for a theory of signs 
However, a problem with the Thing view of the world, signs 'standing 
for' things, is the lack of Tidy Things, that which brings order to 
knowledge. Although the Classical episteme replaces divine order, a 
difficulty arises with the knowledge rules of the Classical episteme 
being 'in' the Things (names of types of events). 
Once these Things are taken apart (analysis), there is the Humpty 
Dumpty problem of the order in which to put them back together again. 
If systems theory is to challenge 'analysis' (reductionism) it must do 
so through a reworking of the system of signs. This requires a theory 
of signs which can replace the Classical system. In particular, 
however, it should not abandon the gains of analysis, but rather 
suggest rules or 'arrangements' for using and reordering the fruits of 
analysis. 
Specifically, there is the possibility that in understanding the 
system which gives rise to the sign in a general way, that the 
potential for substitution may take place across particular sign 
systems, without recourse to assumptions about particular hierarchies 
in sign systems. The general possibility of such substitution may be 
known as the exchange of terms. 
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5.1 the importance of signs 
Discoveries about the world, how to make things happen and how to 
predict events, involve the use of signs. However, unless a pattern is 
imposed, which successfully codifies the energy level into an 
information level, any repetition of events will be 'accidental'. 
Behind the acceptance of a perception as a measurement lies the 
application of method, the codified set of relations between signs. Of 
course, the codification need not be either 'true' or 'complete'; as 
mentioned above, for a degree of certainty, there needs to be merely a 
relation which is constant or 'robust' and 'sufficient'. That is to 
say, the relationship relied on is a stochastic one, not deterministic; 
a correlation not a causal relation. 
Note, here the emphasis is on the relation between signs, not the 
unknowable relation of the sign to the 'thing in its self'. This 
latter relation since Husserl [1964] has been 'bracketed' in any 
discussion of phenomena; things are known only through their signs. 
However, to act, to affect things, except through accident, requires a 
relation to be established between one sign and at least one other 
sign. It is for this reason that a measurement always expresses a 
relation and is never an absolute; for example the thermometer gives a 
reading which is the difference between the relative expansion of glass 
and mercury (and even here the pattern is not always fixed, since 
usually unnoticed is the initial fall in the reading due to the glass 
expanding first). 
Any set of relations which is established between signs can be 
drawn together and constructed. This construction is termed design. 
This is the systems level already referred to; when the signs are freed 
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from being embedded in the phenomena (the process of entitation) but 
are grouped together in an arrangement. Such a process entails the 
abstraction of the sign1 the cancelling of its indicative relation to 
the processes which gave rise to it (de-sign). The configuring of 
signs to other signs gives rise to positional values and the logic of 
such positional arrangements has already been discussed. 
On this discussion, the crucial aspect of signs is not what they 
stand for (equivalence), which is potentially arbitrary and non-unique, 
but their always belonging to a system. It is from their arrangement 
with other signs that signs take their power. This view upsets the 
Classical typology of relations given above in a number of respects 
which need careful ennumeration. It also is contrary to the emphasis 
on the relation of the 'signifier' to the 'signified' on which the 
received view of linguistics from Saussure has tended to concentrate 
(although more recently others have adopted from Saussure his stress on 
'difference', or 'differance' [Derrida, 1981]). The relation of the 
• signifier' to • signified' is discussed further below. 
5.2 historical development 
Eco traces the early historical development of signs from the early 
Greeks to Aristotle and from the Stoics to the Churchmen, Augustine and 
St Aquinas [Eco, 1984, pp.26-38]. Latter development came through the 
empiricist tradition, from Locke to Peirce1 and then through the 
emphasis on phenomenology from Husserl [Eco, 1984, p.19]. If 
Checkland's intuition is right in that the systems approach is a 
phenomenological enquiry (see Chapter 1), then the status of signs 
seems an important area of enquiry for systems researchers. 
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According to Eco, the early Greek philosophers took a long time to 
recognise the relation between 'natural signs' and words [Eco, 1984, 
pp.8-9] and while the stoics attempted this relation, it was Augustine 
who brought them together, recognizing the genus of signs, of which 
linguistic signs are a species (insignias, gestures, ostensive signs) 
[Eco, 1984, p.33]. 
However, for Eco this opens up the problem between equivalence, a 
word standing for something, and inference, the natural sign (being a 
'clue', a symptom) implying either antecedent causes or latter possible 
effects. What is the difference between the relation of linguistic 
expression to content on the one hand and relation of the sign as 
proposition to consequent or antecedent substance, the stuff of science 
on the other hand? While Eco suggests that this problem may arise from 
an 'optical illusion', language starts in an awkward position being 
'too strong, too finely articulated' and hence not amenable to standing 
against the 'elusive and generic' relationships of natural events [Eco, 
1984, pp.33-34], a theory of signs would need to articulate these two 
domains of equivalence and inference. These domains are considered in 
turn. 
5.3 linguistics and equivalence 
Due to natural language's highly developed articulation there has been 
a tendency for it to be made pre-eminent and serve as a model for other 
systems. Given this articulation, linguistics, founded as a science by 
Saussure at the turn of this century, adopted the form of equivalence. 
That is, the notion of meaning as 'synonymy' was developed [Eco, 1984, 
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p.84]. Crucially, definition here will work through essentialism: 
/man/ is 'a rational animal'. The form of equivalence is usually 
pointed to as the distinction between 'signified' and 'significant' (or 
signifier). 
What needs emphasis in this distinction is that it usually carries 
a fixed relation7 the word 'stands for' something. Saussure pointed out 
that, although the relation here is 'arbitrary' (that is, there is 
nothing necessarily in the sign which forms a 'natural connection' or 
reveals the essence of the signified), this relation of denotation is 
f;xed by 'rule' and 'convent; on' [Saussure 1959 pp 72 73] The ... ..., , . - . 
learning of these 'rules' as the basis of language being social, not 
private, was later elaborated by Wittgenstein [1958] in giving emphasis 
to his conception of meaning arising 'in use'. 
While this view of the world might well approach the 'common 
sense' (sometimes called 'naive realism') view of many people over the 
matter of fixed relations (unlike the French or Spanish, the Englishman 
calls fish /fish/ since 'that is obviously what it is'), it also 
appears to explain why, despite the nature of the sign actually being 
arbitrary, people do not see their choice of words as free. However, in 
its assumption of fixed relations, it espouses a very peculiar ontology 
in the unchanging nature of things and fails to discriminate between 
signs which are more constant in their ontological relations (the 
classical schema) and those which are more mercurial in content. 
This emphasis on a fixed relation of expression to content gave 
rise to Saussure's famous distinction between language (the stock of 
fixed relations) which is objective and speech (more modernly: 'speech 
acts'), the subjective speech acts of the individual. The 'essential' 
relations are those which are in language7 other relations implied in 
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the speech act are momentary and transient. In accepting from Merleau-
Ponty that any 'process' presupposes a 'system', Barthes [1967] 
attempts to equate process as speech (parole) and system as the 
language (langue) and then (tentatively) suggests that language acts as 
the 'code' and speech as the 'message' [Barthes, 1967, pp. 22-23]. 
Interesting as this suggestion is, and it would conform with the 
discussion on information theory above, a difficulty with it is its 
dependence on the 'fixed' relation of signifiers to signifieds. 
Although Barthes allowed for some 'displacement' of signs, whole shifts 
of systems of signs, in his discussion on the modern mythologies of, 
for example, cars as cathedrals [Barthes, 1972], he never fully 
abandoned the assumption of fixed relations and simply shifted to the 
level of embedded metaphors. Nor does Barthes particularly question the 
'arbitrary' nature of sign, although his recognition of systems of 
signs might allow him to do this. It is only with Peirce, see below, 
that there is a theory which articulated the arrangements among signs 
and gave emphasis to their 'nomadic' qualities, the absence of 'fixed' 
relations between signifier and signified. 
5.4 pragmatism and inference 
Almost contemporary with Saussure's development of the equivalence of 
signs, C.S. Peirce, the American pragmatist, evolved a theory of signs 
which developed the inferential aspect of signs, an aspect that has 
profoundly influenced Eco [1976, 1984], see below, in developing his 
theories of semiotics. According to Charles Morris who later put 
together Peirce's mostly unpublished writings, the basis to the theory 
involved the recognition of three aspects of signs, semantics, broadly 
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speaking the area of content, syntact;cs the area of form a d .... , , n 
pragmatics, the area of purposes [Morris, 1938]. 
However, crucially Peirce's emphasis on the inferencial aspect of 
signs was not limited to the induction of observations to ideas but 
proceeded inter-actively from initial hypothesis or proposition to 
evolving a more developed (in some sense) proposition. This path 
Peirce called abduction and is represented by Eco as follows: 
Deduction Induction Abduction 
Rule 1- Rule- -: 
Case 
L _[ _ .J 
- - --I 
: Case I 
L __ -' 
r-l-~ 
I Result I Result Result 
L ___ ...J 
[Eco, 1984, p.40] 
Figure 5 
The point of abduction is that there are no fixed relations either 
between sign and object or between effects and causes. An inference is 
always a bet, which requires checking. While deduction proceeds from 
the rule (all men are mortal) through the case (Socrates is a man) to 
the result (Socrates is mortal), induction proceeds in reverse: from 
the lack of breath, the case of death is suggested and this leads to a 
further confirmation of the rule all men are mortal. Whereas Eco 




and hazardous tracing of a system of 
rules which will allow the sign to acquire its 
[Eco, 1984, p.40] 
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the difficulty is deeper. Not only is there a search for the meaning 
(death) of the sign (lack of breath) but the sign itself may be changed 
(to the lack of pulse). Peirce's signs are not only 'nomadic' in what 
they entail as Eco claims, the choice of sign itself is subject to 
change. Abduction might be better shown in Figure 5 as having the 
arrow in the outside loop going in both directions (from rule to case 
as well as vice versa). A preferable way of showing the interconnexity 
might be as a system, drawing on the discussion in the previous 
chapter, which attempts the following closure: 
absence of breath 
absence of pulse 
: Re;ultl 
I L ___ ~ 




In this example it is clear that abduction may begin at any point 
(indeed, in respect of the earlier use of the terms here, there may be 
some arbitrary rotation in perceptual space shifting the correspondence 
of terms); either the case, the absence of breath, gives rise to the 
inference of death which further verifies the rule; or the result, the 
established death, with the rule, check breath, can proceed to the 
case, the absence of breath. Figure 6 better exemplifies therefore the 
interdependence of the case, rule and result; there is an implied 
closure which arise from the inclusion of all three. Note, for 
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example, that if the rule is exchanged (for whatever reason) to 'try 
pulse', the absence of breath in the case needs to be exchanged for the 
absence of pulse. On the basis of exchanging both the case and the 
rule, the strength of the inference relation (predictive power) can be 
compared and either the pulse alone may be preferred or a rule adopted 
which says both pulse and breath need checked. 
5.5 a system of signs 
It is not clear, however, that the terms 'case', 'result' and 'rule' 
are entirely appropriate here (indeed, it could also be argued that 
/rule/ in Figure 5 stands for three different entities). Peirce's basic 
terms were pragmatics, syntactics and semantics and it is these terms 
which it is now suggested may form the set of end terms discussed in 
the last chaper, since their adoption potentially leads to a richer and 
more subtle analysis than the core concepts of systems thinking. Their 
'nomadic' nature, identified by Eco and mentioned above, should also 
allow some equivalent of the aspect of neutrality discussed in Chapter 
2. 
The crucial addition of closure derived in the previous chapter 
is, however, retained and it is this feature which brings to Peirce's 
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SYNTACTICS 
Figure 3 shows Peirce's triad as a system of signs, with the 
system itself requiring representation as a sign. This is not simply to 
say that a system which defines a sign is also representable by a sign. 
More importantly, it is to depict signs of all types as emerging in the 
dialectic interplay of pragmatics, syntactics and semantics. Crucially 
the sign here is the emergent characteristic and, as such, the sign is 
bound not only by the object world, but by the semantics, the 
syntactics and the pragmatics of any discourse which gave rise to it. 
It is only because the sign is so bound that it is available for 
exchange with other signs but, by the same token, it is only available 
for exchange if recognizance is taken of the bounds; that is, the 
limits which give the sign its voice also need to· be accounted for in 
its use. The power of Peirce's theory, as adapted here to form a 
system, is that it supplies a set of basic categories for considering 
the propinquity of any exchange of terms and this is essentially what 
is required by a systems approach. 
At first the use of Peirce's terms as end terms may seem somewhat 
strained; this arises largely from the application of language terms, 
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semantics for natural signs and syntactics for practical rule 
techniques. However, interpreting in the previous example to the end 
terms, it can be seen that the desire to establish death represents the 
pragmatics, the adoption of a rule for checking the presence of pulse 
is the syntactics and the absence of breath or pulse is the semantics. 
As mentioned above, while the pragmatics of establishing death remains 
constant, both the semantics and the syntactics require exchanging with 
the adoption of a new rule in checking the pulse; a change in method 
requires a change in measures. In passing here it should be made clear 
that 'pragmatics' is not to be compared with 'functional' aspects. It 
is more at a level of purposiveness and this is illustrated in Chapter 
4. 
Further, a change in pragmatics, say from establishing death to 
health evaluation, might require not only checks both on breath and 
pulse, but also a switch within the pulse checking method from presence 
to one which ascertains rapidity, giving rise to a semantics which 
takes the form of a rate, 50 beats per second. Such a semantics also 
embeds aspects of the syntactical rules or methods for such a measure, 
as well as embedding pragmatic overtones of inference for the health of 
the heart, or the health of the circulation system in respect of body 
weight and so on. 
6.1 signs and information theory 
A consequence of this system of signs is that no information system can 
be without some aspect of pragmatics, syntactics, and semantics. Before 
extending the theory of signs further, therefore, it is worth testing 
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this part of the system of signs against an apparant counter-example. 
Such a counter-example might appear to be Shannon's information theory, 
since Weaver claimed the theory operated only on the technical level 
and was free of semantics. 
What are the system properties of information theory in terms of 
the system of signs? The pragmatics of the system have been made 
clear; the problem is a transport problem with the emphasis on 
efficiency in the use of transport facilities (the channel). As a 
system, it may be described as a highly constrained system with certain 
unusual properties which rule against information theory being of 
direct interest to communication in general (although, as previously 
mentioned, of importance in any cybernetic feedback loops where coding 
is controllable). 
In terms of semantics, although the system appears semantic-
indifferent (certainly this is Weaver's claim in separating the three 
levels of communication already discussed) it is not semantic-free; any 
signal represents a pre-coded message selection. In any proper sense, 
the semantics are embedded in the codes used by the system and, 
importantly, in the ability of these codes to map fruitfully into the 
external structure of the semantics in which the source presents the 
message or as it is received at its destination. The system only 
appears relatively semantics free because the mapping of the semantic 
structures are embedded in the code and because the internal structure 
of the system depends on the decoder being a perfect inverse mapping of 
the encoder. 
Again it might be thought that the system is syntactics 
indifferent. However, as has been demonstrated this internal set of 
relations in a perfect inverse decoder results in any transformation of 
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the message always being revised. This set of ~elations constitutes 
part of the system's syntactics and the importance of this internal 
syntactics is soon revealed if the code held in the receiver or sender 
is not a perfect inverse of the rule. Further, an important condition 
of the coding and decoding is that the external syntactics, the way in 
which the message to be sent arrives, has to be a sequence, or more 
formally, a set of strings, ' •••• ', 
6.2 exchanging signs 
, . . . . .. , . , • • •• • 
In part what is happening here is that attention to signs (sources) in 
information theory appears limited to the pragmatics of transporting, 
because the semantic and syntactic aspects of particular types of signs 
are internalized into the information system itself, particularily 
through the coding arrangements. In order for the source messages to be 
mapped into signals appropriate for the communication channel, a 
process of exchanging signs, some aspects of the semantic-syntactic 
relationships in the language of the message source are internalized 
into the coding arrangements and into the structure and function of the 
communication system. 
The information transport system may seem semantic or syntactic 
indifferent to signs, but it cannot be according to the theory of signs 
already outlined. In practice a communication system would seem to 
have the following functional structure: (1) sequential arrangement is 
relied on, (2) the internal relations of the signal entities mirror the 
internal relations of the message entities - there is an invariant one 
to one mapping in moving from the message code to the signal code, (3) 
a decoder is needed which inversely and perfectly maps the coder. 
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As was discussed earlier, this not only entails the set of all 
messages (the set of all signs) to already exist in the decoder, but 
also entails that messages which have not been so anticipated cannot be 
sent. For example, an alphabetic coder (without digits) could only 
send a message containing information about numbers alphabetically. In 
fact the message from the source would need to arrive in this way; the 
encoder (without digits) would simply fail to transform any numerals in 
the message. Contrary to Weaver's indication that the system is empty 
of semantics, it is in contrast extremely semantic bound; every signal 
represents a pre-determined message, however meaningless or variable in 
meaning those 'messages' may be from the perspective of the final 
destination outside the communication system. 
Most importantly, however, a general principle can be seen at work 
here that any information system, even one which has only a transport 
function, operates with signs only in a limited way. As a system, the 
communication systems requires closure and it is only through such 
closure that signs may be exchanged or mapped into the system. This not 
only entails some signs being excluded altogether from the system, but, 
further, results in only that aspect of the sign for which the system 
has been designed, the sign itself, entering the system. What is 
represented by the sign, how the sign represents and why the sign is 
representing cannot be taken in. It is only the bound form, the 







Where signs are essentially nomadic, where systems shift the 
reliance from a one to one mapping across codes (equivalence) to 
possibly arbitrary links (inference), it should be noted that the same 
sign may emerge from different perceptions or be mapped into different 
systems. Such transformations it has been remarked form the basis of 
knowledge work and underpin essentially human systems. However, where 
the codes, in either the (machine) perceptual system or information 
system, are a fixed set of one to one mappings (equivalences), only a 
predetermined sign can arise in the perceptual system and only a 
prerecognised sign can enter the information system. All other signs 
will be excluded from either perception or transport in these types of 
systems. 
6.3 two triads 
In terms of the three levels suggested by Weaver, it can be seen that 
these levels do not exist separately and that the 'technical' level can 
only be considered separately in somewhat unusual and restrictive 
circumstances. It could also be argued that the above discussion 
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suggests that the Weaver set of distinctions is not robust and that, in 
their place, the theory of signs from Peirce provides a more flexible 
and serviceable structure. Some further reasons for holding this view 
are now suggested. 
The arguments here are that the questions of 'effectiveness' and 
'semantics' are in part already internalized by Shannon. In 
particular, the efficiency concern and the possibility of perfect 
transmission through the twin nature of the encoder and decoder resolve 
some of the effectiveness questions. As already argued, given the 
nature of codes, the transmission process is highly semantics-driven. 
What is missing in both these cases, is the external analysis and it is 
this level which the theory of signs triad is also capable of handling. 
The process of transmission cannot force behaviour upon those for 
whom any message has been intended. The 'conduct', as Weaver describes 
it, lies outside the system. Neither can 'meaning' be forced. In 
fact, as Weaver accepted, 'meaning' and 'conduct' are strongly related; 
if meanings from a message are uncertain, then conduct is not 
predictable. Finally, all that is being said in Weaver's tripartite 
analysis is that what is outside the system is not necessarily affected 
by the system. 
In addition to the lack of independence in Weaver's levels A, B, 
and C, the serial nature needs also to be considered. Setting A aside, 
it is not clear that B altogether precedes C; messages are selected for 
the effect they may have on someone else; that is the meaning is 
anticipated. This might be better described by the philosopher's 
concept of intentionality. Set against this, from the point of view of 
the other person, the user, the message has meaning, and then effect, 
through relevance. 
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6.4 signs and meaning 
Any message begins therefore with intentionality and ends with 
relevance. These are the pragmatic concepts which underpin the sending 
and receiving of a message. However, the choice of message is also 
influenced by both semantics and syntactics. To elaborate on semantics, 
it can be held that the key concepts of truth and reference guide 
semantics. Strictly reference is to what 'object' the sign points or 
refers. This is ostensive definition, the object in the world is 
pointed to. Or the object in the language is gestured towards by the 
language itself, this is verbal definition. On either type of 
definition, it has usually been held that for meaning, there is a need 
for the intensional definition, the 'concept', to require some truth to 
adhere to it. However, with the system of signs there is no need for 
discussion here of • concepts' (which properly are the entities of 
theories). 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, signs embed relations. 
Semantics is never free of syntactics (nor of pragmatics). That a word 
can stand for an object implies an ordering of the world, and of 
language. The paucity of previous explanations of meaning can be 
illustrated here with reference to one of the most famous explanations, 
that of Ogden and Richards [1923]. They express meaning through the 





This is supposed to correspond to the usual intuitions about the 
working of language. Roughly, a 'word' refers to a 'referent' or object 
via a mental process known as a concept [Martin, 1975, p.S]. The 
completed lines indicate direct relations, the incomplete stresses the 
indirectness of what is usually assumed to be direct. In fact, this 
schema is not a triangle at all, but simply the perspectives of 
language and perception superimposed upon each other, without any 
explanation of how these two separate systems can be reduced to a 
single dimension other than the whollY'inadequate criterion that both 
take place in the mental world. Since an extra entity has to be invoked 
for explanation here, the notion of concepts begs the question of 
meaning rather than explains the interaction of the perceptual system 
with the language system. 
6.5 different structures 
In contrast with a reliance in the introduction of concepts (and their 
consequent proliferation into a 'slum' of fixed relations), not only 
does the system of signs acknowledge that words and referents belong to 
the same genus of signs, but it recognises that the systems which 
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support such signs may take quite different structures. Since no direct 
apprehension can be made of the 'syntax' of the phenomenal world, there 
tends to be an emphasis, in the common reference to meanings, on the 
relation of the sign to an object. Such an emphasis stresses the 
constancy of the sign denoting the object and the reliability of the 
use of the sign stems from the certainty of the connection. 
While there might be some a priori 'truth' in the sense of 
revelation but no certain examples of this exist. Since the Classical 
age, there has been a reliance on the empiricist notion of truth, the 
constancy of the sign denoting the object. Where a sign and an object 
(or set of other signs) attaches constantly or regularly enough some 
predictive truth value is supplied and the heuristic of relying on the 
constancy of the signifier standing for the significant becomes 
paramount. The power of the sign depends on its reliability: the 
cloud signifies rain. A proposition is held to be 'true', because the 
observations referred to by the proposition can usually be shown 
through the application of some predetermined method. 
In the domain of natural languages, the relation of word to 
referent also seems vital, 'the' signifies a noun will follow. 
Indeed, constancy can be taken to be a rule of language - such a basic 
and strong rule that much fun can be derived from breaking it over 
particular parts of a message since sense can be measured from the rest 
of the message - the extent to which a message can be ridden with 
gobbledy-gook is one measure of information redundancy which Shannon 
sought to measure. However, it is in the grasp of syntactics or syntax 
that language is strong, not the relation of word to object which is of 
the flimsiest nature. As Eco pointed out, it is in the articulation of 
language that it is so robust; in all other respects signs are nomadic. 
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It is the order in which the signs are presented that contributes 
much to how those signs are to be understood. Letters, 'a', 'be, 'c' 
and so on are formed into morphemes, units of meaning 'bad', 'lye, IS' 
which can be grouped together to form words, which in turn can be 
constructed into sentences. Sentences in turn can be constructed into 
larger units such as arguments. On Shannon's analysis, it is clear 
that the unit of a message can vary, using an alphabetic coder, from 
either a single letter to a thesis. The choice of unit depends on 
expectations of the response readiness and also the possible penalties 
of misinterpretation. No-one, it is to be hoped, would rely on the 
sending of a single letter to advance an army, although it is possible 
to do so and a question hangs over exactly how the 'button' is arranged 
for the President of the United States. If, for example, the letter 
selected was's', then an S.O.S. or Send reinforcements might 
precipitate the action if the rest of the message fails to get through. 
7.1 the power of the sign 
It was assumed in the Classical episteme, see section 4.2 above, that 
the power of the sign (its ability to carry meanings and have an effect 
on conduct) depends on the sign's reliabilitY1 the cloud signifies 
rain, the signifies a noun (subject/object) will follow. Notice that 
in both these examples semantics and syntactics contribute towards the 
reliability. 'The' denotes a definite article, a specific instance, 
while the syntactical rule of precedence before a noun indicates the 
coming of a noun. Clearly in the case of 'cloud signifies rain', 
syntactiCS has to be understood in its broadest sense, the order of the 
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world is not the same order as the syntax of grammars. However, it is 
regularity of events in the world and the rules of the construction of 
verbal signs which lead to their reliability. 
Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated that this power is 
generally excluded in the information processing system. The 
represention of the sign, the method by which the sign was formed, any 
consequent recovery of its representation, and the purpose embedded in 
the sign are all excluded by the communication system. The system 
strips the sign of its power (de-sign) and imposes its own. 
It is only with the acts of the receiver of the information that 
the power of the sign to represent, to point behind itself to methods 
and purposes is recovered but then in the shadow form of ideas, not in 
the force of perception. 
7.2 knowledge systems 
Any elaboration of the sign system needs, therefore, to take account of 
this fact of language. This is achieved by any communication system 
attempting to internalize its own semantic aspects of truth and 
reference and take on the role of a knowledge system. For example, a 
data base can be kept in the same code as that used in the transmission 
and this gives the communication system not only the power of storing 
as well as transporting but allows internal checks to be made. 
However, for a data base to be effective, the system also needs 
some internalization of syntactics. While rules govern the external 
structures of syntactics, validity is more concerned with the internal 
transformations. From A > Band B > C, it is possible to deduce A> C. 
From such transformations, it is possible to test the semantic 
177 
implications. For example, if someone prefers apples to pears and also 
prefers pears to bananas, the expectation is given the choice of an 
apple and a banana, then they will select an apple. 
A problem arises with beliefs. Because of the reliance on 
constancy for the importation of signs from the natural world without 
being able to check a natural sign's syntactics (since this cannot be 
apprehended directly), there is the danger of self-contradiction in the 
importation of unexamined beliefs. The strength of the transitivity 
rule is to enable belief statements to be checked. Note that in science 
part of the role of method (through its professed allegiance to the 
logic of justification rather than the logic of discovery) is to 
preclude such potentially contradictory importation. However, in data 
bases, by separating validity from truth, access to multiple methods 
can be made. Instead of validity checks being insisted on ex ante, this 
can be applied ex post, as shown below. 
Finally, for pragmatics, the importance of intentionality and 
relevance has already been discussed. Figure 10 shows the system of 
signs extended for the duals of truth and relevance to extend 
semantics, validity and rules to extend syntactics, and intentionality 
and relevance to extend pragmatics. Such a system provides the 
necessary organization to carry out the tasks of representing, storing 
and transporting, it provides the order in which the right signs can be 
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7.3 testing substitutions ex ante 
In particular, the underlying rationale in providing a formal basis to 
knowledge systems is to switch from a black box approach to problem 
solving, where a heuristic from prior experience suggests a particular 
substitution (and when it is then a matter of trial and error to test 
its applicability), to a white box approach where the rules and 
relevance of a proposed substitution can be better apprehended. 
What may be attempted, theoretically, in a knowledge system is 
that instead of only the sign being imported as in the communication 
system, the rules, reference and relevance which embed the sign can 
also be stored (although never perfectly). A first attempt in this 
direction is expert systems where, in areas of expertise where the 
'pragmatics' are fairly constant, the 'if-then' rules which give rise 
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to 'signs' are captured in the system and can be checked. In a full 
knowledge system, it will be possible to search the knowledge base in 
terms of references, rules and relevance for ex post signs and check 
these in respect of the ex ante problem solving triad of 
intentionality, validity and truth. 
What has been demonstrated in this chapter is that the focus of 
the Classical episteme was on aspects of relations for the sign which 
can only be external to communication systems. The relation of the sign 
as a part of a whole is not outwards to the phenomenon but inwards to 
the system in which the sign is bound. The initial discussion on 
tightly coded information systems suggested that only signs can enter a 
system (and then only if they match a prior code). It is the sign 
alone which is transferred through the information system. Any meaning 
which is then given to a sign by an actor has to be 'added back' 
through imposition of the actor's own system(s). 
The attempt in designing knowledge systems is not only to take 
account of signs being systems, but to use this fact in some helpful 
and rigorous way. In particular, understanding signs in terms of 
systems looks to challenge the basic assumption of Saussure in holding 
that signs are arbitrary. They are nomadic in what they stand for; 
nevertheless, in belonging to systems, the choice of any sign is not 
free, although neither is it a matter of 'fixed' relations. Rather is 
it more a question of understanding the rules governing the 
arrangements among any particular set of signs and the heuristics of 
entering and leaving particular systems of signs. 
Although this discussion on the structure of a knowledge system 
could be further developed, sufficient has been said to present the 
formal basis to such systems in order to proceed to Part II where the 
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accounting system will be reworked in light of the system of signs. 
However, this system of signs can be also elaborated and extended to 
illustrate how this order affects the individual actor in the context 
of social organizations and this is outlined in Chapter 4. This, 
together with the application of the formal basis to the knowledge 
system in Part II, then completes the investigation into the 




Context: A Tentative Framework 
C~T~ 4 
Developing the Knowledge System in its Organizational Context: 
A Tentative Framework 
1.1 Introduction 
Following the exposition of the root of systems approaches being in the 
abstract area of language and logic (Chapter 1) and a consequent 
explication of a system of signs (Chapters 2 and 3), this chapter 
outlines how such a system of signs might be developed in the multi-
dimensional area of social organizations. The particular difficulties 
here are first the 'boundary' problem, already discussed in respect of 
wholes in Chapter 2; _and secondly, the integration of the interpreted 
meanings of the individual actor with the manifestation of 'systems' 
through organized social activity. 
The second difficulty lies in a perceived 'reification' of systems 
approaches; in attempting to discuss how an organization exchanges with 
its environment there is an abstraction from the individual and a 
tendency to embody organizations with their own individuality, 
ascribing to them goals, motivation and perceptions. This produces a 
severance of the social system from the individual, analogous in its 
difficulty to the mind-body problem, and it is precisely this 
difficulty which has led many researchers in the social sciences to 
abandon the systems approach. 
Although Checkland's action-based research approach ties problem-
solving to a 'systems' perspective, it is largely concerned with the 
problems of the organization, the system level, than those of 
individual actors. While Checkland is mindful of reification, in that 
he discusses 'problem owners' in his later work [1981] and stresses the 
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individuality of any problem solution from his methodology [1972], his 
concern is still very much in the perspective of the organization's 
problems. Radically different in this respect, the Bath Group have 
evolved a problem-solving approach through which individuals' views of 
a problem space can be mapped and contrasted [Eden et aI, 1983]. 
Both these approaches are sensitive to the need for a flexible 
methodology, in order that the views (and the insights which these may 
contain) of individuals can be included. The framework developed in 
this thesis seeks to augment this important type of work by developing 
a general framework suitable for exchanging 'organizational maps', 
which also retains a flexibility in its approach. Fundamental to the 
framework to be developed are the individual meanings of the actor as 
problem solver. However, since it has been argued that information 
exists only within a system, the problem solver is conceived as usi~g 
knowledge systems to integrate with the physical and social 
environment. 
The basic theory for this was developed in the previous chapter 
and it is by way of extension of the system of signs that the following 
framework is outlined. The simplifying assumption is that a common 
pattern of closure operates throughout all systems due to the 
commonality of signs. This common pattern of closure, discussed in 
detail in Chapter 2, is reflected in all the dimensions of a social 
organization, environment, organizational system, individual as problem 
solver and knowledge systems. 
Since it is only the information system aspects of the system of 
signs which is required for the discussion of the accounting system in 
Part II, the framework for social organizations is developed in outline 
only and should be seen as tentative and suggestive. Much more 
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elaboration of the arguments would be required for justification of the 
framework. In particular, for example, Kant's analytic synthetic 
'solution' could be addressed. And further exemplification of possible 
links with other work is clearly desirable; for example, the Bath Group 
mentioned above have partly pressed their attention on the individual 
through the application of Kelly's Personal Construct Theory. The 
triangulation in use there promises some connection to the system of 
signs, but this is not attempted in this thesis. 
1.2 organizing organizational perspectives 
A guiding metaphor in Hopwood's closing remarks to a review of papers 
given to a conference on Accounting in its Organizational Context is 
that of maps [Hopwood, 1983]. Accounting enters into a 'disputed 
terrain'. Not only is there the 'problematic endeavour' for accountants 
'in charting an organization anew but: 
At the individual level, all 
construct their own maps of 
organizational participants 
the organizational terrain. 
[Hopwood, 1983, p.298] 
Competing with accountant's mappings are the physical and technical 
mappings of engineers, production management, personnel, marketing, 
finance and distribution [Hopwood, 1983, p.298]. 
A rather similar problem arises in the ways researchers have tried 
to perceive the organizations which they are considering. Any number of 
competing perspectives derive from their host disciplines of sociology, 
psychology, economics and the general disciplines of philosophy and 
history, together with their important derivatives of social 
psychology, philosophy of science, epistemics, socio-political theory. 
To these must be added the cohorts of researchers with counterparts in 
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the organization; organization behaviourists, management theorists, 
management scientists, systems analysts, accountants, engineers and 
scientists. 
For example, in developing their thesis on cognitive style, 
Mitroff and Mason use Jungian concepts (bringing in psychology) and 
develop this in a conjunction of Toulmin's argumentation analysis and 
Rescher's notions on plausibility (bringing in logic and epistemics) 
[Mitroff & Mason, 1983]. These sets of ideas are important and capable 
of further development. To what extent do they overlap (map) with the 
Bath Group's looser approach? Both address messy problems - what is 
their potential conflict? 
Researchers on organizations are themselves facing an organization 
problem. Accounting 'researchers, as soon as they look outside the map 
'enshrined as accounting practice' [Hopwood, 1983, p.298] face a 
bewildering array of maps competing for their attention. Promising as 
many are, they are often incomplete or partial and their vagueness may 
hide the potential conflict in borrowing different terms from different 
disciplines. 
Discussing critisms to their methodology, Mitroff has recently 
replied that 'some mechanism for tracking arguments will be implicit in 
a general methodology' [Mitroff, 1984, p.164]. This plea for a 
mechanism for tracking arguments needs to be applied to the 
organizational research itself. The proposal in this thesis has been 
less ambitious than that of attempting to find a mechanism (indeed the 
analysis suggests that a mechanism might function at one level only) 
but a framework is suggested and, since it is terms which mostly go 
astray in arguments, the framework is directed principally at eliciting 
an 'organization' of terms for any discourse on organizations. It is 
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aimed at restricting the proliferation of terms, while protecting the 
rigour of use of terms in their particular perspective. Unlike the 
philosopher's stone it is not ready to turn leaden concepts into gold. 
1.3 exchanging terms 
Fundamentally, the interest is in transporting terms from general or 
specific disciplines into the organization to aid action research or 
problem-solving; equally information gained from action research or 
problem-solving needs to be transported back to the disciplines. These 
interests mediate in the problem of exchange. How can the perspective 
of the host discipline which embeds the insight captured in particular 
terms be turned into the close view of the individual caught in a 
functional task? How can an individual caught in a functional task 
exhange ideas with those concerned with the organization's relationship 
to its environment? 
In these terms, the problem of organizing discourse on 
organizational issues is taken to be equivalent to the organization's 
problems in importing information from the environment. What makes 
discussion 'about' an organization different from discussion 'within' 
an organization is perspective or purpose. At the fundamental level of 
terms to facilitate information exchange, the 'outer' problem of 
researchers organizing their discourse is the inverse of the 'inner' 
problem of 'stakeholders' [Mitroff, 1984], those in the organization, 
organizing information. 
As has been discussed, systems theory arose partly out of the 
interest of biologists in the problem of organization [Bertalannfy, 
1971] and has attracted a number of distinguished adherents to it in 
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the field of management, including Churchman [1968], as a general, non-
partisan means of talking about organizations. Systems theory has 
appeared to offer itself as a potential candidate for the organizing 
framework but a restriction needs to be placed on it that it is made 
operational within the organization. This operationality is attempted 
in this Chapter through an emphasis on problem-solving. The perspective 
of the systems approach to be adopted here is the system of signs, 
already discussed, and in particular the exchange of terms. 
2.1 systems theory and levels of problems 
Among accounting researchers, Lowe has long argued for a systems 
approach to management control and to the design of management 
information systems [Lowe, 1981; 1971]. Central to systems theory is 
the notion of purpose and Lowe has followed Churchman [1971] and Mason 
and Mitroff [1973] in tying together a systems approach to problem-
solving activities to 'develop purposeful 'inquiring systems'. In 
constrast, as outlined in Chapter 1, Checkland has attempted to develop 
his action research based problem-solving methodology in the context of 
systems theory [Checkland, 1972]. 
Churchman, with Mason and Mitroff, and Checkland are both 
concerned, however, with messy problems, and recently Checkland has 
compared how his 'soft methodology ••• maps interestingly on to 
Churchman's treatment' [Checkland, 1984]. In respect of 'inquiring 
systems', Lowe has emphasised: 
that this line of thought depends, critically, upon the 
notion that we are dealing with a 'wicked', 'ill-structured 
problem' for which mechanistic, operational-level, 
information systems are quite unsuited except for limited, 
assumption-ridden purposes. 
[Lowe, 1981, p.213] 
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This remark might be taken as an acceptance by Lowe that there are 
two levels of problem-solving, a top level which is necessarily 
'holistic' and an operational level which is 'routine'. This particular 
danger is illuminated by the reviewer to Lowe's paper, who was ready to 
endorse 'the holistic philosophy of systems design' but nonetheless 
took the position that 'to make practical progress we must ••• proceed to 
some degree piecemeal' [Higgins, 1981, p.227]. 
A difficulty of this latter position was that it accepted the 
hierarchical organizational framework of Harvard, dividing decision-
making into stategic, planning and operational levels [Anthony et aI, 
1976] which Lowe has been concerned to criticise [Lowe, 1981]. Such an 
organization solves the demarcation problem of when a problem is 
sufficiently 'complex' [Mitroff & Mason, 1983] to require an 'inquiring 
system', but does so only at the expense of re-emerging as a 
'recognition' problem; when does a decision appear sufficiently complex 
as to be referred back up to a higher decision level? 
That is, implicit in the recognition problem is a perceived order 
in which problems present themselves. Problems come to the attention of 
those further up the hierarchy when the operational level is seen to 
fail. The piecemeal approach runs from the crumbling of its 
foundations; it relies on firefighting and Lowe recognises these 
dangers as 'introversion': 
Thus it is traditional in management analysis to state a set 
of problems and analyse them in terms of the organizational 
function to which they have been assigned, wheras, in fact, 
they are problems emanating from the environment and should 
be treated, for their solution, extrovertly in terms of the 
organizational-environmental relationship. 
[Lowe, 1981, p.222] 
Lowe is suggesting a reversal of the usual order of treating 
problems. There is some empirical evidence that in particular 
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circumstances the most successful organizations are those that 
internalize external values, for example MacDonalds [Peters & Waterman, 
1982], while those previously vigorous corporations that rely on the 
'pathology' of previously successful policies fail [Hall, 1984]. There 
remains, however, the operational difficulty of how to recognise when 
an internalization of external values has become a 'pathology'. Either 
there is a demarcation problem over messy and routine problems or all 
problems need to be treated as problems in their complexity. 
2.2 separating the organizational system from the information system 
The essential truth in what Lowe is arguing seems clear1 problems for 
organizations are, in some ultimate way, rooted in the environment. It 
seems difficult, however, having paid tribute to this, then to avoid 
overlooking it in the detail of how an organization might handle its 
particular problems. That is, intra-organizational issues dominate. How 
the organization is seen sets a bound on how the 'facts' are perceived •. 
In this respect, a weakness of Lowe's analysis is that the 
organization as organization is not made sharply distinct from an 
organised information system. For many purposes it could be argued that 
the information system is the organization and, at a phenomenal level, 
the two are in many ways conjoined. Nevertheless, the complexity of 
many information systems, their increasing visibility and their 
autonomy in a number of aspects, particularily through increasing 
computerization, is sufficient to merit separate attention. 
On analytical grounds there is also, as a major factor which 
separates the organization from its information system, the systems 
distinction between information and energy. Organizational systems, 
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particularly manufacturing systems are about energy and materials 
transfer; despite giving rise to information output (the car body on 
the assembly line announces 'now fit that wheel'), the detail is in 
the physical arrangements. Information systems, while they use energy 
transfer, require information exchange. 
It is also necessary in designing information systems to consider 
their internal coherence as well as their organizational 'fit' and here 
again an analytical separation is convenient although the shape or 
style of the organization is likely to affect the information system 
design, and vice-versa. Otley [1980] in a review of contingency 
theories separates the information system from organizational factors, 
but leaves the the issue of cause-effect relationships as 
interdependant. Otley's separation and recognition of interdependance 
of the organizational and communication dimmensions is accepted here 
and the nature of the separation and interrelationship is now explored. 
2.3 the communications dimension 
In considering measurement, Mason and Swanson take as its basis 
communication and hold that the theory of signs, drawing on the work of 
C. S. Peirce through to Charles Morris [Mason & Swanson, 1979], is 
fundamental to the field of communication. As has already been argued 
in the last Chapter, the system of signs forges a link between 
measurement and communication and it is proposed to take this link as 
the starting point to set up a systems framework the exchange of terms. 
Three major categories are classified in the theory of signs: 
syntactics - the forms or rules in which signs have relations to each 
other; semantics - the objects to which the signs make reference, 
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either in the 'outside' world or to an abstract one1 and pragmatics -
the purposes to which the signs are intended. However, the theory was 
extended in Chapter 3 to a system of signs and is presented in its 
somewhat novel form in the centre of the lower half of Figure 1. For 
measurement, signs themselves are shown as further bound by a system of 
three categories; references (semantics), rules (syntactics) and 
relevance (pragmatics), with relevance as the critical point of the 
measurement triad, stemming from actors as users of signs, the actor as 
observer. 
In the communication dimension, a further triad bounds the system 
of signs in truth (semantics), validity (syntactics), and 
intentionality (pragmatics) with the latter being the pivot of 
knowledge systems stemming from actors themselves. For information or 
knowledge systems, it is also convenient to distinguish programs, the 
syntactical level, from data in the data base, since the latter serves 
as semantic equivalents. This convenience is also a matter of 
separation in fact in many large information systems, because of the 
constant need to amend programs or extend and up-date data, although 
that concern is not material here. Actors, programs and data bases 
reflect how these inner core system of signs is represented in the main 
divisions of a knowledge system. 
Note that each representation sets up a dual aspect in respect of 
these divisions, since each aspect enjoys relations with a different 
category in the triad. For example, the relation between the program 
and the data base is termed 'validity' at the program edge but 'truth' 
is the concern at the data base edge. Equally, the relations between 
programs and actors sets up 'rules' at the program edge but 
'intentions' at the actors edge, whereas the relations between actors 
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and the data base are 'referende' at the data base edge and 'relevance' 
at the actors edge. Any term, say 'rules' is bound therefore within 
two different types of duals; rules and validity, or rules and 
intentions. 
These complications are fully mapped out in the lower half of 
Figure 1. What can be easily traced through the figure is that, 
between the inner triad of signs and the outer triad, lie the two 
further triads of relations: first, intentions, rules and reference; 
secondly, relevance, validity and truth. 
represent distinctions, not definitions. 
Set out in this way, these 
It should be stressed, 
therefore, that the notion of validity denoted here may not be the 
formal logic term. The actual definition of validity will spring out 
of the rules which encapsulate intentions. Thus, if the intention is 
to set up a 'truth-preserving' method of deduction, rules which allow a 
strict avoidance of self-contradiction will be adopted. (Actually, it 
is possible that we discover measurement rules first and retrieve 
communication intentions later). 
2.4 the organization dimension 
An emerging conclusion from debates on information systems and 
organizational effectiveness is that an information system should 
mirror the decision-making structure of the organization [Galbraith, 
1973]. It is also evident that organization structure tends to be much 
influenced by the type of information system in use - the 'contingency 
theory' view [Otley, 1980]. Others [for example, Manning, 1985] have 
argued for organization to be perceived in terms of systems of signs. 
The framework being constructed here leaves open the causal issue and, 
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instead, constructs a one to one mapping which leaves each reflecting 
the other. 
This mapping is shown in Figure 1, with the 'system' bounded by 
strategies (purposes), plans (forms) and parts (objects), retaining the 
essential categories as developed by Anthony [1965], but loosening them 
of their hierarchical structure, the aspect which it was noted Lowe 
objected to earlier. Parts in the organization dimension are reflected 
by semantics in the communications dimension, plans by semantics and 
strategies by pragmatics. The outer bound of organization systems is 
represented by the fundamental relation of organizations, 'structure' 
and 'function' [Feibleman & Friend, 1945] together with actors, who 
bring purpose(s) to the organization. 
Again, each outer edge captures a dual relation; for example, 
clustered round functions are 'projects' from the actor relation with 
function, but 'skills' from the structure relation with function. 
Projects, from the actors end are the dual of intentions. And so on. 
The two inner triads in the organization dimension, corresponding the 
inner triads in the knowledge system, are: objectives, projects and 
products; benefits, skills, machines. 
It must be stressed again that these mappings represent a 
framework of categories, distinctions not definitions, and they mayor 
may not fully capture the phenomenal reality. Despite the emphasis on 
actors in the organization, it is no longer possible, however, to 
identify individuals with the organization. Many organizations exist 
today for purposes which involve exchange and, whether or not it is 
thought that such systems are living and display autopoiesis, it is 
clear that no single individual exercises full control over any of 
these institutions [Robb, 1983]. It is desirable therefore to include 
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the phenomenon of organization as distinct from the individual, but 
still make individuals, actors, as fundamental. 
2.5 the problem of systems boundary 
A difficulty more fundamental than the demarcation problem discussed 
earlier for 'open systems' approaches to organizations, as put foward 
by Kast and Rosenzweig [1970], Thompson [1967], Katz and Kahn [1966], 
is that of the boundary between the system and its environment. Drawing 
the line between those 'inside' and those 'outside' is tricky; the 
system's picture changes with the particular problem under discussion 
[Hayes, 1983, p.246]. 
The first edition of Kast and Rosenzweig [1970] represents the 
organization as being completely bound by its environment, indeed 
isolated by it, with an inner core protected by intervening 
organizational layers. While the diagram in the second edition has 
broken away from the rigidity of the first, input-output exchange is 
depicted as taking place in an environmental suprasystem which wraps 
round the organization, although some exchange is vaguely directed 
towards a management centre-land. The environment itself is left 
unpictured; all the focus is on the image of the organization [Kast & 
Rosenzweig, 1974]. 
The environment, however, does need to be imagined. As mentioned 
above, Lowe has stressed that it is the organization-environment 
relationship which is of interest. However, it is not organizations 
which picture their environment but individuals in the organization. 
The environment is interpreted for the organization by problem-solvers 
who are actors of the environment and actors of the organization, as 
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well as knowledge systems. Lowe's plea for extroversion relies on 
actors in the organization continuing to picture and interpret the 
environment. It follows that a precursor to understanding the 
organization-environment relationship, and clarifying the notion of 
system boundary, is grasping the environment-problem solver 
r.elationship. 
Viewing organizations as open systems has encouraged an 
introverted view of the system as being ordered in a randomised 
environment; the organization as an island in a sea of entropy. While 
the 'randomised' environment might match the views of some physicists, 
individuals are incapable of picturing it as such. The problem-solver 
either finds purpose in the environment or 'imposes' purpose upon it as 
a consequence of viewing it. The environment is pictured (organized) as 
organized because the actor of the environment is using it and must 
make sense of it; different actors will vary in their sense, and use, 
of it. 
What needs emphasis here is that the framework is a help to 
distinguish aspects of reality, not the imposition of a rigid view of 
what is phenomenal reality. The environment also contains the natural 
world which could be conceived as an 'organization'. However, between 
individuals and the 'natural world' lies much of the structure of the 
man-made world, the results of previous exchanges. The room in which I 
am writing, the city outside the window all evidence the man-made 
world, including the fact of writing itself. 
3.1 openness and closure in problem-solving 
This explicit involvement of the actor as problem-solver in the 
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organization-environment relationship allows recognition of the 
difficulties in search behaviour, explored by the human information 
processing school since Simon [1957b]. It was noted earlier that there 
was a problem over when a matter could be handled routinely in a 
functional area and when it needed a more holistic view. There is also 
the problem of cognitive style [Mitroff & Mason, 1983], a factor made 
more complex by role perception being encouraged [Simon, 1957a], giving 
different perspectives from different positions in the organization. 
Simon [1960] classified techniques for handling non-programmed 
(ill-structured, messy, complex) problems as 'open' decision models, 
whereas 'closed' decision models were applied to programmed (well-
structured, routine) problems. Such a distinction begs the demarcation 
problem, although inclusion of 'aspirations' in the open model from 
Lewin [Wilson & Alexis, 1962], suggested some transfer could arise from 
'error' recognition. As discussed earlier, reliance on this mechanism 
induces a fundamentally introverted and bureaucratic tendency in the 
organization, in addition to the difficulties for the individual in 
'set' or 'functional fixation' pointed to through the experiments of 
other Gestalt theorists [Duncker, 1945; Maier, 1931; Wertheimer, 1959], 
in whose tradition Lewin lies. 
Caught in the success of a particular organizational policy, the 
policy is pursued past its useful life as Hall depicts with the 
Saturday Evening Post, and as Kuhn descibes Henry Ford, when the market 
policies of Sloan were already proving their worth [Hall, 1984]. Up to 
some point, the tendency to functionalize is desirable and 'efficient' 
(William James saw habit as the flywheel of the universe). What is not 





be a tool discriminantly applied but becomes a 
bed to which the situation must conform. 
[Luchins, 1942, p.93] 
Those three words 'tool discriminantly applied' suggest the basis 
of the problem-solving triad: purpose (discriminantly), form (tool) and 
object (applied). Perceptions of objects always come wrapped by the 
form or process by which they are perceived and with purpose built in. 
Complexity cannot be seen directly, it arrives as a 'buzzing blooming 
confusion'. For problem-solving any object level has to be unwrapped of 
existing forms and repacked in terms of perceived purpose. 
It is being suggested here, therefore, that the analysis of 'open' 
and 'closed' decision models presumes well-demarcated problems. 
Instead, what is essential is the ability to 'open up' a problem and 
also the ability to apply 'closure' to a problem. Opening up a problem 
is to lift up the built in purpose and unwrap the object of existing 
forms or functions. Closure entails abandoning complexity by applying 
purpose and form to the problem. Both need to be done using iterative 
loops to check on perceived purpose as this may change in the course of 
the problem-solving. 
3.2 the individual dimension 
The advantage of the triad shape is that it shows any particular 
perception as bound by the inter-relationship of object, form and 
purpose. This shape, shown in the 'lower diagram in Figure 2 is 
suggestive that to unlock existing perceptions of object-form relations 
we have to reconsider purpose anew. Purpose, like Janus, is a two-
headed god; it looks to relations within and to relations without. 
Through perceptions it is concerned not only about the internal fit of 
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the object-form relation, the functionality within the problem space, 
but to the external arrangements, the complexity already discussed. 
This internal-external arrangement is fundamental to the process 
of exchange. The individual can be characterized as a actor (or actor) 
engaged in transactions with his environment which attempt to apply the 
functional to the complex and impose the complex upon the functional. 
Such transactions give rise, for example, to the well-established 
visual phenomenon of the figure and ground effect. In discussing this 
effect, Jordan describes how light rays, which 'carry' the picture of 
the environment, are transformed into the retina: 
As an end result of the process, the person sees the 
environment. 
[Jordan, 1973, p.56] 
That is, the exchange transactions between the environment and the 
individual allow the individual 'actor' of the environment to switch 
from the close focus of the 'particular' perception to the 'general'. 
The possibility of exchange does not, of course, entail that 
individuals behave in a constant attempt to map particular perceptions 
onto a general picture and vice-versa. Indeed, functional fixation 
could not happen unless it was also a habit for many to isolate and 
'box off' perceptions from others. Although it was discussed in the 
last chapter as a necessary part of signs that they were in a system, 
sometimes the system's closure appears to be such that exchange is 
prohibited. 
3.3 the environment and individual dimensions 
Here the environment is perceived, from the actor's perception, as 
bound by problems (objects), solutions (forms) and opportunities 
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(purposes). This is shown in Figure 2 as a direct mapping of 
perceptions being bound by purpose, forms and objects in the individual 
dimension. The outer bound in the environment dimension is shaped by 
'consumables' and 'roles' in addition to 'actors', representing basic 
categories of socio-economic systems. The outer bounds in the 
individual dimension are taken as 'substantives' and 'connectives' in 
addition to 'actors', representing categories of problem-solving. 
What is termed 'intentions' on the part of actors in the 
communication dimension or 'objectives' in the organization dimension 
become 'goals' in the environment-actors inter-action and 'ideals' in 
the individual-actors interaction. Similarly, 'relevance' and 
'benefits' become 'services' and 'satisfactions'. The desires of the 
actors are subtly changed depending on the dimension which is being 
operated in. Again two inner triads can be traced in each dimension. 
In the environment dimension there are goals, tasks and needs1 in the 
individual dimension these correspond to ideals, expectations and 
beliefs. And the duals of these terms set up two further triads: 
services, activities and goods in the environment level1 satisfactions, 
methods and observations at the problem-solving level. 
These terms all occur in common usage or take on special meanings 
in technical discussions. The difficulty of the proliferation of terms 
in any inter-disciplinary discussion is how to take care of the 
insights caught in these special meanings without becoming lost in a 
semantic jungle. Some attempts have been made to establish a formal 
basis of handling such distinctions as ideals, objectives and goals 
[Ackoff & Emery, 1972] but these, typically, suffer the disadvantage of 
being fixed upon from a particular perspective. The framework 
suggested here allows a actor, using the diagrams as a type of map, to 
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move easily from one perspective (dimension) to another and 'exchange' 
terms in an ordered and non-chaotic manner. 
3.4 actor inter-actions 
Four fundamental dimensions in which actors act have been described. 
Figures 1 and 2 may be regarded as illustrating the potential dynamics 
of inter-action between any organization and its formal communication 
system, or that of an individual problem-solver and the environment. 
The imposition of symmetry of each dimension upon the other should not 
be regarded as arbitrary. The desirability of such a mirror effect has 
already been touched upon in respect of organizations and their 
information system; both are artificial constructs and it is not yet a 
recognised view that the organization of organizations and the 
organization of information systems must, in their essentials, be 
different. And parsimony dictates that this needs to be demonstrated 
first. 
The rationale for the presence of symmetry in the environment 
dimension is even more clear; the perception of the environment is in 
the individual, it is no surprise if the order which actors own for 
themselves is imposed upon the 'outside' - or, indeed, that which 
actors recognise as 'outside' is self-imposed upon themselves. 
Further, the environment is partly made up of other organizations, 
individuals and knowledge systems. It is more than a convenience if the 
mappings transpose into each other in a clear and indicative manner. 
It is apparent here that further mappings need to be introduced. 
That is, the other four possible inter-actions are individual-
organization, organization-environment, environment-communication 
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systems and individual-communication systems. 
introduced explicitly through four extra figures. 
These could be 
For convenience all 
four dimensions could be held in a software graphics program which 
related each to any other. Alternatively, the complete set of inter-
actions could be described in two-dimensional space as in Figure 3 
(shown in summary only). This produces a very crowded picture but, for 
the researcher familiar with its use, it is a convenient map to move 
from dimension to dimension. 
The importance of being able to move easily from dimension to 
dimension is clear when the relations which can take place between 
dimensions are recognized. Organizations, other than those with which 
the individual is particularly concerned, act on the individual through 
the environment, through adopting 'roles' or in providing 
'consumables'. Equally, individuals act on other individuals in the 
environment through role playing and providing services. Further, 
organizations act on information systems through individuals' designs 
and, indeed, it is possible to see, as Popper attempts, some knowledge 
systems as organizations (science) [Popper, 1972]. 
4.1 a system of exchanges 
In terms of the phenomenal reality, it is self-evident that the 
framework makes no claims to being a descriptive account of reality. 
All four dimensions may be implicit in, or impinge upon, any real-world 
entity or system, whether an individual or an organization or 
institution composed of individuals, or a knowledge-system designed by 
individuals. The help of the mappings of categories is, first, to make 
distinctions which help to sort out 'the buzzing blooming confusion' of 
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this reality. Secondly, the maps set up an inquiry ·system in which to 
investigate potential implications which lie outside a particular under 
investigation, any push-pull causal notions of classical mechanics tend 
to produce a myopia towards initial or immediate effects and leave 
little help in how to chase up secondary or derived consequences which 
work through systems and their ability to transform or direct energy 
impact into a beneficial exchange. 
The focus of the framework is exactly upon this question of 
exchange. A precise definition of organization may be given in 
exchange terms: the organization of any system delineates what 
exchange functions are open and which are closed. No organization is 
completely closed (the universe in its entirety may not be organized) 
and it appears impossible for any organization to be completely open 
(one example will refute' this claim). Equally, no exchange is possible 
without organization (this is a matter of definition) and it is the 
closure of parts which brings into bear the functions through which the 
exchange can operate. The design of the functions leaves the parts 
open to a selected level of energy exchange. Openness, the ability to 
direct or transform energy in some way, is brought about through 
closure. Living systems bear evidence that this is by no means a zero 
sum game - different designs have different aptitudes and different 
abilities and in some contexts, one design will appear more efficient 
than another. 
These last remarks have an importance for the different abilities 
of organizations to adapt. All organizations need maintenance, without 
maintenance, entropy will increase. Not all organizations can adapt or 
can adapt themselves. Adaptation may be formally defined as the 
ability of the organization to reconfigure the design of its functions; 
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that is to say to switch its parts to alter the closure of the parts to 
a preferred state of exchange possibilities. The need for adaption, of 
course, stems from change in the environment. Was there no change in 
the environment at all, did but the future always resemble the past, 
the organization could rely on maintenance alone. However, since it 
must change, or be prepared to change, its design, it needs not only 
energy exchanges but also information about the environment. 
Information, like energy, also has to pass through an exchange process 
and is gained through functions which require the design of open and 
closed parts. 
4.2 the perspective of problem-solving 
The fields in which application of the framework is possible are wide. 
However, the perspective of the framework is itself contained. In 
self-referential terms, the framework is open in respect of the 
information perspective in any field; it is closed in respect to other 
exchange possibilities such as phenomenal description or descriptions 
of power relations. Any transfer to phenomenal description is possible 
only through the adequacy of insights captured in the information terms 
wich are functional to the field under consideration. Power relations 
may, however, hide complexities which the framework may partially 
illuminate. 
It should be clear, therefore, that the exchanges encapsulated by 
the framework are very different, though they bear some relation to the 
transport equations in General Systems Theory [Bertalanffy, 1971]. The 
essential difference is that G.S.T. attempts to capture phenomenal 
reality through the generalized equations of mathematics in much the 
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same way that Newton's laws capture gravitation. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, this attempt has been much criticised. Part of the 
difficulty may lie in that the regularities, which underlie the natural 
world, are subject to intervention and design features in the man-made 
world. 
4.3 conclusions 
While this chapter has been concerned particularily to set up a 
framework to restrict the proliferation of terms and protect the rigour 
of any term introduced, a further concern has also been to indicate how 
routine problems could be exchanged with messy or complex problems, and 
in this way avoiding the need to prejudge on types of decisions in what 
has been refered to as the demarcation problem. Ackoff, in particular, 
has described a mess as a 'system of problems' [Ackoff, 1974, p.4]. 
The framework given here describes those relations in terms of the 
fundamental 'loops' which have to be 'opened' or 'closed' in order for 
information exchange to take place. 
In particular the framework also allows the inter-relations among 
the dimensions themselves to be traced, and in this way circumvents the 
boundary problem refered to earlier at an analytic level. What the 
framework does not attempt to dictate is how the relations between, 
say, the dimension of the organizational system and any specific 
phenomenal organization should be perceived. The framework, in its 
adoption of specific terms for the exchange categories, is tentative. 
It is hoped that that application of the framework in practice would 
lead to its terms being refined or exchanged for others which 'better' 
207 
capture the rich insights of current terms in any of the four key 





Information Control and Money Signs 
1.1 introduction 
A rationale for this thesis mentioned in the Introduction lies in 
Mattesich's claim about the general lack of attention given to the 
double entry system by accounting researchers in recent years. There 
are some important exceptions to this claim which should be mentioned, 
such as the work by accounting historians (see Chapter 7) but, since 
Littleton's classic Accounting Evolution to 1900 [Littleton, 1966], few 
theorists have examined double entry in any detail within the context 
of the income debate or within the 'crisis' surrounding accounting 
theory (see Introduction). Ijiri [1975, 1967] is an important exception 
to this and his work will provide a focal point for this chapter. 
Drawing on Ijiri [1975], a classification to the main approaches 
in accounting is introduced and then interpreted in systems terms. In 
particular the focus on the bookkeeping as a system is made distinct 
from a user's decision model being regarded as the system. Those who 
adopt the bookkeeping system as central to reporting tend to have been 
concerned with the selection of a single measurement or valuation base, 
while these proponents of decision models tend to urge for increased 
disclosure and are advocates of information evaluation. 
While sympathetic to the axiomatic approach of the information 
evaluation school, Ijiri has suggested instead an information control 
approach. However, his identification of the bookkeeping system with 
traditional double entry reveals his reliance upon double entry to 
provide a control system. Thus in his retention of the existing 
bookkeeping and his adoption of a single valuation base in historic 
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cost, his approach veers towards being similar to other particular 
measurement or valuation schools. Nevertheless, Ijiri's discussion 
about the nature of control in the double entry system is of interest 
because it offers an explanation for the continued use of double entry. 
Ijiri's central argument that the principle of causation is 
fundamental to double entry is therefore examined. However, a detailed 
analysis reveals certain difficulties with the argument and, in its 
place, a similar argument is suggested (prior to the more extensive 
analysis of double entry as a system in Chapter 7) that bookkeeping may 
be interpreted as a system for transposing and conserving information 
contained in money signs. 
The feature of money signs arising in economic exchanges is then 
considered in a fundamental analysis using the traditional theory of 
money. Three types of information are found to be contained in the 
money system and these are then correlated to the three main valuation 
bases normally considered for financal reporting. The main conclusion 
of the chapter is that as money is a system, and as there are three 
important aspects to it, all three aspects of money signs appear to be 
needed for completeness in any full reporting system. 
1.2 bookkeeping and reporting systems 
In considering the nature of the accounting system, a considerable 
change in thinking which has taken place this century has been the 
shift from an introverted or 'internal' emphasis to a user-need or 
'external' perspective: 
We can see a substantial shift in emphasis from the processes 
internal to accounting (recording, classifying and 
summarizing) to the processes external to accounting 
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(economic decision-making) 
[Ijiri, 1975, p.30] 
This shift in focus from the recording and storing of transactions 
data for undisclosed purposes (so-called general purpose data) to 
attempts to communicate the effects of decisions (specific purpose 
data) has also been accompanied by a shift by some researchers from the 
traditional accounting focus on 'transactions' to a more economics 
based recognition of 'events', as exemplified by, for example, Sorter 
[1969]. 
In general terms this change in thinking might appear to represent 
a shift in emphasis from a closed system approach to an open systems 
approach. Typically, however, it is captured in the accounting 
literature by distinguishing the bookkeeping system from the reporting 
system. Earlier perspectives on accounting tended to view the 
bookkeeping as if it existed in a 'closed' system, where the processes 
of recording, classifying and summarizing were undisturbed by reporting 
needs caught in a legalistic conformity to best or normal practice in 
preserving records and which, seen from today's perspective, appear to 
have left reporting practice indifferent to user needs. The shift to 
either a consideration of user-needs (from sayan entity perspective) 
or to the decision-making context (following say the 'events' approach) 
marks, in contrast, an 'open' systems approach. 
Importantly, while a concern with bookkeeping alone (the 
construction and preservation of records) may appear to disregard 
reporting aspects (the use of those records), this is not always true 
in reverse. Arguments for particular user needs, while retaining the 
basic form of the bookkeeping, profoundly affect the content of the 
bookkeeping. For example, Edwards & Bell [1961], Chambers [1966] and 
Lee [1984] all argue for changes in the fundamental valuations from 
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positions on user needs. 
1.3 the traditional system and different valuation bases 
Difficulties with open systems approaches have already been discussed 
in Part 1. In the accounting context, the principal difficulties are 
with the notion of closure, the type of consistency employed which can 
give rise to closure (see Chapter 2), or where to draw the system's 
boundary (see Chapters 2 & 4). 
Since there has been considerable attention on the boundary 
problem, particularly in terms of defining the accounting entity, some 
accounting theorists have adopted a boundary as defined by the 
traditional bookkeeping system and simply proposed the substitution of 
a different valuation base. For example, even with the potentially most 
radical alternative (see Introduction), Chambers [1966] proposed the 
abandonment of historic cost (HC) for net reliazable values (NRV), but 
does not appear to question the use of double entry and retains the 
traditional reporting format in his 'exposure draft' [Chambers, 1975]. 
The key discussion in Chapter 3 suggests that where different 
pragmatics or syntactical rules are embedded within an information 
system, such substitutions may not be entirely valid. The excavation of 
the pragmatic, syntactic and semantic aspects to the traditional double 
entry system will occupy a substantial amount of Part II of the thesis, 
especially Chapter 7, while possible pragmatic, syntactic and semantic 
aspects to three valuation systems will be explicated in Chapter 6. 
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1.4 single valuation bases and user needs 
While any 'closure' which might have been implicit in the double entry 
system has not generally been attended to, some theorists have been 
careful to introduce their own conception of consistency to provide 
validity. No doubt this is in reaction to the permissive appearance of 
double entry in the lack of an explicit valuation rule in the 
traditional system and its tendency to permit the addition of 'apples 
to oranges'. In attempting to introduce a consistency criterion, this 
usually has involved the specification of a single valuation base. 
A consequence of the adoption of this consistency criterion, 
however, is the exclusion of all others and it follows as a consequence 
that single valuation base systems (sometimes referred to as the 
'measurement approach') tend to be locked into a debate as to which 
valuation base is best: 
The measurement [valuation] approach would still attempt to 
resolve the issue as to which rule [base] results in the 
"best" measure of income. 
[Beaver & Demski, 1979, p.44] 
It is difficult to see that all user needs are satisfied by, say, 
the use of current exit prices (Net Realizable Values) and Friedman 
[1978] has particularly addressed criticisms over an exit-price income 
statement only through introducing a further valuation base in current 
entry prices (Replacement Cost), a move which appears to offend any 
reliance on the strict consistency criterion of a single valuation base 
(see section 1.3 above). However, although Chambers [1966] strays 
towards the extreme position of holding that all user needs are 
satisfied by current exit values, in any selection of a single 
valuation base, inevitably, some types of user needs are held in 
preference to others by recourse to criteria such as 'intuitive' appeal 
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[Tweedi~, 1977, p.2]. In contrast to the reliance on a single valuation 
base, Demski [1973] has attempted to prove the impossibility of 
choosing an alternative that is perfect with respect to all users. 
The existence of different strategies here has led to a sharpening 
of the definition of the system's boundary; attempts to identify 
particular exchanges between the reporting system and its users. The 
difficulty is which user? That is, which particular users should be 
included and which excluded? Investors or creditors, employees or 
government? One tactic has been to prefer one group, ususally 
shareholders, to any other. The focus is then on how well the reports 
(system) cater for the shareholders (environment). However, even if 
these were a relatively homogenous group, and there is evidence to 
suggest that they are not [Lee & Tweedie, 1977, 1981], difficulties 
with this approach include the obvious arbitrariness in choice of user 
group and the inherent conservatism of the approach, if an empirical 
approach is applied, since much understanding lies in use and users, in 
this case, can only properly comment on the existing reporting system. 
In passing it might be suggested here that the user needs approach 
has led to an implicit 'contingency' theory in financial reporting, 
different data for different users or decisions. That is, it 
recognizes the possibility of different decision models leading to the 
generation of different data [Demski, Feltham, Horngren and Jaedicke, 
1975]. The emphasis on decision models is now discussed. 
1.5 decision models and information evaluation 
As an extension of considering user needs, there has been a tendency to 
make the user the focal point of the accounting system. That is, 
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instead of regarding the user as the passive receiver of information, 
the user is concentrated on as an active decision maker. Rather than 
the bookkeeping being extended to take account of users, the emphasis 
on accounting transactions is abandoned in favour of identifying 
economic events and, with this, a user decision model is made the heart 
of the analysis. These different positions are contrasted in Figure 1. 
This latter approach, centering on decision models of users and 
tending to abandon the bookkeeping model, has more the flavour of an 
economist's approach. In conventional systems terms, this -is to make 
the decision model the system and conceive of the full set of 
information possibilities as the environment. In terms of Chapter 4, 
this might appear to be a switch from the information system quadrant 
to the individual problem solver. However, most of the analysis on 
decision models has had little to do with the messy nature of problem-
solving as such (see Chapter 4), but the models have been constructed 
instead using economists' assumptions of certainty (with risk factors 
introduced) and perfect availability of information (see section 5.3 in 
Introduction). 
A natural extension of this approach is to open up the 'system' of 
a decision model towards the 'environment' of the variety in choice of 
alternative accounting models. This treats accountants as decision 
makers whose task is to choose among the many alternative accounting 
methods in such a way that the choice will lead to an optimum cost 
benefit result through accountants considering (a) likely actions by 
the users of accounting information under each method and (b) economic 
outcomes from such actions [Ijiri, 1975, p.30]. The theme of this 
information evaluation approach is one of economically provided, goal-
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The information evaluation view may be regarded as an attempt to 
integrate aspects of several of the quadrants of the systems model 
developed in Chapter 4. Any success for this attempt, however, is 
limited at present by the extremely restrictive assumptions of the 
analysis [see, for example, Beaver, 1981] which presumes states of 
knowledge and completeness in information markets bearing little 
resemblance to the real world. Under conditions of genuine uncertainty 
and market incompleteness it is not clear that optimization could 
result or, indeed, what optimization would mean. Since the focus in 
this thesis remains in the knowledge or information systems quadrant, 
the approach of information economists is not further attended to, 
except to bear in mind some of their emphases such as the 'costliness' 
of data. 
2.1 an information control approach 
While Ijiri [1975] has obvious sympathies with the emphasis on 
information, he reacts against the slant on evaluation. He sees 
difficulties inherent in allowing accountants freedom of choice to 
select among accounting models. Such freedom he claims leads to 
'abuse' and in opposition to the 'evaluation' perspective on 
information he advocates an information control approach for the 
'systems designer' [Ijiri, 1975, p.45]; This shifts emphasis on what 
constitutes the 'system' away from the decision model back to the 
bookkeeping. Ijiri's preference lies with the control which he takes to 
be inherent to the use of the double entry system and, with this, Ijiri 
also shifts the emphasis back from general quantification to monetary 
quantification. 
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As Ijiri presents the information control approach, it is 
difficult not to see his case as simply another 'valuation' approach, 
in line with, say, Chambers [1966], Sterling [1970], or Lee [1984], but 
with a preference for retaining HC as the single measurement rule. 
However, in adopting the traditional bookkeeping system, his arguments 
explicitly centre round the 'control' nature of double entry and, since 
it is the control aspect of double entry which is a major concern of 
this thesis, it is for this reason that his analysis is given 
considerable attention in this chapter. 
It is the aim of this part of the thesis to fully develop this 
information control approach in line with the fundamental analysis of 
information systems developed in Chapter 3 and to explore their full 
potential in transporting and storing monetary quantities in respect of 
the full information set in money signs. However, before considering in 
detail the information sets in money signs (see sections 4.1-4.3), 
first the information control approach has to be freed of certain 
preconceptions about the accounting system placed upon it by Ijiri. 
2.2 information control and bookkeeping 
Essentially Ijiri's information control approach is based on the notion 
of 'feedback' [Ijiri, 1975, p.46]. This notion of feedback (see Chapter 
3) is developed in the context of accounting systems in the next 
chapter. However, Ijiri's identification of information control with 
traditional bookkeeping and restriction of monetary quantification to 
historical cost appears preemptive and narrow. Ijiri takes a narrow 
view partly because he believes APB Opinions and FASB Standards 'are 
aimed precisely at avoiding too much discretion' [Ijiri, 1975, p.45]. 
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Hence: 
one of the purposes of issuing rules is to 
information processing systems by eliminating much 
discretionary activity of accountants. 
control 
of the 
[Ijiri, 1975, p.45] 
But this is to put the cart before the horse. It is arguable that 
the need for additional rules arises not simply because of the 
availability of choice of valuation measures, but because there is 
insufficient 'control' within the information processing system. Ijiri 
seeks recourse to external rules because he too readily identifies 
information control with the traditional double entry model and, hence, 
inherits the control weaknesses of the traditional model. This move, 
however, is not necessary. The systems model developed in the next 
chapter demonstrates how sufficient control can be built within the 
information systems themselves. 
Ijiri's investigation into the nature of the closure in the basic 
information processing system is not sufficiently deep and appears 
rather speculative. However, he" is careful to distance himself from the 
traditional view of control being tied up with the 'balancing 
phenomena, and, indeed, is straightforwardly dismissive of this 
'triviality' [Ijiri, 1975, p.84]. Instead, Ijiri suggests a different 
rationale for the control property of double entry. As is discussed 
below, Ijiri rests his analysis heavily on a psychological notion of 
causation, where an information notion of conservation might be more 
appropriate in the design of feedback loops for information control. 
It should be added here that Ijiri [1982] has modified some of his 
earlier arguments in attempting to give some substance to a possible 
triple entry system. However, those arguments germane to the issues 
here are drawn from Ijiri [1975] and Ijiri [1967] without any 
particular changes being made. As Ijiri develops the arguments for 
219 
triple entry he also gets involved in analogies of 'force' and 
'momentum'. It is not clear that his discussion adds much to the 
notion of income as it presently stands apart from an elaboration of 
'earning power' [Ijiri, 1982, p.21] and except that, in line with the 
position taken in this thesis, income is interpreted as best 
represented as neither a 'stock' nor a 'flow' (see Introduction and 
Chapter 6). Ijiri's attribution of the 'concept' of force to Newton 
[Ijiri, 1982, p.21] is also puzzling given Newton's expressed contempt 
for this very concept (see Chapter 1, section 2.1). The dangers of 
relying on 'concepts' on which to build information or knowledge 
systems has also been discussed (Chapter 3, section 6.4). For these 
reasons the later work of Ijiri is not referred to further although it 
is not without interest and contains stimulating ideas. 
2.3 the role of causation 
It has long been recognised that mere duality of entries was not the 
fundamental aspect in what was captured by early double entry systems 
and even in the first extant treatise on double entry bookkeeping, 
Pacioli [1494] gives little attention to the dual nature of entries. 
Attempts to explain the use of two parts to an entry, where it might 
naively be supposed that one could do, come later. 
There is also the classification aspect of 'subtraction by 
apposition', with 'deferred balancing', discussed by Littleton [1966, 
p.24] which is returned to in the next chapter. A crucial aspect to 
this, however, was touched on by Littleton in dismissing classification 
itself as not crucial because he could envisage a statistical system 
which could reproduce the aggregate data of the double entry system 
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[Littleton, 1966, pp.24-25]. Ijiri has elaborated on this point by 
distinguishing between classificational double entry (which can be 
multiple entry) and causal double entry, which is essentially cause and 
effect: 
the essential element in double-entry accounting is the 
causal relationship between an increment and a decrement in 
the present or future resources of an entity. 
[Ijiri, 1967, p.109] 
The introduction of the notion of causation requires some care 
here to investigate the term and ensure that more meaning is not 
carried than is justified. Casual inspection might suggest some very 
strong sense of causation, event B must happen following event A. 
However, apart from it being difficult to imagine an example in 
business of such strict causation, Ijiri interprets Hurne as saying that 
our notion of causality is nothing more than repeated observations of 
one event being followed by another event [Ijiri, 1967, p.38]. 
Causality is a psychological phenomenon more than it is a physical 
actuality. However, since the psychology of recognition is intimately 
tied to categories of classification, Ijiri's distinction appears to 
founder here. 
It is simply speculative to believe that the minds of the medieval 
merchants were possessed by the same psychological grip which Hurne 
[1748] adduced was present in the late eighteenth century. Foucault 
[1970] has argued that an an enormous shift in the sense of order took 
place in the intervening period of the seventeenth century (see also 
Chapter 3). Essentially an epistemic shift in the perception of signs 
took place. A basic duality of what signs were the same and which were 
different, built round the basic notion of 'similitude', shifted to the 
binary form of a 'significant' and a 'signified' [Foucault, 1970, 
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pp.17-44]. While the latter gives free play to the psychology of 
Icause l (signified) and 'effect' (significant), the former system 
relies on a psychology more concerned with resemblance and little given 
to adducing causes: 
The knowledge that divined, 
absolute and older than itself 
of signs built up step by step 
of what is probable. Hurne has 
2.4 causation and conservation 
at random, signs that were 
has been replaced by a network 
in accordance with a knowledge 
become possible. 
[Foucault, 1970, p. 60] 
Nevertheless, since Ijiri's claim has some undoubted intuitive appeal, 
it is as well not to reject it outright. He sees three essential rules 
to causal double entry: 
(1) It always relates an increment and a decrement in a set 
of resources controlled by an entity; 
(2 the increment and the decrement have a cause-and-effect 
relationship; 
(3) the amount (or value) of the increment and the amount of 
the decrement are always set equal. 
[Ijiri, 1967, p.l07] 
In systems terms, the notion of causation is very much tied to the 
push-pull paradigm of mechanism discussed in Part 1. In this context, 
therefore, it is worth considering whether the above aspects truly 
relate to causation, or whether they could instead relate to a systems 
notion such as conservation. Aspect (3), together with aspect (I), 
might be better perceived as representing a conservation rule, of the 
type proposed by Matte~ch [1980], rather than as intrinsically causal 
in nature. That is, nothing is gained into a pool of resources without 
the giving up of something else from that pool. Any acceptance of this 
conservation notion, which is general, appears to cover much of the 
intuitive appeal on which Ijiri relies for his notion of causation and 
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should not be confused with positing some particular relationship 
between two specific categories, which is aspect (2). 
The essential difficulty for aspect (2) arises in the 
identification problems which beset the specification of particular 
relationships. Some discussion of the identification problems which 
specifying such relationships pose for Ijiri is given in Chapter 7. 
Here the specific identification problem examined is the question of 
what makes a causal relation distinct from any other (classification) 
entry. Ijiri is of little help with his discussion of causal relations 
being mostly circular, with the following being not untypical: 
causal double-entry treats increments or decrements as having 
a cause-and-effect relationship 
[Ijiri, 1967, p.104] 
The duality comes from pairing an increment with a decrement. But what 
restriction is there on this process, what guides the recognition of 
this pairing? In particular, where there is no additional rule which 
excludes any pairing from being a causal pairing, the notion of 
causality in this context looks empty. Since Ijiri fails to offer 
additional criteria which can successfully make this exclusion, his 
introduction of the notion of causality looks superfluous. 
2.5 interpreting causation 
This notion of exclusion and the introduction of specific restriction 
rules over the 'permission' to make an entry in a bookkeeping system 
are fully explored in the systems models developed in the next chapter. 
Setting aside the more intuitive aspects, (1) and (3), which are 
perhaps more tied to a concept of conservation, it is arguable that any 
remaining force in Ijiri's suggestion that causation is somehow 
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fundamental to double entry implies that causality carries some tie to 
reality. 
For example, an entry might describe a 'transaction'. Here, since 
there is an exchange of say goods for money or the promise of money, 
the entry describes readily recognizable events in the world. Where 
this is so, Ijiri's introduction of causality carries some power, since 
the use of double entry always forces a connection between the aquiring 
of goods and the consequent reduction in funds which accompanies such 
purchase. But to the extent that any pairing is seen as a causal one, 
this force is lost. As soon as nominal entries are allowed, and Ijiri 
uses an example with a transfer to a profit and loss account which is 
certainly fictive in its description, then the implication of only 
'real' events being captured is lost. The notion of causality looks, on 
this analysis, to be too wide and insufficiently specified to have 
utility. 
Indeed, Ijiri himself seems to find it too wide for he offers the 
following entry as a causal entry: 
(5.13) (Dr.) Cash $100:(Cr.) Capital stock $100 [Ijiri, 1967, p.10S] 
This entry not only appears to offend a strange rule which Ijiri had 
offered that only classification entries moved from assets to equity, 
but the causal nature also needs reinterpreted from the description 
above to the right hand side being interpreted as 'an anticipated 
decrement in cash' [Ijiri, 1967, p.10S, emphasis added]. Where such a 
dramatic reinterpretation is required, the whole question of double 
entry being a causal description is begged. It is possible that in his 
recognition of causation as a psychological entity (and not a 
mechanistic force), Ijiri has not been sufficiently carefully to 
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distinguish the probability basis in Hurne's notion from the psychology 
of association in general. As Berkeley [1710] earlier put the matter: 
The connection of ideas does not imply the relation of cause 
and effect, but only of a mark or sign with the thing 
signified. The fire which I see is not the cause of the pain 
I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns 
me of it. 
Nor is the interpretation of double entries in terms of cause and 
effect a new idea. Not only is it implicit in the wider speculations of 
Sombart [1924] (except that Sombart sees the germ of theories of 
gravitation already contained in the earlier • spirit' of double entry, 
see Chapter 7), but Gomberg in his Histoire explicitly discusses double 
entry in terms of causes and effects [Kaefer, 1966, p.16]. While Ijiri 
makes it clear that he is not using the terms in some crude mechanical 
sense, he fails to make distinct his use of the term causation from 
more loose notions of connection and, hence, fails to clarify its 
importance for accounting. 
3.1 signs and the money system 
It is proposed here that a simpler and less speculative form of 
expressing Ijiri's basic point is to consider double entry as a 
representation of some already extant external duality. In other words 
to see the force of the duality as representing some readily 
recognizable aspect of business, or rather since this evolved from the 
medieval period, trading. This is in fact surprising simple to 
explicate. The impact of the use of money transforms a complex, and 
perhaps never-ending, train of barters involving many effective units 
of account, into the reduction of two direct facts: what was obtained 
and what was paid for it. And, to the extent that there is conservation 
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in the monetary system, what was paid can equally be taken to be an 
incremental measure of what cannot now be obtained. 
Within anyone barter, the goods obtained stand for the items 
given in the exchange. That is, the goods are a sign of what has been 
given up. Such a sign expresses a relative, if strictly limited, 
measure of value. In a money system (with, say, fiat money available as 
a means of payment), such signs, importantly, detach from specific 
objects and indicate in general terms what is being, or will be, given 
up. This is normally expressed as money being used as a unit of 
account, or a measure of value [Wicksell, 1935]. Further, provided 
there is some stability in the signs, that is the prices or rates of 
exchange remain reasonably constant, money will take on its third role, 
that of a store of value. And to the extent money acts as a store of 
value, any price resulting from an exchange can stand as a sign for 
what generally has been given up. These aspects of money signs are more 
fully investigated in section 4 below. 
In other words, through the evolution of money, transactions which 
involve a medium of exchange may be considered as generating sets of 
signs. However, the existence of these signs alone does not constitute 
a system of signs, the signs still need to be organized and classified. 
A major claim of this thesis is that double entry bookkeeping has 
provided a particular system and, in so doing, has influenced the 
perception of relations between signs. However, they are not the sole 
influence and entities such as markets, from the huge medieval fairs to 
the intercontinental trading, money and futures markets of today, also 
exerted their influence. 
In particular, the static duality of the exchange - what is gained 
from the transaction (signified) against what was paid for it 
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(significant) - can be exchanged into the dynamic duality of the sign -
what was paid out (significant) and what needs to be regained 
(signified). It is this last metamorphis which introduces a principle 
of conservation into accounting, but this conservation principle will 
only be realized when all money transactions are accounted for a 
particular entity. 
3.2 mapping and money signs 
Historically, the double entry may be seen as mapping a transaction 
involving money carried out by the business. The double entry was not 
mere form therefore but captured information content on that 
transaction into the bookkeeping. Traditional explanation has tended to 
focus on why two entries where made instead of one. Instead, what needs 
to be explained is the absence of more information on the transaction, 
a fact hinted at by Ijiri's expansion of 'classifi'cation' into multiple 
entries. What is also of interest, here, is Ijiri's reinterpretation of 
causal entries in terms of cash (he also interprets profit as an 
anticipated decrement in cash). 
Double entry, however it was first introduced, is sustained in 
practice by the fact that it records the cash aspect to any transaction 
as well as the aspect relating to the good or service direct. And this 
conclusion is in line with Ijiri's discussion: 
an accountant who is trained in double-entry bookkeeping 
cannot treat a decrease in cash or an increase in inventories 
as independent of each other. 
[Ijiri, 1967, p.84] 
The particular conclusion here is that Ijiri's analysis is 
illuminating in that it reverses the usual preconception over the 
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interest in double entry being. double the required information 
(duplication) and directs attention to the essential question of why 
only two aspects of a transaction were recorded. (Note, once the 
reduction of all possible aspects of a transaction have been made to 
two, the simple device of separating these is less worrisome and 
keeping one set to the left and the other to the right is a convention 
of the same status as driving on the left). 
It is suggested here, while any discussion of first use must be 
speculative, that double entry developed, and continued in use partly 
because it mapped the dual aspects of transactions which involved money 
(cash or credit) as a means of exchange. The key factor in the 
development of double entry lay, not in it capturing 'causality', but 
that it mapped the essential binary nature of signs in a transaction. 
Double entry, fundamentally, was transactions based. 
3.3 equality and conservation 
What the above discussion does not touch upon directly is the question 
of equality. The nature of a transaction may be dual, but this does not 
require both sides of the entry to be equal. Why record in an asset 
account the monetary sign of a transaction, say 'L.930·, instead of 
simply '791 pounds of silk', or '791 pounds of silk at s.23 d.6'? 
Actually, both were recorded (and on both sides) [see Martinelli, 1983, 
p.90-93]. What is of interest is to know why the quantities become less 
important than recording the money sign, even to the extent that the 
recording of quantities sometimes drops out altogether. 
An argument could be presented in terms of the monetary sign being 
psychologically identified with the good, just as earlier a farmer 
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might have perceived in his kitchen table the five bags of corn he 
exchanged for the table. Any such argument, like Ijiri's causation 
argument, would essentially be speculative and difficult to document 
and, worse, does not explain why such a change takes place. In this 
last respect, the argument over 'conservation' has more interest since, 
regarding the business in terms of a 'black box', it becomes easier to 
monitor overall conservation in the system if the entries are equal. As 
soon as there are different value bases to the entries (for example, 
physical quantities), any overall 'balancing' is prohibited or requires 
the conversion of all values to a single base. 
However, it is neither a necessary, nor a desirable step to 
predicate the development of double entry with the argument of 
conservation (it is not clear whether Mattesich intends this in his 
claim about this being the fundamental basis of double entry or whether 
he simply urges advantage to be taken of the fact of it). As it 
happens, no such teleological argument is needed for it can be 
demonstrated (in the following chapters) that equality of entry will 
tend to arise with the adoption of other (more directly convenient) 
conventions, particularity aggregation. 
All this, however, is to jump ahead. Before discussing the 
appearance of closure in the double entry system through the use of 
the equality a full examination of the nature of money signs is 
required since it is also being argued that Ijiri not only too readily 
identified control with traditional double entry, but that he was too 
hasty in identifying monetary valuation with historic cost. 
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4.1 valuation bases and money signs 
These next sections consider the aspects of financial reporting which 
involve accountants reporting in money terms and question Ijiri's 
identification of monetary quantification with historic cost. In the 
Introduction to this thesis, the tentative suggestion was made that 
different monetary valuation bases might interlink with eachother 
rather than act merely as alternatives. 
An earlier attempt to cover some of the same ground here was made 
by Barton who took the position that: 
There is a family of interrelated accounting measurement 
[valuation] systems and it is instructive to examine them so 
as to understand the systems of accounting for the effects of 
inflation. 
[Barton, 1974, p.2] 
Barton at~empted to relate directly 'valuation bases', such as historic 
cost, to 'measurement properties of dollars' (money signs), such as the 
medium of exchange. 
However, Barton offered no fundamental analysis of money signs and 
distinguished only between the medium of exchange and general 
purchasing power. The fundamental analysis here, using the traditional 
theory of money, demonstrates that this is insufficient since relative 
prices are also a function of money signs. Further Barton does not 
distinguish fully between the valuation bases of replacement cost and 
current cash equivalents (net realizable values). He also considers 
present values as a valuation basis and this will be rejected as having 
no correlate in the world of actual money signs. Finally, although 
Barton commits himself to the view that the valuation bases are related 
to each other as a 'family', he still opts in favour of a single 
valuation rule (NRV) [Barton, 1974]. For these reasons Barton's 
analysis is not further considered. 
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First, the traditional theory of money is introduced and examined 
to identify the fundamental functions of money. Secondly the various 
information roles which money plays are deduced and the inter-
relationships of three valuation bases are examined. 
4.2 the traditional theory of money 
While later concern by economists over money principally focuses on the 
role of money as another economic good and is concerned with the 
balance of the supply and demand for money, the traditional theory of 
money, in its most fundamental statement, is straight-forward. Money 
is seen to have three functions: it is a unit of account, a means of 
payment and a store of value. 
Crucial to the traditional analysis is the distinction between 
full and partial monies. Full money arises when something possesses all 
three functions, partial monies having two functions only. Usually, 
for example, fiat money is a unit of account, a means of payment and a 
store of value. Current or chequing accounts with respected banking 
houses commonly have all three functions. When something is possessed 
of only one function, however, it is hard to say of this that it is 
money at all; it is difficult to envisage a means of payment that is 
not also either a unit of account or a store of value. Most goods and 
services combine at least two functions and therefore have the 
potential to be used as partial monies. 
they tend to take on the third function. 
When they are used as such 
What emerges in practice as full money is the result of the pull 
of three forces: confidence, convenience and consideration (in the 
legal sense of the reward or incentive for entering a contract). 
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Consideration, incentive, is measured in terms of the relative prices 
based on a unit of account. The unit of account is normally set by fiat 
and the means of payment, for convenience, is facilitated by the 
fiduciary issue (usually banknotes and coins). The strength of this as 
the bulwark of the system is then dependent on confidence in the 
ability of the fiduciary issue to hold as a store of value. 
With a crisis of confidence, its convenience diminishes and the 
potential of partial monies is activated. Initially, and increasingly, 
the fiduciary issue (and its non-indexed correlates) will be held in 
smaller sums and for shorter periods; that is the level of 
precautionary demand falls, as outlined by Keynes [1936]. As the need 
to store value in items other than money intensifies, a shift in the 
liquidity spectrum of assets occurs, reducing the speculative demand 
for money (Keynes was concerned with different conditions, where money 
as a store value was assured and where potential investment returns 
were low; and in these conditions the liquidity trap could be set). 
These effects may be in part mitigated by high notional rates of 
interest stabilizing the demand for near monies, but in general the 
velocity of circulation of the more controllable part of the money 
supply, the fiduciary issue and the bank credit, will be increased. 
When the store of value function deteriorates further to a complete 
lack of confidence, fiat money may be avoided altogether. 
These three functions are best described as root functions since 
the traditional theory of money does not indicate what institutional 
arrangements will carry out these functions. Indeed the institutions, 
which provide the structure to money, are frequently set up in 
anticipation of serving a specific role, These specific roles are 
derived functions in the sense that they may be traced back to one or 
232 
more of the root functions. For example, although a bank may be set up 
to make a profitable business out of firms' temporary liquidity 
problems, this may be seen as extension and refinement of the economy's 
transmission mechanism (the means of payment) or of its facilities for 
saving (the store of value). Of particular importance to accountants 
in practice are credit arrangements, especially trade credit. 
The term money used at a theoretical level must be distinguished 
from money as a commodity where it exists in many forms such as bank-
notes, bank balances, negotiable instruments and trade credit, all 
requiring different treatment. These refinements will be important in 
cases where money is being treated as another good, as for example with 
Patinkin [1965]. Setting aside the complexities of the institutional 
framework allows an examination of the linkages in the money system 
that is quite separate from the more modern discussions of money, which 
are principally concerned with the balance of the supply and demand for 
money. Here the analysis is not concerned with money as a commodity, 
or further with the balance of the supply and demand for money, but 
with the money system and the interrelationships of the fundamental 
aspects of money. 
Essentially money can be said to operate as a 'system' when there 
is sufficient closure to exclude or restrict barter, direct exchange of 
goods, to all but the occasional and contingent transactions. As 
Clower has argued it in his attack on Patinkin: 
money buys goods and goods buy money; but goods do not buy 
goods. 
[Clower, 1967, pp.207-208] 
However, these differing perspectives are not completely separate. 
For example, Hicks [1967] has convincingly demonstrated that Keynes's 
three motives for holding money are compatible with the traditional 
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three functions, suggesting that they show a closer view of the economy 
in firms' and individuals' behaviour than the more distanced 
traditional functions. Hicks's success here suggests that the 
traditional theory may be usefully drawn upon directly to abstract the 
essential inter-relationships of information sets and investigate the 
bookkeeping and reporting systems required to map these fully. 
4.3 information in money 
It was of importance in the previous section that when something is 
introduced as a means of payment, at least one of the other functions 
adheres to it. When a medium of exchange is brought into operation by a 
transaction, it acts not only in the practical way of being a means of 
payment, but gives rise to a price, a sign, a carrier of information. 
To perceive what this information is, it is useful to substitute the 
alternative description of the unit of account favoured by economists, 
i.e. the measure of value [Wicksell, 1935, p.7]. The perspective from 
which economists approach the understanding of a medium of exchange is 
therefore one of value, and they make a distinction between the store 
of value and the measure of value. These may be examined separately. 
The role of the measure of value may be isolated inside a 
theoretical framework and traditionally this is general equilibrium 
analysis [Hicks, 1967]. Here it becomes clear that the information 
conveyed by money in its role of being a measure of value is that of 
relative prices. 
The device of a closed market is employed since instantaneous 
knowledge of all other prices is not attainable. All goods are for 
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trade and no changes in supply or demand can be affected. On 
convenience assumptions, such as divisibility of all goods, any good 
may be elected to the role of the measure of value. Since equilibrium 
is achieved at the penultimate, (n-1), exchange (where n is the number 
of goods), the· price of the good elected as the measure of value is 
indeterminate inside the analysis; its price would be fixed in the nth 
exchange. The information therefore drawn from this theoretical 
analysis is that of relative prices only: when good A acts as the 
measure of value, good B is changed for A in the ratio of say 5:1. 
To isolate the role of money as a store of value, the problems of 
moving from the above closed market to another may be considered. The 
information content is seen to be the relative price units of money 
over time or, in another way of considering this, the change in the 
general price level of money. 
To consider this, the simplifying assumption needed here is that 
traders wish to move out of all (non-consumption) goods into money 
between markets, rather in line with Adam Smith's dictum: 
The goods of the merchant yield him no revenue or profit till 
he sells them for money, and money yields him as little till 
it is again achieved for goods. 
[Smith, 1787, p.374] 
To enable them to make this decision, they require to know the price 
of money in the nth exchange in both cases, or at least the relative 
price of good A in terms of the good elected to be the measure of value 
in the next market. If this price is unfavourable, the previous 
equilibrium of the (n-1) exchange will be forestalled, since money will 
be taken to be a poor store of value and other goods will be held. 
That is, traders will take account of the general price level in 
the one market in terms of the next - will it double say, or decrease 
by 5%? In practice a business does not always attempt to clear its 
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goods at any price in single discontinuous markets. Hicks, for example, 
considers: 
one of those great fairs, which played so important a part in 
the organization of trade in the Middle Ages. 
[Hicks, 1967, pp.3-4] 
Nor does it attempt to move its assets solely into money in between 
markets as with the venture trading of the medieval merchants. It also 
has to be explained why supplies arise in the market at all and why 
transactions are deferred for future markets. As Keynes pointed out: 
For the importance of money essentially flows from its being 
a link between the present and the future ••• money in its 
significant attributes is, above all, a subtle device for 
linking the present to the future. 
[Keynes, 1936, emphasis in the original, pp.293-294] 
4.4 relative prices and general price levels 
Business men have memories of past price behaviour and expectations of 
future prices. What the foregoing analysis revealed were the 
mechanisms within which the information is conveyed~ the measure of 
value gives rise to relative prices but these attain full meaning only 
when the general price level is known. The problem of expectations is 
therefore two-fold. Business has to predict the relative price of 
goods and it has to predict the general price level. The role of the 
latter is to translate the former into the dimension of time and the 
confidence to produce a good is dependent on the confidence to predict 
either. Specific prices, in the proper sense of being a one-off 
exchange of goods, appear at the time of the event. Since decisions 
are made prior to these events, the vital information is in the form of 
anticipated relative prices translated by the general price level of 
money which is expected. The particular ex post measures for these are 
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considered in section 5 below. 
This last point is so important it must be restated. Confusion 
arises from the frequent attempt, as Barton [1974] attempted, to 
differentiate specific prices and the general price level or purchasing 
power [also see the 'Sandilands Report', Cmnd 6225 1975, pp. 9-14], 
without the difference between relative and specific prices being also 
made clear. Specific prices do exist, but they exist only as a result 
of each individual bargain struck. When reference is made to 'the' 
price of a good, this price is only a suggestion of at most an index. 
Although someone may feel he or she understands a specific price, this 
understanding is either strictly temporally and spacially located or 
dependent upon comparative stability of demand and supply conditions 
restricting movement in relative prices, together with a lack of 
violent fluctuations in the general price level. Behind the specific 
price which is anticipated, lies the knowledge of what is happening to 
relative prices and the general price level. Specific prices may be 
the only ones which exist but their meaning depends on how money is 
behaving both as a measure of value and as a store of value. 
Money, therefore, not only offers specific prices through acting 
as a means of payment, but, through its other functions as a measure of 
value and as a store of value, is an indicator of relative prices and 
of the general price level; the two factors which together make up any 
understanding of a specific price. It is on the basis of all these 
information qualitities that full money acts as an information system. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the power of a sign depends on how well the 
receiver (in this case the accounting information system) coding 
arrangements agree with the structure of the sender (the money system). 
If there is insufficient variety in the recording system, then 
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information loss will result. This point will be explicated further in 
the next chapter. 
5.1 reporting in money terms 
That money cannot be defined directly, but has to be understood by 
reference to the arrangment of its functions, emphasizes the systems 
nature of money. And it is, in its purest form, a system for 
information. The systems aspect of the traditional functions of money, 
and the consequent inter-relationship, or closure, of the information 
sets are expressed in Figure 2 through the use of the triangulation 
device described in Chapter 2. 
What the foregoing analysis reveals is the all too hasty 
identification by Ijiri of monetary quantification with historic cost 
(HC). His emphasis on the importance of causation for the double entry 
leads him to select specific prices as the only important information 
set and overlook the important information sets of relative prices 
movements and general price level behaviour. 
Traditionally, the emphasis on specific prices has been associated 
with past prices, or HC. If specific prices are identified with 
allocation free HC (but see below), then in terms of re-entry to the 
market, information on relative prices can reasonably straightfowardly 
be identified as given by current entry prices, or replacement cost 
(RC). More problematic, perhaps, in terms of an exit from goods, is an 
identification of information of the general price level with current 
exit prices, or net realizable value (NRV). This is because the usual 
index of a 'standard' bundle of goods is irrelevant to the trader, 












completely out of goods into money between markets. What is of interest 
to traders is to know how successfully their bundle of goods, or 
endowment, has been as a store of value and, hence, the information 
they need is the aggregate of NRV. 
While traditionally accountants have recorded specific prices as 
past prices, economists, with thei~ focus on decisions and optimization 
have concentrated on future prices; hence their famous assumption of 
certainty. The foregoing analysis is suggestive why the assumption of 
certainty, once taken on board, is so hard to disassemble. It is not 
only specific prices which have been projected, but expectations of 
relative price movements and general price behaviour have also been 
asssumed. For the remainder of the thesis, no assumptions of 
foreknowledge are used and, consequently, the specific valuation rule 
of economic value (EV) does not appear at all. 
5.2 the problem of credit 
The foregoing completes the abstract analysis of reporting in money 
terms. The problem which remains to be discussed for reporting in 
practice is: which money? It was pointed to earlier that any money 
system may contain a number of different money commodities. Goods may 
be purchased on credit or they may be purchased by cash. Within each 
of these lies a number of alternatives such as bills of exchange or 
unpaid invoices, dollar and sterling notes or book-entries in banks 
transferring balances. 
In that these money commodities are interchangeable, the 
bookkeeping problem is to select amongst the alternatives for the most 
appropriate system in order to avoid double-counting. As mentioned in 
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the section on the theory of money, the bulwark of the money system is 
fiat money. It is this that provides the unit of account and is the 
base to the hierarchy of monies which stem from it; bank balances may 
be used in lieu of the fiduciary issue of notes and coin as the former 
represent promises to repay in terms of the latter; trade credit comes 
into existence on the knowledge of presumption of the debtor's bank 
balances or stores of note and coin, present or future. 
In the control of the money supply, notes and coin and bank 
balances are treated as equivalents. While confidence in the banking 
system is retained, there is no point at which a change of the one into 
the other is necessary during the payment cycle. This is not so with 
credit. At some point, either the goods must be returned, or payment 
must be made in terms of a switch in bank balances or a transfer of 
notes and coin. 
While cash, the common name for both bank balances and notes and 
coin, therefore takes pre-eminence in the money system under the 
existing institutional arrangements and establishes the measurement 
points of entry into and exit from the money system, traditionally, at 
least since double entry, the bookkeeping has recognised both cash and 
credit transactions. In passing it might be said that double entry does 
have the unexpected ability to avoid double counting and this suggests 
a connection between the use of a double entry and any perceived need 
to integrate two potentially separate recording systems of cash 
transactions and credit transactions. 
The desire to record both, and the necessity in the bookkeeping to 
keep each separate (although this separation is frequently lost in the 
reports), forms, perhaps, the very basis of the classification scheme 
which evolved further inside the double entry system to a more full 
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blown scheme and this topic is returned to in the next two chapters. It 
is an interesting thought experiment, however, to consider a possible 
classification system for assets which does not need to keep cash 
accounts separate from credit. 
5.3 a system for recording money signs 
Money is bound by its functions. These three functions together 
describe how money appears. They describe why money is entered and 
exited from. If all the events at which an entity enters or leaves 
money can be captured, together with a description of their potential 
to re-enter, a full financial picture of the entity can be reported. 
First, providing all the points of entry and exit are covered (that is 
all examples of uses of money are recorded), any closure which is 
inherent in the money system can be transferred to the bookkeeping 
system. This is the power of mapping specific prices from all 
transactions. Secondly, however, for completeness of the information in 
the money system, the information sets from all three functions needs 
to be tapped into the bookkeeping and reporting system. The inter-
relationships of the functions, the information sets and the valuation 
bases are further explored in Chapter 6. 
The information importance of these three diverse, but 
interlocking, aspects has been stressed. The inference is that for 
adequate interpretation of money aggregates, all three valuation 
techniques are required for a complete reporting system. The importance 
of this analysis is revealed by the literature of financial reporting, 
which for the last twenty years and more has insisted on offering 
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distinguishable valuation bases as separate and competing systems. The 
concern here has been a perceived tie between meaning and the 
consistent use of a single valuation base. For example, Barton 
stresses: 
It is most important that the accounting system does not 
up its measurement [valuation] systems, for otherwise 





[Barton, 1974, p.3] 
In analysing the particular case of Ijiri, his selection of a 
single valuation base was suggested to be connected to his over-hasty 
identification of control with the traditional bookkeeping system. The 
connection between reliance on double entry bookkeeping and the 
preferential and partisan selection of a single valuation base may be 
quite general. Pointing to the lack of theory concensus and the general 
proliferation of valuation systems, Hakansson has observed: 
I am more inclined to interpret the problem [lack of theory 
concensus] more broadly as caused by the short-comings of 
relying on the single-number (nominal currency point) 
estimates to which the double entry system naturally leads 
us. 
[Hakansson, 1978, p.722] 
So-called mixed value systems have of course been offered, for 
example, Sprouse and Moonitz [1962, pp. 23-26]; and also the notion of 
'value to business' as a rule of choice between valuation techniques as 
in the 'Sandilands Report', Cmnd 6225 [1975]. These have, however, 
lacked the underpin of a theoretical basis and more usually have been 
directly concerned with the question of periodic income. In the 
struggle between a requirement of consistency in the bookkeeping system 
and the need for completeness in the reporting system, it may be said 
that those who have supported selection of a single valuation base, the 
so-called measurement school, have tended towards selectivity in their 
identification of user needs, while the decision-model, information 
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economics approach has veered towards abandoning double entry 
altogether. The next chapter is concerned to expose this dichotomy as 
false by showing how different information systems can be constructed 
round each valuation base but that, further, these systems can still 




Developing Systems Models for Accounting 
1.1 introduction 
In considering Ijiri's information control approach in the previous 
chapter, the inadequacy of a reliance on the notion of 'causation' as a 
basis for this approach was examined. While Mattesich's concept of 
'conservation' appeared a more suitable, and less psychological, basis 
to the double entry system, the explication of this concept in terms of 
the traditional double entry system is somewhat complex and such an 
explication is deferred to the next chapter. 
In the last chapter it was argued that, within the money system, 
there exists a set of money signs. Any full information system, it was 
contended, woould need to map all these aspects. Anticipating some of 
the discussion of Chapter 7, it can be suggested that a central 
difficulty for accepting MattesLch's conservation hypothesis, lies with 
the inherent need for the traditional system to use of a single 
valuation base. It can be argued, using the results of Chapter 3, that 
Mattesich's identification of the double entry system with a black box 
input-output analysis conflates the basic need for information systems, 
in transporting signs, to preserve signs with the additional 
requirements of a knowledge system to conserve the power, the meaning 
or interpretability, of signs. 
The intention in this chapter, therefore, is to consider the 
construction of appropriate information systems to map the three 
information sets in money signs discussed in Chapter 5, in such a way 
as to minimize any information loss in the process of summarizing data. 
This develops the information control approach through the selection 
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of permission rules for entries to be made in the system. This explicit 
mode of systems closure allows information preservation in preference 
to an uncritical reliance on any closure inherent in the traditional 
bookkeeping. The type of closure inherent in the traditional model is 
examined in Chapter 7. 
1.2 criticisms of multi-valuation systems 
As discussed in the last chapter, in adopting the traditional 
bookkeeping system, there has been a tendency by some theorists to 
ensure consistency in the system by reliance on a single valuation 
base. Usually this involves the selection of a particular type of money 
sign, for example historic transaction prices (HC) or current exit 
prices (NRV). In contrast, valuation systems which incorporate 
different bases, such as the 'value to owner' rule applied in a recent 
British Statement of Standard Accounting Practice, SSAP 16, offer 
interesting examples of rules which incorporate multiple types of 
signs. 
Nevertheless, there was considerable hostility to SSAP 16 from 
accounting academics and practitioners alike (the standard has now been 
virtually abandoned). A focus of much of the criticism revolves round 
the difficulties in understanding what meaning can be attached to what 
is being reported from the 'use of summaries incorporating different 
value bases. While some academics view this as a question of 
consistency criteria in the failure to preserve the distinct nature of 
the different values or money signs which enter the system, the concern 
of some of the practioners (after all quite used to adding 'apples to 
246 
oranges') might be interpreted instead as closer to a fear that, in 
abandoning historic cost, some inherent 'control' in the bookkeeping or 
reporting system is lost. However, any substance to this suggestion 
needs further explication and, although 'causation' and 'conservation' 
explantions to the double entry system have been discussed, a more 
satisfactory explication of any inherent control in double entry is 
delayed until the next chapter. 
Despite the problems in multi-base reporting, the arguments of 
Chapter 5 indicate that the closest attention needs to be paid to the 
full set of money signs. However, it also seems neither desirable to 
ignore the consistency requirement as proposed by some theorists, nor 
ignore any inherent control in double entry if this can be securely 
understood. 
1.3 consistency and completeness 
In developing a systems approach in this thesis to reporting money 
signs the use of all information sets in money signs is considered to 
be a major aim of the approach. This serves as a partial response to 
the demands of the information economists for increased disclosure. 
However, this aim must be held against the need to preserve the 
information content in money signs through adopting the consistency 
requirement of keeping different bases distinct and separate. To 
observe consistency, therefore, a separate system is constructed to 
handle each valuation base. In this way, a major lesson from the 
measurement school is followed. 
For completeness three systems are evolved to ensure all aspects 
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of money signs are covered. This satisfies Ashby's Law of Requisite 
Variety, which maintains that information loss will result from 
insufficient variety in a system [Ashby, 1956]. That is, since three 
types of money signs are used, three information systems are required 
to handle this variety. However, each information system may act also 
as a knowledge system and, as will be shown, the design of each 
knowledge system varies in response to the reference, rules and 
relevance required of each aspect of the money sign. 
Within this construction of systems it is possible to retain the 
double entry system. However, it is anticipated that mere retention of 
double entry will not satisfy the practitioner's felt need for 
'control' mentioned above and a possible integrality of these three 
systems in forming an overall system is discussed. Finally, the 
structure of this integrality is compared with Mattesich's depiction of 
the assumptions of the traditional double entry system. 
The major concern, however, of this chapter is to construct a set 
of required models using the systems approach as setting up basis 
constraints in the manner discussed in Part 1. A detailed comparison 
with the traditional model of the 'control' emphasis is given in the 
next chapter, but for a full understanding of the systems models, the 
discussion in Chapter 8, where a worked example is given demonstrating 
a reconcilation process between the systems, is also necessary. 
2.1 entries and types of closure 
Any fully constructed and internally consistent system must exhibit 
closure. That is, the system must be open only in certain particular 
respects and be closed in all other respects (see Chapter 2). Where 
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the system under consideration is an information system, the system is 
open to some types of signs and closed to all others (see Chapter 3). 
Such closure has been sometimes subsumed under discussion of 'channel', 
where the practical phenomena of 'noise' (information types imperfectly 
excluded) has received attention [Shannon & Weaver, 1949]. 
In considering bookkeeping as a system, therefore, it is crucial 
to discuss to which type of signs the system is open. Types of signs 
which are excluded may then be discussed. Where the transfer of signs 
into the system is made by ENTRY, what is fundamentally at stake here 
is a rule or set of restrictions which: 
1) selects what information should be entered, used to help separate 
different types of signs - a partition rule 
2) guides how the information should be stored (coded), or when the 
entry should be made, a permission rule 
3) reflects why the information is required, a preservation rule. 
These three aspects mirror the semantic, syntactical and pragmatic 
aspects respectively of any information system as discussed in Part I 
of this thesis. The semantic aspect concerns the content of the 
information system, what type of signal or sign is carried by the 
entry. Syntactical aspects concern the 'form' of the information 
system, how the signs are stored or, in operational terms, when an 
entry is required. It was in this respect that Ijiri' explanation of 
double entry was found to be critically weak in its lack of a 
conception of a 'permission' rule for entries (Ijiri's approach is 
discussed further in Chapter 7). And pragmatic aspects concern the 
purpose of making the entry, why the particular signs are collected, 
the need to transport signs from sources to receivers and, in so doing, 
preserve them as much as possible given other pragmatic concerns, such 
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as the need to summarize, which arise with the context of the system as 
a knowledge system. 
2.2 a system of signs 
As discussed in Chapter 5, since the bookkeeping is an information 
system, it may be characterized in terms of signs. The system of signs 
drawn up in Part I may, therefore, be drawn upon to discuss the inter-
relations of any particular system. However, since the use here is to 
construct a system, the diagram used in Part I is inverted to help this 
process. In constructing each system, therefore, three aspects of 
system are integrated using the triangular form discussed in Part I to 
indicate closure of the system. 'Each of these three aspects carries a 
'dual', each side of the dual reflecting the inter-action of the 
interlocking aspects shown in Figure 1. 
The duals are /relevance/ and /intentions/ for pragmatics, 
/validity/ and /rules/ for syntactics and /truth/ and /reference/ for 
semantics and these are shown as bounds on the system to be constructed 
in the diagram of a knowledge system, drawn from Chapter 3, and shown 
here again in Figure 1. Note how the duals are formed out of the 
inter-action of the interlocking aspects. Between syntactics and 
semantics, for example, a distinction formed is that of /validity/ on 
the syntactics side and /truth/ on the semantics side, while between 
syntactics and pragmatics, the distinction is /rules/ on the syntactics 
side and /intentions/ on the pragmatic side. Thus the dual of 
syntactics is made up of /validity/ on the semantics face of syntactics 
and /rules/ on the pragmatics face. A third distinction arises between 
/reference/ and /relevance/ on the semantics-pragmatics inter-action. 
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These arrangements form a system of terms. The type of meaning 
introduced by them is that of relative meaning only. No specific 
definitions of these terms are imported and, as a network of 
distinctions, they form a set of constraints on the arrangement of the 
specific terms which may now be introduced in a discussion of the 
bookkeeping system. The project now is to construct a bookkeeping 
system, using these constraints, through a set of models being 
developed which pay attention to the signs in the money system arising 
from its use as a means of payment, a measure of value and a store of 
value. Each set of information measures, the set of historic entry and 
exit prices arising from transactions or HC, the set of current exit 
prices or NRV, and the set of current entry prices or RC, will be 
incorporated into one of these systems models. It should be stressed 
that discussion of HC in this chapter may be understood as either cash 
flows adjusted for credit transactions or unallocated historic costs 
and revenues. 
3.1 a restricted double entry model 
In considering the need to construct a bookkeeping system round the 
aspect of money signs, the dominant aspect of the means of payment is 
considered first. The three restrictions set up in the previous 
section will be considered in reverse order. First, why information 
should be required? Here it is required to posit, in line with some of 
the discussion in the previous chapter, that the /intentions/ of the 
system amount to MAPPING the signs which arise from exchange 
transactions using the money system as a means of payment. Provided all 
transactions are mapped any closure in the money system is then 
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transferred to the bookkeeping (see also Chapter 7 for a full 
discussion of this). 
The second restriction concerns how the information should be 
stored. The syntactics here are guided by the notion of the DOUBLE 
ENTRY. The /rule/ is that the entry is made twice on either side of a 
left-right convention. That is to say the same amount which is entered 
as a debit (left hand side) is also entered, somewhere, as a credit 
(right hand side); and vice versa, any amount recorded as a credit is 
also recorded as a debit. Some permission for any entry to be made is 
also needed. That is, when mayan entry be made. The restriction rule 
adopted is that of the transaction. There has to be an exchange 
involving the entity to which these signs relate. /Validity/ for the 
system is determined by adherence to the TRANSACTION ENTRY restriction; 
that is an entry may be made if and only if a corresponding transaction 
has been made. 
Together, these restrictions affect the semantic aspects of the 
system. The combination of MAPPING and a restriction on TRANSACTION 
ENTRIES will invoke the use of transaction prices and ENTRY-EXIT prices 
at the transaction date will naturally enter the system under /truth/ 
as true statements, or 'values'. Reference to 'truth' here may sound 
somewhat grand or out of place, but in that /truth/ stands in 
contradistinction to /validity/ and /intentionality/, it simply has the 
role of emphasising the verification or measurement basis to any value. 
That is, statements about transactions are located temporaly and 
spacially and are open to falsification principles. 
The /relevance/ of such mappings is further developed through 
CLASSIFICATION. For example, some exchange transactions may be seen as 
more routine than others giving rise to say 'fixed assets' being kept 
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as a separate category from 'stock'. Or, in a similar way, some 
transactions take place with cedit, others with cash; again separate 
categories can be used. However, these examples merely illustrate the 
way in which a classification may be useful. No actual classification 
scheme is suggested here since the concern is with the form of the 
system, not its substance, but the potential to partition further the 
historic transaction aspect of money signs puts pressure on a 
particular format of classification, or set of ACCOUNTS, to develop. 
Figure 2 illustrates the emerging model of double entry. 
3.2 aggregation 
The foregoing model is not yet complete. Another /rule/ needs to be 
added, that of AGGREGATION, before the system is fully operational. 
The pragmatics of adopting this additional rule is the need to provide 
summaries, or BALANCING. That is, for any category or ACCOUNT in the 
/classification/, an aggregate can be calculated. Of course, due to 
double entry, two aggregates are needed, an aggregate of debits as well 
as of credits. This encourages DEFERRED BALANCING; the totals of each 
side of an ACCOUNT are summed in 'apposition' with the net amount, or 
BALANCE, being represented by the difference. 
In the context of the outlying terms in the system of signs 
developed in Part I, the information from the 'actors' or user 
perspective becomes, implicitly, that of deferred balancing. The form 
of the double entry is dictated by the logic of 'programming' for this 
deferred balancing and, further, the content of the 'data base' is 
given by historic prices, or (unallocated) historic costs. These are 




















I I SYNTACTICS 






knowledge system in Part I, and are depicted in Figure 3. 
The system will now have the 'emergent' characteristic of the 
balances summing to zero. So much attention has been given to this 
phenomenon that a separate discussion is given to the importance 
attributed to balancing in the next chapter. Here only the relation of 
balancing to the closure properties of the system are explored. 
3.3 closure properties 
In terms of information content of the system, the semantic aspect, the 
most noticeable feature is the absence of quantities from the 
transactions data. The effect of the equality in the double entry has 
been to exclude non-monetary values. Even if this data was included in 
the entry somewhere, the compulsion to construct aggregates or balances 
would lean towards the use of money values in heterogenous accounts 
rather than involve a much larger set of categories to cover all types 
of goods or sub-divide particular creditors/debtors into aspects of 
their trading to produce homogenous accounts in terms of quantity 
measures. 
Secondly, any type of entry other than that reflecting a 
transaction is prohibited. All other types ot entries are ruled out. 
An entry reflects an exchange in cash or, at least, a potential 
exchange in cash if credit has been allowed or given. It should be 
noted that it is this rule which particularly gives closure to the 
system and establishes a /validity/ or internal coherence to the 
system, not the balancing, although this latter has been usually 










































Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the effect of the need to 
make double entries reflecting the dual nature of a transaction forces 
all accounts into the system or LEDGER. No account which is affected 
by a transaction can be excluded. 
accounts have balances upon them. 
All accounts are drawn in and all 
The meaning of those balances, 
however, is restricted to the semantic content given by the values 
used. A discussion of the historic importance of the inclusion in the 
traditional model of all accounts, together with the interpretation of 
the values of the balances, is reserved to Chapter 7. 
Little has been said so far on the classification of accounts 
except to indicate that this could develop organically.in response to 
the type of entries. Cash entries and credit entries certainly need to 
be made distinct, but a set of categories for assets has not yet been 
determined. However, given the use of money values, it can be seen 
that there is little pressure to develop a set of categories which 
reflect individual economic goods (homogenous accounts) and, instead, 
there is the pressure of simplicity to use heterogenous accounts such 
as a general STOCK account to reflect trading transactions, a basis 
which might then later be subdivided into, say, fixed and current or 
capital and trading stock. 
3.4 trading and the calculation of profit 
The system of accounts developed in the foregoing sections maps the 
exchange transactions of an entity in terms of FLOWS. Some 
peculiarities of the system require discussion. These mainly arise 
through the existence of balances, through the aggregation of these 
flows, and the act of balancing, the sum of the balances equalling 
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zero. 
Two points need to be mooted in respect of the use of data from 
the transaction. First, where goods have been traded and both bought 
and sold, there is an exit price cancelling the entry price. However, 
since the goods have been bought and sold at different times and, 
usually, in different places, it would be exceptional for the two 
prices to be the same. Either the goods are sold for less and there is 
a LOSS or, more likely, the good is sold for more and a PROFIT is 
taken. However, any calculation of these sets of profit or loss, on an 
individual transaction basis, requires further information than has 
been included in the system above, or a different data tracking system 
involving recording quantities and homogenous accounts. 
The nature of trading is that while five bundles of silk may be 
bought in one transaction, only one bundle of silk is sold in another. 
Calculation of profit on each individual transaction becomes unwieldy, 
particularly in that anyone sale might involve several, or several 
hundred, different transactions and historic entry prices. There are, 
of course, other problems in including all relevant costs, such as 
overheads, but these are not discussed here. These difficulties drive 
the calculation of any gains away from individual calculation towards 
keeping credit and debit aggregates and the introduction of a general 
or nominal account in the profit and loss account. This in turn 
increases the pressure for types of entries which are not transaction 
based and which are prohibited in System I. The introduction of income 
determination requires a different or rather, amended system, if the 
permission rule for entries is not to be broken and this is explored 
later in this chapter. 
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3.5 interpretation of aggregate flows 
There is a second point which needs to be noted in respect of the use 
of data from transactions. A tendency will also be inherent in System I 
for users to interpret the balances on the accounts as meaningful in 
any number of different ways and especially to rely on the aggregate 
values as indicating, say, potential sale values. However, no such 
interpretation is strictly possible since the values which have entered 
the system and the values remaining in the system 
entry values at the dates of the transactions. 
are specifically 
But it is not only the value of the balance which is in doubt. 
Unless some simplifying but unrealistic assumption is made about 
constant prices both in relative terms and in general price level 
terms, it is not at all obvious what meaning can be attached to an 
aggregate of entry prices which have existed in different places and at 
different times. However, one coherent interpretation of these balances 
is possible. What can be said to be represented by the running 
balances is the total cash which has left (or through credit about to 
leave) the entity and, at the date of the balance, has not been 
recovered. 
This emphasis, which departs radically from the time honoured 
emphsis on what enters, costs, asserts that what is important is what 
has left the system, and has yet to be recovered. Such a switch accords 
with the discussion in Chapter 5 on the change in interpretation in 
money signs. Further, in that deferred balancing offers under this 
system a partial view of the firm's existing position in conserving 
funds (funds received less funds paid out), there is here a possible 
interpretation of Mattesich's claims for the root of double entry to be 
a conservation principle and the basis of a (as yet incomplete) control 
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system. 
In summary, System I, as a knowledge system, represents a system 
for tracking funds flows in and out of the organization, using the 
fact of transactions as the basic permission rule. for entries to be 
made. The balances represent aggregate flows of cash (or calls on cash) 
classified through different categories such as cash and credit, or 
trading (working capital) and non-trading (fixed assets). However, as a 
control system the picture is incomplete through lack of values to 
indicate realizable cash. To identify, say, current values of the 
balances, an entirely different system of classification is required 
based on homogenous economic goods and using current values and this is 
discussed next. 
4.1 capital and income measurement 
In the foregoing sections the development of a system for tracking 
funds flow, which was essentially transaction based, has been 
described. It was stressed that the information content of this model, 
System I, was primarily that of keeping running totals of cash 
surpluses or amounts owed and owing. Further, these flows could be 
tracked through some basic classification of accounts, especially, say, 
between trading accounts and 'fixed asset' accounts and also between 
cash and credit accounts. 
It was claimed in the last section that information on 'capital' 
values of economic goods owned by the entity required an entirely 
different information system and it was also claimed that income 
calculation required an extension of System I. The aim of the next 
sections is to elaborate on those claims and, in particular, develop 
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these information systems and clarify the meaning of 'capital values' 
and 'income' respectively. 
A system for the recording and use of information in respect of 
capital values is first developed, System II, and then the question of 
income, System III, is examined. However, whereas System I and System 
II be described as knowledge systems constructed around 
measurement, in that the signs used are open to verification or 
falsification techniques, System III is essentially constructed around 
the problem. of income determination. The focus in this system is on 
calculation and is constructed to aid certain pragmatic decision needs 
such as the distribution question: how much should be paid by way of 
dividend? how much more could be paid in wages? how much tax is due? 
Nonetheless, some measurement basis can be given to this 
calcuation in that the measurement bases of Systems I and II (on which 
System III is parasitic) form constraints to any calculation. Finally, 
the valuation base for any calculation is taken to be current entry 
prices and since these prices are open to verification, there is here 
too some measurement basis to the system. However, despite these 
matters, which undoubtedly assist the objectivity of the system, 
essentially the different nature of System III must be re-emphasised. 
Both the system for capital values and the quasi-system for income 
determination take as their key-note aspects of signs generated by 
exchanges in the money system. Where funds flow was related to the 
'means of payment', in line with the discussion on money signs in 
Chapter 5, capital values are related to money as a 'store of wealth' 
and income is determined, within the constraints of the funds flow and 
capital systems, using money as a 'measure of value'. 
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4.2 capital as cash potential 
A peculiarity of System I was that it threw up balances on accounts 
which might be misinterpreted to be meaningful in terms of capital 
values. The crucial aspect of capital, it is assumed here, is the 
ability to enter or re-enter the money system. That is, capital is 
measured in terms of cash held or the ability to change goods held into 
cash. Such an ability not only is a measure of the potential to enter 
the money system but, with this, reflects the ability to switch 
investment and the basic flexibility of the business. 
It should be noted here that this is a measure of ability, not the 
reflection of a decision. It should also be noted that while the 
measure accords to all economic goods held, any decision may reflect a 
switch only in part, but clearly the greater the reservoir of potential 
funds in cash terms compared to decision needs, the greater is the 
financial strength of the company and also, incidentally, the greater 
is the ability to raise funds and avoid having physically to switch 
into cash directly. 
In contrast, therefore, to System I, which was a measure 
essentially of cash flows, System II is a measure of the potential cash 
stock held within the discretion of the firm. It does not, however, 
directly measure all potential funds available to the entity since 
institutions exist to extend credit (and might well use the potential 
cash measure for extending credit and since business risk factors) and 
these, among other factor~, may also affect the ratio of potential cash 
to credit available. Since the emphasis is on the ability to re-enter 
the money system, it is the 'store of value' aspect which is selected 
here as the crucial aspect to the money system in line with the 
discussion in Chapter 5. 
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4.3 a system for capital measurement 
In setting up the system the constraints of a general sign system or 
knowledge system are observed, see Figure 4. The /relevance/ of the 
system comes through the MAPPING of the store of value aspects of money 
signs onto the data of the system. The /intentions/ of the system are, 
therefore, to arrange a LISTING OF CATEGORIES which would allow 
appropriate current prices to be mapped onto basic data. 
In terms of semantics, this involves using CURRENT SALE PRICES as 
/reference/ signs and mapping these onto aggregate STOCK QUANTITIES as 
/truth/ statements to provide values. Current sale prices (net of 
expenses involved) are used here because this is the set of prices 
which establish the cash potential of present goods and, hence, the 
ability to switch investment into other goods. The content of System 
II, therefore, is in net realizable value, NRV, terms. 
In terms of syntactics, the form of the system is essentially 
lists, primarily lists of physical quantities which can be integrated 
with lists of corresponding prices. /Validity/ concerns the categories 
in these lists and the operations surrounding their integration, the 
application the basic /rules/ of the system are AGGREGATION and 
MULTIPLICATION. As discussed earlier, any set of categories for such 
lists would need to reflect homogenous economic goods so that prices 
could be drawn from the money system and be mapped directly on to any 
aggregates of quantities. 
However, in practice, any useful set of categories would avoid 
each item having to be priced separately since pure homogeneity of 
goods is neither possible, nor cost effective. It is important, 
however, to appreciate that the system does not require the exactness 





























any complete way, since neither pure homogeneity in the categories, nor 
records of all categories is likely to exist in practice. 
A new /rule/ of MATERIALITY needs to be introduced to avoid too 
intricate detail, the counting of paper clips and so on. Materiality 
decisions concern whether the outcome, the reportable NRVs, could be 
affected in any significant way by either a greater degree of precision 
in the categories of goods, or in the inclusion of goods which are not 
already included (previously having had say a zero sale value). Any 
material changes in the categories reported would need to be disclosed, 
for example plant or equipment for which a substantial sum had been 
paid but which became worthless during the reporting period. 
Materiality not only makes System II, see Figure 5, manageable, but is 
to be interpreted in respect of the pragmatics of potential to enter 
the money system; that is the materiality is in respect of differences 
in the measure of NRV. 
In view of the possible scope for error or misjudgement here, some 
external checks are also needed to ensure validity in the system. 
/Validity/ in the system is ensured by subjecting physical records to 
physical checks, confirming the suitability of the categories and by 
checking estimates of sale prices. It is important to stress that 
objectivity here is not acheived through mere precision. The 
operational 
. 
definition of objectivity lies in the 'degree of 
divergence' in the opinions of experts [Ijiri, 1967; Sterling, 1979]. 
4.4 selecting sales values 
System II does not, therefore rely on aggregation alone. Since prices 















































REFERENCE - J SEMANTICS] 
might be thought that the essential sequence is multiplication first 
for each specific item and then aggregates would be determined. 
However, as discussed above, keeping a physical record for every item 
is not practical. There is always, therefore, some tendency to group 
items into sets of goods or types of assets and provided. This raises 
some difficulties over the homogeneity of goods in anyone list, in 
respect of identifying and mapping an appropriate price. 
This undecidability of the order of the rules of multiplication 
and aggregation lies at the root of the common attack on the use of 
sale values7 their variance in prices depending on how they are bundled 
together. Sometimes the price of goods can be affected dramatically by 
the sale of a part without other parts, even when the sale is orderly 
(i.e. not a forced sale). With complete markets and low transaction 
costs, the usual commutative laws would prevail, making the order of 
multiplication and aggregation of no consequence for the information in 
the System. However, since prices vary, depending on the bundling 
together of goods, the order can matter. Compare: 
a) 3 x £4 = £12 b) 3 
5 x £6 = £30 + 5 
£42 8 x £5 = £40 
-- --
where b) represents the average (unweighted) price of two types of goods 
c) 3 x £4 = £12 d) 3 
5 x £4 = £20 + 5 
£32 8 x £6 = £48 
-- --
where d) represents a change in sale values from complementary goods 
sold together. 
The importance of the materiality assumption here may now be 
appreciated. Any classification of assets would have to be arranged 
with the consequences for sale values in view. It might be added here 
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that some matrix form might be preferred for the actual storage of 
physical data. Since classification arrangements under System I and II 
can be expected to vary, the use of the matrix form would allow the 
data to be stored in both systems. 
5.1 income determination 
Both Systems I and II have some basis in reality. In System I prices 
paid or gained from the sale of goods are mapped into a set of 
categories known as accounts. In System II potential prices, estimates 
derived from known events, are mapped onto quantities in lists of 
categories which can be physically checked. System I is largely a 
process of summarizing historical data and System II involves some 
measurement (in the derivation NRV using price estimates). In contrast 
the process of determining income is one of derivation. Strictly 
speaking, it does not involve an independent system but represents a 
model which mediates between Systems I and II. 
As mentioned above, the point of this chapter is not to discuss 
the exact purpose of income determination, but rather to construct a 
set of models and show how a knowledge system for income determination 
may be constructed from systems principles. However, using systems 
principles aids coherence in a number of respects but does not entail 
substantive issues. The only substantive issues raised here are on the 
subjectivity of income determination. While further discussion of the 
purpose of income determination is given in Chapter 8, the essential 
point here is to show how income determination may be constrained 
between the funds flows of System I and the capital values of System II 
(both objective data). Subjectivity is then focussed on any 
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'allocations' or 'adjustments' to these data bases. 
However, while these adjustments could be made in any arbitrary 
way, the use of money as the 'measure of value', or RC as this was 
interpreted in Chapter 5 offers a method of making the adjustments 
which is open to independent checks and measurement. This method is 
illustrated in detail in Chapter 8. The main point of this system is to 
use the sign data of RC and, since it is anticipated that income 
determination will continue in one form or another, show (1) how any 
apportionment or other transfer can be separated out and kept away from 
the data bases in Systems I and II and (2) how income determination may 
be kept as objective as possible using the objective data bases as 
constraints and RC data as a the base for any adjustments. 
No prior definition of income is, therefore, assumed. Income is 
defined instead by the knowledge system, income is simply the product 
of this quasi-system. Arbitrarily, for the moment, it may be taken as 
representing an indefinite problem space which ranges from the surplus 
available for distribution to the need for further investment. Using 
the measure of value property of money signs, the income model is 
constrained between the data requirements of Systems I and II. Income 
is constrained between the realized cash and funds flow data of System 
I and the changes in the realizable cash, or wealth in money terms, of 
System I, see Figure 6. While for purposes of illustration, some 
conventional terms are introduced, the point of the following is simply 
to demonstrate how a knowledge system for income determination may be 
constructed. 
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5.2 a system for income determination 
The pragmatics of income determination revolve round the comparison of 
the past cash flows (System I~ with a potential cash stock (System II). 
These overall constraints are fixed. However, for the purposes of 
exposition of the construction of a particular income system within 
these overall constraints, the more specific purpose of the system is 
assumed to be to distinguish /intentions/ over income, essentially a 
DISTRIBUTABLE SURPLUS, from ADAPTION or MAINTENANCE needs which have 
/relevance/ for reserves. 
As far as syntactics are concerned, the double entry credit and 
debit system is extended through the use of reserve and expense 
accounts, using ALLOCATION /rules/. These rules have their /validity/ 
in a PERIOD or MATCHING connection which attempts to attract any costs 
that have been incurred to the reserve gained from that outlay. 
However, the nature of these allocation exercises are strictly limited 
and much more narrow in scope compared, say, to current practice. The 
worked example in Chapter 8 showing the process of reconciliation 
illustrates the effect of these contraints on limiting the nature of 
allocations 
As discussed above, the valuation base for this system is RC. In 
terms of semantics to determine /truth/, that is the values in this 
system, current: entry prices need to be mapped into the /reference/ 
aggregates containing the prior period entry prices (which in turn have 
been derived from historical aggregates). However, any truth in the 
semantic content is only achieved by valid substitution. It is the 
physical data which requires the mapping of current entry prices, 
before the aggregate historical data can be replaced by RC data. This 
is illustrated in Figure 7. 
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RC - NRV 
6.1 closure of the complete system 
Each of these systems can be considered closed in that each is a 
knowledge system of the type described in Chapter 3. Closure is 
achieved by the system being open to a particular type of money sign. 
No other money information enters or leaves the system (except as 
noise). Each system can be considered, therefore, as having a 
'channel' through which the required signs may pass but through which 
no other data on value enters. 
Only System I, however, may be considered fully closed in this 
respect. All sums of money, which affect the entity through cash or 
credit transactions, are recorded. Once the basic classification is 
fixed no other information, except the ability to identify both sides 
of the transaction into the categories of accounts, is needed. This is 
not quite so, however, with System II. Here some information also is 
required to enter in respect of physical quantities for each list of 
goods. Perpetual inventories need to be kept in physical terms (as 
most firms do) and this requires a separate underlying system. 
In respect of System III the basic classification of System I is 
extended to introduce further accounts to allow income determination, 
nominal accounts. The balances (historical aggregates) of accounts of 
System I, the real accounts, are copied into the corresponding accounts 
of System II for each period in which income is required to be 
determined. Further, in order that the RC aggregates can be derived, 
or allocations made say in respect of stock adjustment to the cost of 
sales, data from the physical categories is also required. Finally, the 
knowledge Systems I and II act as data bases in System III. This 
suggests that the three systems, while closed in the respect of each 
using one valuation base only (or rather one type of money sign), are 
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each interdependent with the other, although the funds flow, System I, 
appears relatively independent. 
is now explored, see Figure 8. 
The integration of all three systems 
6.2 integration of systems models 
The discussion of closure in the previous section indicates that the 
closure of each system is possible not only relative to the type of 
money sign, but that a high degree of integration of basic information 
among the three systems is possible. Indeed to avoid proliferation of 
data input, this is desirable. What integration is involved? 
The need for the greatest integration arises in System III since 
some of the information on which this system depends comes from the 
other two systems. The crucial question, however, lies in the 
integration of Systems I and II. In System II the base data is 
physical quantities. How should these enter the system? What can 
restrict the making of unnecessary or false entries? What could serve 
as an important guide here, of course, are transactions. Each time a 
transaction is made, the physical quantities could be recorded as 
entering or leaving the system by appropriate changes to the lists. 
Were a matrix set up with categories of lists on one edge and 
categories of accounts on the other, this could_ be achieved 
automatically. Further, given the double-entry need of System I, this 
suggests further that each should result in a triple entry; the usual 
double entry accompanied by a further entry in respect of the change in 
quantities. 



























MAP SHOWING RECONCILIATION NEED OF SYSTEMS I & II FOR INCOME DETERMINATION PROBLEM, SYSTEM III 
However, a category system using physical quantities cannot rely on 
transaction-based entries alone. Where there is not only trading but 
production, the physical nature of the goods is transformed and this 
leads to the need for further types of entries. Here the rule of 
materiality is important for System II and entries of this type are, of 
course, open to physical checks (perhaps also on a sample basis). 
7.1 a comparison with Matte~ich's model 
Following the systems constraints built up in the first part of this 
thesis helps to ensure an internal consistency or coherence in the 
systems models developed above. In particular, what has been shown is 
how several separable systems can be nested together into a bookkeeping 
system. 
How does the systems model of the bookkeeping compare with 
existing models in the accounting literature? Treatises in accounting 
are nearly as old as the practice of double entry, beginning in 1494 
with Pacioli [Geijsbeek, 1914] and, while many writers, especially 
Littleton [1966], have attempted to postulate the fundamentals of 
bookkeeping, Mattesach [1964] was the first to offer a fully systematic 
presentation of accounting using set theory. It seems appropriate, at 
this point, before proceding with a historical discussion to consider 
how the systems model compares to Matte~ich's systematic presentation. 
Comparison with Mattesich's model not only sharpens the areas of 
contrast of the systems model with traditional bookkeeping, but also 
serves to indicate some points in his 'conservation' argument. 
Any systematic account tends to produce a list of items. 
Matte~ch does not claim any particular order or sequence of importance 
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for the 18 basic assumptions which he lists, although he notes 
assumptions 11-18 as 'surrogate assumptions' - 'place holders' for more 
particular empirical hypotheses which are needed [Mattesach, 1964, 
p. 31] • Since no pre-eminence is given to particular assumptions 
(except the duality assumption which he regards as unique), the 
usefulness of the Mattesach model is that of a check list. Mattessich 
claims that the assumptions are necessary and (hopefully) sufficient 
conditions for an accounting model [Matte~ich, 1964, p.31)]. Any 
missing from his list, or vice versa, require comment. 
The eighteen assumptions may be listed as follows: 
1. Monetary Values 11. Valuation 
2. Time intervals 12. Realization 
3. Structure 13. Classification 
4. Duality 14. Data Input 
5. Aggregation 15. Duration 
6. Economic Objects 16. Extension 
7. Inequity of Monetary Claims 17. Materiality 
8. Economic Agents 18. Allocation 
9. Entities 
10. Economic Transactions 
where 11-18 represent 'surrogate 
assumptions' [Mattesach, 1964, pp.32-45] 
7.2 comparison of assumptions 
Given that Mattesich offers no particular structure to the assumptions 
he has identified, the most direct manner to compare models is to 
transpose Mattesach's assumptions onto the systems models. Figure 9 
illustrates the results of mapping Matte~ch's eighteen assumptions. 
Money values (1 above) is fully represented by the central triad 
of money signs or prices. In contrast, Valuation (11) appears in all 
three outer systems, but makes more explicit the types of empirical 
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Mattesich, but may be mapped in part to the 'period' validity criterion 
in System III. Here the concept of Duration (15) is perhaps also 
pertinent, but this relates more to pragmatics since what is being 
separated may be considered as relating to the 'set of hypotheses about 
the expected life of the entity' [Mattesach, 1964, p.44]. 
Structure (3) relates to the 'significant categories of an entity' 
[p.33]. Here Matte~ich implies by this the 'set of accounts' but this 
is little distinguishable from Classification (13), which is a 'chart 
of accounts' [p.44]. Either would appear to map with 'classification' 
on System I or with the set of categories of System II. Of interest 
here is Mattesich's distinction between 'homogeneous' and 
'heterogeneous' accounts [p.44]. This could be related to the 
discussion already given of the use of heterogeneous accounts for the 
classification in System I and the reliance on homogeneous accounts for 
the set of categories in the inventory lists of System II. 
Duality (4) maps with the 'left-right' convention in System 1, 
while Data Input (14) applies to the 'mapping' process, involved in all 
the systems but see System I. Similarly Aggregation (5) maps directly 
to 'aggregation' in System I, while Extension (16) effectively extends 
the aggregation rule for the entities themselves. Economic objects (6) 
are the 'real or financial objects' which constitute the basis for the 
data values in System II, while Inequity of Monetary Claims (7) follows 
this to overrule any valuation process with the fixed convention for 
debts to 'redeem them in legal tender at face value' [p.36]. 
Economic Agents (8) Matte~ich notes is dispensible for some 
accounting systems because of assumption 9 and, as already discussed, 
the perspective in this thesis has been to forgoe the users perspective 
in favour of a bookkeeping or entity perspective. Entities (9) is 
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represented by the whole model of these interacting systems. Of course 
the model is not a complete representation of the entity. Economic 
transactions (10), within the entity, constitute the basis of the 
mapping of System I with the money triad of signs but, equally, those 
outside the entity determine the mapping of System II with the money 
triad. Realization (12) appears to cover the same ground, but is a 
sub-set of those economic transactions which involve the entity, since 
realization applies only to that which has both entry and exit values; 
realization ties therefore to the intentions of 'distinguishable 
surplus' in System III. Allocation (18) is important also here as a 
'rule' or set of rules for income determination. Lastly Materiality 
which Mattesich sees as important for determining when a economic 
transaction related event is to be reflected by an accounting 
transaction [p.45]. Thus, this applies not to income determination (as 
might be thought), but applies as a 'rule' over problems in System II 
as discussed in the previous chapter on 'homogeneous' categories or 
inclusive in the inventory. 
7.3 discussion of comparison 
It would appear, allowing some lassitude in interpretation of terms, 
that all eighteen assumptions of Mattesach's are represented. However, 
it can be noted that several of the assumptions appear to apply to all 
three systems in the systems models, while some appear only once. The 
systems models also suggest some basic categories for the assumptions. 
The systems models further includes terms which are not found directly 
in Mattesich's list. The systems models, therefore, are helpful in 
making the Mattesich list more exhaustive. 
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Missing from Mattesach's list are the assumptions surrounding 
closure. No explicit rules were introduced for making entries except 
for Materiality (17), which the systems model restricts to System II, 
and Allocation (18). In contrast, an explicit permission rule for 
entries is given in System I in the fact of a transaction in which the 
entity is involved. Mattesich cannot employ such a rule, since in his 
multi-task system a number of rules are needed. That Mattesich does 
have in mind such a rule, however, is suggested by his discussion of 
Economic Transactions (10) that 'economic transactions are recorded 
through accounting transactions' [p.38]. This leaves the matter too 
vague and 'materiality' is of little immediate help. Certainly, 
Chambers in a review article has criticised Matte$ich for giving no 
reference to markets as determinates of 'values' [Chambers, 1966b, 
pp.107-108]. 
In contrast, for System I, while the nature of transactions is 
limited to cash or credit transactions, the wider range of economic 
events affects System II through the materiality rule, guided by 
changes in sale values. This is the main starting point for any 
differences between Matte~ch's model and the systems model which makes 
the role of markets much fuller. 
The most striking difference between the two models is the 
organization of terms in the systems models. This clarifies where 
basic assumptions are repeated, e.g. Valuation (11) but become 
interpreted (adopt a specific measurement such as NRV) or are system 
specific, e.g. allocation, period, duration and realization which apply 
to income determination, System III. However, the compelling aspect of 
this organization of terms is the emphasis on the interaction of 
particular assumptions with other assumptions. The systems models is a 
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demonstration of how the assumptions work in sub-units of sub-systems 
which can be grouped together to form the overall system. For example, 
the aspect of equality in System I may be regarded as a combination of 
the assumptions of aggregation, a monetary convention and the use of 
double entry, as will be discussed in sections 2.1 to 3.5 in the 
following Chapter. 
7.4 completeness of systems' model 
Closure in the sense of internal consistency of each system has been 
given much attention. The imposition of the systems contraints evolved 
in Part I helped to evolve sets of rules which enabled closure in the 
cybernetic sense to be preserved. The historical discussion in the next 
chapter will discuss the importance attached to the internal 
articulation of the accounts in the development of the traditional 
model. What may also be of importance, anticipating the discussion of 
Chapter 7, is that this alternative and more traditional type of 
closure, wholeness or integrality, is also preserved. If this is not 
so, there is a danger of proliferation of systems, the very danger 
which it is arguable the historical development strove to avoid and 
which Mattesich has also been concerned to avoid (see Introduction). 
The absence of this danger in the systems models can be shown in two 
ways. First, in respect of completeness in mapping the information 
source. Secondly, in terms of the intergration of the models to form 
one bookkeeping system. 
In terms of information source, all aspects of money signs are 
used. The money triad has been decomposed into HC, RC and NRV and each 
of these has a resultant system. No other measures exist. Cpp is an 
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index derived from a comparison of RC with HC for any particular bundle 
of goods. And economic values (EV) are a construct from purely notional 
data, the future stream of cash flows, derived in turn from prices 
which may exist only in the future. Any danger of proliferation of 
systems is avoided. Other systems may be needed but they would lie 
outside this central framework. 
Each system also relates also to each other. In comparison to the 
Mattesich model, the systems are organized. Thus, the money values for 
the accounts in System I and the basic physical quantities for the 
records in lists in System II spring from a common source. Equally, 
System III not only has as its basic data the non-allocated money 
transactions from System I, but also, as a constraint on any 
allocations, it uses the value data of System II. That is, any 
'balances', thrown up by apportionments or allocations in the accounts 
to determine income in System III, must reconcile with the measurements 
of System II. A formal demonstration of this reconciliation process is 
given in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 7 
The ~is~2~ical_D~elo~ment~f Doubl~E~try 
.!.!-.!_Sy.!te!!! 
C~T~ 7 
The Historical Development of Double Entry as a System 
1.1 introduction 
Some comparison of the systems model developed in the last chapter to 
the traditional bookkeeping model was given by an analysis of 
differences between the assumptions required by the systems model being 
considered against an analytical listing of the assumptions of the 
traditional model developed by Mattesich [1964]. Problems arise in 
attempting a direct comparison of the systems models with existing 
bookkeeping, since, in contrast to the systems models, a number of 
purposes or functions of the bookkeeping appear inextricably entwined. 
While Mattesich's analysis did not reveal the structure to the 
traditional model, some of the importance which might be attached to an 
assumed integrality or unity in the model could be perceived in the 
comparison, shown in Figure 9 of Chapter 6, which depicted Mattesich's 
assumptions broken up into the different systems models. In particular, 
this raised questions about the relation betweem this 'integrality' and 
the nature of any 'control' inherent in the traditional bookkeeping. 
In this chapter, some further analysis is given to explicating the 
possible nature of control in traditional double entry through the 
systems models being compared to the traditional double entry model in 
terms of general control concepts and then exploring in a systematic 
historical analysis how such control could have developed. First, 
therefore, the general concepts of control which Ijiri [1975] holds to 
be fundamental to accounting measurement are discussed in the context 
of the systems models. 
Following this, a comparison of the control aspects of the systems 
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models with the traditional double entry model is developed by 
introducing some of the historical debate. After discussion on the 
importance of order and system in the historical development of double 
entry, some suggestions as to how the various separable and distinct 
functions of the bookkeeping became wrapped up together in the one 
system. In particular, it will be argued that the provision of order 
which accompanied the development of double entry brought with it a 
type of closure in the system which gives a mere illusion of control 
compared to the more satisfactory nature of control in the systems 
model. 
1.2 some comments on the argument surrounding closure 
An essential argument of this chapter is that the assumptions which 
appear 'natural' to double entry form a self-constructing system with 
particular properties of closure. All accounts must be included in the 
ledger, a special restriction rule for making entries is generated and, 
with this, a single type of valuation rule is incorporated. An emergent 
characteristic of this type of closure is an automatic articulation of 
accounts which is exhibited by the 'balancing' phenomenon 1 that is the 
accounts, given appropriate arithmetic content, sum to zero. This 
articulation, however, has not so much been perceived as a mere 
consequence, or by-product, of the use of double entry, as it has been 
taken to be axiomatic to the theory of accounting and contributed to 
the expectation of an automatic articulation of reports. The 
psychological hold of this automatic articulation of reports is 
discussed further in Chapter 8. 
The main ground of the chapter is to excavate the relations 
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between certain implicit or explicit rules in double entry and the 
articulation of accounts and, hence, the extension to an automatic 
articulation of external reports. The argument is concerned to show the 
necessary connections between choice of rules and articulation. 
Although the context is historical, because the concern is a logical 
one, the essential argument is conducted in an analytical form and not 
historical. That is, no causal argument is proposed. For example, the 
directionality of any historical link does not affect a demonstration 
of logical relations. It does not matter whether the rules were chosen 
to gain an articulation or whether the articulation dictated the choice 
of rules. 
What does matter is, as will be shown, that a few rules only 
necessitate the property of articulation. Some discussion could then 
ensue on the liklihood of the particular choice of rules in a given 
historical context; this is the ground which has been given the 
greatest prominence previously in the literature the question of how 
double entry was invented or carne to be evolved. Or consideration could 
be given to the consequences of adoption of the rules and the 
articulation. The latter is the particular line of enquiry pursued in 
this chapter and, since it deals with some logical relations, the 
treatment is again analytical. However, as substantive matters are also 
involved here, some discussion of historical issues is also required. 
2.1 Ijiri's Fundamental Concepts 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, Ijiri's defence of historic cost accounting 
is argued in terms of the control which he believes to be provided by 
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the double entry system. In particular, it was mentioned that Ijiri 
feels the need to resist the pleas of information economists for 
greater disclosure as it would increase the area of judgement for the 
accountant. 
In his analysis of the fundamental concepts in accounting 
measurement, Ijiri [1975] suggests three areas of judgment: control, 
essentially an identification problem~ guantities, problems of 
classification and measurement within a class (satisfying indifference, 
additivity and non-negativity conditions)~ and exchanges, the ability 
to partition all changes into exchanges which consist of an increment 
and a decrement. Some idea of what Ijiri intends by 'judgement' can 
perhaps be drawn from a closer consideration of these areas. 
2.2 Ijiri's areas of judgement 
The judgment over control, according to Ijiri, is concerned with 
criteria. Control criteria are needed to judge whether a resource is 
under the control of the entity at a particular point in time. Such 
criteria are left vague by Ijiri, but appear to rely on records, 
recognizing that being 'physically in the entity's "territory" is 
neither a necessary nor sufficient condition' for something to be a 
resource [Ijiri, 1975, p.53]. This perspective on control seems to 
focus unduly on the physical ownership and miss out entirely that what 
is also required is a set of controls on the information 
is, it is not only goods which need to be controlled, 
itself. That 
but control on 
the information about those goods is also needed. This latter form of a 
control is made an integral part of the systems models and is discussed 
further in the next section. 
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As far as the judgment area of quantities is concerned, although 
Ijiri makes the claim that the primary measures, imputed to an 
accounting measurement system, are 'essentially physical quantities' 
[Ijiri, 1975, p.56], he instead commits himself to money signs through 
the adoption of historic cost. The systems model resolves this 
difficulty in Ijiri's formulation and shows how System I deals with 
money aggregates only, while System II relies on physical quantities, 
and takes account of events which change those quantities, before 
mapping on to these current prices. 
Over the last area of judgement, exchanges, Ijiri's analysis is 
surprisingly weak. Although he circumvents some problems for 
traditional bookkeeping in presupposing the need to adopt a single 
valuation base, he fails to distinguish properly between internal and 
external exchange. He attempt to form all changes (Sorter's events) 
into 'exchanges', thus conflating (external) accounting transactions 
with (internal) economic events. Again, there seems a lack of concern 
by Ijiri for control over the information level and perhaps an over-
reliance on some 'control' inherent in the double entry system. 
2.3 control over information 
In contrast, it is the existence of money signs generated by exchanges 
in the money system that is central to the systems model ability to 
partition any changes to the entity. In respect of a particular set of 
changes to the entity, System I maps signs from external exchanges, 
transactions, in which the entity has taken part and records increments 
and decrements in either cash or credit terms. Another set of changes 
is partitioned by the existence of changes in prices and System II maps 
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price information for estimates of realizable cash from potential 
transactions, while System III uses price information for estimates of 
replacement cost. 
In respect of a need to recognise internal changes or economic 
events, the systems models are still able to keep external transactions 
data separate from other events. It should be noted that although the 
initial basis for an entry in System II is a transaction, recognition 
of any changes through internal 'events' may also be made (through the 
materiality criterion). For example, from the week's production, so 
many metres of wood may be removed from the size categories and entered 
into the category of kitchen tables (with presumably a change in NRV). 
In the systems models, not only are changes which affect the 
entity divided up within anyone system (by classification in System I 
and through use of the category lists in System II), but the types of 
changes are further split between those which arise from external 
exchanges (which are partitioned further between money signs arising 
from transactions and those signs which are simply current in the money 
system and represent potential transactions) and those which are 
internal and are recognised as, say, production events. 
3.1 the systems models and control 
In contrast to Ijiri, the systems models take a wider view of control. 
While System II approaches Ijiri's use of control in the use of records 
as the basic control criteria, the reliance on records would require 
also physical checks (on a sample basis). However, the concern in the 
systems model is much more directed at the information level and on 
having clear criteria for the existence of records (e.g. only a cash or 
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credit based transaction allows the making of an entry in System I), 
together with restricted processing for any presentation of that data 
(e.g. only aggregation is allowed in System 1, no other valuation 
technique is introduced). Further, each system strictly allows only 
one valuation measure (thus in System I only historic transaction 
prices are used as entry or exit values). 
The notion of control in Ijiri, essentially the problem of 
identification, has been extended in the systems model and represented 
as a problem of information control in identifying: 
(1) the basis for the making of any entry, why information is 
needed - a preservation rule 
(2) the rules which restrict operation on any information from an 
entry, how or when information is processed - a permission rule 
(3) a single valuation measure for each system, what information is 
required - a partition rule. 
In Ijiri's terms (1), the preservation rule, may be seen as tied 
to any particular type of 'exchanges', (2), the permission rule is more 
specific than Ijiri's 'control' and concerns classes of information, 
and (3), the partition rule may be related to 'quantities'. For 
example, in respect of this last restriction rule, it can be noted that 
the consistency strategy of adoption of a single valuation base helps 
to satisfy the indifference, additivity and non-negativity conditions 
in judgments on quantities discussed by Ijiri. These three aspects of 
control are now examined in more detail. 
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3.2 internal consistency and control 
The importance of the systems models are their ability to clarify 
relations between systems arrangements and information levels. Systems 
design constrains information aspects. In particular, control is 
exerted over when information (a sign) enters the system (and excludes 
other occasions) (the permission rule - rule 2 above), what information 
enters the system (and what does not) (the partition rule - rule 3), 
and also in what happens to the information once inside the system (and 
prohibits anything else happening) (the preservation rule - rule 1). 
In terms of the partition rule for information entry, the type of 
signal which can be received is predetermined, together with a basis 
being selected for acceptance of a particular signal, the permission 
rule. For example, in System I the type of signal is restricted to the 
historical price determined in a transaction. However, only those 
transactions entered into by the entity itself are of direct interest 
for entries in System I and, of these, the further restriction is 
adopted that it is only when cash either leaves or enters (or, in the 
use of credit, the prospect of cash leaving or entering), that an entry 
is made. 
Such control, in systems terms, represents closure of the 
particular type discussed in Chapter 3. The demands of this type of 
closure are such as to necessitate very tight' systems to handle 
information signals and ensure some preservation of signs and of the 
information content. In the systems model meaning or interpretation of 
information content is ensured in part by separation of the different 
types of signals and, further, by a separate knowledge system to handle 
each type of signal. 
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3.3 comparison with traditional model 
This emphasis on a variety of systems (three) to handle different types 
of money information signals (three) conforms to the Law of Requisite 
Variety proposed by Ashby for cybernetic systems as discussed earlier. 
Provided the information once in the system is also minimally 
interfered with, the preservation rule, these rules affecting content 
provide a basis for interpretation of any information message which is 
taken from each system. Consistency in the type of signal is 
maintained and, in consequence, any set of messages generated by the 
system can 
interpretation 
be considered to be coherent enough to 
(although this does not entail that any user 
the interpreted results meaningful). 
attempt 
may find 
However, as discussed earlier (when Mattesach's assumptions were 
compared to the systems models), the traditional model has enjoyed a 
different type of closure, an apparant integrality. The system appears 
as a 'whole' in that all accounts are integrated into the ledger and 
that all reports are generated from the data in the ledger. 
Superficially the output of the traditional system appears at odds with 
the Ashby's Law in that three reports are generated from the one 
system. 
However, these three reports are interdependent and articulate 
closely with each other and, crucially, all rely on the one basic type 
of money signal. In its reliance on historic cost, the traditional 
model appears to observe the partition rule, (3) above, and tends to 
exclude various aspects of information7 for example, traditionally 
current price data was excluded. However, even here exceptions have 
been introduced in the application of the traditional bookkeeping to 
accomodate important anomalies7 for example, in the introduction of the 
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'lower of cost or market' rule and, more recently the use of market 
valuations for property. 
Further, while all transactions result in an entry in the 
traditional model, there appears to be no strict permission rule, 
compare rule (2) above, and various other types of entries which 
involve arbitrary allocations of one sort or another are also made (the 
rule is not all transactions require an entry but that all entries 
require a transaction). The consequences of this are particularily to 
upset rule (1), the preservation of information. 
To fully understand the differences between the systems model and 
the traditional model, the actual relation of the traditional model to 
these rules of information contol described above now requires 
examination. The nature of the wholeness or integrality in the double 
entry also requires investigation in the traditional model 
particularily to decide whether any counterpart to it can be found in 
the systems' model; that is, in what sense it too represents a systems 
closure in the sense of being integral and a 'whole'. Before 
considering the systems model further, therefore, it is important at 
this point to discuss aspects of the traditional double entry model. 
However, due to the complexity of the interwoven threads in the 
development of double entry, this discursion is somewhat extended. 
4.1 invention and evolution 
A standard view of the development of the double entry system is the 
'evolution' view of Littleton [1966]. Essentially Littleton's argument 
is against the more traditional interpretation of double entry as an 
'invention' and, instead, is based on the system slowly evolving 
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through an inherent utilty to users in any particular method or 
addition to the system prevailing over the choice of other methods 
additions. This view is also shared by de Roover: 
double entry developed in response to the needs of nascent 
\ 
capitalism. 
[de Roover, 1956, p.174] 
or 
However, given the fairly full description of double entry 
applications by Pacioli [1494], it is difficult to accept that the 
original bookkeepers foresaw the future needs of users for the next 
five hundred years, especially given the crude and embryonic nature of 
business in the early medieval period. As Yamey points out in response 
to de Roover: 
this explanation of its origins is unsatisfactory because the 
particular needs, supposedly not met by other accounting 
arrangements, are not distinctly specified. 
[Yamey, 1982, p.17] 
The explanation is also unsatisfactory since Littleton and de 
Roover appear, often implicitly, to have in mind owners as users" not 
the bookkeepers themselves. It is also worth bearing in mind here that 
a major source of criticism of present practice is its supposed 
indifference to user needs. 
4.2 the argument round closure 
In constrast to the evolution-utility view, the theme of this thesis is 
to reemphasise the traditional argument of the essential nature of 
double entry as a form or system for handling information. However, the 
argument here is not that this form had particular advantages to users, 
although it is important to be clear about what those might have been, 
but, rather to elucidate the constraints this set upon future 
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development. 
In this respect it is different from Yamey's arguments, which are 
concerned to attack Sombart's [1924] thesis of double entry as a causal 
agent in the rise of capitalism, not only in holding that Yamey 
consistently underestimates the importance of the contribution of 
double entry as a system (see sections 2.3 to 2.6 below), but rather in 
a much more limited view being taken in this chapter that the systems 
aspects of double entry may have severly restricted reporting 
developments. 
No new evidence for the development (or the lack of development) 
of double entry is brought foward here. Instead, certain systems 
aspects which are peculiar to double entry are identified and some 
possible effects of these aspects are suggested. In particular, it is 
suggested that an inherent closure and self-constructing nature of 
double entry was attractive to the bookkeepers (whether owners or 
clerks) because of the sense of order which it forced upon the 
bookkeeping and that, further, this closure has exerted a psychological 
hold over accountants through its 'logic' of system which has inhibited 
developments in reports. First, however, the systems aspect of closure 
in traditional double entry is discussed in respect its relevance for 
the debate over Sombart's thesis, then the later consequences of the 
closure for the development of reporting matters are considered. 
4.3 Sombart's thesis 
In terms of the historical debate surrounding the development of double 
entry, consideration of the systems aspects to double entry appears to 
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vindicate Winjum's partial defence of the Sombart thesis. In response 
to a series of attacks by Yamey on Sombart's claims for double entry, 
Winjum [1971] took the defence that double entry had provided a 
systematic organization for business and, in so doing, had (perhaps) 
played a critical role in the development of capitalism. However, 
Winjum's line of argument can be greatly strengthened by perceiving 
that the crucial contribution in double entry was not merely an 
increase in the degree of order, but a change in kind in the addition 
of system, an enforced order, and, in this context, the self-
constructing propensity of the traditional model is examined in section 
5.2 below. 
Yamey interprets the Sombart thesis as principally concerned with 
the influence of double entry on the profit motive: 
systematic or scientific accounting, identified with the 
double-entry system, played an important part in releasing, 
activating, stimulating or accentuating the "rationalistic 
pursuit of unlimited profits", an essential element in the 
capitalistic spirit. 
[Yamey, 1964, p.117] 
However, Winjum has suggested that Sombart also gave great prominance 
to the contribution of the role of 'order' which the double entry 
system gives to the organization of business affairs: 
His discussion of double-entry bookkeeping and capitalism 
begins: "Order heightens our powers. Organization in economic 
matters increases economic potentialities". Order and 
systematic organization were necessary for prosperity, and 
the source of order was double-entry bookkeeping: "The 
characteristic pattern of business organization resulting 
from systematic bookkeeping has been of crucial importance 
for the development of capitalism in its most essential 
aspect." 
[Winjum, 1971, p.345] 
In passing it might be mentioned that attention to Sombart's 
thesis has partly been distracted by the more general claims about its 
status as a precusor to other theories such as the circulation of the 
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blood and the laws of gravity attributed to Sombart by Most [1972, 
1979], among others. However, in a recent note by Lister [1985], a more 
careful statement of these wider aspects of Sombart's thesis has been 
provided. For the present, these more speculative issues are not 
discussed. First the debate between Winjum and Yamey is considered. 
4.4 Yamey's arguments 
Yamey's essential criticisms are three: 
a) that single entry can do anything that double entry can achieve, 
thus profit or capital measurements were available in any casel 
b) that balancing was conducted on an irregular basis only, thus the 
desire for double entry profit or capital measures seems weak I 
c) that Sombart confuses the reporting system with the bookkeeping 
system, thus much of what Sombart attributes to double entry 
belongs instead to accounting generally. 
While Winjum does contest directly Yamey's case against double 
entry as a catalyst in affecting the profit motive by an appeal to the 
evidence of original accounts and historical treatises, reliance on 
these sources are problematic and in respect of 'actual uses of 
accounting data' Winjum feels 'forced to speculate' [Winjum, 1971, 
p.342]. And while Winjum quotes extensively from historical treatises 
in favour of his own emphasis on 'order' being the important aspect of 
double entry, critically he does not explain why or how double entry 
forces order into the bookkeeping. Winjum in emphasising the 
'systematic' nature of double entry, instead of analysing the 'system', 
misses the strength of this line of argument. 
In this latter respect Yamey's argument over single entry 
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accomplishing anything double entry can is reexamined. First the claims 
for 'accuracy' are examined and it is found that double entry checks 
only double entry. However, double entry, through the expectation of 
balancing, forces a system upon the bookkeeping while single entry does 
not. And since it is only the feature of balancing which is required, 
not the reports generated from this, no regular balancing is needed. 
While it is clear that profit and capital measures can be acheived by 
single entry, what is of major interest is why double entry developed 
despite the existence of these alternatives and why the nature of these 
previously separate reports came to be dominated instead by 'double 
entry's ability to provide an interlocking record of enterprise 
progress and status' [Winjum, 1971, p.337] 
4.5 the argument over single entry 
Much of the power of Yamey's criticisms stems from his comparison of 
double entry with previous methods which he 'conveniently' calls 
'single entry' [Yamey, 1949, p.105]. He wants to show that income and 
capital reports can be gained from single entry accounts; that, in any 
case, the facility of regular balancing in double entry for generating 
reports was not much used; and, further, that development in business 
is related to reporting developments, not narrow bookkeeping functions. 
In short, the question which appears to underlie all his analysis is: 
what can double entry do which single entry cannot achieve? 
In an early article, Yamey accepts that double entry as a system 
can provide more than single entry in that it produces calulations of 
profit or loss, capital employed and financial condition [Yamey, 1949, 
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p.10S]. However, in a later aricle Yamey claims 'double entry has no 
inherent superiority' in this context since calculations can be made 
'independently of a system of double entry' [Yamey, 1964, p.120]. This 
latter claim is further discussed below but, in any case, as these 
reports only properly arise if the books are balanced, and are only of 
particular use if balanced regularily, Yamey can ignore these 
additional reporting features on his interpretation of the facts that 
books did not always balance and, in particular, the balancing was 
irregular [Yamey, 1949, pp.106-111, Yamey, 1964, pp.124-12S]. In 
passing it may be noted that Yamey's tacit acceptance above of the lack 
of 'independence' between reports and the bookkeeping invalidates the 
basis of his third criticism of Sombart, Sombart's attribution of 
reporting developments to the double entry system. 
If reports were not generated, this appears to leave the ability 
to balance as a basic advantage over single entry. And, since Yamey 
believes the focus is on reporting developments only, Yamey grants the 
importance of these 'narrowly bookkeeping purposes' [Yamey, 1964, 
p.12S]. Here the main claim is over checking the accuracy of the 
ledger: 
The striking of a balance, which could not be correct unless 
the two sides of the balance account were equal, would reveal 
whether any errors of arithmetic had been made in the ledger. 
[Yamey, 1949, p.110] 
It must be stressed in this context that the check to accuracy 
given by double entry alone (without the aid of subsidiary ledgers or 
books of original entry) is purely an arithmetic one. A short analysis 
is sufficient to establish that double entry is completely ineffectual 
against errors in the ledger of a non-arithmetical type. It cannot 
detect type 1 errors, entries which should have been made and which 
have not been made or, conversely, those entries which have been made 
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and never should have been madel that is, errors against any permission 
rule allowing the making of an entry. Nor can it detect type 2 errors 
concerning amounts being placed in the wrong account. Indeed, Yamey 
criticises Pacioli for the absence of guidance over choice of accounts 
[Yamey, 1975, p.S]. Further, a new type of error, type 3 errors, quite 
unique to double entry, is introduced, that of putting the entries the 
wrong way round. Both these last two errors undermine any preservation 
of information rules. The only type of error which will be revealed is 
the placing of an amount twice to one side. Since this type 4 error is 
also unique to double entry, it can be held that, aside from arithmetic 
errors, double entry checks double entry but that is all. 
4.6 the need for system 
There is now a difficulty in understanding why double entry was 
adopted. If no reliance was made on the capital or income reports which 
could be generated, and if there were no significant gains to be had in 
terms of accuracy to the bookkeeping, then Yamey's argument can be 
reversed. Why was the much more 'complex' method of double entry 
prefered to the 'simpler and more natural' [Yamey, 1949, p.10S] method 
of single entry? 
The answer which is suggested here is one which Yamey himself 
provides. Double entry as a 'system' predates single entry as a system. 
Indeed, it is questionable that the set of rudimentary methods, which 
were 'used in every shop' or which merchants 'could manage "without 
outside assistance'" [Yamey, 1949, p.10S], amount to a system at all. 
Again Yamey, in a different article, comments that the '''books of 
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accounts" were mere scraps of paper' and commenting that 'the records 
were in no way systematized' allows that: 
it is perhaps incorrect to describe them as single entry, 
which term today implies the presence of some system in the 
records. Indeed, single entry as a system is more likely to 
have been a development from double entry. 
(Yamey, 1947, p.264] 
As authorities for this view Yamey quotes the German writers, Jaeger, 
Schmalenbach and, writing in 1741, Fluegel. Oddly, Yamey appears to 
miss the fact that Sombart himself held the view that single entry was 
but a 'crippled' version of double entry and of a later date [Most, 
1972, p.726]. In a later article Yamey quotes Andreas Wagner, who, 
while disclaiming Jones as the 'real inventor' of single entry, accords 
Jones as 'having been the first to develop this method of bookkeeping 
into a proper order' [Yamey, 1982, pp.88-89]. 
And it is the property of 'system' which was most valued. Winjum 
lists almost all the important early writers on double entry, Ympyn, 
Colinson, King, Dafforne, Monteage, Mair and North, as selecting the 
abolition of confusion 'by creating order out of chaos' as the 'primary 
advantage' of double entry [Winjum, 1971, p.345]. The crucial aspect 
of double entry is that it brings with it aspects of order and system 
which are integral to its use. In contrast any aspects of system must 
be brought and added to single entry. Since aspects of system are not 
compulsory but are left to be added in respect of perceived needs, this 
allows arbitrary decisions to be made about, say, which accounts are to 
be kept and especially leaves different accounts to be run as separate 
units. Contrary to Yamey's supposition, all the onus in the debate must 
be on tpe need to show documentary evidence that single entry methods 
amounted to recognizable systems and not 'mere scraps of paper'. But 
Yamey has already admitted, when not attacking the Sombart thesis, that 
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this is not the case. 
4.7 consequences of an integral system 
Why does Yamey miss the importance of the 'system' aspect of double 
entry? It must be said first that in seeking to attack Sombart's 
relation between double entry and the developing aquisitiveness for 
profits he relys too hard on the distinction between reporting and 
bookkeeping. In his emphasis on the lack of documentation to support 
the production and use of reports he misunderstands or has overlooked 
Sombart's emphasis on the relation between form and content, an 
emphasis which Ijiri notes with approval [Ijiri, 1975, p.84]. The 
argument that the reports are fully integrated with the bookkeeping 
and, further, that bookkeeping factors came to dominate reporting 
practice thr9ugh the inherent tendency towards closure in the 
bookkeeping system is an important theme of this thesis and is returned 
to after the discussion on the self-contructing nature of double entry 
below. 
Secondly, Yamey does not appear to appreciate the full force of 
the order that double entry provides. Double entry is not simply more 
'systematic' in that a greater degree of organization was brought to 





'self-controlling' aspect of the system noted by de Roover 
p.149] amounts not simply to the 'accuracy' of the balance, but 
much deeper issues such as the construction of the 
classification system and the reliance on a particular value measure in 
historic cost. In short, it is because double entry may be regarded as 
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having a propensity to be self-constructing as a system, in its 
inherent tendency towards closure, that double entry may be seen as 
forcing system aspects on the bookkeeping. There seems little room to 
doubt that the bookkeepers were delighted by and drawn to this inherent 
push towards system in an age which which prized order so highly in its 
conceptual schemes for viewing the world and no doubt sought a contrast 
to the continual upheaval and strife to which the Italian City State 
was subject [Martines, 1980]. 
There are some 'narrowly bookkeeping' gains to be made in the use 
of double entry and Yamey gives an excellent account of the saving in 
labour and simplification which occurs by transposing only the balances 
into the new ledger upon the closing (say because the book is full) of 
the old ledger [Yarney, 1949, p.107]. However, the biggest immediate 
gain was in terms of the simplification in the sets of books being kept 
and further by 'the integration of personal and impersonal accounts 
into a cohesive system' [de Roover, 1938, p.146]. Double entry reversed 
the earlier tendency for a single memorandum to fragment into different 
books for different purposes and encouraged the development of a single 
system: 
It entailed a great deal of simplification and a number of 
books dropped out. The cash book, for instance, was 
superseded by the cash account, the libro segreto was 
rendered superfluous by the proprietorship accounts in the 
ledger, while the journal took care of the transactions 
formerly dispersed in miscellaneous notebooks. 
[de Roover, 1938, p.147] 
This tendency towards a single system leads not only to an 
integrated and articulated set of accounts, but culminates in a switch 
from essentially separate and independent income and capital 
measurement, prior to double entry, to all the financial reports being 
drawn from the same data base. However, before discussion of this 
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critical issue which stresses the interrelations of the bookkeeping 
with reporting matters, why double entry was essentially self-
constructing as a system is now considered. 
5.1 definitions of double entry 
Winjum has commented that several important writers on the topic of 
double entry do not specifically define the concept of double entry and 
he indicates how some of the issues are traceable to a difference in 
definition [Winjum, 1971, p.335]. He distinguishes between two extremes 
in use. First, where double entry merely refers to a system in which 
the only criterion is the equality of debits and credits. Against this, 
double entry may be used to refer to a full blown system of 
recordkeeping in which real and nominal accounts are 'integrated within 
a coordinated and internally consistent structure capable of 
simultaneously producing reports on both the accounting entity's 
progress and status'. Further, any calculations are assumed to take 
place at fixed periodic intervals [Winjum, 1971, p.335]. 
Winjum clarifies various positions which may be taken in between 
these extremes: 
(1) A bookkeeping system constantly in equilibrium in which 
the only criterion is the equality of debits and 
·credits. 
(2) The addition of a 'capital account to the first system. 
(3) The use of nominal accounts (revenues, expenses, 
ventures, etc.) in addition to the capital account of 
system 2, but an irregular closing of these accounts to 
capital. 
(4) The same as system 3 except for the periodic closing of 
nominal accounts to capital and the annual calculation 
of net income. 
[Winjum,1971, p.335] 
By drawing on the above distinctions in the definition of double 
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entry, Winjum has used the separable nature of (4) to counter Yamey's 
argument (c) above. Provided neither the system of double entry needs 
regular balancing, nor the rational of the system requires the 
provision of periodic income reports, then the fact that often 
balancing was conducted on a irregular basis only is irrelevant. As has 
already been mentioned, Winjum is arguing that the contribution to 
capitalism or the development of business in general lay not in the 
more systematic measurement of profit (the ability for double entry to 
measure profit is in any case under dispute) but in the specific order 
which double entry contributed. The following section in this thesis 
will discuss how this order was forced upon the bookkeepers 1 for 
example, in the need to record all transactions in the ledger and in 
the inclusion of all accounts in the ledger. 
While Winjum points to definition (3) as the critical system, on 
the grounds that an annual reckoning is not always necessary, no 
particular definition is prefered in this thesis. Selection would 
necessarily be arbitrary but, in any event, it is suggested here that 
the definitions are interconnected, especially definitions (1) to (3). 
It might be argued that the addition of the capital account (2) and the 
addition of nominal accounts (3) followed naturally from the internal 
requirements of the extension of the use of the criterion of equality 
of debits and credits (1). Indeed Yamey accepts this link and further 
quotes Alexander Macghie, writing in 1718, as an early recognition of 
this: 
"Ficticious or Nominal Accompts are such as contriv'd on 
Purpose to supply the Defect of a Debitor or Creditor, in all 
personal or real accompts, seeing no Accompt can alone 
consist of a Debitor without a Creditor, or vice versa." 
[Yamey, 1964, p.134n] 
However, the periodic closings under (4), and the annual 
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calculation of net income appears to require adoption of the annual 
reporting convention, and in this case it is the bookkeeping which 
appears to be responding, patchily and much later, 
external needs of users. 
5.2 self-construction of traditional model 
in part to the 
The 'wholeness' or integrality of the traditional model may be 
attributed to an inherent tendency to closure in the system or ability 
for self-construction. This inherent closure in the double entry arises 
out of the choice of rules and practices, but the closure, equally, 
directs further development of these rules and practices. The adoption 
of the practice of equal and opposite entries, together with a rule of 
aggregation and the use of historic transaction values only, provide a 
sufficient set on which to construct a minimum system of double entry. 
No further rules are needed since these assumptions inter-act to form a 
system. An emergent characteristic of the system is the phenomenon of 
'balancing'; the accounts sum to zero. It is important to realise that 
balancing is not a fundamental assumption, but a (formal) consequence 
of the adoption of the other assumptions. It is this emergent or 
formal nature of the property which leads Ijiri to exclaim 'what a 
triviality' [Ijiri, 1975, p.84]. 
Nevertheless, the consequences of balancing (or the desire to 
balance) are not trivial. There will be a tendency in making double 
entries to keep each account which needs to be entered near each other 
and the habit of making double entries encourages this more than simple 
cross-referencing. Eventually, this draws in each possible account. And 
the prospect of balancing strongly reinforces this tendency into a 
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compulsio~. Out of this order comes the ledger, ~ accounts together 
in the one place. The tendency arises partly out of tidiness. For 
example, some pure money entries, Dr customer Cr cash, invite the use 
of money values on both sides and introduce credit accounts to co-exist 
in the same system with cash accounts. The trading entry, however, Dr 
stock Cr cash, does not. There might be every reason, before double 
entry, to expect the inventory account to lie outside the ledger and be 
kept in physical terms. Indeed, in the early development of double 
entry, the inventory account is also sometimes left out. For example 
even a huge organization like the Fuggers prepared the inventory 
'outside' the bookkeeping system [Kellenbenz, 1979, p.91]. Why was it 
brought inside? 
First there is the nature of trading. To the extent that five 
bundles of silk bought this week will be sold next week, the change in 
money prices which is realized stands as 'profit' (or loss). There 
appears information on profits to be gained (provided no clear view on 
the nature of profit is held) by recording money values in the stock 
account. And, indeed, the habit of striking individual 'profits' or 
'losses' is shown in the early double entry accounts. This is discussed 
further below. Secondly, there is the aspect of tidiness already 
mentioned. The use of double entry in its equality of each entry 
encourages all accounts to be uniformly entered. Finally, however, the 
compelling argument arises out of the developing systems nature of 
double entry. The prospect of balancing forces all accounts into the 
ledger. No account can be omitted. 
While it is partly speculative to suggest this, it is hard not to 
believe that the phenomenon of balancing was taken by the bookkeepers 
as a demonstration of the integrality of the system and, although only 
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an 'effect' of the system, becomes its rationale or 'cause'. Certainly, 
this is how the writers of the treatises treated balancing and this 
remained so for over at least three centuries; 
and: 
proof of the accuracy of the books is the proof provided by 
double-entry bookkeeping 
[Gottlieb, 1531, quoted by Yamey, 1947, p.267] 
the whole capital ••• must constantly equal the sum of all 
its parts. This EQUALITY is the great essential of 
bookkeeping. It will at once give the Reader a clear idea of 
the nature of that proof which is so highly and justly 
appreciated in Accounts ••• 
[Cronhelm, 1818, p.vi] 
The adoption of equal and 'opposing' entries, together with all 
accounts being formed into the one ledger, the one system, has a 
further reprecussion in that there is now an inherent tendency to 
include all transactions. While the early uses for records are simply 
not known, it seems unlikely that a merchant would trouble to record 
all the petty details of trade and some significant items such as 
interest, under the usury laws might be wisely omitted altogether. 
Balancing alone does not require this, although by drawing, say, the 
cash book and memoranda on capital together into the same system of 
accounts a uniform 'recognition' level is needed and this is likely to 
tend to the lowest common denominator with the need to record all 
transactions. 
However, in comparison to the systems model it might be argued, 
that instead of some explicit restriction rule on entry being adopted, 
sufficient to prohibit any other types of entry other than 
transactions, balancing was mistaken for the validity criterion. With 
the mystification and reification of balancing the inherent tendency 
towards closure is reinforced. The force of this self-construction on 
the conception of the nature of profit and the inclusion of the 
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inventory accounts and, in particular, fixed asset accounts within the 
ledger is discussed in the next sections. 
5.3 the changing concept of profit 
In paying attention to fact that it is possible to derive measures of 
profit without the aid of double entry, Yamey overlooks the fact that, 
on his own analysis, the nature of the concept of profit developed and 
changed with the development of double entry. Early notions of profit 
are inherently bound up with the individual transaction and examples of 
this continue to appear in the accounts well after double entry has 
been in use. This practice is very clear in the very early ledgers, for 
example those of the massari [Martinelli, 1983] and the Gallerani 
Account Book: 
the difference between purchase and sale prices is noted as 
profit 
[Nobes, 1982, p.308] 
However, with the development of the nominal accounts, separate 
entries of 'gains' or profit on individual transactions gives way to a 
general 'income' determination for the period. It is only in closing 
the accounts, and in the deferred balancing of aggregate expenses 
against aggregate revenue, that income is properly struck. Whether this 
net balance is to be preferred to an aggregate of profit figures per 
transaction is undecidable here7 what is clear is that there will be a 
tendency in the former process to omit other expenses and overheads, 
while these are automatically included under a full double entry 
system. The confidence which is created by a system under which 
automatically all expenses or revenues are included (see the discussion 
in the previous section on the need in double entry to include all 
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transactions) is not to be underestimated. 
While Yamey is perfectly correct that the merchant may not require 
double entry information to make the ad hoc individual decisions on 
which his business depends [Yamey, 1964, pp.128-133], the addition of 
confidence from an apparantly objective and complete record confirming 
past decisions must affect future decisions. Although Winjum sees the 
critical role of confidence, particularily in past activities, but also 
in a new activity [Winjum, 1971, p.341-342], he fails to explain 
properly why double entry creates confidence, for example in its catch 
all approach of noting all expenses and revenues through recording all 
transactions. 
5.4 the inclusion of the inventory accounts 
In contrast to later writers, Pacioli [1494] does not make any 
particular fuss over balancing although he is aware of the phenomenon. 
However, he gives great, and primary, emphasis to the inventory taking 
(Chapters 2-4 in Geijsbeek's reproduction), a feature which loses its 
importance and drops out altogether in some texts. For example, Richard 
Dafforne (1660], the first writer in the English language whose work 
went through several editions, advertises only a waste book, a journal 
and a 'leager' in his 'perfect' and 'exquisite' method. Where inventory 
is mentioned (as in page 14 of Geijsbeek's reproduction of the third 
edition), the context of unsold goods appears to indicate this as 
essentially the stock account inside the ledger. 
The forced inclusion of inventory accounts in the ledger, together 
with the reliance in the system on mapping historic cost signs, leads 
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to the existence in the ledger of 'balances' without any further 
measurement. While with trading accounts, both exit and entry prices 
are included (any residuals being attributable to profit or loss per 
transaction), with fixed asset accounts exit prices are rarely 
included, since particular cash or credit transactions to record the 
usage of the asset are absent. The existence of entry prices only in 
the fixed asset accounts poses a problem for the use of double entry 
systems. 
Strictly, these balances do not represent current values in any 
meaningful sense, although it is difficult for those who have purchased 
a good not to attribute meaning to the purchase price. For some 
representation, however weak, of 'value' (current value?) to be 
retained, either the (current) value of the goods needed to be measured 
directly, or some adjustments need to be made to the entry prices in 
the accounts. In either case a new permission rule for entries is 
needed; either a permission rule is introduced generally to make 
entries in response to changes in current value, or a new rule such as 
wear and tear or, eventually, depreciation rules is introduced. It can 
be noted that as the rules get adapted, the rationale for the rules is 
no longer restricted to accounting transactions but shifts to the wider 
net of economic 'events'. 
5.5 the proliferation of entry rules 
Neither of these moves is intrinsic to the system. Adjustments lack 
the • permission , of a transaction for an entry to be made; measurement 
is excluded by the reliance on historic cost for entry values. The 
choice seems indeterminate. However, in the absence of an explicit 
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validity rule to govern the making of entries, an adjustment might be 
made, in the first instance, by a simple double entry and justified 
with reference to a worn out asset (a change to the entity not covered 
by transactions). With this, the 'balancing' is retained. In contrast, 
appeal to direct measurement looks to open a Pandora's box in a whole 
string of measurements whose meaning clashes with the meaning 
attributable to entry prices and whose existence might appear to 
threaten the integral nature of the double entry system. 
Since, historically, it was the traders or bankers who developed 
the system, fixed assets woud have been of minor importance and the 
system would have mapped well the 'flow' nature of transactions with 
the inventory account being mainly trading stock. Early production 
systems also mainly relied on craft skills which, through labour skills 
being rented, again suited the flow nature of double entry. Only with 
the rise of industrial production in the 18th Century did fixed assets 
become much more significant. The increased shift to machinery, and 
the growing larger sums of money spent on purchasing machinery in the 
capital deepening process, gave rise to the proper recognition of fixed 
assets (thus affecting an extension to the cash-credit basis of 
classification of assets) and the need for the introduction of 
systematic rules to simulate in the fixed asset accounts an equivalent 
to the exit prices of the trading stock accounts. 
By the 18th Century the use of double entry had become fairly 
widespread and reliance on the balances thrown up by double entry for 
the keeping of inventory is well established. For example, while John 
Mair is clearly aware of the difference in the two approaches to 
inventory, inventory keeping drops away in favour of reliance on the 
balances generated by double entry: 
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begins the World, and first sets up to trade, the 
is to be gathered from a Survey of the Particulars 
up his real Estate; but ever after is to be 
from the Balance of his old Books, and carried to 
[Mair, 1741, p.S] 
This reliance on the double entry balances sets up the need for 
adjusting entries and the consequent introduction of ad hoc rules, 
such as wear and tear, to justify these entries. The refinement of 
these ad hoc rules over the next two centuries into the more 
sophisticated depreciation rules of today may be regarded, in this 
argument, as a matter of extension of habit and gradual rationalization 
of evolving practice, guided and directed by the constraints of the 
double entry paradigm. 
5.6 summary of historical discussion 
While much attention has been given in the foregoing discussion to 
weaknesses in Yamey's arguments, there can be little doubt that in 
focussing the issues which surround the development of double entry 
round the critical question of what difference does this make compared 
to single entry procedures, Yamey has provided a signal contribution to 
an area where all authors are otherwise agreed on the necessarily 
speculative nature of any discussion. Concentration on differences 
between the two methods not only sharpens issues, such as the role of 
system in the present analysis, where some analysis is possible, but 
equally avoids more general issues of the supposed utility of 
accounting reports, such as the ubiquitously dubious 'aid to memory' 
claim (since either method can achieve this), made by Lane [1973] and 
others, and which goes back to a possible misunderstanding of Pacioli 
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(see Chapter 1, where Pacioli's point about the mind having no. rest 
without the aid of the debit and credit method surely is an emphasis on 
the 'order' which the method imposes on the accounts, not the 
merchant's difficulties in remembering who owed what [Pacioli, 1494, 
p.33]). 
Yamey is right also to seek to temper any extravagance in claims 
on the lines of Sombart's thesis, although Sombart was more inclined to 
push the interdependance of capitalism and double entry rather than the 
causal nature of double entry that Yamey sometimes appears to suggest. 
Sombart concludes: 
"It is difficult to decide, however, whether in double-entry 
book-keeping capitalism provided itself with a tool to make 
it more effective, or whether capitalism derives from the 
'spirit' of double-entry book-keeping." 
[Yamey, 1956, p.9] 
In his effort to undercut the overreaching claims, what Yamey 
misses is that a crucial and important change has taken place in the 
exchange of independent income and capital measurement to an 
interdependance of these reports. This dovetailing or automatic 
articulation of the financial reports arises from the adoption of the 
double entry. Double entry, if not strictly self-constructing, has a 
tendency towards closure through adoption of 'balancing' as the 
essential sign of the validity or accuracy of the accounts. 
There is little question that Yamey is correct in the theoretical 
distinction between reporting and bookkeeping. A theoretical framework 
for financial reporting may be erected without reference to the 
bookkeeping. This does not, however, provide a case that such a 
separation is desirable. Not only does the bookkeeping ultimately 
underpin whatever messages are available in reports, but certain 
relations may also be formed by the bookkeeping system. In particular, 
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as is argued in Chapter 8, the form of the bookkeeping in the 
articulation of accounts may have carried over to the structure of 
reports the psychological need for an automatic articulation of 
reports. No such automatic articulation is inferred in the systems 
model and, instead, a formal reconciliation process must be entered 
into. In contrast to Yamey's argument, the systems models makes the 




Balancing Equations, Articulation and Reconciliation 
1.1 introduction 
In the previous chapter it ~as argued that, contrary to the view of 
double entry developing in response to business needs, the closure in 
the double entry system may well, in the inclusion of capital and 
income accounts inside a bookkeeping mechanism arguably most suited for 
tracking funds flows, have constrained developments in reporting. In 
this chapter this argument is extended to suggest that this closure not 
only worked through the integration of interlocking income and capital 
accounts, but that, from this, an expectation of an automatic 
articulation of reports developed. 
The effect of this psychological hold of an automatic articulation 
has been, at least until recently, to restrict traditional double entry 
to one measurement base, historic cost, but also to encourage 
proponents of alternative measurement bases to develop fully 
articulating systems, including both income and wealth measurement, 
from a single measurement base. For example, Chambers [1966] not only 
proposes a wealth measurement directly from sale values (NRV), but 
also derives an income measurement from the period change in sale 
values. 
After a general discussion of the rather closed nature of the 
accounting discipline, the effect of this is discussed on limiting the 
nature of the thesis to an extension of some particular systems and 
information concepts, instead of a full blown systems model of the type 
outlined in Chapter 4. A brief survey of part of the earlier theories 
of accounting show that three distinct series of accounts were marked 
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as integrated within the double entry system and that, from this, the 
'balancing equations' were developed enshrining this integration. 
While the systems models challenge this integration of different 
reporting bases within the one bookkeeping system, the concern is also 
to show that any gains to developing separate systems are not bought at 
the cost of either a proliferation of systems, the historical problem, 
or at the loss of articulation of the reports. In respect of the 
latter, a worked example demonstrates how the different reports are 
subject to a reconcilation process [see also Munro & Robertson, 1985c]. 
Possible additional advantages of this reconciliation process over 
automatic articulation are then discussed. 
1.2 relation to other fields 
Despite Littleton's views that double entry evolved in response to the 
needs of the business community, he accepts accounting as closely 
related 'only in a limited degree to historical events' [Littleton, 
1953, p.8]. Littleton also suggests that it is 'closely related to 
only a small segment of the whole of knowledge' [Littleton, 1953, p.8]. 
Setting aside 'Letters and Arts', 'Biological Science' and 'Physical 
Science', and surveying 'Social Science and Abstract Science', 
Littleton finds the accounting oriented most closely only with 
economics and statistics. However, the differences between accounting 
and economic approaches have been the subject of numerous articles. 
Boulding [1962], for example, stressed the 'uncongenial' nature of the 
two. Equally, statistics has more of a mathematical orientation in its 
theoretical base than accounting, which tends towards an arithmetical 
base. 
318 
Nor is Littleton himself convinced. When being more descriptive, 
rather than normative, he stresses the difference between economic 
transactions and accounting transactions (the former is related more to 
the information economist's wider preoccupations). Further, he points 
out that accounting is concerned with 'prices rather than values' 
[Littleton, 1953, p.12]. In respect of statistics, Littleton also 
points out the 'peculiarities' of accounting in that every ledger 
account ';s a dual category' [L;ttleton 1953 p 11] .... ..., ,.. To these 
comments it might be added that the focus in traditional accounting is 
with transactions, processes or flows, whereas primarily statistics 
deals with recording qualities, facts or attributes. Waddington [1977] 
has discussed the primary difference in the 'process' view of the world 
compared to the 'thing' view of the world (Chapter 1, section 1.5). 
The point of the preceding remarks is not to challenge the fact 
that there is some overlap with accounting and economics or statistics. 
These relations are clearly important. Nevertheless, overlap is not 
identity and what is significant is the distinct nature and separation 
of traditional accounting from economics or statistics. Not only does 
accounting stand on its own and has its distinctive differences, but it 
is relatively immune to changes and developments in these disciplines. 
Given the lack of connections to other fields, accounting appears as a 
relatively closed discipline. This fact contrasts oddly with the view 
which Littleton also holds of the wide importance of accounting: 
accounting has 'grown into a factual instrument of large social 
significance' [Littleton, 1953, p.7]. How can a discipline which is so 
closed from others wield such wide influence? 
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1.3 a general systems approach 
In more recent times, this 'closed' approach to accounting has 
been under considerable challenge and, in respect of the Social Science 
and Abstract Science fields mentioned by Littleton, there has not only 
been the aforementioned influence of information economists, but there 
has been pressure from accountants interested in organization theory, 
[e.g. Hopwood, 1978; 1983], social theory [e~g. Cooper, 1983; Tinker, 
1985] and also the philosophy of science [e.g. Sterling, 1979]. 
That a much more 'open' systems approach is required for 
accounting has been suggested by a number of researchers, some of whose 
work has appeared in collected readings [for example, Lowe & Machin, 
1983; Chenhall, Harrison & Watson, 1981]. Some of the work in this area 
was examined in Chapter 4, where a reworked systems model developed in 
the earlier chapters was extended across the systems, environment, 
individual and knowledge dimensions. 
An attempt to apply this model might seem, in this respect, a 
logical continuation of the previous examination of accounting. 
However, the scope of such an extension is so vast and the tools for 
such a work so underdeveloped that any attempt is, at present, far too 
major a task. In addition, given the very closed approach of 
traditional accounting, any attempt in this thesis to open up the 
subject, in kind rather than by degree, must be considered as 
overstretching itself. 
1.4 the information control approach 
For these reasons a systems approach to accounting in general has not 
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been attempted in this thesis. In its place the focus has been on 
accounting measurement. The relatively closed position of accounting 
has not been attacked and, instead, the nature of this closure in the 
traditional model of double entry has been made the subject of 
scrutiny. 
The ambition of this thesis has been, through the limited 
application of some systems concepts, to place the use of closure in 
the bookkeeping on a more explicit basis. Any rules necessary to 
ensure strict information control are then open to examination. It is a 
corrolary of this attempt to make the basic rules explicit that much of 
the pressure against change in reporting lies not so much with 
abhorance of particular measurement bases proposed, but more with an 
unexamined hold of the systems nature of double entry and a consequent 
reluctance to adopt anything which threatens or upsets this 
'invention'. 
It was the theme of the last chapter that there was an inherent 
tendency towards closure in the traditional double entry system, and 
that the reasons for the closure reflected predominantly internal or 
bookkeeping needs rather than external or reporting matters. In 
particular the separable reporting matters of cash, credit, inventory 
and capital were all mentioned as having been brought into the one 
system. The discussion in this chapter focuses round the possibility 
that the integration of cash, credit, inventory and capital as 
interlocking accounts in the traditional systems gave rise to an 
expectation that the external reports had to articulate automatically. 
The common factor is, of course, the phenomenon of balancing. The 
focus of the discussion begins, therefore, on the role of balancing in 
the traditional theory of accounting. 
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2.1 a basic concept in accounting 
A further point made by Littleton in his comparison with other fields 
of knowledge is that subjects other than accounting have a basic 
concept such as 'value' in economics, or 'justice' in law, which belong 
uniquely to that field and serve as a unifying base, and which is 
usually left undefined. In contrast accounting has none [Littleton, 
1953, p.1S]. 
In considering accounting measurement, it should be fairly clear 
that the unifying concept which has been used in this thesis in 
designing an information system has been that of 'closure' or 
information control. However, this concept has been bound by other 
terms. In particular, closure of a system for handling information is 
achieved through attention to the interlocking concepts of 
intentionality, truth and validity, coupled with relevance, rules and 
reference, and so on. It also has been stressed that in a similar way 
the phenomenon of balancing is a mere by-product or 'emergent 
characteristic' of the rules which established closure. 
However, in considering reporting matters, or accounting 
generally, the notion of closure is not of direct interest. Here the 
pivot of reports might be expected to figure round user needs, 
decision-making or aspects of problem-solving. It is odd, therefore, 
to find the traditional theory concerned fundamentally with the 
phenomenon of balancing in its depiction of the 'balance sheet 
equation' (e.g. Assets = Liabilities or Assets - Liabilities = Equity). 
This concern for balancing in reporting matters is particularly odd 
when the fact of balancing in the bookkeeping has been relegated to a 
minor and even trivial role (see discussion in Chapter 7). 
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2.2 the issue of income 
Since Littleton can both imagine a statistical system that would 
provide him with similar data to that produced by double entry or, 
alternatively, an equilibrium produced from a non double entry system 
[Littleton, 1966, pp.25-26], he has been concerned to emphasize the 
uninteresting status of balancing. Instead, Littleton's own candidate 
for a basic concept is 'income'. However, the concept of balancing is 
integral to Littleton's conception of income: 
an essential aspect of net income therefore is that it is a 
resultant of a balancing of forces. 
[Littleton, 1953, p.21] 
His focus is on input and output and Littleton uses the processes 
of 'Anabolism' and 'Katabolism' as an analogy for there being something 
'deeply fundamental' in this conception of balancing [Littleton, 1953, 
p.21] (Mattesich's remarks on 'conservation' seem also relevant here, 
see Introduction). Von Bertalanffy would have been very happy with 
this description of the accounting system. Balancing here or, more 
strictly, the concept of homeostasis, however, is a different notion 
from the artifact of balancing in the bookkeeping. Nor is income any 
longer a mere residual of the balance sheet, 'a figure to bring the 
assets and liabilities plus capital into equilibrium' [Littleton, 1953, 
p.32]. 
While others have criticised the central role given to income in 
modern day reporting practice, on grounds of it being a 'will 0' the 
wisp', or subject to arbitrary allocations [Thomas, 1969], this debate 
is not entered into here. Whether or not income determination will 
ever be finally abandoned, at present it occupies a central place in 
reporting. What is of concern instead is that no other report, 
especially the balance sheet, or the ability to report cash flow should 
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be demeaned solely to report profit. For example, in setting up income 
as the central concern, it is clear that Littleton has abandoned wealth 
measurement in any sense. For him the balance sheet simply contains 
'deferred charges to future reserves' [Littleton, 1953, p.32]. 
2.3 the balance sheet and income series 
In this context, it is important to perceive that what Littleton is 
fundamentally 'balancing' is not assets and liabilities, but revenues 
with expenses (profit = revenue less expenses). Littleton with 
Zimmerman distinguish accounts of achievement, income and expense 
accounts, from accounts of status or position, asset and equity 
accounts [Littleton and Zimmerman, 1962, p.30]. 
According to Kaefer [1966], Gomberg in his Histoire names the 
Italian Riva as a precursor of this distinction. Riva in 1868 divided 
all accounts into two great series: 
the first containing the assets and equities, the other the 
, profits and losses. 
[Kaefer, 1966, p.31] 
However, as both sets of accounts existed within the ledger, these 
sets of accounts were also interdependent. This resulted in one set of 
accounts being always dominant over the other. As Kaefer sees it, the 
income series came to replace the prior importance of the balance sheet 
series: 
On both sides of the Atlantic the income statement more and 
more supplanted the balance sheet as the most important 
financial statement. 
[Kaefer, 1966, p.31] 
The effect of double entry on the unification of all accounts into 
a single inter-locking system is to force two potentially distinct sets 
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of records for reporting purposes to balance with each other. The end 
effect is for the income report and the balance sheet report to 
articulate automatically. 
2.4 funds flow and income series 
However, Littleton does not begin with data on revenues and expenses. 
The basic data in the double entry bookkeeping, because of its 
transactions base, is a classification around cash and credit movements 
capturing 'receipts' and 'disbursements'. Note that it is possible to 
recognise receipts or disbursements in two main ways, either cash or 
credit, and through double entry some further combination of both of 
these. 
Kaefer attributes the recognition of the distinction between 
accounts for money and future payments, recording the flows of receipts 
with disbursements, as against accounts for services (and service 
potentials), recording the revenue and expense streams, to Sganzini, 
and especially Walb. Walb's fundamental equation is interpreted by 
Kaefer as: 
receipts - disbursements = revenue - expense 
income I = income II 
[Kaefer, 1966, p.33] 
Walb's income I would normally be recognized as net funds flow. 
Again this is something which could be reported directly. However it 
is this information which Littleton subjects to an apportionment or 
reclassification process in which again the subordinate set of accounts 
must balance with the superordinate set of accounts and must 
necessarily do so 'for mathematical reasons' according to Gomberg 
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[Kaefer, 1966, p.33]. Again two potentially distinct sets of accounts 
are forced through being together in the double entry to articulate 
with each other and the effect is for the funds report and the income 
statement to articulate automatically. 
3.1 the embodiment of articulation in accounting theory 
Within the present double entry system, it has been recognized by 
various authors, see above, that there are three distinct series. What 
has not been sufficiently recognized is the separable nature of these 
reports since incorporation of the series into the one bookkeeping 
system forces them to be interdependent. 
Indeed, contrary to offering any critique or criticism on this 
interdependence of information bases for reporting, in the past most 
authors have either felt compelled to justify and extol the virtues of 
such interdependence, or simply accepted the fact of these 
interdependencies and defined accounting accordingly. Even today it is 
hard to find a basic text on accounting (bookkeeping) which does not 
enshrine articulation into the the fundamentals of accounting being the 
balance sheet equation and the identification of income with revenue 
less expenses. 
At the level of theory, it is interesting to note that economic 
theory may also have played a role in acceptence of wealth measures 
being defined through income valuation as a consequence of the virtual 
tautologies proposed by Fisher [1906] and, in reverse, with income 
being defined through comparative wealth measurement through from 
[Hicks, 1946] and, especially, Chambers [1966]. These different 
paradigms are considered more fully in Munro [forthcoming]. 
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3.2 problems of an articulated reporting system 
Nevertheless, there has been a number of calls, especially from the 
information economists impatient with the confines of double entry for 
the abandonment of double entry, but also from those concerned more 
with information processing (see the Introduction to this thesis). The 
difficulties of getting additional reports, or existing ones on a 
different measurement base have often been noted. For example: 
For some unexplained reasons they [accountants] often 
restrict themselves to the double-entry structure if they can 
possibly stretch this device to cover the problem at hand. 
Even though much information is processed outside the double-
entry system, other important information may be discarded 
because it does not fit conveniently into the framework. 
[Devine, 1966, p.21] 
This constriction has been traced in this thesis as a reluctance 
to abandon the perhaps inadequately understood system of control in 
double entry. Others have attributed it to an overconcern 
accountants for a 'tidiness': 
Reinforcing the attitude that all information must be 
recorded and be "tied in" is a preoccupation with the double-
entry system of bookkeeping ••• Double-entry bookkeeping may be 
neat and emotionally satisfying, but it is inefficient and 
has outlived its usefulness for many large organizations. 
[Brown, 1966, p.58] 
by 
However, rather than abandon double entry altogether, Devine has 
suggested, that since assets equal equities 'because, and only because' 
measuring rules have been adopted that made them equal, 
articulation could be abandoned: 
Certainly measurement rules are influenced by the dual 
structure, but if, for example, different purposes are served 
by the income report and the financial statement, there seems 
to be little or no necessity for the measurement rules to 
"articulate" them. 
[Devine, 1966, p.21] 
this 
More recently, MacDonald [1974] has repeated this call for the 
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possible abandonment of articulating reports, rather than sacrifice 
user needs which might gain from the benefits of separate reports. 
Nevertheless, the vagaries and 'mess' of such standards on 'inflation 
accounting' as the recent Statement of Standard Accounting Practice, 
SSAP 16, suggest that the hold of double entry and especially the 
desire for articulation of reports may be too strong, at least for the 
present. A different and more thorough examination of the articulation 
problem seems needed before any further calls for abandoning 
articulation are made. 
3.3 a systems reporting system 
The concern in this thesis has been first to understand in the double 
entry system the nature of the hold over the accountant and retain it 
where it appears most appropriate (i.e. in the tracking of funds and, 
futher, in the base for income determination>. The central problem in 
the bookkeeping has been to separate the different internal controls 
over the information bases in order that the use of different valuation 
rules did not conflict and, further, so that any allocation exercises 
to determine income are held in a separate system, out of harm's way 
from the data bases of the other systems. 
Secondly, the advantages of the historical integration of 
previously separate systems needs to be taken seriously. While before 
double entry, the problem of systems design was likely to have been a 
major one, this is not true today. However, some control may be gained 
from an articulation of reports. Although it seems speculative to 
suggest the nature of this control, some restriction on the scope of 
income determination seems built into the system, because of the 
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transactions base and despite the apparantly arbitrary nature of 
allocations. 
In any case, the nature of the integration of the proposed systems 
models is such that not only is the base constraint of the transactions 
data retained (and purified of any allocations whatsoever), but a 
further constraint on the apportionment process is added in the need to 
reconcile any 'balances' from the income determination with the balance 
sheet on a current value basis. 
It has been a major result of this thesis to demonstrate through 
this intergration that double entry not only can be retained (although 
its use in some parts may amount to little), but also that an 
articulation of reports with different measurement rules may be 
possible. What has to be abandoned is the automatic articulation of 
traditional balancing and, instead, a formal and explicit 
reconciliation process is entered into in its place. 
3.4 three sub-systems 
The three series of accounts identified in sections 2.3 and 2.4 above 
are reflected in the design of the systems models set up in Chapter 6. 
First there is the movement of funds. This can be further broken down 
into cash flows and credit movements since the classification system in 
double entry is sufficient to enable cash flows to be derived from the 
usual historic cost figures, or vice versa (see below). This series 
has been captured in Chapter 6 as System I and uses historic 
transaction prices. 
Secondly, there is the series of assets and liabilities. In this 
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thesis the arguments of the wealth measurement school have simply been 
accepted that the only meaningful balance sheet is in current cash 
equivalents or net realizable values. System II in Chapter 6 was set 
up to map NRV prices onto the basic quantities in the lists of 
categories to produce a balance sheet. It was presumed that the sets 
of homogeneous categories in System II would be used, but these could 
also be converted into the heterogeneous classification system of 
System I through a matrix structure. 
"-
Finally, while an income measure could simply be derived from the 
period revaluation in System II, in the present context of income 
reporting, the third series of revenues and expenses is captured in 
System III by an apportionment process on the basic funds data of 
System I. This apportionment process is guided by the comparison of RC 
data and this allows a separation of 'disposable profits' from 
'reserves' (although other rationales could substitute here). However, 
the apportionment process is restricted by the transaction data base on 
the one hand and the need to balance to the balance sheet (NRV) data on 
the other. 
In this way, while specific allocations are not dictated, the 
scope of any adjustments is strictly limited. This allows, therefore, 
for particular allocations to be entered into to suit the nature of the 
business. The 'calculation' of income has some inherent flexibility 
and yet there is 'control' in the system, through the constraints of 
the basic transaction data having to 'match' the constraint of external 
market signals. While there is choice within the allocation process, 
it cannot be said that the process is entirely arbitrary. Further, any 
adjustments made can be fully reported in a new statement, the 
reconciliation statement, where they are fully exposed to the scrutiny 
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of auditors and users. The mechanics for this reconciliation process 
are now considered in some detail. 
4.1 purpose of a statement of reconciliation 
It is arguable that in the determination of profit in System III, 
primary attention is paid to historic market signals which have been 
internalised through the double entry bookkeeping system - this is 
'flow' data of System I. In contrast, the measurement of wealth pays 
primary attention to current price signals in the market - this is 
'stock' data of System II. Inherent in the double entry bookkeeping 
of the flow data (the transactions) is a mechanism which throws up 
balances - many of these are simply unallocated cost residuals and 
there is no reason to expect that they would ever accord with 
measurements of 'stock' values. 
The purpose of the statement of reconciliation is to reconcile, 
formally and explicitly, any 'balances', which arise from the 
apportionment process in System IlIon the flow transactions data 
(drawn from System I), with the 'stock' value measurements drawn 
directly from current external market data (System II). In this way 
the apportionment process is constrained both in its base data and in 
its end result. The only effective adjustments which can be made 
concern the use of RC price data to discriminate allocations between 
'reserves' and 'profit' accounts. 
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4.2 an outline of the reconciliation process 
(a) Market signals are first conceived, in line with the discussion in 
Chapter 5, as composing three separate systems. The major 
distinction is conventionally between the group of all prices 
which are recorded during the period in which transactions take 
place and the group of prices which are available as current 
prices when reporting is desired, for all reportable items. The 
information in current prices is further split into two distinct 
measurement bases, NRV and RC: 
Market 
State A 
. I ~ 
S~gna s 
ALL transactions 
at historic prices 
State B Current prices for 
ALL reportable items 
SYSTEM I (HC) 
SYSTEM II (NRV) 
SYSTEM III (RC) 
Financial accounting is therefore interpreted here as involving 
three distinct phases. Firstly the transactions data is recorded 
in System I - based on state A signals, or unallocated HC. 
Secondly monetary values are placed on the period end physical 
position in System II - based on the NRV part of state B signals. 
Finally, the result from System I are transposed at the period end 
into System III and then the 'balances' are reconciled, through 
the apportionment process, to the balance contraints of System II. 
This reconciliation process in System III is now described. 
(b) Within System III, the results of System I data (transactions) are 
mapped at the period end against the constraint of a period end 






The difficulty in integrating these two systems of signals 
provides the rationale for introducing a formal reconciliation 
statement to report any apportionments in System III. 
(c) In order to trace the mechanics of this integration in double 
entry terms it is convenient to adopt a matrix format, as shown 
below. 












This format is used in the simplified example of reconciliation 
which follows: 
4.3 a simplified example 






1.1.85: Receive cash £150 - by way of 
loan. 
2.1.85: *Purchase machine - for 
cash £100. 
2.1.85: Purchase stock, 10 items 
at £10 each - for cash. 
20.1.85: Sell 6 items at £16 each - on 
credit. 
B 31.1.85: Net Realisable Value (NRV) of machine 
is £80. 
31.1.85: NRV of stock items is £12 
each. 
31.1.85: Replacement Cost (RC) of stock items 
is £14 each. 
31.1.85: RC of machine is £120. 
* Expected useful life 10 months. 
(b) Taking the signals from state A first, these would be mapped 
through System I with the following results shown in the double 
entry matrix. 
DEBITS 
Stock Debtors Bank Loan Profit Machine 
Stock 100 100 
Debtors 96 96 
Bank 150 150 
Loan -
Profit -
Machine 100 100 
CREDITS - - 200 150 96 - 446 
[Note: for the sake of convenience all revenue and expenses are 
collapsed into one cell (or account) in the matrix 
described for convenience as a 'profit' cell although 
strictly within System I no profit is measured] 
Conventionally a Trial Balance (state A signals only) would 









Profit (Sales) 96 
296 296 . 
Traditionally, a number of matching and related profit adjustments 
would be made to this data base. The end result would be a 
profit statement with the residual balances forming the balance 
sheet. However, in the systems models this takes place in System 
III, once the data base from System I is transposed there at the 
period end. With regard to the profit statement, a decision must 
be taken as to the method by which profit is to be calculated. 
This apportionment process is returned to at (c) below. 
In respect of any balance sheet, a decision must be taken as to 
the valuation basis to be adopted. Traditionally, where the 
balance sheet comprises little other than unexpired cost 
residuals, the valuation decision has effectively been made by 
default. However, using state II information, it is possible to 
map current prices directly onto a physical position to report 
monetary values. This application of physical records and state 
II price signals can be achieved without necessarily having to 
revert to the use of double entry. While any valuation basis 
could in theory be chosen, for the purpose of this example the NRV 
basis of System II for deriving a balance sheet is applied. It is 
a relatively simple matter then to derive the NRV balance sheet at 
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(4 x 12) 
Reserve (including profit) 24 (balancing figure) 
224 
In effect, for the determination of profit in System III, State I 
prices require to be mapped onto this state II financial position, 
and this requires consideration of non-transaction based entries. 
The NRV balance sheet now acts as a constraint and the scope for 
profit and reserve adjustments is in consequence restricted. 
Any adjustments which are made necessarily constitute the basis 
of the reconciliation statement. 
(c) The gaps between the transposed System I data and the constraint 
of System II data can be illustrated in matrix form as follows: 
Transactions Total 















50 150 96 296 










The transactions balances shown are the results from the state A 
price signals derived earlier. The financial position balances are 
the NRV balances from the balance sheet above. Profit and/or 
reserve adjustments must therefore operate within these 
constraints. Note that byy taking "a balance sheet orientated 
approach", the reserve figure of £24 in the balance sheet (and 
matrix) above could, if desired, be reported as 'income' for the 
period. However, this would ignore state A signals altogether, 
and the attempt here is to utilise the results of both prime sets 
of data, historic and current prices. 
Following the rules of System III, suppose that for the purposes 
of this illustration it is deemed desirable that reported profit 
be based on replacement cost - on the grounds that users require a 
measure of profit which allows for the replacement cost of assets 
consumed. In the simplified example, in order to derive a 
conventional replacement cost measure of profit, the profit and 
loss account must be charged with the replacement cost of goods 
sold and with replacement cost depreciation. The full set of 
profit and reserve adjustments required to accommodate replacement 



























50 150 96 
20'+-
50 150 20 96 
50 150 
1. Replacement Cost of Sales: 6 items @ £14 = £84. 
2. Stock -increase in RC: 6 items @ [£14 - £10]. 
3. Replacement Cost Depreciation: £120 x 10% = £12. 
4. Machine - NRV Revaluation at 31.1.85 (£100 - £80). 
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24 
5. Stock - NRV Revaluation at 31.1.85: 4 items @ [£12 - £10]. 
The matrix now contains both the data results of Systems I and II 
along with the necessary reconciling adjustments and the 'profit' 
and 'reserves' rows/columns can be clearly seen as 'buckets' into 
which all adjustments between the data from System I and System II 
should go. The balance sheet figures are determined by 
measurements which are drawn from a set of signals, NRV in state 
B, and kept separate from the set of signals mapped from state A. 
Adjustments 4 and 5 are in respect of changes in the NRV of the 
. 
firm's assets and are shown as affecting the reserve position 
only. However, adjustments 1, 2 and 3 are made in respect of RC 

















It can be seen in this particular example how NRV has acted as the 
balance sheet constraint, while RC has acted as the discriminator 
as to whether an adjustment affects profit or reserve. In 
addition to acting as a discriminator, RC could of course have 
been selected as the balance sheet constraint - in which case, 
clearly the adjustments would be more straightforward. Were this 
the case System II would simply have its measurement rules 
adjusted accordingly. 
4.4 financial statements 
It is now possible to suggest the following as the resulting set of 
financial statements. The balance sheet on an NRV basis is as 
previously stated, but with retained profit and reserve now 
distinguished. The profit and loss account on an RC basis is derived 
from the above matrix. The reconciliation statement shows all 
accounting adjustments. 
1. PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT (RC) 
Sales 



























3. STATEMENT OF RECONCILIATION 
(a) PROFIT ADJUSTMENTS 
Trading Movements 
Cash inflow from sales 
Cash outflow for purchases 
Net trading cash flows 
Increase in stock at NRV 
Reserve adjustment 
Increase in Debtors 
HC profit (before 
depreciation) 
Taken to Reserve 
Charge to fund re-
placement of machine 
(RC depreciation) 
Charge to fund re-
placement of stocks 
(COSA) 
RC profit 
Retained profits blf 
Retained profits at 


















(b) RESERVE ADJUSTMENTS 
Charged against Profit 
Retained to fund 
replacement of 
machine 
Retained to fund 
replacement of 
stocks 
Asset Price Movement 




NRV in period (20) 
Stock: increase in 
NRV in period 8 




sheet date 24 
In the statement of reconciliation, accounting adjustments are 
divided into 'profit' and 'reserve' adjustments. The 'profit 
adjustments' part of the statement highlights all the adjustments which 
have been necessary in order to convert trading cash flows into an RC 
measure of profit. To the net cash flow position from trading, are 
added all other movements in working capital. This results in a 
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measure of HC profit (before depreciation), to which all profit 
adjustments which have been made may be shown. In the above statement, 
the adjustments are in respect of the replacement cost of stock sold 
and replacement cost depreciation. For the purposes of exposition, 
HC profit (before depreciation) has been shown as an intermediate step 
in the reconciliation process. There is, however, considerable scope 
for refinement both in terms of how adjustments are shown and the 
explanatory descriptions attached to them. 
The 'reserve adjustments' part of the statement draws attention 
directly to asset price movements for the period, in NRV terms, after 
once more highlighting the adjustments referred to above, which have 
been made between reserve and profit. Again, the statement layout and 
the explanatory descriptions used are tentative and open to variation: 
some adjustments, such as the cost of sales adjustment have been 
included to allow points of comparisons with the recently lapsed U.K. 
inflation accounting standard, SSAP 16. As the statement of 
reconciliation stands, more instructive or more radical formats could 
be introduced. Indeed, the whole 'nature' of reserves could be 
questioned, since under historic cost amounts disclosed here are 
frequently meaningless. Even with the constraint of an NRV balance 
sheet, the availability of any funds here largely depends on an 
'orderly' sale. 
4.5 some comments 
The above illustration represents only a first attempt to demonstrate 
what a statement of reconciliation might involve. Three general 
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comments appear appropriate at this stage: 
(1) The context of the illustration - NRV balance sheet and RC profit 
-has been chosen to suit the systems models designed in the 
earlier chapters. While a particular comparison with Current 
Cost Accounting profit (SSAP16), CCA, is not a vital concern here, 
of all the non 'mixed value' systems RC gives the closest 
approximation to CCA, while at the root of many of the arguments 
for a more meaningful balance sheet appears to lie the intuitive 
appeal of NRV. 
(2) The immediate purpose in the foregoing sections is not to appraise 
the merits or demerits of such a combined RC/NRV/HC reporting 
system but rather to illustrate the general operation of a 
reconciliation statement. The argument does not particularily 
concern which adjustments should be made, nor how they should be 
made. Rather the argument is, given that certain adjustments are 
to be made, it is better that they be made explicit than have 
them hidden, as at present, within the process of automatic 
financial statement articulation. 
(3) The systems models do not attempt to acheive a better way of CCA. 
Rather they encapsulate the argument that RC is most appropriate 
for income calculations, NRV is most appropriate for measuring 
financial position, and HC (unallocated) is most suitable for 
recording the funds flow from transactions. Each of these, as 
already discussed refers to one of the three series of accounts in 
which some consistency in valuation base seems imperative 1 it is 
precisely in its inattention to consistency criteria that CCA 
fails. 
Some more specific comments on the illustration may now be offered: 
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(a) The system depicted highlights the interaction between "two prime 
sets of data" - transactions data and current market values. The 
manner in which profit is derived from the basic transactions data 
is shown in the 'profit adjustments' schedule in the statement of 
reconciliation. The impact of price movements on assets reveals 
itself in the 'reserve adjustments' schedule. 
(b) Profit is determined without the disadvantage of an attendant 
balance sheet full of 'meaningless' cost residuals. More 
generally, different valuation bases may be selected for each of 
the two main financial statements and this allows the independent 
yet concurrent development of profit statement and balance sheet. 
(c) The system reflects the need to distinguish those areas of 
reporting which are objective and verifiable (transactions and 
market prices) from those which are necessarily subjective and 
open to manipulation (profit measurement). The statement of 
reconciliation contains all the main judgemental areas. It 
highlights all accounting adjustments made and reveals these 
explicitly to financial statement users. 
(d) The system illustrated should be reasonably straightforward to 
audit. While this is essentially an empirical matter, some 
tentative comments here seem in order. The transactions base is 
objective and verifiable and free of major accounting judgements. 
The balance sheet is taken directly from market p~ices which again 
should be reasonably straightforward to verify, although margins 
of error here may vary from asset to asset. Under the system, the 
auditor's attention is largely drawn to the statement of 
reconciliation as the main source of subjective accounting 
judgements. In this respect it may be that the focus of the 
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audit is sharpened - an evaluation of the adjustments revealed in 
the reconciliation statement becoming perhaps the central element 
in the assessment of truth and fairness. 
5.1 some comments on the system 
The worked example demonstrates that the three bookkeeping systems 
developed in Chapter 6 can be fully integrated together into a unified 
reporting system. While Systems I and II are relatively independent in 
that System I records 'flows' and System II focuses on 'stocks', both 
data sets act as constraints, balances, for any income determination in 
System III. The rationale of this integration is, of course, money 
exchanges where systems of signs have been decomposed, for the 
convenience of the bookkeeping, into its elements for Systems I, II and 
III. 
The particular advantage of this decomposition is that any 
'meaning' attributable to the money signs is preserved, for example in 
the funds flow, the data is subject to classification and aggregation 
only. In respect of classification, through the double entry, cash and 
credit aggregates can be kept separate and reported separately. Any 
meaning which can be attached, say to cash aggregates, is, hence, clear 
and unequivocal. Equally, any meaning which can be attached to the 
current cash equivalents or aggregates of net realizable value are also 
clear and unequivocal. Although, clearly, the degree of estimation in 
arriving at some prices may be greater in some cases than others, the 
problem of precision is distinct from, and should not be compared with, 
aspects of meaning. Income can, under System III, be determined 
without tampering with the data bases of the other systems and 
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affecting their meaning or content. 
It has been a basic strategy of this thesis not to concern itself 
directly with meaning. It is arguable that much of the emphasis on 
finding a single 'best' reporting measure arises from 'essentialist' 
definitions of, say, income, which attempt to define the true essence 
or meaning of income. The starting point of this thesis has been 
simply to accept that certain measures exist and, instead, construct 
suitable systems round the fact of these measures to conform with some 
basic rules of information processing. Since this thesis has been 
limited to the basic area of accounting measurement, the utility of 
these reports for users, has not been questioned. The potential for 
these reports has, 
literature. 
in any case, been widely discussed in the 
5.2 implications for use 
Within the unified reporting system, these separable bookkeeping 
systems support the reporting system and act as subsystems to it. The 
vital question for the reporting system is now whether it is of 
additional use and relevance to users of financial reports. While the 
rationale of this thesis has largely been to test the systems 
methodology evolved in Part I in a practical area, i.e. accounting, 
ideally this further issue is an empirical question. However, the 
reporting system is not in use and, in any case, user habits and 
expectations have been formed from the existing system, although this 
has undergone some recent changes. Nevertheless, although it is still 
possible that with careful thought and planning, a number of empirical 
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tests could be conducted, a number of observations can be made which 
suggest that there is much to commend the adoption of the suggested 
reporting systems in place of the present. 
1) The information sets required are already in use. No new 
information sets are required which have not already been in part 
drawn into historic cost. Sterling, for example, lists a great 
variety of measurement rules to be found under 'historic cost' 
[Sterling, 1970, p.248]. The introduction of the U.K. inflation 
accounting standard, SSAP 16, further extended temporarily the use 
of NRV and, especially, RC data to HC. 
2. Nothing is lost. Any advantages in the use of double entry are 
retained and, on the face of it, no existing report is being given 
up. Income is still reported, but without the disadvantage of a 
balance sheet being a list of meaningless residuals. It could also 
be claimed in that the system constrains the process of income 
recognition that, in general, any meaning which may be attached to 
income is heightened. However, this claim is made in the 
context of the recognition that no particular meaning can be 
attached to an income figure. 
3. The use of the information sets is more fully organised. Each 
information set is contained within its own bookkeeping system. 
The scope for selective choice, or tampering with, information is 
consequently reduced. 
4. The interpretation of the reports is more straight-forward. In 
respect of those information sets which are objective and 
verifiable, transaction prices and market prices, their containment 
in Systems I and II respectively should help any further audits of 
these systems. And where the apportionment process is necessary in 
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System III, the statement of reconciliation reveals transfers which 
are necessarily subjective and open to manipulation. 
S. The emphasis is on internal control. The bookkeeping systems, if 
properly designed, can effect all the control needed. While some 
basic standards, or guidance, may be required here from a 
governing accounting body, the systems model dispenses with the 
need for regular and increasing interference and allows some 
flexibility in the apportionment process without letting a free for 
all develop over profit determination. 
6. Any change to one bookkeeping system can be introduced with the 
minimum of disruption to the other systems. In addition, the use of 
explicit rules from the knowledge system base should permit proper 
argument over any proposed change in the rules and, in particular, 
encourage the substitution or exchange of rules, rather than the 
mere addition of further ad hoc rules to accomodate existing 
practice, with possibly self-contradictory consequences or 




1.1 the lack of unity in knowledge 
From the perspective of the present fragmentation of knowledge and 
confines of specialisms, it is perhaps difficult not to see the 
Classical episteme as other than a 'golden age' - the 'Age of 
Enlightenment', the 'Age of Reason' - an age which had the confidence 
to give birth to the encyclopedia, an age when knowledge seemed a 
graspable whole and an age in which the fruits of science were 
answerable to everyman's reason. 
In contrast, science today has developed its own 'sign systems and 
symbolic constructs' which are no longer translatable into 'the 
language of everyday consciousness' [Gadamer, 1981, p.12]. Ostension 
(the act of pointing) is severed from the level of a common and shared 
faculty of reflection and the danger here is of immunity and dogma 
discussed by Kuhn. 
The role of reason in practical affairs has been seriously 
challenged by the rise of the sciences and the expansion of technology. 
It is within this context that Gadamer has investigated the change in 
the meaning of reason from the use of the everyday reflective faculty 
(philosophy) to the application of theory (science). Nor are these 
sign systems of the sciences susceptible of easy translation into each 
other and where physics takes over chemistry and chemistry takes over 
biology these sites tend to form new sign systems or discourses1 new 
advances tend to emphasise a lack of unity in knowledge, an absence of 
any common level of discourse. 
On the negative side of this lack of unity are the 






investigation, the existence of a boundary to the scientific entity 
through which the specialist only may pass. But on the positive side, 
Gadamer identifies that the split of science from natural perception in 
the twentieth century has at least broken the 'dogmatic seductiveness 
that arose from this easy accessibility' [Gadamer, 1981, p.13]. Kuhn 
argues that one of the first great triumphs of twentieth century 
physics was 'the recognition that information could be questioned' 
(Kuhn, 1964, p.23] and the twentieth century can in part be seen as 
concerned with the 'dedogmatization' of science and an end to what 
Hegel called the 'whitewashing over of contradictions' which gave 
science much of its apparent unity [Gadamer, 1981, p.13]. 
1.2 theories and their construction 
At the root of the fragmentation is the fact of constructing theories. 
From the Greek standpoint, it would be impossible to 'construct' 
theories. As Gadamer remarks 'that sounds as if we made them'. The 
distance proper to the meaning of theoria is that of 'proximity and 
affinity' (its primitive meaning was participation in the delegation 
sent to a festival for the sake of honouring the gods) [Gadamer, 1981, 
p.l3]. Today, theory involves deliberate distancing from actors 
constructed around the projection of an unbiased and 
observer. 
anonymous 
Although the methods of Galileo and Descartes broke with the 
involvement stressed by the Greeks in a theory, an appearance of unity 
in knowledge in the Classical age arose out of a commonality in the 
adoption of these methods for the construction of theories 1 what 
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counted for knowledge, how knowledge could be gained, and that 
knowledge was valuable in its own right - these were all shared values 
under the Classical episteme. 
However, the final court for reason is no longer that of natural 
perception. The shift from science to the development of many sciences 
has broken with an ostention which is direct and each science has 
relied more and more on intension, the lock of its own construction to 
justify or dismiss observations (see the discussion on Kuhn in the 
introduction). But these sciences, being no longer bound by a 
commonality of construction, have developed their own rules and have 
emerged in apparent contradiction with one another; the sciences no 
longer rely on a commonality of method which could be called 
'systematic'; but take their own path and evolve as 'systems'. 
1.3 unity in systems not signs 
As Gadamer remarks, the 'rational need for unity' has repeatedly been 
disappointed by the progress of research and puzzlingly astonished to 
find its balance in the midst of a 'manifold of particularities', each 
of which in itself possesses the 'particular unified structure peculiar 
to systems': 
I think it is symptomatic that 
displaced systematic constructs. 
systems theory has 
[Gadamer, 1981, p.17] 
Those who looked for unity within the information, the level of 
signs, were bound to be disappointed. Instead, if there is any unity 
to be found, it is within these systems themselves, and from which any 
information or sign can voice its peculiarity. The Classical reliance 
on commonality in signs (general signs) as well as constancy in signs 
350 
(reliable signs) was doomed as soon as the sciences explored far enough 
to break with the dogma of unity. 
However, whereas the signs can stand for different things 
(particular signs), the systems which support such signs may themselves 
have common aspects, since they must in some way handle man's 
unavoidable anthropocentrism, and man's intrinsic and special ability 
to reflect on perceptions. 'We stand at the end of our reflections' 
[Gadamer, 1981, p.18] and the system in part must reflect its belonging 
to an actor, not to nature. 
2.1 the model of science 
The foregoing remarks may go some way to explaining why this thesis, in 
seeking to research a possible path of development for accounting, has 
not adopted Sterling's plea for a science of accounting [Sterling, 
1979]. In the lack of unity in science there is no one model of 
science to copy from, but any number of possible models. While 
Sterling himself is too well versed in the history and philosophy of 
science to fall victim himself to perceiving a unity to science, and 
has stressed that his quarrel is with those who wish to single out a 
systematic method and 'attempt to make such restrictions' [Sterling, 
1972, p.4], the danger for others is rather that it is the dOgma of 
science, the Classical myth, that will be copied. 
Indeed, one philosopher of science, Peter Caws, has suggested that 
more lessons for Science might be found in areas such as accounting, 
where 'interpreting' is as important as 'looking' [Caws, 1972, p.73]. 
However, Sterling's use of scienqe is less towards the wholesale 
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adoption of a particular model, but more expressive of a wish for 
accounting when concerned with aspects of 'looking' to benefit (1) from 
some of the experience of scientists in chasing will 0' the wisps 
(income is compared to phlogiston), (2) in adopting conventions which 
do not affect the decidability of any outcome (compare 'going concern' 
convention with the matrix standard), and (3) in having some referent 
whose measurement could bear out any calculation. In respect of the 
latter, consider also the discussion on 'force' in Chapter 1 and 
Newton's dictum hYpotheses non fingo. 
Strangely, for the scientists themselves, the methodology of their 
particular science is usually invisible [Checkland, 1972, p.56]. 
Methods tend to become invisible when they are simply not 'on offer' as 
discussion topics and it should be said that much of Sterling's 
discussion lies more in the philosophy of science than in the actual 
method of a specific science. This philosophical level may be one 
reason why accountants have been slow to respond to Sterling's 
suggestions; in addition to a lack of philosophical training (although 
the philosophy is essentially about method), accountants may also not 
be very conscious of what their own method is. It is hard to replace a 
habit; it is even harder to replace an unconscious habit. 
On another level, the appeal of the sciences may have lessened. 
The discoveries of sciences today are much less obvious than those 
before the twentieth century; while previously the discoveries were 
relatable to normal perception, now that particular link has been 
severed. In consequence, any science has lost some of its 'power' over 
those outside its discipline, since non-specialists can no longer 'add 
back' the power to the sign (see Chapter 3) from their own experience. 
Further, Gadamer points to how science dangerously appears to encourage 
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an 'alien interest' inst~ad of the 'direct interest in the satisfaction 
of a need' [Gadamer, 1981, p.13]. And while this satisfaction of needs 
is partly the ground in which accounting has attracted criticism, a 
subject self-consciously there to serve needs is unlikely to be 
attracted by science's ever more apparent failure here. 
2.2 accounting as a science 
Perhaps the most dangerous of assumptions to make about accounting, 
because of its lack of conformity to standards exerted by say the 
exemplar of physics, is that it is in a 'pre-scientific stage' [AAA, 
1977]. This is dangerous because it assumes that accounting is without 
a respectable method and, worse, overlooks the fact that accounting 
exists within a system. A more fruitful analysis might follow Popper's 
demarcation of science from 'psuedo-sciences' in the latter's failure 
to adopt that principle he has enunciated as 'falsification' [Popper, 
1963]. Or, since Laudan argues falsification has been an 'unqualified 
failure' over demarcation, in the productiveness of a research 
tradition in problem solving [Laudan, 1981, p. 153]. 
Accounting, in that it has methods and these methods are 
constructed into a system, is a science (psuedo-science or not). And 
if the severance with natural perception is a test of a science (though 
hardly a sufficient test otherwise astrology might also pass here), the 
lack of 'intuitiveness' of much of accounting has already attracted 
comment [see, for example, Lee & Tweedie, 1977]. The difficulty of the 
symbolic constructions of accounting arise in part from the underlying 
system and, unless the system is understood in system terms, it cannot 
be expected that any new rules can be substituted for the old without 
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accountants perceiving (and fearing) that the system on which they rely 
may be threatened. 
Pleas to switch rules based on 'science' appear therefore more as 
appeals for a unity of science and, within this, towards models of 
science which are barely understood, if at all. From the earlier 
discussion, such appeals also look suspect. Science in the Classical 
episteme required a constancy in the relation of signs which is not to 
be found in social sciences. What is needed is not substitution of 
methods on the direct level, but more an examination of the system as a 
system in order to question its rules and bring its autopoiesis in line 
with needs as well as these can be discerned. 
2.3 a system of signs: review of Part I of the thesis 
In the reworking of systems theory in Part I a first move, encouraged 
by the work of Checkland and earlier systems researchers, was to shift 
from the entity level to that of abstraction. In considering the 
nature of such systems thinking a major emphasis was placed on closure 
(Chapter 2) and while such closure appeared fruitful to some extent in 
considerations at the energy level, it seemed most applicable, at the 
more fundamental level within which any inquiry is bound, in 
considerations of information. 
In particular, the information problem initially considered in 
Chapter 3 was the transport problem. While initially this looks (in 
the face of problems of measuring) of only minor interest, there is a 
sense in which all problems in information revolve round this transport 
perspective. However, first the particular analysis by Shannon was 
reconsidered. Despite Shannon's theory initially promising much either 
354 
in terms of a general theory or at least as a transport theory, the 
extreme closure of his system represented only a partial solution 




Shannon's analysis was found not to apply to situations in which 
there is no control over the matching of the decoder to the coder. 
However, viewed as a system, what was made clear was that it is only a 
sign which 'enters' an information system. Nothing of the system which 
gives rise to the sign, its semantics, syntactics or pragmatics, can be 
transferred into the information system unless each stands as a sign in 
its own right. The 'power' of the sign, its supporting system, is 
therefore not transportable. The power can only be recovered by being 
added back by a receiver of the sign through the receiver's knowledge 
of the inter-relationships of the semantics, syntactics or pragmatics 
which, to the receiver, must have been present. But such an inference 
remains only a 'bet' although to the specialist, the expert, it may be 
an informed guess. 
Crucial to this whole part of the thesis was a conclusion, 
implicit in the theory of signs, that there was considerable advantage 
for the development of knowledge systems to separate signs (data) from 
their systems interpretation systems (programs) (see also the comment 
by Caws over 'looking' and 'interpreting' in section 2.1). Knowledge 
systems attempt to transport not only signs but interpretative systems 
to allow possible users (actors) to recover the sign's power or check 
their own interpretative systems. 
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2.4 organizing information 
The notion of 'transporting' information turns out in this analysis to 
be not simply a spatial metaphor, a geographical term, but much wider 
in its range. Just as the microscope transports the light rays back to 
the observer's eye so a theory (a construct of methods) provides the 
information system in which an experiment may be conceived. And it is 
the experiment itself which is the system which articulates the sub-
information systems of the observation instruments and the statistical 
recording devices. But, again, it is only through the theory (or a 
rival theory) that the results can be interpreted. 
The danger of such 'knowledge in use' is that of partial 
transportation. Discoveries are ignored where they might benefit 
through difficulties of translation. Rediscoveries are continued 
because there was no access to the original. Discoveries are recycled 
because the field so narrows that no new entities can enter. 
Discussion about the lack of unity in science is discussion about the 
lack of a final information system to which all discoveries can be 
referred and from which the basis of all experiments could be drawn. 
It should be clear that it is a decided view in this thesis that 
such an information system to bring about the unity of science is the 
utopian dream of those who wish to avoid the administration of 
information. Information needs not simply to be administered, but 
organized. The question is how? A conclusion of this thesis is that, 
although the systems through which actors can observe signs have 
abstract common characteristics, there is no necessary commonality of 
signs. Indeed, there is a danger that the use of systems gives rise to 
an illusory commonality in signs (the episteme of resemblance which 
preceded the Classical episteme) and this danger would be particularly 
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grave was there any unity of science (or theory closure) to be imposed 
upon the sciences. For example, the AAA Committee on Concepts and 
standards for External Financial Reports gave emphasis to the futility 
of attempting to dictate 'ultimate theoretical truths': 
Our message is clear: theory closure cannot be dictated 
[AAA, 1977, p.49] 
However, certain regularities between phenomena are evident in 
nature and, in making use of such constancies in their methods, 
disciplines necessarily evolve in diverse ways to recover ever more 
precise information. In so doing, some commonalities of the signs are 
abandoned and the methods themselves may become more obscure. The 
difficulty is of transporting information which may be useful to others 
out of a science. A particular danger is that of simplifying the 
constraints under which the information can be presented [Mattesach, 
1980]. Being able to provide checks on these constraints is an 
existing use of expert systems. 
3.1 different approaches to systems 
The conclusion in this thesis is that essentially signs are uncovered 
through the application of systems of various kinds, natural and 
artificial, and that these systems need to be evoked again by a 
receiver once they have been transported through any information 
system. An emphasis such as that given by Mattesich [1980] to systems 
at theory on input-output measurement (see Introduction) is therefore, 
best, a limited (although it may in some circumstances be very 























































While Figure 2 gives a very different picture to Figure 1, it 
should not be thought that these are necessarily competing pictures. 
In terms of the discussion in Chapter 3, the input-output model is 
essentially a measurement system useful at the phenomenal level of 
'entities', while Figure 2 depicts essentially a communication system. 
Closure is a key element in both systems, but the crucial difference 
arises in the nature of the closure not being known in the case of the 
'black box', an entity is identified and the apparent boundary 




However, in the case of an information system this is designed and 
is strictly a 'white box': it is the worlds in which signs appear 
which are 'black'. Any cybernetic operations, such as feedback loops, 
can be fully understood and only with some danger are they to be 
treated as existing within a black box. Since input-output analysis is 
extrinsically, though not necessarily, a black box approach in use its 
application to information systems is not likely to be helpful in 
understanding these. 
In the last chapter of his wide ranging review of systems thinking 
Mattesach [1978] pays attention to the emerging and important area of 
design. Unfortunately, he adopts Herbert Simon's view that simulation 
is a 'black box' activity. While this is in part true, it is more 
correct, in the perspective of this thesis, to say that Simon's work in 
artificial intelligence has been concerned with means-ends analysis. 
That is, Simon has investigated the conversion (or transformation) 
stage of the 'input-conversion-output cycle' [Matte~ich, 1978, p.275]. 
His interest has been in making definite and explicit changes to the 
design of the conversion 'programs' and observing the end result or 
'output' [for example, Newell et aI, 1958]. As the terms have been 
used in this thesis, therefore, Simon's approach might be captured by 
recognizing the reflexiveness in 'white box' changes to design being 
compared to 'black box' measurements in effects. 
3.2 tests of substitution 
Some of the above remarks may be exemplified by considering again the 
question of substitution (see the earlier discussion in Chapter 3). 
Consider for a moment logic as an information system. Although its 
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transport function is concerned with the validity of deduction 
transporting 'truth' from premises to conclusions - rather than 
wholesale transport of premises, this concern f~r validity can be 
detected in many statistical summarizing systems. Given some 
pragmatics here of truth preserving, the question of substitution into 
true sentences arises. 
Since the exchange of semantic meanings alone can give rise to 
changing true sentences into false ones (see Chapter 3), Quine's 
approach to this matter has been to treat the sentence as a black box 
and the test in these circumstances for a substitution is that of 
salva veritate, where the truth is preserved by the substitution 
[Quine, 1980, pp.139-159]. But this is an ex post test and one that an 
actor may not always be in a position to test. Indeed, were the actor 
in a position to test, then there is no need for substitution: the 
truth of the sentence or proposition is known direct and the truth of 
any previous sentence is irrelevant. In effect, for Quine to adopt the 
overriding criteria of salva veri tate as an operational device is to 
declare a certain bankruptcy about the use of logic and, indeed, 
difficulties with substitutions led Quine to recommend that 
substitution be avoided. 
Recently Fine has questioned the substitution of terms on semantic 
grounds 
account 
alone and shown that syntactic rules need to 
of [Fine, 1985] before substitutions can be 
be also taken 
made. Quine's 
abandonment of substitution arose because attention to the 
substitutions was too narrow: 'validity' also needed to be accounted 
for not just 'truth'. Fine's attempt may be interpreted as that of 
attempting to make the sentence more of a 'white box'. 
However, from the theory of signs, it must also follow that, in 
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certain circumstances, substitutions valid syntactically and truthful 
semantically will also fail and linguistics is rich in examples which 
will also bear this out. One example may serve here to exemplify this: 
'they are eating apples'. Here the syntax is ambiguous and two 
separate readings are possible. However, knowledge of the pragmatics 
will make the choice of syntax clear. 
Failure of substitution, according to the theory of signs, may be 
therefore accounted for on three grounds: semantic failure or opacity 
of reference so that truth may be carried7 syntactic failure or 
ambiguity of rules so that validity is not held; and pragmatic failure 
or lack of explicit relevance so that intentionality is misplaced. 
Substitution is so integral to either measurement or communication that 
it cannot be avoided altogether7 nor can ex post tests such as that of 
salva veri tate be relied upon since the interest is in the use of 
substitution. However, knowledge systems by accounting for all three 
aspects may assist here. 
3.3 articulating the different approaches 
Essentially, therefore, the black box technique is useful for the 
entity level, the measurement of the behaviour of 'wholes'7 the white 
box technique is useful for attempts to understand constructed systems. 
However, much of the discussion in this thesis has treated these levels 
as exchangeable 7 the entity level can not only be opened up for 
analysis, it can be constructed in an abstract way. In this context, 
as mentioned above, input-output analysis and abstract construction of 
systems as infol'mation systems are not mutually exclusive but rather an 
361 
entity can be considered in turn as a black box and as a white box. 
To use both together requires a form of articulation. The 
information system has not only to be constructed in a way that 
conforms with the system of signs, but its predictions need to 
articulate with the measurements gained from treating the entity as a 
black box. This is the importance for accounting of Sterling's [1979] 
contribution from the methodology of science: a reminder that internal 
articulation is useless without checks to the external phenomena. But 
it should also be clear that what to check cannot be clear until the 
information system is understood (in terms of a white box). 
4.1 accounting as a black box 
While sometimes it is suggested that the financial reporting system may 
be treated in terms of input-output, it is not at all clear what could 
be meant here. Apart from the boundary difficulties - should the 
bookkeeping or the user be treated as the input-output entity? (see 
Chapter 5) - from what perspective are the different signs to be 
compared? In Figure 1, the need is made clear for an observation 
system which will interpret the results. 
In fact Figure 1 goes further and shows that properly two 
observation systems are required since the syntactics and semantics of 
output signs will be different from input signs. Input signs are not 
strictly comparable to output signs and while for many systems such 
differences can be overlooked, they certainly cannot in the case of 
bookkeeping in accounting where 'profit' implies not only a 
set of references to the input signs but also use different 
different 
sets of 
rules and, with this, embody different intentions as was uncovered in 
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Chapters 6 and 7. 
If the bookkeeping is treated as a black box (although such a 
procedure is fraught with difficulty as given emphasis above), then its 
output signs require their referents to be specified and this is 
Sterling's major point against contemporary procedures, the lack of any 
measurement phenomena against which income calculations can be checked 
[Sterling, 1979]. 
4.2 an integrated critigue 
While Sterling's criticisms here seems unquestionable, there is a sense 
in which, as criticisms, they simply do not go far enough. It is not 
only in the lack of referents that failure of substitution may arise, 
but also in the ambiguity of rules and the lack of relevance. These 
matters have on other occasions been raised by Sterling (among others). 
It is hoped that the approach in this thesis shows these criticisms to 
be an integrated set of criticisms against contemporary financial 
reporting. 
Nevertheless, the task of setting the bookkeeping system up as a 
black box seems misconceived. This is to treat the system as 
autopoietic (self-constructing) and ignore the fact that it has to be 
brought in line with 'needs' at some level. As it is hoped the 
discussion in Part I shows, the bookkeeping system may be strictly 
) d to the extent J.·t cannot be so specified (made a white box an, 
specified, so much the worse for those parts of it which cannot be 
integrated explicitly. 
In the system developed in Chapter 6, however, even aspects such 
363 
as the 'going concern', identified by Wells [1976] as an anomaly, were 
given a place in the systems appcoach. Clearly, where income 
determination was not an acceptable puroose, h t . _ suc aspec s ~ght be 
dropped out altogether. 
4.3 resistance to change 
With the recent demise of the British accounting standard on inflation 
(Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 16) and a likely 
continuation of a historic cost system (with minor 'modifications' for 
indexing) in the UK at the date of writing (1985), financial reporting 
would seem to have proved resistant to either questions about its 
referents (Sterling's criticisms) or suggestions to change its rules 
(see the discussion by Wells covered in the Introduction) and is 
largely immune to criticisms about its relevance (although it was taken 
up on a wide front including Chambers [1966] the question of user needs 
was raised largely by the information economists discussion in the 
Introduction and in Chapter 5). 
A question hangs over why the bookkeeping system appears so 
intransigent to change. Two major points need to be made here. First, 
that the bookkeeping system has proved enormously flexible and has 
accommodated extremely wide changes in business needs. Most 
importantly the double entry system has accommodated a shift from 
capital disclosure to income reporting [Kaeffer, 1966]. The ability 
for any system to survive, in a developed form, five hundred years is 
taken as self-evident testimony of its special nature. 
It is, therefore, only by taking the system itself seriously, 
holding up the system as a system to scrutiny, that any change can be 
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possibly considered. The second major point regarding previous 
criticisms of accounting is that they have simply not gone far enough 
in explicitly examining the historical success of double entry and 
clarifying what the special nature of it is. Unless accountants can be 
assured that the crucial ingredient for their past success is included 
in the new system, any alternative must fail to gain true approval of 
those needed to implement its application and foster its use. 
In passing, some mention should be made of recent 'critiques' of 
accounting which purport sociological reasons for accountants' 
resistance to change along Marxist lines [for example, Tinker, 1985]. 
A focal point of such recent criticisms lies in Habermas's view of the 
'systematic' distortion of information systems and the holding on to 
power through a 'communicative competence' [Habermas, 1979]. Such a 
critique may be particularly important is raising to the surface types 
of 'rational' behaviour which might, in Gadamer's phrase, upset Hegel's 
optimism 'that in reality the irrational cannot hold out in the long 
run' [Gadamer, 1981, p.36]. However, these considerations have not 
been brought directly to bear in this thesis, although they could, for 
example, be incorporated in the discussion for the theory of signs, 
especially in the systems framework developed in Chapter 4. 
5.1 the systems model: review of Part II of the thesis 
Following a comparison in Chapter 5 of Ijiri's 'causation' hypothesis 
with Mattesich's suggestion of a 'conservation' basis to double entry, 
the formal basis for a knowledge system, developed in Chapter 3 from 
the reworking of systems theory attempted in Part I, was employed in 
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Chapter 6 exactly to hold up the existing bookkeeping system for 
scrutiny and to offer an alternative that would follow the needs of 
information systems in the partitioning and preservation of signs and 
yet, in line with Kuhn's analysis discussed in the Introduction, meet 
the need of carrying the scope of the old paradigm through into the 
new. 
Since under the systems model developed in Chapter 6, signs (data) 
are kept separate from interpretations (programs), this allows the 
introduction of several data streams (historic entry and exit prices, 
current sale values, current replacement prices and data on physical 
quantities). This, together with the ability to report flow data and 
stock data, separately and independently, alongside an income measure, 
emphasises that the scope, or completeness, of the suggested systems 
model is wider. 
However, critical to the development of the systems model was not 
primarily simply greater scope, but also more attention to an internal 
coherence, or consistency, in the processing systems. This emphasis on 
coherence and the explict development of 'permission' rules to guide 
the nature and timing of entries also retrieves some of the utility of 
the double entry system prior to the development of income reporting 
(discussed in Chapter 7). 
As a consequence of abandoning the traditional 'balance sheet 
equation' in its naive form, the systems model allows both flow data 
and stock data to be reported without their being distorted as a 
consequence of any further income determination. In particular, it 
might be claimed that it was articulation with phenomena (Sterling's 
attack) which 
entry system. 
was necessarily abandoned in the traditional double 
The systems models restore the measurement checks on 
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phenomena, but critically keeps separate 'looking" (measurement) from 
'interpretation'. 
Finally, Chapter 8 demonstrates that while there are separable 
systems in operation in the systems' model, their integrality is not 
threatened. No fragmentation (as was feared by Mattesach, see 
Introduction) occurs in the switch from the traditional model and, 
further, no further sign systems need to be included (for financial 
reporting), since all aspects of money signs are accounted for. 
S.2 the accounting system and progress 
The systems model is therefore put forward as an alternative system, 
which meets both theoretical needs and criticisms of the traditional 
model, but is also one that also preserves the perceived success of the 
traditional model. The latter is important due to the necessarily 
insufficient perspective which any theory encompasses and is 
acknowledgement to the fact that it is 'practice' which innovates and 
'theory' which has largely a justificatory role. 
The systems model, while presented in this thesis on theoretical 
grounds, seeks to introduce to accounting some of the practice, such as 
consistency rules or requisite variety which has surrounded the 
development of information systems in more recent years. The difficulty 
of traditional bookkeeping is that it impedes any experiment or 
practical innovation; indeed traditional bookkeeping might be regarded 
not so much a practice as a theory and, as a theory, one subject to 
what Lakatos has termed a 'degenerative problemshift' [Lakatos, 1970, 
p.11S]. 
Instead of being able to run ahead and suggest problems for 
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research, traditional bookkeeping continually lags behind current 
practice. While some new types of entries have been admitted in an ad 
hoc manner, mostly pressing issues and problems are ignored. And, 
although it is strictly accounting problems, such as inflation 
accounting ,which gain most of the headlines, perhaps more compelling 
and difficult problems lie in the articulation of accounting 
information with other management reports. In this respect, the recent 
findings by Jones [1985] have shown the drive to obtain consistency 
between management accounting systems in the case of mergers 
considerably overshadows any of the so-called 'contingency' variables 
[Otley, 1980] in the aquired companies having to conform to centrally 
imposed standards. In the case of financial reporting, due to the 
'flexibility' problem, potential manipulation of results, the 
accounting authorities have embarked on standardization programmes 
which further limit the potential in the existing system to innovate 
and respond to current issues. 
In this sense, since the bookkeeping hardly provides even the 
traditional control data (see Chapter 7), double entry bookkeeping as 
currently practiced has become a barrier to progress and it is 
principally this fact that has led Chambers to castigate accounting as 
a 'myth', not a science. Myths, he explains, are fictions 'having no 
premises, no argument and no conclusion'. It is accepted in toto 
[Chambers, 1980, p.1681. 
However, in his analysis of mythologies, Barthes has suggested 
that myths are in the displacement of systems to a different level 
[Barthes, 1972]. The analysis of the nature of systems in Chapter 3, 
indicates that the 'structure' of a system may undergo change in the 
new context and this appears to have happened in accounting in the 
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unifying force of 'balancing' of double entry reappearing as the 
'balance sheet equation' for accounting reports (see Chapter 8). 
While any rationale for accounting in general, other than the 
balance sheet equation, has been unclear, this study has interpreted 
the in toto nature of accounting as evidence less of a myth an more of 
a possible, if poorly understood, underlying system. Some of the 
traditionally accepted rationales, particularly the 'balance sheet 
equation', were rejected and, in an effort to clarify the systems 
nature of double entry, this thesis has shown double entry to have 
possible premises, such as the use of money signs, possible arguments 
in use of permission rules and possible conclusions in reporting 
separate information bases. Outside this, the study has indicated a 
need to carefully identify arguments and premises alongside 
identifiable reports. That is, the need for explict systems. 
As things stand, double entry provides a potential menace in its 
ability to be used and manipulated to produce all manner of results. 
The development of the systems model will not solve all the problems 
which developing accounting information entails. However, in its 
emphasis on explicit rules and careful design to secure against 
unnecessary information loss, it not only serves as a response to 
current problems, but also opens itself to further development as 
issues or problems change. 
5.3 limitations of the thesis 
A final word must stress the limitations of the systems' model. These 
are predictable through considering the tentative systems' framework 
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developed in Chapter 4. The system of signs was only one part of that 
framework which suggests that a full theory of accounting would have to 
include the organizational and individual actor dimensions as well 




Since the focus in Part II was on the bookkeeping, these other 
dimensions were not discussed directly. As an initial step developing 
the information system used by accountants in line with the systems of 
signs seemed a proper move. However, developments here, according to 
the framework, must exchange with developments elsewhere1 the thesis 
stops far short of attempting this. Nevertheless, as a first step it 
must be said that the setting out of the systems model is an 
improvement because it is only when the system is made explicit that 
fruitful discussion can be made as to what changes are needed for the 
system to integrate with the other dimensions. 
Up till now much behavioural research has suffered from attempting 
to find causal or stochastic correlations in line with the Classical 
episteme, mainly disregarding the existence of a system lying behind 
the use of any particular sign. More work is needed, not simply on the 
motivational and organizationally dysfunctional effects of making 
managers accountable for 'profit', but also, in addition, research on 
how the financial performance system can integrate, or be 'reconciled' 
with, the reward systems of pay, promotion, power and recognition of 
services. 
It was clear from much of the discussion in the thesis that unity 
of information systems was neither to be expected nor hoped for; 
instead a framework in which categories could be tentatively exchanged 
seems to offer the best hope of paying attention to the disciplinary 
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or functional nature of knowledge, without burying the fruits of that 
knowledge hopelessly in the method of its derival. By clarifying and 
organizing the accounting systems on a formal knowledge system basis 
that also promises assistance in developing thinking in other areas, a 
first step towards developing accounting in its organizational context 
may be claimed. 
371 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Accounting Standards Committee, 'Current Cost Accounting', Statement of 
Standard Accounting Practice 16, 1980. 
Committee on Concepts and Standards for External Financial Reports, 
Statement on Accounting Theory and Theory Acceptance, American 
Accounting Association, 1977. 
'Inflation Accounting', Report of the Inflation Accounting Committee, 
Cmnd 6225, HMSO, 1975. 
Ackoff, R.L., 'General System Theory and Systems Research: Contrasting 
Conceptions of Systems Science', in Mesarovic, M.D., op cit, 
1964, pp.51-60. 
Ackoff, R.L., 'Towards a System of Systems Concepts', Management 
Science, Vol.17, No.11, 1971 (reprinted in Beishon, J. & 
Peters, J. (eds.), Systems Behaviour, 2nd Ed., Open University 
Press, 1976, pp.105-112). 
Ackoff, R.L., Redesigning the Future, Wiley, 1974. 
Ackoff, R.L. & Emery, F.E., On Purposeful Systems, Tavistock, 1972. 
Angyal, A., Foundations for a Science of Personality, Harvard 
University Press, 1941, (pp.243-261 reprinted in Emery, F.E. 
(ed.) as 'A Logic of Systems' in Systems Thinking, 1969, pp.17-
29). 
Anthony, R.N., Planning and Control Systems, Harvard University Press, 
1965. 
Anthony, R.N., Dearden, J. & Vancil, R.F., Management Control Systems, 
Irwin, 1976. 
Ashby, W.R., Introduction to Cybernetics, Chapman & Hall, 1956. 
Ball, R.J. & Brown, P., 'An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income 
Numbers', Journal of Accounting Research, Autumn 1968, pp.159-
177. 
Barnes, B., T.S. Kuhn and Social Science, Contemporary Social Theory, 
London, 1982. 
Barthes, R., Elements of Semiology (translated by Lavers, A. & Smith, 
C.), Hill & Wang, 1967. 
Barthes, R., Mythologies, Paladin, 1973. 
Barton, A.D., 'Accounting for the Effects of Inflation', in Victoria 
University of Wellington 22nd Advanced Accounting Seminar, What 
is Profit?, Sept. 1974, pp.1-20. 
372 
Beaver, W.H., Financial Reporting: An Accounting Evaluation, Prentice-
Hall, 1981. 
Beaver, W.H. & Demski, J.S., 'The Nature of Income Measurement', The 
Accounting Review, Jan. 1979, pp.38-46. 
Berkeley, G., A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, 
Dublin, 1710 (ed. Warnock, G., Fontana, 1962). 
Bertalanffy, L. von, General System Theory, Penguin, 1971. 
Boulding, K.E., 'General Systems Theory - The Skeleton of Science', 
Management Science, April 1956, pp.197-208. 
Boulding, K.E., 'Economics and Accounting: the Uncongenial Twins', in 
Baxter, W.T. & Davidson, S. (eds.), Studies in Accounting 
Theory, Sweet & Maxwell, 1962, pp.44-55. 
Bradley, F.H., Appearance and Reality, 2nd Ed., Oxford University 
Press, 1897. 
Bromwich, M., 'The Use of Present Value Valuation Models in Published 
Accounting Reports', The Accounting Review, July 1977, pp.587-
596. 
Brown, R.G., 'Financial Reporting Through Inductive Accounting', in 
Jaedicke, R.K., Ijiri, Y. & Nielsen, O. (eds.), Research in 
Accounting Measurement, American Accounting Association, 1966, 
pp.49-58. 
Buck, R.C., 'On the Logic of General Behaviour Systems Theory', in 
Feigel, H. & Scriven, M. (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science, Vol.I, University of Minnesota Press, 
1956, pp.223-238. 
Burrell, G. & Morgan, G., Sociological Paradigms and Organizational 
Analysis, Heinemann, 1979. 
Caws, P., 'Accounting Research - Science or Methodology?', in Sterling, 
R.R. (ed.), Research Methodology in Accounting, Scholars Book 
Co., 1972, pp.71-73. 
Chambers, R.J., 'The Role of Information Systems in Decision Making', 
Management Technology, June 1964, pp.15-25. 
Chambers, R.J., Accounting, Evaluation and Economic Behaviour, 
Prentice-Hall, 1966 (reprinted Scholars Book Co., 1974). 
Chambers, R.J., 'Accounting and Analytical Methods: A Review Article', 
Journal of Accounting Research, Vol.4, 1966b, pp.101-118. 
Chambers, R.J., 'Accounting for Inflation', EXposure Draft, University 
of Sydney, Sept. 1975. 
373 
Chambers, R.J., 'The Myths and the Science of Accounting', Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, Vol.5, No.1, 1980, pp.167-180. 
Checkland, P.B., 'Towards a Systems-based Methodology for Real-World 
Problem-Solving', Journal of Systems Engineering, Vol.3, No.2, 
1972 (reprinted in Beishon, J. & Peters, G. (eds.), Systems 
Behaviour, Open University Press, 2nd Ed., 1976, pp.51-77). 
Checkland, P.B., Systems Thinking, Systems Practice, Wiley, 1981. 
Checkland, P.B., 'Rethinking a Systems Approach', in Tomlinson, R. & 
Kiss, I. (eds.), Rethinking the Process of Operational Research 
and Systems Analysis, Pergamon, 1984, pp.43-60. 
Chenhall, R.H., Harrison, G.L. & Watson, D.J.H. (eds.), The Organiza-
tional Context of Management Accounting, Pitman, 1981. 
Churchman, C.W., The Systems Approach, Delta, 1968. 
Churchman, C.W., The Design of Inquiring Systems, Basic Books, 1971. 
Clower, R.W., 'A Reconsideration of the Microfoundations of Monetary 
Theory', Western Economic Journal, Vol.6, (pp.1-9 reprinted in 
Clower, R.W. (ed.), Monetary Theory: Selected Readings, 
Penguin, 1969, pp.202-211). 
Cooper, D., 'Tidiness, Muddle and Things: Commonalities and 
Divergences in Two Approaches to Management Accounting 
Research', Accounting, Organizations and Society, 1983, pp.269-
286. 
Crick, F. Of Molecules and Men, University of Washington Press, 1966. 
Cronhelm, F.W., Double Entry By Single: A New Method of Book-Keeping, 
1818 (reprinted by the Arno Press, 1978). 
D'Arcy, B.G. & Jayaratna, N., 'Systems Closure and Enquiry', Systems 
Research, Vol.2, No.1, 1985, pp.85-88. 
Dafforne, R., The Merchants Mirrour, 3rd Ed., 1660. Partial facsimile 
in Geijsbeek, J.B., Ancient Double-Entry Bookkeeping, 1914 
(reprinted by Scholars Book Co., 1974), pp.140-181. 
Debreu, G., Theory of Value, Wiley, 1959. 
Demski, J.S., 'The General Impossibility of Normative Accounting 
Standards', The Accounting Review, Oct. 1973, pp.718-723. 
Demski, J.S. & Feltham, G.A., 'Forecast Evaluation', The Accounting 
Review, July 1972, pp.533-548. 
Demski, J.S., Feltham, G.A., Horngren, C.T. & Jaedicke, R.K., A 
Conceptual Approach to Cost Determination, Iowa State 
University Press, 1975. 
374 
Derrida, J., Positions, translated and annotated by Alan Bass, The 
Athlone Press, 1981. 
Devine, C.T., 'Some Conceptual Problems in Accounting Measurement', in 
Jaedicke, R.K., Ijiri, Y, & Nielsen, O. (eds.), Research in 
Accounting Measurement, American Accounting Association, 1966, 
pp.13-27. 
Dretske, F., Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Blackwell, 1981. 
Duhem, P., The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (translated by 
P.P. Wiener), Atheneum, 1962. 
Duncker, K., 'On Problem-Solving', Psychological Monograph, Vol.58, 
1945. 
Eco, U., A Theory of Semiotics, MacMillan, 1977. 
Eco, U., Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language, MacMillan, 1984. 
Eden, C., Jones, S. & Sims, D., Messing About in Problems, Pergamon, 
1983. 
Edey, H.C., 'The Logic of Financial Accounting', Deloitte Haskins & 
Sells Lecture, University College Cardiff Press, 1980. 
Edwards, E.O. & Bell, P.W., The Theory and Measurement of Business 
Income, University of California Press, 1961. 
Eigen, M. & Winkler, R., Laws of the Game: How the Principles of 
Nature Govern Chance, Pelican, 1975. 
Emery, F.E., 'Introduction' to Emery, F.E (ed.), Systems Thinking, 
Penguin, 1969, pp.7-13. 
Emery, F.E. & Trist, E.L., 'Socio-technical Systems', in Churchman, 
C.W. & Verhulst, M. (eds.), Management Science, Models and 
Techniques, Vol.2, Pergamon, 1960, pp.83-97. 
Feibleman, J. & Friend, J.W., 'The Structure and Function of 
Organization'. Philosophical Review, Vol.54, 1945, pp.19-44. 
Fine, K., 'A Defense of Arbitrary Objects', Aristotelian Society, Supp. 
Vol.LVII, 1983, pp.55-77. 
Fine, K., The Problem of De Re Modality, private copy, Edinburgh, 1985. 
Fisher, I., The Nature of Capital and Income, 1906 (reprinted Kelley, 
1965). 
Flew, A., Thinking About Thinking, Fontana, 1975. 
I Th 0 d f Th 'ngs· An Archaeology of the Human Foucau t, M., e r er 0 1. --
Sciences, Tavistock, 1970. 
375 
Friedman, L.A., 'An Exit~Price Income Statement', The Accounting 
Review, Jan. 1978, pp.18-30. 
Gadamer, H.-G., Reason in the Age of Science (translated by Frederick 
Lawrence), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1981. 
Galbraith, R.I., Designing Complex Organizations, Addison-Wesley, 1973. 
Geijsbeek, J.B., Ancient Double-Entry Bookkeeping, 1914 (reprinted 
1974 by Scholars Book Co.). 
Georgescu-Roegen, N., The Entropy Law and the Economic Process, 
Harvard University Press, 1971. 
Gerard, R.W., 'Entitation, Animorgs, and Other Systems', in Mesarovic, 
1964, op cit, pp.119-l24. 
Gonedes, N.J. & Dopuch, N., 'Capital Market Equilibrium, Information 
Production, and Selecting Accounting Techniques: Theoretical 
Framework and Review of Empirical Work' and 'A Reply', Studies 
on Financial Accounting Objectives: 1974, Journal of 
Accounting Research, Supplement to Vol.12, 1974, pp.48-129 & 
pp.158-169. 
Haack, S., Philosophy of Logics, Cambridge University Press, 1978. 
Habermas, J., Communication and the Evolution of Society (translated by 
T. McCarthy), Heinemann, 1979. 
Hacking, I. (ed.), Scientific Revolutions, Oxford University Press, 
1981. 
Hakansson, N., 'Where We Are in Accounting: A Review of "Statement on 
Accounting Theory and Theory of Acceptance"', The Accounting 
Review, July 1978, pp.717-725. 
Hall, A.D., A Methodology for Systems Engineering, Van Nostrand, 1962. 
Hall, R.I., 'The Natural Logic of Management Policy Making: Its 
Implications for the Survival of an Organization', Management 
Science, 1984, pp.905-927. 
Hayes, D.C., 'Accounting for Accounting: A Story about Managerial 
Accounting', Accounting, Organizations and Society, 1983, 
pp.241-249. 
Heck, J.L. & Huang, J.C., 'Significant Accounting Articles', 
preliminary note of a survey, Villanova University, 1985. 
Heidegger, M., Being and Time (translated by Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, 
E.), Oxford, 1973. 
Hicks, J.R., Value and Capital, 2nd Ed., Oxford University Press, 1946. 
Hicks, J.R., Critical Essays in Monetary Theory, Oxford University 
Press, 1967. 
376 
Higgins, J.C., Commentary on 'The Management of Purposive Environmental 
Enquiry', in Bromwich, M. & Hopwood, A.G. (eds.), Essays in 
British Accounting Research, pp.224-228, Pitman, 1981. 
Hitch, C.J., 'An Appreciation of Systems Analysis', The RAND 
Corporation, 1955, reprinted in Optner, S.L. (ed.), Systems 
Analysis, Penguin, 1973, pp.19-36. 
Hoos, I.R., Systems Analysis in Public Policy, University of California 
Press, 1972. 
Hopwood, A.G., 'Towards an Organizational Perspective for the Study of 
Accounting and Information Systems', Accounting, Organizations 
and Society, 1978, pp.3-13. 
Hopwood, A.G., 'On Trying to Study Accounting in the Contexts in Which 
it Operates', Accounting, Organizations and Society, 1983, 
pp.287-305. 
Hurne, D., An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1748 (ed. Anthony 
Flew, Collier MacMillan, 1962). 
Hrones, J., 'Foreword' in Mesarovic, 1964, op cit, pp.ix-xi. 
Husserl, E., Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology 
(translated by Dorian Cairns), Martinus Nijhoff, 1960. 
Husserl, E., The Idea of Phenomenology (translated by Alston, W.P. & 
Nakhnikian, G.), Martinus Nijhoff, 1964. 
Ijiri, Y., The Foundations of Accounting Measurement: A Mathematical, 
Economic and Behavioural Inquiry, Prentice-Hall, 1967 
(reprinted by Scholars Book Co., 1978). 
Ijiri, Y., Theory of Accounting Measurement, Studies in Accounting 
Research No.10, American Accounting Association, 1975. 
Jensen, M.C. & Meckling, W.H., 'Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behaviour, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure', Journal of 
Financial Economics, Oct. 1976, pp.305-360. 
Jones, C.S., 'An Empirical Study of the Role of Management Accounting 
Systems Following Takeover or Merger', Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 1985, pp.177-200. 
Jordan, N., 'Some Thinking about "System"', The RAND Corporation, 1960 
(reprinted in Optner, S.L. (ed.), Systems Analysis, Penguin, 
1973, pp.53-72. 
Jordan, N., Themes in Speculative Psychology, Tavistock, 1968. 
Kaefer, K., Theory of Accounts in Double-Entry Bookkeeping, 
International Education and Research in Accounting, 




Kant, ~., Critique of Pure Reason (translation N. Kemp-Smith), 
MacMillan, 1929. 
Kaplan, R.S., 'Yesterday's Accounting Undermines Production', Harvard 
Business Review, July-August 1984, pp.95-101. 
Kast, F.E. & Rosenzweig, J.E., Organization and Management, McGraw-
Hill, 1974, 1970. 
Katz, D. & Kahn, R.L., The Social Psychology of Organizations, Wiley, 
1966. 
Kellenbenz, H., 'The State of Bookkeeping in Upper Germany at the Time 
of the Fuggers and Welsers', Working Paper No.7, in Coffman, 
E.N. (ed.), The Academy of Accounting Historians, Vol.l, 1979, 
pp.87-94. 
Keynes, J.M., The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 
MacMillan & Co., 1936. 
Kindler, J. & Kiss, I., 'Future Methodology Based on Past Assumptions', 
in Tomlinson, R. & Kiss, I. (eds.), Rethinking the Process of 
Operational Research and Systems Analysis, Pergamon, 1984, 
pp.1-17. 
Klir, G.J., An Approach to General Systems Theory, Van Nostrand 
Reinhold, 1969. 
Kuhn, A., The Study of Society: A Unified Approach, Irwin-Dorsey, 
1963. 
Kuhn, T.S., 'A Function for Thought Experiments', in L'aventure de la 
science, Melanges Alexandre Koyre, Vol.2, pp.307-334, Hermann, 
1964, reprinted in Hacking, op cit, pp.6-27. 
Kuhn, T.S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd Ed., 
University of Chicago Press, 1970. 
Lakatos, I., 'History of Science and its Rational Reconstructions', in 
Buck, R.C. & Cohen, R.S. (eds.), PSA 1970, Boston Studies in 
the Philosophy of Science VIII, 1970, pp.91-108, reprinted in 
Hacking, op cit, pp.107-127. 
Lane, F.C., Andrea Barbarigo, Merchant of Venice, 1418-1449, John 
Hopkins University Press, 1944. 
Laudan, L., 'A Problem-Solving Approach to Scientific Progress', in 
Hacking, op cit, pp.144-155. 
Lee, T.A., Cash Flow Reporting, Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1985. 
Lee, T.A., Income and Value Measurement: Theory and Practice, 3rd Ed., 
Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1985. 
Lee. T.A. & Tweedie, D.P., The Private Shareholder and the Corporate 
Report, I.C.A.E.W., 1977. 
378 
Lee, T.A. & Tweddie, D.P., The Institutional Investor and Financial 
Information, I.C.A.E.W., 1981. 
Lister, R.J., 'Werner Sombart's "Der moderne Kapitalismus": An 
Apotheosis of Double-Entry Accounting?', Accounting and 
Business Research, Summer 1985, pp.229-231. 
Littleton, A.C., Structure- of Accounting Theory, Monograph No.5, 
American Accounting Association, 1953. 
Littleton, A.C. & Zimmerman, V.K., Accounting Theory: Continuity and 
Change, Englewood Cliffs, 1962. 
Littleton, A.C., Accounting Evolution to 1900, 2nd Ed., Russell & 
Russell, 1966. 
Lowe, E.A., 'On the Idea of a Management Control System', Journal of 
Management Studies, Feb. 1971, pp.1-12. 
Lowe, E.A., 'The Management of Purposive Environmental Enquiry: 
Suggestions for the Development of MIS Thinking', in Bromwich, 
M. & Hopwood, A.G. (eds.), Essays in British Accounting 
Research, Pitman, 1981, pp.209-224. 
Lowe, E.A. & Machin, J.L.J. (eds.), New Perspectives in Management 
Control, MacMillan, 1983. 
Luchins, A.S., 'Mechanization in Problem-solving', Psychological 
Monograph, 1942, No.248, pp.1-95. 
MacDonald, G., 'Deprival Value: Its Use and Abuse', Accounting and 
Business Research, Autumn 1974, pp.263-269. 
Maier, N.R.F., 'Reasoning in Humans. II. The Solution of a Problem and 
its Appearance in Consciousness', 1931 (reprinted in Wason, 
P.C. & Johnson-Laird, P.N. (eds.), Thinking and Reasoning, 
Penguin, 1968, pp.17-27). 
Mair, J., Book-keeping Methodiz'd, 2nd Ed., Edinburgh, 1741. 
Manning, P., 'Limits of the Semiotic Structuralist Perspective Upon 
Organizational Analysis', Studies in SymboliC Interaction, 
Vol.6, 1985, pp.79-111. 
Manning, P., 'Signwork', Human Relations, forthcoming 1986. 
Martin, G.D., Language, Truth and Poetry: Notes Towards a Philosophy 
of Literature, Edinburgh University Press, 1975. 
Martinelli, A., 'The Ledger of Cristianus Lomellinus and Dominicus De 
Garibaldo, Stewards of the City of Genoa (1340-41)', Abacus, 
Vol.19, No.2, 1983, pp.83-109. 
Martines, L., Power and Imagination, City-States in Renaissance Italy, 
Penguin, 1980. 
379 
Mason, R.O. & Mitroff, I.I., 'A Program of Research on Management 
Information Systems', Management Science, 1973, pp.475-487. 
Mason, R.O. & Swanson, E.B., 'Measurement for Management Decision: A 
Perspective', California Management Review, Spring 1979, pp.70-
81. 
Mattesich, R., Accounting and Analytic Methods, Richard D. Irwin, 1964 
(reprinted Scholars Book Co., 1977). 
Mattesach, R., Instrumental Reasoning and Systems Methodology: An 
Epistemology of the Applied and Social Sciences, D. Reidel, 
1978. 
Matte~ich, R., 'Management Accounting, Past, Present, and Future', in 
Holzer, H. Peter Ced.), Management Accounting 1980, University 
of Illinois, 1980, pp.209-240. 
Maturana, H.R. & Varela, F.J., Autopoiesis and Cognition, D. Reidel, 
1972. 
McCarthy, W.E., 'The REA Accounting Model: A Generalized Framework for 
Accounting Systems in a Shared Data Environment', The 
Accounting Review, July 1982, pp.554-578. 
Mesarovic, M.D., 'Foundations for a General Systems Theory', in 
Mesarovic, 1964, op cit, pp.1-24. 
Mesarovic, M.D. (ed.), Views on General Systems Theory, proceedings of 
The Second Systems Symposium at Case Institute of Technology, 
John Wiley & Sons, 1964. 
Miller, J.G., Living Systems, McGraw-Hill, 1978. 
Mitroff, I.I., 'If Applied Systems Analysis is "True", must it also be 
"Bad" and "Ugly"?', in Tomlinson, R. & Kiss, I. (eds.), 
Rethinking the Process of Operational Research and Systems 
Analysis, Pergamon, 1984, pp.159-167. 
Mitroff, I.I. & Mason, R.O., 'Can we Design Systems for Managing 
Messes?', Accounting, Organizations and Society, 1983, pp.195-203. 
Morris, C.W., 'Foundations of the Theory of Signs', International 
Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol.1, No.2, University of 
Chicago, 1938. 
Most, K.S., 'Sombart's Propositions Revisited', The Accounting Review, 
Oct. 1972, pp.722-734. 
Most, K.S., 'Sombart on Accounting History', Working Pap~r No~35, in 
Coffman, E.N. (ed.), The Academy of Accounting H~stor~ans, 
Vol.2, 1979, pp.244-262. 
Munro, R., 'A Comparison of the Income Approach with the Wealth 
Approach', forthcoming. 
380 
Munro, R. & Robertson, A., 'Developing the Balance Sheet - I', The 
Accountant's Magazine, April 1985, pp.173-175. 
Munro, R. & Robertson, A., 'Developing the Balance Sheet - 2', The 
Accountant's Magazine, May 1985, pp.228-229. 
Munro, R. & Robertson, A., 'Developing the Balance Sheet - 3: a 
statement of reconciliation', The Accountant's Magazine, June 
1985, pp.273-278. 
Nagel, T., 'What is it like to be a bat?', Philosophical Review, 
Oct. 1974 (reprinted in Nagel, T., Mortal Questions, Cambridge 
University Press, pp.165-180). 
Naughton, J. & Peters, G., 'Systems and Failures', Systems Performance: 
Human Factors and Systems Failures, Unit 1, The Open 
University, 1976. 
Newell, A., Shaw, J.C. & Simon, H.A., 'Elements of a Theory of Human 
Problem Solving', Psychological Review, May 1958, pp.151-166. 
Nobes, C.W., 'The Gallerani Account Book of 1305-1308', The Accounting 
Review, April 1982, pp.303-310. 
Ogden, C.K. & Richards, I.A., The Meaning of Meaning, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1923. 
Otley, D.T., 'The Contingency Theory of Management Accounting: 
Achievements and Prognosis', Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 1980, pp.413-428. 
Pacioli, L., Summa de Arithmetica, Geometria, Proportioni et 
Proportionalita, Section 9, Treatise XI, Chapters 1-36, 
reprinted in Geijsbeek, op cit, pp.33-81. 
Patinkin, D., Money, Interest, and Prices: an Integration of Monetary 
and Value Theory, 2nd Ed., Harper & Row, 1965. 
Peasnell, K., 'A Note on the Discounted Present Value Concept', The 
Accounting Review, January 1977, pp.186-189. 
Peters, T.J. & Waterman, R.H., In Search of Excellence, Harper & Row, 
1982. 
Popper, K.R., Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1963. 
Popper, K.R., The Open Society and Its Enemies, 5th Ed., Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1966. 
Popper, K.R., Objective Knowledge, Oxford University Press, 1972. 
P K R U ded Quest an intellectual biography, Fontana, 1976. opper, •• , nen : __ 
Prigogine, I., From Being to Becoming, W.H. Freeman & Co., 1980. 
381 
Putnam, H., 'The"Corroboration" of Theories', in Schlipp, P.A., The 
Philosophy of Karl Popper, Open Crust, 1974, PP.221-240,---
reprinted with a 'Retrospective Note', 1978 in Honderich, T. & 
Burnyeat, M. (eds.), Philosophy As It Is, Pelican, 1979, 
pp.353-380. 
Quade, E., 'Military Systems Analysis', The RAND Corporation, 1963 
(reprinted in Optner, S.L. Ced.), Systems Analysis, Penguin, 
1973, pp.121-140). 
Quine, W.V.O., 'The Ways of Paradox', in The Ways of Paradox and Other 
Essays, Random House, 1966, pp.1-18. 
Quine, W.V.O., From a Logical Point of View, 2nd Ed., Harvard 
University Press, 1980. 
Rapoport, A., 'Remarks on General Systems Theory', in Mesarovic, 1964, 
op cit, pp.170-172. 
Robb, F.F., 'Cybernetics in Management Thinking', Systems Research, 
Vol.1, No.1, 1984, pp.5-23. 
de Roover, R., 'Characteristics of Bookkeeping Before Pacioli', in The 
Accounting Review, June 1938, pp.144-149. 
de Roover, R., 'The Development of Accounting Prior to Luca Pacioli 
According to the Account-books of Medieval Merchants', in 
Littleton, A.C. & Yamey, B.S. (eds.), Studies in the History 
of Accounting, Sweet & Maxwell, 1956, pp.114-174. 
Russell, B., 'On Denoting', Mind, 14, 1905. 
Ryle, G., The Concept of Mind, Peregrine Books, 1963. 
de Saussure, F., Course-in General Linguistics, Bally, C. & Seechehaye, 
A. (eds.), Philosophical Library, 1959. 
Schutz, A., On Phenomenology and Social Relations (ed. by Wagner, 
H.R.), University of Chicago, 1970. 
Shan n C E & Weaver W The Mathematl.·cal Theory of Communication, no, •• , ., _ 
University of Illinois, 1949. 
Silverman, D., The Theory of Organizations, Heinemann, 1970. 
Simon, H.A., Administrative Behaviour, 2nd Ed., MacMillan, 1957. 
Simon, H.A., Models of Man, Wiley, 1957. 
Simon, H.A., The New Science of Management Decision, Harper & Row, 
1960. 
Smith, A., The Wealth of Nations, 5th Ed., 1789 (ed. Skinner, A., 
Pelican, 1970). 
382 
Smyth, D.S. & Checkland, P.B., 'Using a Systems Approach: the 
Structure of Root Definitions', Journal of Applied Systems 
Analysis, 5 (1), 1976. 
Sombart, W., Der moderne Kapitalismus, 6th Ed., Duncker & Humblot, 
1924. 
Sorter, G.H., 'An "Events" Approach to Basic Accounting Theory'; The 
Accounting Review, Jan. 1969, pp.12-19. 
Sprigge, T.L.S., Theori~s of Existence, Penguin, 1984. 
Sprouse, R.T. & Moonitz, M., A Tentative Set of Broad Accounting 
Principles for Business Enterprises, Accounting Research Study 
No.3, A.I.C.P.A., 1962. 
Sterling, R.R., 'Theory Construction and Verification', The Accounting 
Review, July 1970, pp.444-457. 
Sterling, R.R., Theory of the Measurement of Enterprise Income, 
University Press of Kansas, 1970 (reprinted Scholars Book Co., 
1979). 
Sterling, R.R., 'Introduction', in Sterling, R.R. (ed.), Research 
Methodology in Accounting, Scholars Book Co., 1972, pp.1-7. 
Sterling, R.R., Toward a Science of Accounting, Scholars Book Co., 
1979. 
Sterling, R.R. & Harrison, W., 'Discussion of Capital Market 
Equilibrium, Information Production, and Selecting Accounting 
Techniques: Theoretical Framework and Review of Empirical 
Work', Studies on Financial Accounting Objectives: 1974, 
Journal of Accounting Research, Supplement to Vol.12, 1974, 
pp.142-157. 
Strawson, P.F., 'On Referring', Mind, 59, 1950, pp.320-344. 
Thomas, A.L., The Allocation Problem in Financial Accounting, Studies 
in Accounting Research No.3, American Accounting Association, 
1969. 
Thompson, J.D., Organizations in Action, McGraw-Hill, 1967. 
Tinker, T., Paper Prophets: A Social Critique of Accounting, Holt, 
Rinehart & Winston, 1985. 
Tweedie, D.P., 'Cash Flows and Realisable Values: the Intuitive 
Accounting Concepts? An Empirical Test', Accounting and 
Business Research, Winter 1977, pp.2-24. 
Urmson, J.O., Berkeley, Oxford University Press, 1982. 
Van Gigch, J.P., Applied General Systems Theory, 2nd Ed., Harper & Row, 
1978. 
383 
Vickers, G., Freedom in a Rocking Boat, Allen Lane, 1970. 
Waddington, C.H., Tools for Thought, Paladin, 1977. 
Weiner, N., Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the Animals 
and the Machine, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1948. 
Wells, M.C., 'A Revolution in Accounting Theory?', The Accounting 
Review, July 1976, pp.471-482. 
Wertheimer, M., Productive Thinking, Tavistock, 1959. 
Wicksell, K., Lectures on Political Economy, Vol.2, Robbins, L. (ed.), 
Routledge, 1935. 
Wilson, C.z. & Alexis, M., 'Basic Frameworks for Decisions', Journal of 
the Academy of Management, August 1962, pp.151-164. 
Winjum, J.O., 'Accounting and the Rise of Capitalism: An Accountant's 
View', Journal of Accounting Research, Autumn 1971, pp.333-350. 
Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations, 2nd Ed., Basil 
Blackwell, 1958. 
Yamey, B.S., 'Notes on the Origin of Double-Entry Bookkeeping', The 
Accounting Review, July 1947, pp.263-272. 
Yamey, B.S., 'Scientific Bookkeeping and the Rise of Capitalism', The 
Economic History Review, Second Series, Vol.1, Nos.2 & 3, 1949, 
pp.99-113. 
Yamey, B.S., 'Edward Jones and the Reform of Book-keeping, 1795-1810', 
in Littleton, A.C. & Yamey, B.S. (eds.), Studies in the History 
of Accounting, Sweet & Maxwell, 1956, pp.313-324. 
Yamey, B.S., 'Accounting and the Rise of Capitalism: Further Notes on 
a Theme by Sombart', Journal of Accounting Research, Autumn 
1964, pp.117-136. 
Yamey, B.S., 'Notes on Double-Entry Bookkeeping and Economic Progress', 




B.S., 'Early Views on the Origins and Development of Book-
keeping and Accounting', Accounting and Business Research, 
Vol.10, No.37A, Special Issue, 1980, pp.81-92. 
B.S., 'Accounting in the Middle Ages', in Dictionary of the 
Middle Ages, Vol.I, Charles -Scribners's Sons, 1982, reprinted 
in Yamey, B.S. (ed.), Further Essays in the History of 





Rolland Munro, BA, AlB 
Alastair Robertson, MA, CA 
This two-part article develops some of the 
"consistent but radical" pleas for refonn of 
the balance sheet which have been made 
by previous contributors to The Account· 
ant's Magazine. 
Rolland Munro and Alastair Robertson are 
Lecturers in the Department of Accounting and 
Business Method, University of Edinburgh. 
CCA-the new push? 
A pertinent, if unusual, measure of the 
success of eeA profit determination is the 
number of recent articles on the balance 
sheet. The focus of hostile criticism has 
shifted from profit and loss determination 
to the thomy issue of balance sheet 
measurement. Attacks from practitioners 
on the eeA profit statement have notice-
ably reduced and, while adherents of 
historical cost no doubt still abound, 
concem over the muddle inherent in eeA 
profit determination looks more and more 
an academic issue. In contrast, David 
Balfour, Alistair Maclennan and Peter 
Reynolds have all in recent issues of The 
Accountant's Magazine put forward a can· 
sistent, but radical, plea for a "more 
complete and meaningful balance sheet". 
The plea for a meaningful balance sheet 
All the various attempts at inflation 
accounting, according to Alistair Maclen-
nan, have concentrated on the profit and 
loss account, which he characterises as 
"adjusted for everything, including the 
kitchen sink". As he states: 
"The tradition in the profession has been 
to. get the profit and loss account right 
With the balance sheet falling into place 
derivatively as a 'snapshot' of a particular 
moment in time." 
As a radical altemative he flies David 
Balfour's "kite" as "get the balance sheet 
right"-first and foremost: 
"Get the balance sheet right and the 
profit and loss account, however stated, 
will represent the net change in the value 
of the enterprise from one accounting 
date to the next." 
Peter Reynolds is in broad agreement 
When he argues that the better the balance 
sheet the better will be the measure of 
profit or loss ... "if the balance sheet is 
wrong the profit and loss account will 
probably be wrong too". 
A fundamental issue 
The plea for a more meaningful balance 
The ACCountant's Magazine April 1985 
sheet is indeed well intentioned but the 
argument as it has been put forw'ard does 
~aise some interesting issues. In particular 
It wo~ld appear that the profession has 
expenenced (and is experiencing) some 
difficulty in concurrently developing both 
the eeA profit statement and the current 
value balance sheet. This and the related 
issues are worthy of clarification, since 
they touch upon matters fundamental to 
accountants. 
B~hin? the arguments of Peter Reynolds, 
Alistair Maclennan and David Balfour, two 
broadly differing approaches may be dis-
cemed: 
• the traditional approach, which is profit 
statement orientated, with the "balance 
sheet falling into place derivatively"; and 
• the balance sheet orientated approach, 
under which profit is simply the difference 
between two balance sheets at different 
points in time. 
Herein lies a fundamental difference 
between the approaches-each is con-
cerned that the other should take the 
residual role. The profit approach throws 
up balances as residuals, while the balance 
sheet adherents leave profit as the residual 
between two balance sheet dates. 
Differences in approach 
At first glance, then, the two approaches 
seem to be at complete odds with each 
other. Each, however, has respectable 
antecedents, although the historical per-
spective is more murky than either side 
might allow. The profit approach is intrinsi-
cally transactions based: all basic entries 
to the double-entry bookkeeping arise from 
transactions-this is the flow data. The 
balance sheet approach is fundamentally 
measurement based: all items can be given 
a value based on current price signals in 
the market-this is the "stock" data 
Note that both approaches involve esti-
mation. This is explicit in the 
"measurement" approach, but the "match-
ing" adjustments made to transactions 
data also involve estimates (eg, the use of 
economic life in depreciation), a matter 
compounded by further estimates under 
eeA. 
There is, however, a crucial difference in 
the approach to estimation. In the determi-
nation of profit, attention is paid to histori-
cal market signals intemalized through the 
double-entry flow data In contrast, for 
measurement of the "stock" items, at-
tention focuses on the aggregate of wealth 
from c~rrent extemal signals, in disregard . 
of the Intemalizeddatalndeed.itis not 
clear that those engaged in deriving profit 
as a mere residual between two balance 
sheet dates require double entry at all. 
Which data is primary? 
The c~ntral difficulty is, therefore, one of 
wha~ IS taken as the primary data The 
profit approach, being transactions based 
takes intemal flow data as primary. Th~ 
measurement of wealth, concerned with ! 
v~ues, takes external "stock" prices as 
pnmary. 
This, of itsel~, might present no difficulty, 
except th~t Inherent in the double-entry 
bookkeeping of the transactions is a 
mechanism which throws up balances. 
Equally, it is self-evident to those con-
cerned with measurement of values that 
the increment between two dates repre-
sents profit for the period. 
.1 
Since the "balances" from the transactions 
data are Simply the unallocated cost resi-
duals dumped from the process of profit 
determination, there is no reason to expect 
that these would ever accord with 
measurements of "stock" values. Again, 
the difference between two aggregates of 
"stock" values is hardly likely to meet with 
the outcome of the complex set of adjust-
ments to the flow data entailed by' profit 
determination. 
Needs and choice 
It seems not unreasonable to suggest that 
investors and others might benefit from 
knowing both the results from the internal-
ized transactions data and the position in 
terms of current external data 
The apparent intrinsic choice between 
(a) profit determination and what David 
Balfour refers to as a "joke" balance sheet 
and 
(b) a statement of value with a residual 
profit measure 
caused G M MacDonald to suggest. a 
decade ago, the abandonment of recon-
ciliation (the articulation of financial state-
ments)-in order that investors may gain 
the benefits of both the main financial 
statements. 
The attraction of throwing off this recon-
ciliation of the two main financial state-
ments is that those interested in a more 
"meaningful" balance sheet do not have to 
throwaway the advances made in profit 
determination. 
Restating the argument 
The strength underlying the Balfour posi· 
tion is not (as he, Maclennan and 
Reynolds all argue) that it replaces the hard 
won improvements in profit determination 
with a profit figure which is simply a net 
difference between two estimates of value 
for the enterprise. Rather it is this: given 
that profit determination has become more 
meaningful as estimates have been intro-
duced to the basic flow data, why not 
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liberate the "stock" items as well? Why 
not introduce estimates to them, especi-
ally when for a good number of the "stock" 
items the measures are objective (market-
based) and are open to verification? 
The plea of Balfour and others can be 
restated as being for a more "true and fair" 
balance sheet in line with the development 
of a "true and fair" profit statement. The 
approach is the same in both cases-the 
use of estimation. A critical difference 
however, is that estimates for profit deter: 
mination are largely intemal, while esti-
mates of wealth are extemal in their 
reference. 
More information, less tidiness? 
The im~ediate benefits in terms of 
I~formatlon to users of reports is clear. 
Firstly, there is more information and 
~econdl~, there is a comparison of types of 
information, the ?omparison of intemally 
generated data With thatwhich is extemal 
to the business. The necessary cost would 
appear to be abandoning the reconciliation 
of the balance sheet with the profit state-
ment. 
Now is this a loss which investors, bankers 
and other users could bear? How much 
wo.ul? they mi~s an accounting procedure, 
~ tldlne~s, which keeps the producers of 
Information happy? 
In ~he second and concluding part of thi~' 
article . ~e. S~all explore the matter 0" 
reconcIliation In more detail. ,- : 
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Insurance round-up 
Cover for accountants' costs 
For a small businessman the accountancy 
and other costs involved in dealing with an 
"in-depth" investigation by the Inland 
Revenue can be high. Hambro Legal Pro-
tection Ltd is offering a fonn of protection 
which, if provided by a firm of accountants 
for all eligible clients, will cost in the region 
of £15 per client. With this protection in 
force a firm can say that, in the event of an 
in-depth Inland Revenue investigation or a 
VAT appeal, the accountant's costs will be 
met by the insurance and not by the client. 
A spin-off to membership is that partners 
or directors of a member finn or company 
can obtain legal advice, 24 hours a day, 365 
days a year, on any matter, business or 
personal. 
Where a firm of accountants does not buy 
this cover for all clients, it can be bought 
individually, at a cost of about £25 per 
annum per partnership or company. 
Self'administered pensions 
With the growing popularity of small self-
adm~nistered penSion schemes, Scottish 
PrOVident Institution is offering a choice of 
seven unit-linked pension funds which can 
be used by the trustees of such schemes. 
The minimum initial investment is £200 
with the minimum for further investment 
being £500. While the initial charge is 5% 
at the outset, 102% of the investment, less 
£100, purchases units. On withdrawal, 
p.rovided at least five years have elapsed 
Since the investment was made into the 
plan, the full value of the units will be paid 
out. On earlier withdrawal, the bid value will 
be reduced by V2 % for each year, or part of 
a year, less than five years. 
Investment trust policy 
Increasingly, life offices are joining forces 
with investment trusts to the extent that 
the. former are offering unit-linked funds 
which are linked to shares of the latter. City 
of Edinburgh Life Assurance Co Ltd is a 
~ent example. Owned in part by Ivory & 
Slme, it is offering a Single premium bond 
Where the life fund invests in the range of 
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i~vestment . t~sts managed by Ivory & 
Sime. The aim IS to provide active manage-
ment for policyholders who do not have 
the specialist expertise necessary to trade 
actively in the investment trust market. 
Flexible personal pension 
Scottish Equitable Life Assurance SOCiety 
has .introduced Reflex '85, which is a 
pension contract for the self-employed and 
for those in non-pensionable employment. 
Switches can be made between the S0-
Ciety's unit-linked and profit-sharing funds. 
There is flexibility as to the amount and 
timing of contributions. Annual, monthly 
and Single contributions can be made to 
the same policy, and further contributions 
can be made at any time. The level of 
regular contribution (plus any single contri-
bution) is established at the outset thus 
~aking this an acceptable means of ~epay­
mg loans so far as many building societies 
and other lenders are concemed. 
Waiver of premium (in the event of dis-
ability) is available not only in respect of 
regular contributions but also, unusually, 
for single contributions-provided Single 
contributions have been paid in at least the 
two consecutive years preceding the disa-
bility. 
Pension "performance table" 
A number of organisations publish "per-
formance tables" for managed pension 
funds but there has not been a comparable 
table for funds to which personal pension 
policies can be linked. Pension consult-
ants Martin Paterson Associates aim to 
meet that need by publishing a quarterly 
survey, which includes performance statis-
tics for both unit-linked and profit-sharing 
contracts. Since, for any sector, there have 
been differing numbers of funds in exist-
ence from year to year, they are ranked in 
percentile rankings so that, irrespective of 
the number of funds involved in any year, 
one can see whether a fund has held its 
relative position year by year. Charging and 
allocation terms are being shown in a 
separate section so that they can be 
compared. 
Initially, some 460 unit-linked funds and 40 
pr~fit-sharing ~ontracts, issued by 90 life 
offices, are being included in the survey 
which costs £350 per annum. ' 
Mortgage repayments 
To reduce premium cost for house pur-
chasers planning to repay their mortgages 
~y the endowment method, Life Associa-
tion of Scotland Ltd is offering its "low 
cost" Homebuilder Plan on a basis which 
discounts 80% of future anticipated bon-
uses (assuming maintenance of the cur-
rent rate), rather than 80% of the current 
rate of bonus in the future. This has the 
effect of redUCing the initial sum assured 
and thus the premium payable. ' 
Valuing for insurance 
In the booklet Insurance Valuation 
published by valuers John Foard & Co, th~ 
point is made that, while insurance brokers 
and advisers can deal with the technicali-
ties of insurance, advice from a profes-
sional valuer is needed to establish the 
"quantum" to be insured. "It is better to be 
right before the event than a loss prove the 
inadequacies of the insurance arrange-
ments". This is a helpful booklet, which 
makes a number of important points about 
valuing property, plant and machinery. It is 
available, free, from 61 Queen's Gardens, 
London W2 3AH. 
Directors' liability 
With fears that the new legislation 
regarding the personal liability of directors 
will catch both rogue and innocent alike, 
brokers Bain Dawes predict that directors' 
and officers' liability insurance will be a 
major growth ~'ea in coming years. While 
some 30 to 40% of Britain's top 500 
companies hold such policies, the percen-
tage is much lower for smaller companies. 
Bain Dawes are advising executive and 
non-executive directors to consider such 
insurance as a means of protecting them-




stated that "the statutory move towards 
greater protection for minorities is simul-
taneously being given common law sup-
port by the courts, which appear to be 
viewing the position of such minorities 
with far more sympathy and are thus 
rendering the duties of directors, especi-
ally their fiduciary duties, more effectively 
enforceable. Specifically, the courts seem 
to be moving towards a flexible definition 
of the circumstances in which an individual, 
shareholder is able to bring a derivative 
action ... ". 
There is scarcely any evidence to support 
such an assertion. Indeed, cases so far 
decided under the more liberal section 75 
of the Companies Act 1980, allowing 
shareholders to petition on grounds of 
unfair prejudice, suggest that the courts 
are maintaining their traditional reluctance 
to interfere in the affairs of a company 
unless there is fraud or similar unlawful 
activity. A case cited in support of the 
author's view is the judgment of Vinelott J 
in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v New"';~ 
Industries Ltd NZ ((1981) CL 257). His 
judgment was, however, reversed by the 
Court of Appeal in favour of the c thodox 
view. To say therefore that "the Newman 
case also demonstrates that directors 
without voting control can be made 
Developing the 
balance sheet-2 
Rolland Munro, BA, AlB 
Alastair Robertson, MA, CA 
In their second article the authors argue 
the advantages of fonnal and explicit 
reconciliation of the balance sheet and the 
profit statement. 
Abandoning reconciliation 
In our first article (TAM April P 173) it was 
pointed out that, while adherents to histo-
ric cost are learning to live with CCA profit 
adjustments, pressure may be building up 
to force them to give way on more 
fundamental ground. Supporters of a cur· 
rent value balance sheet are now using the 
argument of improved information qual-
ity-once also a central argument for the 
Introduction of CCA profit. The difficulty is 
that pursuit of a current value balance 
sheet, while attempting to retain the 
advances made in profit measurement, 
could be seen as a step towards aban-
doning the reconciliation of the two main 
financial statements. 
The issue appears, therefore, to be one of 
an improvement in reporting information in 
t~~s of giving more as against the loss of 
tidiness within the reports themselves. 
Outsiders would no doubt have little hesi-
tation in opting for additional information. 
ACcountants, however, (perhaps most 
a?c.ountants) would presumably find it 
difficult to give up reconciliation of the 
main financial statements. It is worth 
asking therefore what is so special about 
the reconciliation process? 
What is reconciliation? 
The term itself needs some elaboration. 
The reconciliation under discussion is that 
of the net change in wealth with the 
'?A 
reported profit. Under existing bookkeep-
ing practice, balances arise automatically 
as residuals from the process of profit 
. determination; this feature of balances is a 
spin-off from· the use of double-entry. 
Whesl these balances are reported, there is 
an automatic reconciliation of the balance 
sheet with the profit statement. 
Very tidy. And the importance of such 
tidiness should not be underestimated as 
there may be something in it which lies at 
the source of the accountant's sure grip on 
the most powerful of information systems. 
The baby should not be thrown out simply 
because the bathwater has grown mUrky. 
On the other hand, to deny investors and 
creditors a meaningful balance sheet. ... 
A psychological hold 
Before the courts the existence of recon-
ciliation may be the auditor's first line of 
defence in so far as arithmetical correct-
ness alludes to truth and faimess. To those 
not versed in the niceties of double-entry 
there appears to be something incontrover-
tible about balances-they arise directly 
out of the same system into which the 
important transactions data has gone. 
Surely they also must be important? 
Mathematicians would take the view that 
these balances are a totally trivial outcome 
of the use of double-entry-a property of 
any system which sets up real numbers 
with opposite algebraic signs. However, 
the psychological hold upon accountants 
is very great since, from their earliest use of 
double-entry, they are taught to believe that 
these totals represent something-
namely, the bal.ances of .the finn. At the 
responsible to the shareholders for any 
breach of duty from which they personally 
benefit", is less than true and fair 
One possible future development which 
may affect accountants is that once the 
proviSions of the Insolvency Bill are en· 
acted and company directors lose some of 
the protection afforded by the Salomon 
principle, they may become a more viable 
target for some of the writs that are now 
directed towards accountants. 0 
• Legal liabilities· of Practising Accountants; 
Emile Woolf; Butterworths; 457 pages; (27-00. 
Nigel Savage lectures in law at Trent Poly· 
technic. 
same time they leam that what the totals 
represent does not have meaning in the 
real world. 
Meaningless and trivial or not, the psycho-
logical hold of automatic reconciliation 
over the traditional thinking of accountants 
is very strong. This hold extends even to 
those who think more radically-as Peter 
Reynolds' artic1e1 illustrates. Anxious to 
improve the balance sheet, he is prepared 
to reduce profit to a residual, an automatic 
difference between two balance sheet 
dates. Once caught on this hook he is 
forced into pushing for a more "complete" 
balance sheet-not simply because the 
attribute of completeness is desirable in 
the balance sheet itself, but because it is 
also then seen as a necessary condition for 
the "correct" statement of profit. This in 
tum leads him into the thorny problem of 
measuring intangible assets-a difficulty 
that produced some understandable wrath 
from Jeff Pearcy2, someone not otherwise 
unsympathetic towards the need for bal· 
ance sheet improvement. A psychological 
hook perhaps, but a hook nonetheless. 
Automatic reconciliation could not there-
fore be given up lightly-all the more so, 
given the apparent weight that generally 
accepted accounting procedures and con-
ventions carry with the courts. But even the 
law changes and simply because the 
balance sheet never has been a statement 
of value does not guarantee that, in the 
future, clever lawyers will not argue that it 
ought to be. 
A third man? 
Consider for a moment the consequences 
of abandoning reconciliation. A meaning-
ful current value balance sheet could then 
be developed independently and concur-
rently with a CCA profit statement. This 
would appear to result in profit essentially 
being derived from the flow transactions, 
as at present, and in the balance sheet 
being constructed directly from stock 
items. All these balance sheet 
measurements can be drawn from external 
market data and have therefore an objec-
tive base. The process of dra','Jing on such 
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data is also open to verification by the 
auditor. And, perhaps most importantly, 
these figures are not only reliable, they are 
relevant since they have meaning; they 
represent (at the balance date) facts of the 
outside world, not figments of the double-
entry process. 
By now some readers will have already 
realized there is something wrong with the 
conundrum as it presently stands. The 
need to make balance sheets useful is 
virtually self-evident to anyone in touch 
with the users of reports~ Additionally, few 
accountants would wish to throwaway the 
gains made in profit determination. And 
presumably even fewer would be prepared 
to abandon reconciliation. 
The root of the difficulty is the automatic 
articulation of the main financial state-
ments; and it is this automati? feature of 
reconciliation which gives nse to the 
psychological hold already discussed. I! is 
not reconciliation itself, therefore, which 
needs to be dispatched-it is the invisible, 
unseen, certainty of it. 
Perhaps what needs to be introduced is a 
third financial statement in addition to the 
GGA profit statement and a current value 
balance sheet. This could take the form of 
Education 
a statement of reconciliation which would 
formally and explicitly reconcile the basic 
flow transactions data with the "stock" 
value measurements drawn directly from 
current extemal market data 
Advantages of explicit reconciliation 
(1) The prinCipal advantage is in being fully 
able to utilize the results of two prime sets 
of data-transactions data and current 
market values. 
(2) Relaxing the psychological hold of 
automatic reconciliation provides scope 
for developing the two main financial 
statements concurrently in a constructive 
way .. 
(3) The double-entry technique is retained 
for the essential recording and control of 
the transactions base. 
(4) Any residuals created by the separate 
balance sheet or profit statement adjust-
ments are held out of harm's way in the 
statement of reconciliation. 
(5) A statement of the reconciliation, at 
present conducted invisibly, would have 
some interest since it highlights any 
accounting adjustments made by the com-
pany. Any comment provided on these 
adjustments is also likely to be useful. 
(6) The reconciliation of balance sheet 
values and cost residuals is made explicit. 
Attracting quality-and quantity 
Alasdair Cockburn, a partner in Coopers & 
Lybrand, Aberdeen, comments on the 
report "The CA in the 1990s", recently 
published by the Institute. 
In his report on the educational profile of 
the future chartered accountant· Niall 
Lothian concentrates on the reactions of a 
small cross-section of members and users 
towards the ability of the CA to meet the 
challenges of the future business environ-
ment. Inevitably, important are~ Of. con-
cern are highlighted. I say ineVitably 
because I believe that his approach encou-
raged a "what is wrong" reaction rather 
than one of "what is right". As one of those 
questioned by him I must admit to having 
myself put forward some major reserva-
tions about the present system. Generally I 
agree with the conclusion that two o~ ~he 
main deficiencies of newly qualified 
accountants are: 
(a) that they lack judgment and commer-
cial awareness; and, 
(b) that as a result of (a) they have difficulty 
in contributing constructively to manage-
ment. 
Following from the above Mr Lothian 
introduces some suggestions on h.ow the 
Institute might respond. These Include 
changing the thrust of the exam syllabus 
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and adding to the syllabus. In adding to the 
syllabus by means of. industrial ~eco~d· 
ment and the introduction of a reSidential 
management course, it is suggested that 
the training contract be extended by a 
period of nine months. 
At first sight these may seem logical 
improvements to the apparent educational 
weaknesses. My concem is that I do not 
believe that these weaknesses are the 
major educational issues now facing the 
Institute. My concem is that I ~ee in.creas-
ing indications that the Institute IS not 
attracting sufficient numbers of cntran~s to 
its training contract. Set out below IS a 
summary of the number of students enter-
ing training contracts in :he las! four years 
in the Scottish and English Institutes. 
ICAS ICAEW 
1981 513 4,929 
1982 455 4,671 
1983 449 4,859 
1984 468 5,171, 
It is disappointing that in a period when the 
financial services sector IS buoyant, t~e 
ICAS appears to be having. difficulty In 
sustaining growth in student Intake. 
My request to the Institute. is that when ~t 
reviews its future educational needs It 
does not ignore the competitive and ~~m­
mercial pressures which the training 
It is Open not only to audit but to the vie't\ 
of users of accounts. From this perspec., 
tive it is not clear why an invisible anc 
automatic reconciliation has ever been 
accepted as satisfactory. 
Conclusions 
The aim of these two articles has been:· 
first, to restate the arguments of the l 
supporters of a meaningful balance sheet; 
secondly, to point out the major difficulty' 
in reconciliation; and thirdly, to argue that; 
explicit reconciliation is preferable 
to-and more true and fair than-invisible 
and automatic tidiness. 
There is, however, no advantage in pre-: 
tending that a reconciliation statement is I 
without problems. Clearly, the actual 
mechanics of a reconciliation statement I 
require to be worked out in some detaiL! 
Nevertheless, in principle the process of. 
explicit reconciliation appears to have 
much to commend it. A third article will· 
give a worked example of a reconciliation 
statement. 0 
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scheme now faces. It is not enough to look 
at the education role only from the 
viewpoint of quality. The Institute also has 
a responsibility to ensure that the CA 
qualification is seen by potential students 
to be an attractive training opportunity for 
both professional and industrial careers. 
Given the apparent difficulty in attracting 
students, I would suggest that the follow-
ing questions should also be addressed: 
(a) why is the number of students not 
increasing? 
(b) is there any validity in the view that 
students find the new training scheme 
unattractive, particularly compared with 
other accounting training schemes? 
(e) are the costs of CA training likely to 
encourage training firms to look at other 
forms of training to ensure that they can 
meet their client's expectations? 
I hope that Dr Tom Johnston and his 
Advisory Board, when they look at the 
educational role, have the opportunity of 
considering the importance of attracting 
quality students in numbers as well as the 
need to improve education. If we cannot 
recruit enough students with management 
potential in the first place (and not all 
students have this potential) all the training 
in the world will not produce the type of 
accountant that meets the profile 
described by Niall Lothian. C 
Alasdair Cockburn, LLB, CA 
• The report "The CA in the 19ros: an edu· 
cational profile", by Niall Lothian, is available to 
members on request, from Ian Marrian, Director 
of Education, at the Institute (tel: 031-225 5673). 
An article summarising the report's findings and 
conclusions was published in the March Issue ot 




-a statement of reconciliation 
Rolland Munro, BA, AlB 
Alastair Robertson, MA, CA 
The statement of reconciliation which was 
suggested in the two previous articles to 
be a requirement of the development of a 
meaningful balance sheet is now exam· 
ined In detail by the authors. 
This article follows up the discussion of 
reconciliation introduced in two previous 
articles (TAM April and May 1985), wherein 
comment was made on some of the 
perceived difficulties in concurrently de-
veloping both the profit statement and the 
balance sheet. Within this context the 
phenomenon of automatic articulation of 
financial statements was discussed and it 
was suggested that there are occasions 
where this automatic articulation is less 
than helpful. Not only does it appear to 
exert a powerful psychological hold over 
much of the debate, but its invisible 
operation serves to mask interactions 
between transactions data and current 
market values. It is also hard to see how 
unseen data interaction can make a posi· 
tive contribution towards user confidence 
in financial statements. 
It was recognised, however, that complete 
abandonment of articulation of financial 
statements might simply cause as many 
problems (if not more) than it sought to 
alleviate. It was therefore suggested that, 
rather than abandon articulation com· 
pletely, the reconciliation process should 
be made explicit. This could be achieved 
by means of a third financial statement-a 
statement of r~onciliation. The purpose of 
this third' article is to consider tentatively 
some of the actual mechanics of such a 
statement. 
Purpose of a statement of reconciliation 
value measurements drawn directly from 
current external market data 
An outline of the reconciliation process 
(a) Market signals are conceived as com· 
prising two separate systems: the group of 
all prices which are recorded during the 
period in which transactions take place; 
and the group of prices which are available 
_as current prices when reporting is desired, 
for all reportable items. 
state I 
Market .......... all transactions at historic prices 
signals ....... · 
. 'state" 
current prices for all reportable items 
Financial accounting is therefore inter· 
preted here as involving two distinct 
phases. Firstly, the transactions data is 
recorded-based on state I signals. Sec· 
ondly, monetary values are placed on the 
period end physical position-based on 
state II Signals. 
(b) The results of state I signals (transac· 
tions) are next mapped against the con· 
straint of a period end physical poSition as 







The difficulty in integrating these two 
systems of Signals provides the ra!i?n.ale 
for introducing a formal reconCIliation 
statement. 
(c) In order to trace the mechanics Of. th~s 
integration in double entry terms It IS 
convenient to adopt a matrix format, as 
shown in Figure 1. 
Ftgure 1 
This format is used in the simplified 
example of reconciliation which follows: 
A simplified example 
(a) Consider the following signals which 
exist under Signal states I and II: 
1.1.85 Receive cash 





2.1.85 Purchase stock., 10 
items at £10 each-
for cash. 
20.1.85 Sell 6 items at £16 
each-on credit 
31.1.85 Replacement cost 
(Rq of stock items 
is £14 each. 
31.1.85 Net realisable value I 
(NRY) of machine is 
£00. 
·31.1.85 RCof machine is 
£120. 
31.1.85 NRVof stock items 
is £12 each. 
• Expected useful life 10 months. 
(b) Taking the signals from state I first, 
these can be mapped into the double entry 
matrix, as shown in Figure 2. 
Conventionally, a trial balance (state I 









Profit (Sales) 96 
296 296 
Customarily, a number of matching and 
related profit adjustments would be made 
to this data base. The end result would be a 
profit statement with the residual balances 
forming the balance sheet. With regard to 
the profit statement a decision must be 
taken as to the method by which profit is to 
be calculated. This is returned to at (c) 
below. In respect of the balance sheet, a 
decision must be taken as to the valuation 
basis to be adopted. Traditionally, where 
the balance sheet comprises little other 
than unexpired cost residuals, the valu· 
ation decision has effectively been made 
by default. 
However, using state II information, it is 
In our first article it was argued that, in the 
detennination of profit, primary attention is 
paid to historic market signals which have 
been internalized through the double entry 
book·keeping system-this is "flow" data 
In contrast, the measurement of we~th 
pays primary attention to current pnce 
Signals in the market-this is "stock" data 
Inherent in the double entry book·keeping 
of the flow data (the transactions) is a 
mechanism which throws up balances-
many of these are simply unallocated cost 
residuals and there is no reason to expect 
that they would ever accord with 
measurements of "stock" values. The pur· 
pose of the statement of reconciliation is 
to reconcile formally and explicitly, the 
"flow" trans~ctions data with the "stock" 
TRANSACTIONS ..::-____ st_oc_k __ de_b_to_rs __ b_an_k_p_r_of_it ___ -r ___ --, 
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selected as the balance sheet constraint-
in which case, clearly, the adjustments 
would be more straightforward. 
Financial statements 
We now suggest the resulting set of 
financial statements shown in Figure 5. 
The balance sheet on an NRV basis is as 
previously stated, but with retained profit 
and reserve now distinguished. The profit 
and loss account on an RC basis is derived 
from the matrix (Figure 4). The recon-
ciliation statement shows all accounting 
adjustments. 
In the statement of reconciliation, account-
ing adjustments are divided into "profit" 
and "reserve" adjustments. The "profit 
adjustments" section highlights all the 
adjustments which have been necessary in 
order to convert trading cash flows into an 
RC measure of profit. To the net cash flow 
position from trading are added all other 
movements in working capital. This results 
in a measure of HC profit (before depreci-
ation), to which all profit adjustments 
which have been made may be shown. In 
the above statement, the adjustments are 
in respect of the replacement cost of stock 
sold and replacement cost depreciation. 
For the purposes of exposition, HC profit 
(before depreciation) has been shown as 
an intermediate step in the reconciliation 
process. There is, however, considerable 
scope for refinement both in terms of how 
adjustments are shown and the explana-
tory deSCriptions attached to them. 
The "reserve adjustments" section draws 
attention directly to asset price move-
ments for the period, in NRV terms, 
after once more highlighting the adjust-
ments referred to above, which have been 
made between reserve and profit. Again, 
the statement layout and the ex-
planatory descriptions used are tentative 
and open to comment. 
Some comments 
The illustration represents only a first 
attempt to demonstrate what a statement 
of reconciliation might involve. Two gen-
eral comments appear appropriate at this 
stage: 
(1) The context of the illustration-NRV 
balance sheet and RC profit -has been 
chosen to suit the contrasting views dis-
cussed in the earlier articles. Of all the non 
"mixed value" systems, RC gives the 
closest approximation to CCA profit (SSAP 
16), while at the root of many of the 
arguments for a more meaningful balance 
sheet appears to lie the intuitive appeal of 
NRV. 
(2) Our purpose, however, is not to 
appraise the merits or demerits of such a 
combined RC/NRV reporting system, but 
rather to illustrate the general operation of 
a reconciliation statement. Our argument 
does not concem which CCA adjustments 
should be made, nor how they should be 
made. Rather our argument is, given that 
certain adjustments are to be made, it is 
better that they be made explicit than they 
be hidden within the process of automatic 
financial statement articulation. 
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Figure 5 
(1) Profit and loss account (RC) 
Sales 
Cost of sales 
Depreciation 
Profit 
(3) Statement of reconciliation 
(a) Profit adjustments 
Trading movements 
Cash inflow from sales 
Cash outflow for purchases 
Net trading cash flows 
Increase in stock at NRV 
Reserve adjustment 
Increase in debtors 
HC profit (before depreciation) 
Taken to reserve 
Charge to fund replacement 
of machine 
(RC depreciation) 




Retained profits blf 

























Some more specific comments on the 
illustration may now be offered. 
(a) The system depicted highlights the 
interaction between what was referred to in 
the last article as "two prime sets of 
data"-transactions data and current 
market values. The manner in which profit 
is derived from the basic transactions data 
is shown in the "profit adjustments" sec-
tion in the statement of reconciliation. The 
impact of price movements on assets 
reveals itself in the "reserve adjustments" 
section. 
(b) Profit is determined without the disad-
vantage of an attendant balance sheet full 
of "meaningless" cost residuals. More 
generally, different valuation bases may be 
selected for each of the two main financial 
statements and this allows the indepen-
dent yet concurrent development of profit 
statement and balance sheet. 
(c) The system reflects the need to distin· 
guish those areas of reporting which are 
objective and verifiable (transactions and 
market prices) from those which are neces-
sarily subjective and open to manipulation 
(profit measurement). The statement of 
reconciliation contains all the main judg-
mental areas. It highlights all accounting 
adjustments made and reveals these expli-
citly to financial statement users. 
(d) The system illustrated should be 








(b) Reserve adjustments 
Charged against profit 
Retained to fund replacement 
of machine 
Retained to fund replacement 
of stocks 
Asset price movement 
Machine: fall in NRV in period 
Stock: increase in NRV in 
period 




















reasonably straightforward to audit. The 
transactions base is objective and verifi-
able and free of major accounting judg-
ments. The balance sheet is taken directly 
from market prices which again should be 
reasonably straightforward to verify. The 
auditor's attention is drawn to the state-
ment of reconciliation as the main source 
of subjective accounting judgments. In this 
respect it may be that the focus of the audit 
is sharpened-an evaluation of the adjust-
ments revealed in the reconciliation state-
ment becoming perhaps the central 
element in the assessment of truth and 
faimess. 
Conclusions 
The purpose of this final article has been to 
consider tentatively the mechanics of a 
statement of reconciliation and to open the 
basic idea to comment. At the outset it 
might perhaps have been expected that the 
switch from an automatic to an explicit 
process of reconciliation would have 
created considerable computational com· 
plications. This does not, however, appear 
to have been the case. There is a sense in 
which what is being suggested is merely a 
shift in emphasiS, and essentially what is 
involved is a reorganisation of information 
which already exists. At the same time, 
prima facie, nothing is being given up. 
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FlQure 2 
Stock Debtors Bank Loan Profit Machine DEBITS 
Stock 100 100 Debtors 96 96 Bank 150 150 Loan 
Profit --Machine 100 100 
CREDITS - - 200 150 96 - 446 
[Note: for the sake of convenience all revenue and expenses are collapsed into one cell (or 
account) in the matrix-a "profit" cell] 
Suppose that for the purposes of this 
illustration it is deemed desirable that: 
reported profit be based on replacement 
cost-on the grounds that users require a 
measure of profit which allows for the 
replacement cost of assets consumed. In: 
the simplified example, in order to derive a: 
conventional replacement cost measure of: 
profit, the profit and loss account must be : 
charged with the replacement cost of: 
goods sold and with replacement cost: 
depreciation. 
possible to map current prices directly 
onto a physical position to report monetary 
values. This application of physical records 
and state II price signals can be achieved 
without necessarily having to revert to the 
use of double entry. While any valuation 
basis could in theory be chosen, for the 
purpose of this example let us suppose 
that an NAV balance sheet is desired. It is a 
relatively Simple matter then to derive the 













Reserve Oncluding profit) 24 (balancing 
224 figure) 
State I prices require to be mapped onto 
this state II financial position, and this 
requires consideration of non-transaction 
based entries. The NAV balance sheet now 
acts as a constraint and the scope for profit 
and reserve adjustments is in conse-
quence restricted. Any adjustments which 
are made necessarily constitute the basis 
of the reconciliation statement. 
(e) The gaps between state I and state II 
Signals can be illustrated in matrix form as 
shown in Figure 3. 
The transactions balances shown in Figure 
3 are the results from the state I price 
Signals derived earlier. The financial posi-
tion balances are the NAV balances from 
the balance sheet above. Profit and/or 
reserve adjustments must therefore oper-
ate within these constraints. 
Figure 3 
Transactions 













By taking what was referred to in an earlier 
article as "a balance sheet orientated 
approach", the reserve figure of £24 in the 
balance sheet (and matrix) above could if 
desired, be reported as "income" for the 
period. However, this would ignore state I 
altogether, and the attempt here is to 



















The full set of profit and reserve adjust-, 
ments required to accommodate re-: 
placement costs would be as shown in the: 
matrix in Figure 4. I 
The matrix in Figure 4 now contains both 1 
Signal states I and II along with the! 
necessary reconciling adjustments and the ~ 
"profit" and "reserves" rowS/columns can 




Loan Machine Profit Reserve debits (net) 
150 96 296 
58} 





150 20 96 44 
150 24 224 
1 Replacement cost of sales: 6 items @ £14 = £84. 
2 Stock-increase in RC: 6 items @ [£14 - £10]. 
3 Replacement cost depreciation: £120 x 10% = £12. 
4 Machine-NRV revaluation at 31.1.85(£100 - £80). 
5 Stock-NRV revaluation at 31.1.85: 4 items @ [£12 - £10]. 
Total 
Loan Machine Profit Reserve debits 








adjustments between state I and state II 
should go. The balance sheet figures are 
determined by measurements and valu-
ations which exist in a system of signals, 
state II, outside the separate system of 
signals mapped from state I. 
Adjustments 4 and 5 are in respect of 
changes in the NAV of the firm's assets 
and are shown as affecting the reserve 
position only. However, adjustments 1, 2 
and 3 are made in respect of AC (also state 
" signals) and affect both the profit and 
reserve positions. 
POsition 50 150 24 224 
In this particular example NRV has acted 
as the balance sheet constraint, while AC 
has acted as the discriminator as to 
whether an adjustment affects profit or 
reserve. In addition to acting as a discrimi· 
nator, AC could of course have been balances (net) 
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"The audit of honesty and regularity is long 
established in relation to public expendi-
ture ... what is now required is not simply 
an extension of and evolution from the 
traditional audit of financial transactions, 
but rather something different in concept. 
It would be a serious mistake to under-
estimate the differences in approach, prac-
tice and reporting which are required. The 
auditor must therefore recognise that the 
additional responsibility requires a new 
approach and that it is more than an 
extension or by-product of what he has 
formerly undertaken." 
He went on to say:-
". . . point is clear, as the range of 
responsibility for this type of auditing 
grows, the auditor cannot and must not 
undertake evaluations beyond his com-
petence. He is peculiarly suited to be the 
coordinator or team leader since his 
professional skills are financially ori-
entated, but he must recognise the need 
for other experts in coming to the opinions 
for which he has the final responsibility, 
and he must use them and rely on them." 
Here lies the second major challenge to 
the profession. Can we develop our train-
ing to tackle this new audit and co-
ordinating role and tackle it well? 
Tackling the challenges 
At present the resources available in the 
private and public sector for appraisals and 
efficiency audits are very limited. Our 
Institute training does not provide the 
breadth of vision necessary to fill these 
roles, nor does that of any other profes-
sional body. This capability, if we could 
develop it, would provide commercial ori-
entation and would assist in promoting 
"CAli as a business qualification rather 
than as a strictly technical one. 
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Unsophisticated financial statement users 
may, if they wish, confine themselves to 
reading the basic statements of profit and 
of financial poSition. Both the statements 
in the illustration given could be argued to 
have some clear and intuitive meaning. For 
the more sophisticated users, on the other 
hand, the statement of reconciliation tells 
an important accounting story. Adjust-
ments to the transactions base in respect 
of working capital movements are first 
shown, followed by any further profit 
adjustments deemed necessary and, fin-
ally, any revaluation in respect of assets. 
This process may be elaborated through 
the use of conventional "notes to the 
financial statements" and, if desired, 
through additional comments. In this way 
the switch to an explicit process of recon-
ciliation encourages improved disclosur~, 
and may have an important role to play m 
improving the confidence of users in 
financial statements. 0 
The authors, who are lecturers in the Department 
of Accounting and Business Method at the 
University of Edinburgh, gratefully acknowledge 
the particular contribution of Professor T A Lee 
in developing some of the ideas fundamental to 
this paper and thank John Innes and Falconer 
Mitchell for their helpful comments. 
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A fundamental switch in our training is 
therefore necessary if we are to secure 
these objectives. As a first step we should 
aim to develop the following:-
A comprehensive company appraisal ser-
vice 
This would be provided by the profession 
and would cover a review of, inter alicr.-
• corporate strategy and business devel-
opment 
• management information systems and 
reporting packages 
• information technology and office 
automation 
• organisational structures and person-
nel policies 
• industrial and consumer marketing 
• manufacturing/wholesaling/service 
activities 
A company appraisal report procedure 
could be developed along the lines of the 
statement of accounting poliCies in the 
annual accounts. This would help to satisfy 
the need for greater disclosure on the one 
hand and improved company performance 
on the other. 
Profit improvement circle techniques for 
companies 
A profit improvement circle can be defined 
as:-
"An in-house project team which under-
takes a profit improvement programme 
within the company, identifies problems, 
makes recommendations for their solu-
tion, presents an Action Plan to the Board 
and seeks to secure specific profit 
improvement objectives." 
The programme could cover all the aspects 
of the business included in the com-
prehensive company appraisal service 
listed above. 
With suitable training the CA could play an 
important role either in the steering com-
mittee or as project co-ordinator in the 
profit improvement project structure. 
Value for money audits for central and 
local govemment 
There is now an urgent need to provide 
resources to undertake this worK:. Con-
siderable effort is required to develop audit 
guides and to establish the appropriate 
methodology and performance indicators. 
The main components of value for money 
auditing are economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness; therefore the audit, which is 
both quantitative and qualitative, must 
cover each of these inter-related aspects 
and measure performance. 
Management consultants and other suita-
bly qualified specialists could be brought 
in to augment the accounting resources 
involved in those three main develop-
ments. 
Training 
The Lothian Report contains two sets of 
recommendations on training. The first 
deals with the fine tuning, the second with 
structural changes. 
I remain to be convinced that the fin. 
tuning changes proposed will be adequat' 
for the specific challenges which lie aheac 
Because of the complexity of the Inst 
tute's training requirements, however, it i: 
not possible in the space available here t< 
develop a comprehensive range of pro 
posaJs. From my review of the Report an< 
assessment of the specific needs dis 
cussed, I venture to suggest the followin{ 
changes:-
• eliminate the "who teaches what?' 
problem (Lothian Report, page 49) b} 
plaCing the initiative with the Institute tc 
decide on its own requirements. Thi~ 
should assist in achieving a clarity 01 
direction on education and training; 
• eliminate the areas of overlap which 
exist at present in university and Institute 
curricula and try to achieve a consistent 
approach to training (Report, page 49); 
• revise the syllabus to provide for the 
commercial orientation of students by 
incorporating the management elements 
listed under "A comprehensive company 
appraisal service". [This would probably 
mean introducing business management, 
efficiency audit and information tech-
nology papers and restructuring Auditing I 
and II Management Accounting (Part A) 
and Business Finance (Part B)]; 
• consider increasing the number of 
subjects by two or three in Parts I and II and 
introduce some element of student choice 
and streaming; 
• structurally it should be possible to-
-prepare a register of organisations in the 
private and public sector which would 
allow in-house training of student CAs to 
take place for a period of, say, six months, 
as recommended in the Lothian Report, 
-compile a list of senior managers and 
above (not necessarily qualified account-
ants) as tutors in business who could 
supervise a student's term within these 
organisations, 
-introduce an honours course of one or 
two years' duration. 
Conclusion 
There are many first-class ideas in the 
Lothian Report. One of the most imagin-
ative is that of founding a multi~iscipline 
Business School as a centre of excellence. 
This would be bound to have a beneficial 
effect on the business scene. But please 
keep training as practical as possible. 
Undiluted theory can be such a tum-off in 
business. 
The CBI document "Change to Succeed" 
is trying to provide a total strategy for the 
future instead of lobbying for bits and 
pieces. This is indeed an opportune time 
for us to stay in the forefront of profes-
sional developments in a bold and yet 
realistic way. Let the debate continue-but 
don't forget the action. . . . '~ 
The report "The CA in the 1900s: an educational 
profile ", by Niall Lothian, is available to memo 
bers, on request, from Ian Manian, Director of 
EducatiOn. at the Institute (tel: 031·225 5673). An 
article which summarises the report's findings 
and conclusions was published In the March 
issue of The Accountant's Magazine. 
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